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Abstract 
 
 
My thesis uses an ‗ethnographic‘ approach to explore the complexities of radicalisation 
within Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), a clandestine radical Islamist organisation. At the heart of this 
thesis is the issue of radicalisation: that is, how some young British Muslims become 
radicalised and why they join HT. After spending several years interacting with HT radicals, 
I was able to interpret their social world, enabling me to map out some of the personal 
trajectories into the group. There appears to be a reciprocal relationship between the radical 
and the social field that provides a pretext for radicalisation. My reference points were 
several powerful and insightful biographical accounts of members of HT. I chose these case 
histories, while interacting with HT members in their natural settings, because they 
exemplify some important theoretical points and provided a rich source of narrative 
concerning the pathway into Islamic radicalism. The results of my research indicated that 
common traits existed in certain individuals, especially prior to joining HT. I identified a 
host of recurring characteristics amongst most of the respondents. Activists were greatly 
influenced by, and matured in reaction to, adverse social interactions experienced during 
their early life cycle development. Members had not formed stable connections with their 
social environments, which would suggest that respondents‘ current identities are the 
outcome of a failure to integrate within the social context. In this respect, the members 
needed the group to gain a sense of belonging. Also, HT has managed to attract a 
disproportionate number of middle-class recruits. This unbalanced stratification has resulted 
in the emergence of a homogeneous sub-group, which is uniformly represented by young, 
middle-class, South Asians. Therefore, the process of radicalisation within HT has distinct 
psychological and sociological characteristics that make it definable: a UK member profile 
can be formulated, defining the key features before and after radicalisation.  
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Chapter One: 
Contextualising Radicalisation: A Study of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Britain 
 
Hizb ut-Tahrir
1
 (henceforth, HT), a radical fringe group, has managed to inspire countless 
young people in Britain to turn away from the bedrock principles of this country, infusing 
them with religious fanaticism.
2
 For over three decades HT has operated relatively 
unchallenged within British society, yet fairly little has been published about how this 
movement evolved and why its appeal among some young Muslims continues to grow. The 
rise of global terrorism, particular in the wake of 9/11, promoted fierce scrutiny of the 
Muslim community here in the UK. However, heightened security measures and stricter 
legislation did not prevent four home-grown terrorists from killing and injuring hundreds in 
Britain‘s largest terror attack. Unsurprisingly, radicalisation has taken centre stage. Tony 
Blair, in the aftermath of the 7/7 bombings, identified young British Muslims as being 
particularly at risk from radicalisation, a sentiment echoed across media and academic 
channels alike (The Guardian, 10/11/2005). Young British Muslims have been singled out 
as a problem group, because extremist elements are increasingly gaining a foothold among 
their disgruntled ranks, making it even more important to understand their needs. Given this 
concern, I chose to study HT, because it is vital to discover why some young people are 
attracted to the organisation.  
 
1.1 Background to Research 
 
I would like to start by stating my motivation to study this topic, as this will allow me to 
present some raw observations, which I made several years ago. On 13 August 1995, at the 
age of sixteen, I attended a rally in Trafalgar Square. I did not know at the time of the storm 
that such an event would trigger, nor could I have predicted the social upheaval that would 
result from it. The ‗Rally for Islam‘, as it was entitled by the organisers, was a pioneering 
event.
3
 Surprisingly I witnessed the existence of different, and to some extent conflicting, 
                                                 
1
 According to Hizb ut-Tahrir‘s official manifesto, the group is defined as an ‗Islamic party that was formed in 
1953 [by Taqiuddin an-Nabhani in the West Bank] with the objective of working to re-establish the Islamic 
way of life and to carry Islam to mankind. This work embodies striving to establish the Khilafah (Islamic State) 
system in an Islamic country‘ (Anon 2000, p.76). Refer to chapter three for insight into HT‘s origins, ideology 
and methodology (see chapter 3, p. 72). 
2
 Religious fanaticism, as Steffen (2007, p. 81) describes, ‗invokes the idea of ultimacy‘. This allows 
religiously inspired activists to attach an overvalued meaning to actions within the frame of religious practice 
and belief.    
3
 The „Rally for Islam‟ was organised by Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT).  
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identities of young Muslims. In particular, these were well educated British-born Muslims, 
from similar ethnic and socio-religious backgrounds. Yet they consciously appeared to reject 
all aspects of Western civilisation as morally corrupt and inherently wrong. What stood out 
with significant clarity was the apparent re-structuring of identities into a single religious 
perspective, which appeared to be inspired by a collective group identity. This perceived 
homogeneous identity appeared to melt the individual identities into a collective one, 
embracing the different types of identity among the spectators. I was shocked by the great 
devotion shown by these young Muslims to religion, especially as I was raised in a secular 
household, making this difficult to understand. In my encounters with other young Muslims, 
I perceived them to be thoroughly integrated into British society. It was this contrast that 
provoked in me a great deal of interest in understanding the processes involved in the 
making of a radical identity.   
 
1.2  Contextualising Knowledge: My Journey In and Out of HT 
 
When I began my research, it became apparent that I was setting out to generate knowledge 
and insight of a social reality that I had already experienced in my youth. For this reason, I 
had a set of subjective assumptions about the radicalisation process, as I had already 
experienced HT radicalisation. So, in essence my investigation of HT was not starting from 
scratch, but rather from pre-existing knowledge. It became clear that I could not avoid using 
my own personal experiences of HT within the research, and thus I needed to identify a way 
of utilizing this experience rather than pretending it did not happen. I decided to validate my 
analytical approach through the use of feminist methodology, as this would enable me to 
constantly compare my research with my own experience as a member of HT and share it 
with the respondents. In particular, ‗conscious partiality‘, as articulated by Mies (1983), 
stood out as a key way to maintain a real and flexible counterbalance between object and 
subject, which I did not want to separate in an artificial manner. In this respect, I was able to 
identify with HT activists, as a hallmark of feminist methodology is the ‗continual testing of 
the plausibility‘ of the research against one‘s own experiences (Parlee 1979, p. 130). In other 
words, as someone who has experienced HT radicalisation, I am also my own source of 
knowledge. As du Bois (1983, p. 111) explained, the centrality of experience means the 
knower is part of the matrix of what is known. The process of ‗partial identification‘ with 
HT activists made it necessary to move away from ‗value-free objectivity‘ as a 
methodological starting point (Mies 1983, p. 123). This is because I cannot simply assume 
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ignorance of those being studied, and regard them simply as objects, especially since this 
would deny my own experiences of HT membership.   
 
Before I delve into my research, I want to contextualise my motivation for conducting this 
study by drawing upon some of my own experiences as a former member of HT. My early 
youth was greatly shaped by my feelings of social dislocation. In particular, I struggled to 
construct a coherent identity during my adolescence. I tried to develop a position that would 
relate my teenage life to what I had experienced before, in an effort to gain meaning. I was 
raised in a very secular household, in fact, religiosity was not emphasised in any way. As I 
matured, I could not develop a unified understanding about all the diverse aspects of my life. 
Religion and ethnicity were disconnected from my social identity, preventing me from 
establishing a unified identity. Also, I found it difficult to make sense of my ethnicity, 
especially since I lived in a predominantly white area. Despite rejecting my ethnicity, I still 
felt socially dislocated from the white working class friends I had made at secondary school. 
There were two reasons for this sense of exclusion. Firstly, I was raised in a middle class 
household, which brought me into conflict with my white working class counterparts, 
especially as I struggled to relate to their social world. Secondly, despite gaining some 
degree of acceptance amongst my white friends, I could not fully overcome their negative 
perception of belonging to a different ethnic group. This consequently reinforced within me 
the sense that my identity was artificial. 
 
At college I was confronted, for the first time, with a multicultural environment, which to 
some degree forced me to re-evaluate my negative stereotypes about race and ethnicity.
4
 
This new social situation allowed me to re-invent myself; however, it was extremely 
intimidating and overwhelming. I felt isolated and slightly insecure, so I went in search of 
the ‗familiar‘.5  Thus, I came into contact with HT recruiters when I started to attend Friday 
Prayers, and they introduced me to Islamic radicalism. I had never considered myself 
connected to a global community and thus I was never emotionally moved by the plight of 
Muslims. However, this changed when I was exposed to the rhetoric of HT. I slowly began 
to think in terms of ‗us and them‘. At this point my identity was struggling to adjust, because 
the new ideas being offered to me were impossible to work into a smooth and consistent 
whole. HT rhetoric projected a homogenous identity – one is Muslim and not British or 
                                                 
4
 I attended Hammersmith and West London College from 1996 to 1998.  
5
 According to Wolf (2008), homogenous peer group structures provide individuals with safe social 
settings, drawing people who often share similar social characteristics such as age, gender, ethnicity and 
religion.  
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Pakistani. However, I considered my identity evenly distributed, even when I became a 
member, it was a mix of positions, but this caused immense internal conflict.
6
          
 
After several years of wrestling with my own contradictions, I decided to join the group. 
This was not a free choice; significant coercion was used in order to manipulate me into 
joining the organisation. Although, there was no physical pressure, the coercion was clear if 
you did not join HT then you were sinful and God would condemn you to the pits of hell for 
an eternity.
7
 By virtue of ignorance, I was placed in a state of guilt for not working for the 
party aim, and thus I felt compelled to join. After a lengthy delay, I was placed into a 
Halaqah (private study circle) with six other individuals and a Mushrif (Teacher) was 
appointed to indoctrinate us into the party culture. This is considered a key stage and an 
instrumental part of group radicalisation. During this period, intellectual pressure is applied, 
forcing the novice to bend towards group expectation. In particular, the Mushrif was very 
keen to establish a joint construction of reality, amongst us, in order to create a new 
cognitive perspective. The Halaqah provided a conceptual framework, with which 
connections had to be made to our own social realities. To remove extreme individual 
differences and independent thought the Mushrif forces novices to agree with and carry the 
ideas presented in Halaqah. The novice is seen as intellectually inferior, especially if he or 
she displays independent thinking. In my Halaqah, I remember that most of the novices 
conformed to the Mushrif‘s judgements in order not to appear different. Although, this 
alignment of ideas is consciously arrived at, it does denote the acceptance of influence.  
 
The party rhetoric, as cited in countless publications, has stated that the Mabda (ideology) 
itself to the exclusion of anything else is the basis of organising and mobilising the 
fraternity. In reality, this is not true, as I experienced. HT enforced ideology onto its 
members, demanding they obey the commands of the party hierarchy. When I became a 
member, I wrote a letter to the then Amir, Abdul-Qadeem Zullum, asking him about the 
limits of the party‘s authority. According to Zullum, ‗it is wajib [obligatory] on the member 
to obey his Masool in all circumstances except if the Masool requests a haraam [forbidden] 
action is clear that it is haraam e.g. leaving a Fard or doing a haraam such as Zina [adultery], 
drinking alcohol etc.‘ (Answer and Question, 2002). This clearly indicates the party 
                                                 
6
 My internal conflicts seemed partly connected to a ‗dual ideological framework‟. In theory, I created a hybrid 
of ideological ideals, which became assimilated into my identity structure while living in a secular environment 
(Refer to Appendix VI: Dual Ideological Framework, p. 287) 
7
 Refer to chapter four (p. 129) for eschatological aspect of HT recruitment. 
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authority has wide reaching influence and control, which is applied at the discretion of the 
hierarchy.  
 
When the novice begins to convey the thoughts of HT effectively, as if they were his own, 
then he is considered for membership. However, the novice must show desire for 
membership by imposing himself on the organisation, which serves as the first indicator for 
their readiness. During this period, I remember that novices competed with each other to 
gain the recognition of members. At the time, this staged rivalry provoked some controversy 
among the novices, as they questioned the morality of such a policy. Senior members felt it 
was totally acceptable for novices ‗to compete in this fashion for good deeds‘ (Faheem, 
Member). However, the atmosphere became rather polluted by individuals trying to outdo 
others, but for the hierarchy it showed psychological dependency for HT and a desire for 
membership. 
 
I recall being summoned, without any explanation, on an early Sunday morning by a senior 
member. I arrived at the location to find several members already present, among them was 
the Naqib (area leader) and Masool (local leader). To my surprise, they offered me 
membership into HT, which I reluctantly accepted. Jalauddin Patel, who was the Naqib of 
West London at the time, explained that in order to become a member, I must take al-Qasm 
(the Oath). In fact, the swearing of the oath is a requirement for all prospective members, as 
to be assured of his sincerity and loyalty. After a few weeks, I soon realised the full 
ramifications of the oath, which in reality meant I belonged to HT. However, I do not believe 
my personal identity gave way completely to the group identity. When I was exposed to 
group pressure, for example, I realised that in public situations I conformed to HT. However, 
privately I disagreed with the group.
8
 As a member, I found it impossible to operate without 
independent thought and free will. As I became submerged in party activism, my concerns 
heightened. Consequently, I broke party protocol and started to voice my concerns openly. 
Initially, I tried to create a conflict among the majority by challenging their norms, but I 
found it difficult to provide an alternative norm for them to consider because they only 
referred to HT ideology.     
 
                                                 
8
 I began to question the nature of HT ideology, especially after the first year of my politics and philosophy 
degree which exposed me to alternative modes of thinking and ideology. In essence, I lost my initial fascination 
with HT ideology.  
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I started to question the coercive nature of HT, as Masools seemed to operate with impunity. 
Moreover, because I challenged the party leadership concerning its immoral practices, I was 
subjected to an investigation. The findings of the investigation required I fully comply with 
the UK branch. In order to assess my loyalty, the leadership informed me ‗the Masool has 
the power to prevent any member from contacting his friends if the Masool thinks this will 
cause harm to the party‘. This allowed HT to control my interactions, especially with other 
members and it prevented me from contacting other Islamic scholars. The leadership issued a 
final warning: 
 
…he must completely abstain from any violations or anything 
that affects the party or its thoughts and that he must adhere 
completely to the party, its thoughts and have complete trust in 
the party, its thoughts and its Masools. And if he does not 
adhere to all of this then he should be informed of his ‗ihmaal 
taam‘ [complete removal].   
 
I refused to comply with this request and subsequently was dismissed from HT.
9
 Although, 
this is a short glimpse into my narrative with HT, it does show that I experienced huge social 
change. In particular, I struggled to blend and mix different identity-types together into a 
complete whole, which initially pulled me towards HT radicalism. Within HT my identity 
was totally refashioned. Even though, the sense of belonging I attained in HT overshadowed 
other social attachments, it was not anchored by ideology. In fact, I had little connection to 
HT ideology; instead I was attracted by the homogenous nature of the organisations 
fraternity. The members emerged from social realities and backgrounds that were very 
similar to mine, but after I left HT, I wanted to know whether these young people were 
drawn to the group by similar motivations. On the surface, HT activists appear driven by one 
single overriding variable, namely ideology, but I wanted to go much deeper.
10
 Therefore, I 
sought to contextualise HT membership. This meant giving voice to HT narratives in a way 
that would allow me to understand the changing experiences and worldviews of HT activists, 
what they saw as important, and how they dissected their past and present experiences.         
 
1.3  Framing the Research Problem 
 
                                                 
9
 My departure from HT did not greatly hinder my subsequent fieldwork, as I was still regarded as an insider by 
most rank and file members. However, I did experience problems with the party leadership, who remained 
sceptical of my motives and were not prepared to participate in the study.   
10
 Refer to footnote 14, p. 17. 
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My research began by conducting a review of the literature, focusing on older and more 
recent works on the topic of Islamic radicalism. I initially tried to locate these sources with 
standard techniques, but I found that this produced far too many results. It was therefore 
necessary to narrow the search parameters. I needed to identify the contributions which were 
considered to be the main works on the study of Islamic radicalism.
11
 However, I 
encountered a major problem in narrowing my search; it became apparent that social 
theorists did not agree on a precise conceptual definition of ‗Islamic activism‘ (Esposito, 
1992; Said, 1997). After extensive analysis, I was able to list the concepts that were most 
frequently cited by social scientists. The most frequently used terms appeared to be 
‗Islamism‘ (Roy, 1994; Kepel, 2002; Denoeux 2002), ‗Islamic fundamentalism‘ (Voll, 1982; 
Martin and Appleby, 1993; Burgat, 1988), ‗radical Islam‘ (Sivan, 1985; Carré and Dumont, 
1985) and ‗terrorism‘ (Crenshaw, 1981; Hoffman, 1998; Post, 1991; Crayton, 1983; Jenkins, 
1979). This allowed me to identify the core works on the subject, providing a map of the 
relevant studies in the literature. However, it became apparent that there was considerable 
overlap between each conceptual definition, which presented a number of problems.  
 
Firstly, Islamic radicalism had not been adequately defined, causing immense confusion in 
its application and usage. According to Patel (2007, p. 42), Islamic radicalism relates to 
‗people seeking a fundamental change in the present political order‘ in response to the 
Western influence in Muslim countries. This definition of Islamic radicalism is not 
sufficiently differentiated from other concepts. Defining the history of the term in order to 
place it within a given context could have done this. In chapter two, I will clarify what 
Islamic radicalism means, offering a historical explanation for its emergence and usage as a 
distinct term. Secondly, Islamic radicalism was merged in the literature with other 
phenomena, most notably with terrorism. Crenshaw (1981, pp. 7-8) believes that terrorism is 
not committed by individuals, but by radical Islamic groups ‗who reach collective decisions 
based on commonly held beliefs‘. She fails to define Islamic radicalism as a distinct process, 
reducing it instead to an over-generalised form of terrorism. This constitutes a very 
incomplete and inadequate way of representing Islamic radicalism. Thirdly, the antecedents 
of Islamic radicalism had not been explored in its own right, therefore it was not possible to 
explain the processes involved in the making of a radical, especially in a group context. 
Crayton (1983, p. 37), for example, asserts that Islamic radicalism occurs in the context of 
‗narcissistic injury‘. It is very difficult to accept this position, because here Islamic 
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 Refer to chapter 2 (pp. 46-54) for definition of Islamic radicalism, Islamism, Islamic terrorism and Islamic 
fundamentalism. 
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radicalism is seen as an internal expression of uncontrollable mental processes. The 
verification and reliability of data is crucial when constructing a hypothesis, yet Crayton 
(1983) does not substantiate his theory with detailed biographical data. This is because 
biographical data on Islamic groups is not easily obtainable, forcing theorists to make 
generalisations which cannot be tested by empirical methods. My task was now to expand 
my literature search to consider Islamic radicalisation, but finding an approach that could 
explain this phenomenon was not easy.  
 
The literature was brimming with virtually endless accounts of the causes of radicalisation.
12
 
The vast majority of theories tended to fall into one of three categories: those concerned with 
the reason for radicalisation (Esposito, 1992; Fukuyama, 2002; Huntington, 1995; Roy, 
2002); those concerned with how radicalisation worked (Crayton, 1983; Crenshaw, 1981; 
Jenkins, 1979; Post, 1990); and those concerned with the effects of radicalisation on identity 
(Abbas, 2007; Halliday, 1992; Jacobson, 1998; Lewis, 2008; Raza, 1991). My preliminary 
survey of the literature indicated a number of shortcomings. Firstly, these contributions 
failed to develop a coherent relationship between theory and empirical research. For 
instance, Roy (2004, p. 1) argues that the radicalisation of young Muslims is a ‗pathological 
outcome of the Westernisation of Islam‘. Roy, like many other researchers, could not explain 
why some individuals became radicalised while others did not. Secondly, the majority of 
scholars did not substantiate their respective theories with case studies showing how 
individuals become radicalised. Post (1991), for example, believes Islamic radicals exhibit a 
mental disorder, yet he could not support this assertion with any biographical data. Thirdly, 
an effective methodology had not been established in relation to the radicalisation of British 
Muslims. For instance, Jacobson (1998) adopts a structural explanation of British Muslim 
identity, but she fails to understand the relationship between increased religiosity and the 
impact of Islamic radicalism on Muslim identities. Fourthly, no clear definition of 
radicalisation could be found in the literature, making it difficult to frame in a broader 
context. In chapter two, I attempt to define Islamic radicalisation in order to distinguish it 
from similar phenomena such as religious conversion. This was necessary since the literature 
has limited explanatory accounts of the meaning of radicalisation, especially as a distinct 
process of Muslim engagement.    
 
1.4 Defining HT Radicalisation 
                                                 
12
 See chapter two (pp. 46-54) for an overview of key concepts and theories related to Islamic radicalism.   
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Within the social sciences a robust debate has been underway since 11 September 2001 
concerning the causes and consequences of radicalisation. In a British context, however, the 
debate has been focusing on Muslim identity and the role of radical Islamist groups. Janet 
Williams, the commanding officer of the Muslim Contact Unit (Metropolitan Police Special 
Branch), declared that ‗radicalisation‘ was the single biggest threat to national security 
(BBC, 22/06/2005). Tony Blair, shortly after the London Bombings (2005), proscribed a 
number of radical Islamist movements.
13
 This was designed to tackle the processes of 
radicalisation that appeared to be taking place among young British Muslims. Within this 
context, I seek to explore the processes of radicalisation, focusing on the issues that have 
allowed HT to radicalise some young Muslims in Britain.  
 
A few years ago, I attended a panel discussion on the broad issue of Islam and the West, at a 
community centre in Tooting, South London. Taji Mustafa, the media representative of HT 
in Britain, asked the audience, ‗When exactly did ‗radicalisation‘ become a dirty word?‘ He 
argued that, ‗what the government maligns as radicalisation is in fact politicisation…Young 
Muslims are taking an interest in global politics and getting engaged in non-violent 
discussion and campaigning, which is surely a good thing?‘ This attempt to revise the 
parameters of ‗radicalisation‘ is a strong indicator of radical groups, like HT, trying to be 
seen as legitimate political activists. After the gathering, Adam (member, 29) suggested it 
was a ‗government trap to redefine Islamic politics‘. As a former member, I was not 
surprised to hear points of view like this, as activists are trained to defend the party. In 
particular, I recall attending a member‘s meeting after the 9/11 terror attacks, in which the 
UK leadership instructed the fraternity to ‗manufacture positive and negative stereotypes‘ in 
order to dilute the threat HT pose. Ultimately, the aim of such actions was to avoid any form 
of legal sanction against the party in the UK.  In the end, however, these comments illustrate 
the need to define ‗radicalisation‘.  
 
In the course of this study, I have explored many different ways of framing the subject of 
radicalisation
14
, and I believe social psychology is a good starting point. This is because 
                                                 
13
 Al-Ghurabaa and the Saved Sect became the first UK-based Islamist groups to be banned under laws 
outlawing the glorification of terrorism (BBC, 17/07/2006).  
14
The study of groups has always been rooted in two distinct fields of study: social psychology and political 
sociology. Although, I have sought to contextualise HT radicalisation within a social psychology and cognitive 
framework, it is worth noting that political sociology can offer perspective on the mobilisation of HT. Speaking 
from a narrow perspective, some political sociologists reduce the rise of movements, like HT, to their ideology 
(Bendix and Lipset 1966, p. 10). At a basic level, HT is a political party that is stimulated by a distinct 
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social psychology, as can be inferred from its description, combines the ways in which both 
social and mental processes determine identity (Rom and Lamb, 1986). Radicalisation, in a 
social psychology context, refers to a considerable departure from traditional ideals, 
constituting a full and real change at the root of the personality (Popplestone and 
McPherson, 1988). This definition offers a good starting point, but I need to amend this 
definition because it is incomplete and far too general in its scope and application. For 
instance, the same definition of radicalisation could be given to those who undergo a 
religious conversion. According to Rambo (cited in Eliade 1987, p. 77), there are two 
transformations that are central to the conversion process: ‗total change in all other aspects 
of life, and a new awareness of the well-being of others‘. In general, the act of religious 
conversion might have a similar end result to radicalisation, but these two forms of identity 
change are not identical.  
 
Despite accumulating a vast array of new data regarding HT members and their 
backgrounds, it is still extremely difficult to pinpoint precisely why some young Muslims 
join HT, since radicalisation is a ‗complex process that does not follow a linear path‘ 
(Pargeter 2006, p. 737). Therefore, if HT radicalisation takes place amongst a 
disproportionate number of young middle class Asians, then I must understand the 
trajectories of these individuals and sketch out commonalties. The evidence for this will be 
shown in the course of following chapters. My immediate concern here is to provide a 
definition of HT radicalisation before any serious study of the topic can be made. Firstly, I 
prefer to use the idiom HT radicalisation, instead of more generic terms like Islamic 
radicalisation. This is because from social constructivist theory
15, ‗framing‘ of radicalisation 
draws upon a collective phenomenon that is essentially contextualised to two key agents: the 
group and the individual (Snow et al., 1986). Thus, the definition of HT radicalisation I have 
                                                                                                                                                      
ideology, which establishes a scheme for how society should function (refer to chapter three, pp. 86-94). Its 
political ideology encapsulates two elements: (1) its political aim, which is the reestablishment of the Islamic 
State; and (2) its method, which relates to how it will establish its aim in society. Political ideology is an 
important factor in group mobilisation. Capoccia (2007, p. 33), in his seminal piece ‗Defending Democracy‘, 
illustrates the influential role ideology plays amongst political actors and institutions. The analysis offered by 
Capoccia (2007, p. 291) allows one to understand why political actors mobalise against institutions, often 
moderating their ideological disposition once in political office. Therefore, political sociology can offer 
theoretical explanation into how and why HT formed. Taji-Farouki (1996), for example, uses a political-
historical approach to explore the ideological formation of HT. In her study, she is greatly preoccupied with 
explaining the ideological undercurrents of the group and its structural nature. However, she does not 
contextualise HT‘s growth in Britain and does not explain why HT has mobalised a homogenous subgroup of 
young British Muslims. This intellectual puzzle cannot be explained by a study of HT ideology and aims, as 
direct reference needs to be made to its members – addressing why they were drawn to the movement.        
15
 Social constructivist theory is grounded within the sociological school of thought, it relates to the 
mechanisms individual‘s experience when participating in group settings (Greene and Kropf 2009, p. 123). 
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crafted can be separated into three distinct parts: (1) a new cognitive perspective is 
engineered that is (2) internalised, so that (3) a new collective HT identity is created 
(fostering a feeling of empowerment and solidarity).   
 
1.4.1 New Cognitive Perspective 
 
The most fundamental part of HT radicalisation is the deep process of indoctrination, which 
provides a new cognitive perspective with which to view the social world. At this point, I 
want to briefly look at cognitive theory, in order to clarify its meaning in the context of 
radicalisation. Social cognitive theory defines behaviour as a reciprocal interaction between 
an internal emotional state and triggers that are available in the environment (Bandura, 
1977). Social psychologists have long tried to identify the key cognitive and motivational 
changes that occur within individuals when they become group members. The radical group 
is the primary setting for the creation of a new cognitive perspective, because members are 
willing to ‗bend towards group expectation‘ (Newcomb 1952, p. 221). This explanation 
shows the strong interplay between individuals and groups, which enables the group to 
change the cognitive perspective of members. Wiktorowicz (2005, p. 19) in her study of Al-
Muhajiroun, now disbanded, discovered contact with the radical group often required a 
‗cognitive opening‘. This cognitive opening is a gateway to the wholesale transformation of 
previously held beliefs. According to Wiktorowicz (2005, p. 20), this is often inspired by 
‗identity crisis‘, which renders the recipient more susceptible to radical ideology. Thus, early 
fascination with the radical group often leads to a ‗cognitive opening‘, activating a process 
of ‗religious seeking‘ (Wiktorowicz 2005, p. 19). The triggers for this opening are 
multifaceted and greatly hinge on the experiences of the individual, making them vulnerable 
to the movement.
 16
            
 
This view of cognitive change in perception within a group setting has also been referred to 
as a new shared group norm, and involves members privately and publicly adopting this as 
their own choice (Appelbaum, Duneir and Giddens 2009). As a result, individuals are 
categorised, and placed in an in-group. This membership is then internalised by members as 
an aspect of their identity (Tajfel, 1981). In this respect, the basis for a member‘s self-
definition changes within the group, allowing his or her personal identity to be submerged 
                                                 
16
 The connection between ‗cognitive openings‘ and ‗identity crisis‘ is complex, since crisis can take multiple 
and diverse forms. In chapters 4, 5 and 6 I observe how social triggers like racism prompted HT members to re-
evaluate their cognitive outlook.   
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into a collective identity (Post, 1991). According to Triplett (1898), moving from a state of 
social exclusion to a group setting can drastically diminish one‘s sense of individuality. 
Similarly, Newcomb (1943) found that increased interaction with other members prompts 
individuals to change their attitudes in accordance with the group consensuses. In other 
words, for the cognitive transformation to take effect the individual must align his viewpoint 
with HT. As Wiktorowicz (2005, p. 16) explains:  
 
‗The movement‘s schemata must resonate with an individual‘s 
own interpretive framework to facilitate participation. The 
alignment is contingent on fidelity with cultural narratives, 
symbols, and identities; the reputation of the frame articulator 
and consistency of the frame; the frame‘s empirical credibility, 
and the personal salience of the frame for potential participant. 
Movements must compete with frames proffered by 
governments, counter-movements and intra-movement rivals‘.  
 
In a group setting, members come to understand their social world by way of shared 
perspectives and representations. According to Snow (1986), cognitive change provides a 
framework for understanding the external world, by rendering a situation meaningful. At this 
stage of the HT radicalisation process, an individual aligns their cognitive perspective with 
that of the group. This alignment acts as a unifying force, moulding the individual‘s ideas 
and actions into synchronization with HT collective identity (Noakes, 2000). This makes the 
cognitive process an active force in the construction of one‘s reality (Jones, 1989). At the 
heart of this cognitive process is the making sense of the ‗other‘.  A set of processes are 
undergone through which individuals are reconfigured and various forms of ‗us and them‘ 
are constructed (Bandura, 1990; Bar-Tal, 1998). Some social theorists believe that this 
occurs in individuals who have suffered some form of emotional damage, usually at the 
hands of the ‗other‘, during early life (Freud, 1930; Knutson, 1973). In theory, the individual 
then internalises these representations in their actions and responses. Forging a new 
cognitive essence requires a change in the way an individual thinks and acts, until he or she 
becomes a walking manifestation of the radical identity.  
 
A good preliminary illustration of this cognitive transformation is Mohammed, a British 
born Muslim from London.
17
 I knew Mohammed for many years and spoke to him regularly 
in a casual fashion. There appeared to be one primary social trigger that influenced his 
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 Mohammad (actual name changed for privacy) is a 26 year old HT novice. In chapter 4 more detailed case 
studies will be utilised.   
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newfound cognitive perspective and his resulting radicalisation into HT. Firstly he seemed to 
develop a greater malevolence towards British society. I recall running into Mohammad 
several days after a brutal assault had taken place in the local area, in which a gang of white 
youths had attacked two Asian youths. This rather unsettling episode played a key role in his 
cognitive transformation. In particular, he ranted about the evil nature of British society and 
people. In the midst of this discussion, I noticed that he used derogatory terms in describing 
non-Muslims, something he never did before. Several months after the incident, I bumped 
into Mohammad outside his local Mosque where he was distributing HT paraphernalia. I was 
rather surprised by this and asked why he had joined HT. He explained: ‗it is Fard (duty) to 
work for Allah‘s deen (religion) on this earth…and to expose the Kufar system‘. Though a 
very simplistic illustration, it does exemplify how Mohammad‘s cognitive perspective had 
been radically reformatted, internalised and embedded within a new radical HT identity.  
 
1.4.2 Internalisation 
 
Internalisation is a general term for the process of incorporating concepts and behaviours 
into one‘s self, and embedding features of the external world into the internal world 
(Meissner, 1981; Scharff, 1992; Wallis, 2001). This ‗internal world‘ is strongly influenced 
by group involvement, which actively imposes constraints on behaviour and defines the 
external world. These representations of the self-exist in relation to other objects, which may 
be external or internal (Fairbairn, 1952; Winnicott, 1969). In other words, perceptions of 
‗others‘ become rooted into one‘s own behaviour (Heider, 1958). In regards to the 
radicalisation process, when a novice
18
 enters the group setting in HT, his or her perceptions 
of others change in accordance with HT‘s perceptions, allowing him or her to internalise the 
collective HT identity. This internalisation of ideas and beliefs actively occurs through the 
culturing process, which completely alters the disposition and creates group loyalty. For 
instance, a college teacher in London told me, during the 7 July remembrance ceremony, 
some of his Muslim students made excessive physical gestures throughout the minute of 
silence. When he asked them what they were doing, they replied no remembrance was 
afforded those Muslims killed in Iraq. I later discovered young HT members had 
orchestrated what they described as a ‗non-verbal protest‘, which was sanctioned by the 
group hierarchy. By adopting a new cognitive perspective, one internalises a new set of 
beliefs and attitudes, replacing the old perspective. As Wiktorowicz (2005, p. 167) 
discovered from his respondents, ‗the only way to achieve salvation and enter Paradise on 
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 Within HT the terms ‗daris‘ and ‗shab‘ are used interchangeably to describe new recruits or novices.   
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Judgment Day is to follow the movement‘s prescribed strategy‘. This transformative phase is 
integral to HT radicalisation, as it infuses the individual to the group. 
 
1.4.3 New Collective HT Identity and Empowerment 
 
HT is a significant actor in the conditioning of a new cognitive and behavioural disposition, 
especially as it is the sole interpreter of the radical ideology. Within the group setting, the 
novice is indoctrinated into thinking in accordance with the group perspective. This is 
manifested in a new way of viewing the social world, which may contradict established 
convention (Hassan, 2001). Thus, the first significant aspect of HT radicalisation relates to 
the establishment of a new cognitive perspective that reflects the group identity. According 
to Sherif and Sherif (1969, p. 252), the group setting has a powerful influence on individual 
behaviour, justifying the ‗in-group‘s negative opinions of the out-group‘. Similarly, David 
and Turner (1999) argue that in a group setting people tend to ‗depersonalise‘ and 
‗stereotype‘ themselves and other people. Consequently, HT members focus more on the 
similarities between themselves, which makes it easier to impose differences between them 
and the ‗others‘. More importantly, the new cognitive perspective, gained in a group 
environment, spawns greater self-esteem and empowerment (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). 
Empowerment is an essential part of the radicalisation process, increasing the ideological 
strength of individuals; the empowered develop a greater sense of confidence in their own 
abilities.
19
 In chapter four, I look at the real-world impact of HT radicalisation on identity, as 
the individual is transformed to incorporate the radical identity. In the context of HT, for 
example, the member must ‗adopt the opinions of the group, its thoughts and its constitution 
by word and deed‘ (Anon 1998, p. 1). This means that anyone who becomes a member of 
HT has to pledge an oath to adopt everything the group calls for even if he or she is not 
convinced of some of it (Anon 1998, p. 2).  
 
Mohammad was not politically orientated, especially during his teenage years, believing 
instead Muslims should concentrate on spiritual affairs. However, his encounters with HT 
provided him with a new cognitive perspective that gave him a greater impetus to engage in 
political activism. However, this radical change should not be confused with politicisation, 
because the latter pertains to a social, economic or legal issue that has become political in 
nature, making people become active over that issue, but not making them seek to change 
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 The sense of empowerment gained from membership with HT essentially enables young Muslims, who have 
become greatly disaffected by British society, to find belonging amongst similar individuals. 
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the whole social order. In contrast, HT radicalisation is stimulated by a cognitive change at 
the root of one‘s identity, which creates a new social perspective. For instance, this 
newfound outlook inspired powerful emotions in Mohammad, most notably deep frustration 
in not finding a place within British society. On the other hand, an individual who becomes 
frustrated could just as well become involved with non-radical politics. To choose to become 
a HT radical requires sufficient motivation.
20
 However motivation is still not enough. The 
radical would also need the opportunity to join HT, and be accepted (Shaw, 1986).
21
 As 
Wiktorowicz (2005, p. 127) describes, before the group can reformat the viewpoint of the 
perspective recruit, a ‗cognitive opening‘ must be made in which the recruit is prepared to 
expose themselves to the ideology of the group. At this stage, HT seek to build a connection 
between the social problems experienced by the recruit and the solutions group membership 
will generate for them in their social life (e.g. empowerment). This allows the individual to 
derive their sense of identity, at least in part, from the collective group identity (Knutson, 
1973). The group is a powerful force that imposes conformity, which in turn assimilates the 
novice as a fully functioning member. Taken as a whole, the theory of HT radicalisation will 
encompass individual and collective life, identifying the shifting patterns of behaviour that 
take place at the root of a personality.  
 
1.4.4 Agency and Ideology: Differing Modes of Agency in HT 
 
A large part of my fieldwork on HT radicalisation entailed accumulating personal narratives. 
Abdul, Tariq, and many other HT activists shared their past and present experiences and 
narratives with me. Many recurring themes emerged from these personal narratives, but one 
particularly vivid and consistent issue emphasised by most, if not all the respondents, 
concerned ‗agency‘. Although, I talk about agency in chapter five, it is worth prompting an 
introductory discussion about agency here that explains its theoretical framing within the 
spectre of HT radicalisation. At the heart of the debate about HT radicalisation is whether or 
not HT activists are free agents in the radicalisation process. According to Sen (1985, p. 
204), agency relates to ‗what a person is free to do and achieve in pursuit of whatever goals 
or values he or she regards as important‘. In this sense, agency is general, applying to 
individuals in different social settings. I do not wish to get bogged down further by trying to 
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 According to a Policy Memorandum on Radicalism and Radicalisation, issued by the Dutch Ministry of 
Justice, two elements are integral to the radicalisation process: (1) individual experiences (e.g. identity related 
dilemmas), and (2) contact with radical agents (usually the group). These two interconnected elements often 
stimulate the radicalisation process. 
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 In chapter 4 (p. 112) the role of peer group associations will be explored in the trajectory of HT recruits.  
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conceptualise agency in more depth, as there is little agreement amongst scholars on this 
debate, as human ‗agency‘ is a highly complex phenomenon (Mahmood, 2005). Instead, I 
want to examine the interconnection between HT ideology and agency.  
 
Dreze and Sen (1995, p. 104) believe that participation within groups is a direct expression 
of human agency. The agency for HT activists relates to their capacity to make choices and 
to implement those choices in reality. In other words, HT activists make their decision to 
join the group; it is an act of a free agent, who can leave at any point. However, as the case 
studies in chapter four will illustrate, structural forces play a key role in influencing HT 
activist choices. HT recruiters, for example, often argue that joining HT is a religious 
obligation in which one has no choice but to comply with this religious commandment.
22
 In 
reality, structural strains do not exclusively determine a member‘s pathway, despite the 
activist being contained within a system that imposes a worldview onto them, because they 
control their choices. Therefore, a balance between structure and agency exists (Bourdieu, 
1990). So, a HT activist may be influenced by structural forces, but they are capable of 
removing themselves from the social structures they are embedded within.
23
 In particular, as 
the narratives in chapter four will show, the recruits took time grappling with their decision 
to join HT, and in some cases members choose to leave the group.       
 
Within HT, however, joint forms of agency are often constructed, in which a member builds 
his or her identity in conformity with HT ideology.
24
 According to Allport (1924, p. 6), 
‗there is no psychology of groups which is not essentially and entirely a psychology of 
individuals‘. However, HT is more than the sum of its parts (e.g. the members that make it 
up). For instance, the group, in one sense, is nothing but the members who have joined, but it 
is also much more than the aggregate of individuals. Through their interactions over time, 
their social structures, rules, roles and shared understandings are collectively created, and 
these in turn shape members‘ responses. This view presents a problem for determining the 
extent to which the properties of HT membership can be reduced to individual agency. Tajfel 
(1981) provides some insights into this problem by making a critical distinction between 
agency and group identities. According to Tajfel (1981), social identity is influenced by a 
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 According to Giddens (1984), the ‗duality of structure‘ means social structure is the process and the end 
result of social action. In other words, human agents are embedded within structural systems (e.g. norms or 
culture etc), but the agent is capable of consciously changing his or her seeding in the structural makeup of 
society.  
24
 For further discussion regarding HT ideology refer to chapter three, pp. 86-94. 
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continuum of interaction, which, on one end, is governed by the membership of various 
groups and, at the other, is directed more by human agency.            
 
In this project, I construct a social psychology picture of HT radicalisation, which essentially 
reduces the phenomenon of HT recruitment to a specific demographic constituency. Even 
though the evidence clearly shows that HT is predominately represented by middle class 
Asians, who share a common set of social experiences and problems, there is a need to 
consider other variables. In theory, ideology should play an important role in attracting 
individuals to HT. According to Wilkinson (1974, p. 133), Islamic activism cannot be fully 
grasped unless one accounts for the development of a radical‘s ideology, belief and life-style. 
Activists are seen as free agents, as Crenshaw (1981, p. 10) contends, who act on rational 
choices. However, Crenshaw (1981, p. 10) believes that terrorism is not committed by 
individuals, but ‗by groups who reach collective decisions based on commonly held beliefs‘. 
This analytical approach tends to reduce the rational characteristics of free agents to the 
group, as group goals are seen through the narrow lens of collective rationality. This 
approach ignores the individual, which should be the primary measure of analysis, especially 
if one seeks to understand why some young Muslims are drawn to HT.    
 
Ideology and agency, if one goes beyond recruitment, should play a role in keeping activists 
with HT. A salient feature of attachment to HT ideology is the creation of a ‗we‘ versus 
‗them‘ dichotomy. From a social context, it is beneficial for people to seek out attachments to 
groups because groups offer protection in unfamiliar and hostile settings (Darwin, 1998). In 
this respect, members are drawn to HT to secure specific social needs. Amongst these 
fundamental needs are recognition, security and identity.
25
 During my experience with the 
group, when the members failed to attain these needs from society, they became frustrated, 
which in turn caused them to develop a deep psychological need for a sense of belonging. 
Consequently, within HT, the members swiftly developed a distrust of non-believers and 
began breeding a hostile identity towards them. According to Dawud (ex-member, 32), ‗the 
members constantly malign the Kufr [non-Muslims], while not understanding that Islam 
came for the whole of mankind‘. By developing an ideology around ‗we-ness‘, a member is 
made aware that beyond HT is a ‗they‘ that constitutes the dominant culture. This distinction 
between themselves and the larger society allows HT to shape members‘ ideologies and 
identities, which plays a significant role in the very being and functioning of HT. In other 
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words, members adjust their sense of identity—their thoughts and behaviours—to match the 
collectively defined ideology of HT. 
 
When individuals join HT, they belong to the group because they will derive their sense of 
identity, at least in part, from that group. Also, the majority of HT members whom I 
observed enhanced their sense of identity by making comparisons with out-groups. In the 
case of HT, the maintenance of the group‘s cohesion is achieved through specific internal 
forces, which create a collective ideology. In particular, I observed four distinct symptoms of 
an HT group ideology. Firstly, members had unquestioning belief in the moral correctness of 
the group and ideology. According to Aminur (member, 25), ‗… the Hizb is based on divine 
text, so the fikra [thoughts] and the tariqa [methods] are correct, making them irrefutable‘. 
Secondly, HT manufactured negative stereotypes about the out-group. As Fahim (member, 
35) commented, ‗the kufar [non-Muslims] are totally corrupt, shallow and evil … look at the 
way they worship celebrities and footballers‘. Members are indoctrinated into stereotyping 
others, especially members of other groups, by focusing on alleged characteristics and 
ignoring variations. Thirdly, there was strong group pressure towards conformity at every 
level of the group structure. According to Yemin (ex-member, 40), ‗they [HT] train novices 
to think robotically…. I remember during the sighting of the moon fiasco, members were 
fully aware that the party had made a mistake, but they followed blindly like sheep, even 
though the rest of the ummah [community] were telling them they were wrong‘. This 
example also demonstrates how HT protects the group from contrary viewpoints, especially 
by using self-appointed vanguards. According to one member, ‗the party uses people to spy 
and report on other members, to assess whether they‘re loyal… they have kangaroo-style 
courts in which members have to disclose every personal detail, just to fulfil the whim of the 
leadership‘. Fourthly, self-censorship helped ensure that members maintain group loyalty. 
As one ex-member commented, ‗membership is the final stage of radicalisation, because you 
feel that you cannot live without the group‘. The novice develops a strong emotional 
attachment to the group through indoctrination and institutionalisation, creating ideological 
dependency. I would like to postpone trying to examine these highly complex processes 
here, as I explore these issues in greater detail in other chapters.  
 
1.5 Contextualising Radicalisation in Britain: The Muslim Community 
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Since the September 11 terror attack, a growing body of literature has sprung fourth 
regarding the increase of radicalisation in Great Britain. The contextualisation and framing 
of the Muslim community in Britain is crucially important, especially if one seeks to 
understand radicalisation, because each country has unique social properties. A cursory 
glance at the Muslim community before 2001, before the emergence of radicalisation as a 
widely accepted phenomenon, will provide a broader historical perspective on the existing 
literature. I have separated the scholarly literature into two divergent, but inter-connected, 
historical periods and conceptual themes: (1) the pre-2001 literature; and (2) the post-2001 
literature.
26
  
 
1.5.1 Pre-2001 Literature: Migration and Settlement 
 
In order to demystify the complex nature of radicalisation, I must survey the literature on 
Muslim identity within a British context. There has been substantial research conducted on 
Muslim experiences and encounters over the past several decades. By looking at the Muslim 
community from specific historical and contextual frames, I am able to understand the varied 
experiences of Muslim actors and communities as described in the literature. In the wake of 
the Rushdie affair (1989), the question of Muslim identity started to become a salient issue 
and generated much debate. From a cursory overview of the large body of literature, it is 
somewhat clear that concepts and categories of analysis concerning Muslim identity 
formation are widely contested. In particular, structural forces like religion, class, ethnicity 
and nationality have been treated as explanatory factors (Jacobson, 1998). However, 
simplifying the concept of identity-formation into these restrictive parameters does not 
necessarily explain the emergence of British Muslim identities. The Muslim communities in 
Britain are greatly influenced by the diversity of migration, which has taken place within a 
global context. Therefore, it is important to develop a theory of identity that recognises, but 
does not restrict, the social structures from which young Muslims emerge. In the following 
sections, I will be reflecting on some of the key literature related to Muslim identity 
formation.  
 
1.5.1.1 First Generation:  
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 To start with, I have focused on the migration experiences and settlement of the first generation from the 
post-war period. I also explore the regional perspectives on the study of the Muslim community and its 
development, concentrating particularly on second generation identity formation. The second section provides a 
brief look at the post 9/11 literature in the United Kingdom.    
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Anecdotal evidence would suggest the first generation of Muslim migrants appear less 
inclined towards HT radicalisation, as they have seemingly developed a healthier 
relationship with the wider society while retaining their ethno-religious identity. Conversely, 
the offspring of the early settlers seem socially and politically displaced, making them far 
more susceptible to HT radicalisation. For this reason it is crucial to first consider the 
writings of theorist‘s pre-1990, before the emergence of radical actors and groups. This will 
enable me to gain a broader understanding of the changing social context of migrant 
identities, providing theoretical insight into the historical processes that have shaped identity 
issues.  
 
I have identified several useful studies conducted during this particular time period, allowing 
me to forge three basic conclusions. Firstly, religion was not seen as a salient feature of 
identity among early Muslim settlers. To begin with, South Asian minorities were often 
classified into a single racial cluster.
27
 Taylor (1962) in his study, the half-way generation, 
made no distinction between the racial and religious cleavages of Asian youth in Newcastle. 
Similarly, Evens (1971) in his study of young immigrant attitudes isolates the Pakistani 
racial-group, as being the most introverted. Yet, he neglects the historical influence of 
religion in the formation of identity amongst his chosen demographic, which he perceived in 
fixed and settled terms. However, I am not suggesting Muslim identity is constituted by a 
single definable factor, because a sense of identity is often extracted from multiple sources 
related to one‘s group membership.28 However, social theorists have frequently sought to 
examine minority identity issues within rigid parameters that emphasise a generic ethnic or 
racial identity. Treating these dimensions as an explanatory factor neglects the formation of 
differing perceptions among young Muslims. These features must be assessed in terms of 
religion, ethnicity, class and nationality, because they are susceptible to historical processes 
and determine the social context. 
 
                                                 
27
 As Rex and Moore (1967) point out, race dominated the discourse about immigrant minorities during the 
post-war era. 
28
 Turner (1987) believes self-concept governs the way individuals view themselves, which he separates into 
two distinct forms: ‗personal identity and social identity‘. In his view, personal identity reflects self-
descriptions concerning ones individuality, forming distinct behavioural characteristics. In contrast, social 
identity refers to a category-based perception of an individual that belongs to a group, which enables him or her 
to derive a sense of identity from that group. Thus, identity is greatly influenced by a member‘s affiliation to a 
well-defined and clearly distinct social category. This gives rise to homogenous group behaviour, which 
produces inter-group favouritism, as members associate themselves with the various common attributes and 
norms that represent the group. 
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Secondly, the research provided a skewed portrait of South-Asian homogeneity. In 
particular, socio-political difficulties were treated as common problems amongst South-
Asian communities, with little recognition of ethno-religious multiplicity. Anwar (1982), for 
instance, writes about the problems South Asians face in adjusting to British society, 
concentrating particularly on a lack of opportunities and rights. Early theorists were not 
particularly concerned by religious differences and boundaries, for two possible reasons: 
Firstly, the actors never actively identified themselves through narrow religious faultiness; 
and secondly, South Asians initially sought to secure collective interests based on shared 
ethno-cultural needs (Baumann 1996).
29
  
 
Thirdly, the subject matter concerning identity has been examined in relatively narrow and 
restrictive terms. This indicates early researcher‘s never conceptualised religion as a 
significant factor in fostering identity. However, contemporary literature defines the 
communities from South Asia as having strong religious links, especially in forming a social 
identity. Saeed (cited in Ansari 2004, p. 18) discovered ‗that a Muslim identity was chosen 
by double the number of those who chose the Pakistani alternative‘. There seems to be a 
slight inconsistency between the two accounts. Ansari (2004, p. 1) provides an explanation 
of this discrepancy, as he suggests, the construction of ‗British Muslim identities‘ must be 
assessed ‗within a range of historical perspectives‘. In other words, changing historical 
events and forces greatly influenced the way in which Muslim identity was manufactured. 
The Rushdie Affair (1989), for example, is often cited as a significant turning point in which 
Muslim actors and groups became deeply animated by the scandal (Lewis 1993, p. 5). The 
Muslim community as a whole was provoked into a state of unmitigated indignation, as the 
controversial book Satanic Verses was published, which united a community in their 
absolute condemnation.
30
 The scandal exposed the fragile relationship the Muslim 
community had with the state, and marginalised it further when the demands it made 
concerning the banning of the book were ignored (Abbas, 2005). In the aftermath of the 
Rushdie Affair, some elements within the Muslim community sought to preserve cardinal 
aspects of their religious-cultural beliefs and practices.
31
 The rededication to religious 
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 Racism, housing and education were just some of the common issues and problems that Asian migrants 
sought to resolve in a collective capacity.  
30
 The initial response to The Satanic Verses began in a localised fashion, namely with a small demonstration in 
Bradford. The demonstrations were originally orchestrated by the Bradford Council of Mosques, a body which 
acted as an ‗advocate of Muslim concerns‘ (Lewis 2002, p. 24).   
31
 The British Muslim community is not a homogenous entity. In fact, as Lewis (2002, pp. 153-169) points out, 
the Rushdie Affair (1989) revealed a spectrum of religious-sectarian differences in beliefs and practices 
amongst British Muslims (e.g. Barelwi and Deobandi religious split). 
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identification naturally degraded the augmentation of an Asian identity.
32
 This would explain 
the demise of the ‗Asian Youth Movement‘ in the early 1980s (Lewis 2002, p. 68). 
According to Ansari (2004, p. 1), British Muslims began to question and debate identity 
construction after the Rushdie Affair, because they became to be ‗imagined as outsiders‘.  
 
1.5.1.2 The Second Generation: The Salience of Religion in Identity Formation  
 
The radicalisation of some young British Muslims underscores the necessity for better 
consideration of the tensions and fragilities in young Muslim identity construction. Radical 
groups, like HT, introduced a radical dimension to Muslim identity development, which 
sought to contest the legitimacy of British culture. This was made apparent on August 24
th
 
2003, when HT arranged a conference entitled: ‗British or Muslim‘. The conference 
consciously sought to circumvent integration by re-structuring Muslim identities into a 
single collective religious identity. As noted earlier, modern theorists have actively sought to 
rationalise the seemingly sudden revitalisation of religion as a key marker for Muslim 
identification (Ballard, 1996; Saeed, 1999; Samad, 1996; Statham, 2003). The socio-political 
landscape has greatly shifted, especially after the Rushdie Affair and the Gulf War, which 
widened the labelling of South Asians into specific ethno-religious categories. However, as 
Hutnik (1985) confirmed in his study of South Asians, eighty per cent of his respondents 
regarded religious membership an integral part of their identity makeup. This is important 
because his research was carried out prior to the Rushdie Affair. To explain radicalisation in 
Britain, I need to explore why some second generation Muslims are turning to religiously 
ladened identities.  
 
From a primordial perspective, the ethno-religious attachments of South Asian Muslims are 
greatly entangled and cannot be simply removed (Kucukcan, 1999).
33
 This implies deep-
rooted primordial linkages to kin and religion (Shils, 1957). If these attachments truly exist, 
as permanent features of human identity, then early Muslim settlers would have imported 
them from their places of origin (Geerz, 1973). In theory, a sense of belonging is reinforced 
amongst community members and provides a means to conceive of their identity through 
sharing a common ethno-religious past. It is somewhat difficult to actualise the primordial 
approach in totality, since it degrades the social context. For instance, the importation of 
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 South-Asians have a common linguistic and ethnic bond, but this was eroded as a form of identity. 
33
 Islam in contemporary Britain forms a significant source of identity for the Muslim community. ‗The Fourth 
National Survey of Ethnic Minorities‘ reported that two-thirds of the Pakistani respondent‘s aged 16-34 stated 
religion is ‗very important‘ to the way they live their lives (www.data-archive.ac.uk). 
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cultural attachments into a host country needs to be merged with the national identity. The 
process of synchronising identities can be highly problematic as it is dependent on the actors 
themselves. Thus, despite some residual linkages to kin and country of origin, religious 
identity is a fluid and mobile construct. In other words, religious identification becomes 
active within a given context. Saeed (1999) discovered that younger Muslims preferred to be 
recognised through multiple identity-types, namely Scottish-Muslim. However, when asked 
to place these hyphenated formations in order of preference, eighty-one per cent regarded 
themselves Muslim first. This statistic, though important, slightly underplays Muslim youth 
identity formation, which I assert is a far more complicated process: one that is constructed 
through negotiation during different periods of socialisation.  
 
To start with, as Markstrom-Adams (1992, p. 174) contends, identity construction is not 
merely an individualistic process since it is reliant on ‗family relations, ethnic and racial 
group membership and religiosity‘. These interconnected social threads are significant, as 
Hayek (1992, p. 12) stipulates, because attachments stem from a ‗tradition of learnt rules of 
conduct‘. Jacobson‘s (1998) study of second generation British Muslims in the London 
Borough of Waltham Forest revealed that many young British-born Pakistanis hold religion 
as a strong element of their identity. As she states: ‗I have suggested that Islam survives as a 
source of meaning in the respondents lives partly because the content of its messages is 
accessible and appealing to the young people‘ (1998, p. 126). This rather simplistic 
observation greatly underplays the complexities of identity negotiation through various 
stages of the life cycle. In reality, socialisation provides a way for young people to learn 
about their religious heritage, enabling them to become active members of their community 
and thus perpetuating religious affiliation for newer generations (Brim, 1980). Therefore, 
socialisation becomes an essential element in the process of identity formation, as the 
process of upgrading and differentiating take place, gradually shaping specific characteristics 
through the complexities of the life cycle (Parsons, 1964). In reference to second generation 
Muslims, the complex nature of the upgrading process is greatly amplified since they emerge 
from two diverse social worlds. This makes it extremely difficult for them to adjust their 
identity to different social settings. Children of immigrants in Britain, Weinreich (1986, p. 
304) explained, are exposed to dual socialisation processes: in the home they form primary 
identification with their parent‘s cultural mores; while at school they encounter an opposing 
culture. In most cases, young Muslims struggle to overcome conflicts with elements that are 
perceived to be incompatible with their ethno-religious home-based identities. This situation 
- 32 - 
 
is often exacerbated by the fact that second generation Muslims are born and raised in 
Britain, and thus view their parent‘s country of origin as foreign (Gardner and Shakur, 
1994).    
 
Trying to frame religious identity within a discreet and essentialist framework is extremely 
problematic, as identity construction is repeatedly negotiated within different periods of the 
life cycle. Identity negotiation is firmly embedded within the process of socialisation, which 
may result in the centralisation of identity into a core structure, providing balance to the 
other disjointed identities (Gecas, 1982). The centralisation of religiosity is contingent on the 
interchange between individuals recurring encounters and experiences within society 
(Lofland, 1969). In the case of second generation Muslim identity, I tentatively assume it is 
not directed by a stable core identity structure because, as Bhabha (1994, p. 185) suggests, 
settlement has generated ‗hybrid identities‘. These multiple identities allow the individual to 
define for themselves who they are within different social settings, but this can often lead to 
dual loyalties and conflict. Consequently, the failure to establish stable identities can 
cultivate disaffection among some young Muslims who may become marginalised through 
socialisation. More significantly, radical groups, like HT, offer young recruits a strong core 
identity based on religiosity. In this regard, HT activists view themselves as symbolic 
disciples of Islam (Monroe and Kreidie, 1997). In a broader context, young Muslims that 
contextualise religion as a core element of their identity often dichotomise the ‗other‘ in 
antagonistic terms, posing a threat to their religious heritage.
34
  
 
This is greatly compounded by the broad struggle of young Muslims ‗to discover how to be 
a Muslim as a minority in a non-Muslim society‘ (Lewis 2007, p. 6). Stratham (2003) 
equates the rise in overt religious affiliation amongst some Muslims to two interconnected 
social realities: (1) Islam seeks to assert itself within the public realm, and (2) Muslim 
identity formation is an acute response to social deprivation and discrimination. In regards to 
the latter, Muslim self-consciousness is often reinforced by negative media stereotypes. The 
public vilification of Muslim belief and practice tends to lead to introverted responses: 
‗Muslim communities closing ranks‘ (Samad 1996, p. 97). Similarly, Ballard (1996) believes 
the marginalisation of Muslims from the majority culture has triggered a reaffirmation of 
religion. This is because young Muslims perceive their religious identity to be under 
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 From a historical perspective, the British Empire often ‗privileged religious identities‘ in order to exert 
control, ‗which inevitably helped to sharpen distinctions between Muslim and non-Muslim‘ (Robinson, 1998 p. 
5). This contextualisation of India had a residual influence in the way migrants to Britain were categorised 
according to ethno-religious markers.     
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constant threat, and not their ethnicity, resulting in greater mobility towards Muslim identity. 
This movement away from ethno-identity labels is exacerbated by the declining attachment 
to South Asia, as a cultural and linguistic reference point. As Samad (2004, p. 17) suggests, 
‗identification with Pakistan and Bangladesh – countries that young people may only briefly 
visit – becomes less significant and Muslim as an identity becomes more important‘. In this 
respect, religious identity, Gardner and Shuker (1994, p. 164) explain, ‗provides both a 
positive identity, in which solidarity can be found, together with an escape from the 
oppressive tedium of being constantly identified in negative terms‘.  
 
The examination of religious affiliation and identity amongst young Muslims in Britain has 
its inherent problems. As Lewis (2007, p. 1) explains, there is a tendency to miniaturise 
young South Asian identity to ‗one single affiliation‘, namely their religious makeup. This is 
quite dangerous as Muslim identity is bound to different threads, as Lewis (2007, p. 2) points 
out: ‗for some, their ‗Muslimness‘ is as much ‗cultural‘ as religious…for others, it is a 
vehicle of ‗identity politics‘‘. Thus, pinpointing a coherent connection between an increase 
in religiosity – in terms of religious practice – and as a source of identity is not easy and 
highly complicated (Samad, 2004). In his most seminal piece, Lewis (2002) sets out in his 
research to explore the inner dynamics of Muslim communities in Britain, focusing on 
Bradford as his case study. His work has provided my research with some valuable insights. 
In particular, he observes ‗signs of a British Muslim culture developing‘ (2002, p. 209). This 
would suggest young Muslims are actively trying to negotiate and merge diverse elements of 
their ethno-religious cultural roots with the complexities and realities of modern Britain. 
Significantly, Lewis (2002, p. 207) points out, this process has ‗bypassed the ulama‘, which 
means young Muslims are searching for identity solutions beyond traditional religious 
institutions and structures. It is clear from the cursory review of the literature concerning 
young Muslims that Islam remains a salient feature of identity construction, but this does not 
necessarily mean it leads to an increase in religiosity or radicalism. Thus, as Samad (1996) 
argues, the development of Muslim identification becomes more visible and prominent when 
young people acquire a sense of becoming British (Samad, 1996). 
 
1.5.2 Post-2001: Radicalisation in Britain  
 
The phenomenon of radicalisation in Britain cannot be easily divorced from the milieu in 
which second generation Muslim youth find themselves embedded in, making the process of 
identity formation critical to this problem. In the section directly above, I explored the 
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complex realities and issues, as documented in the literature, concerning the seemingly 
sudden rededication to religiosity amongst younger Muslim practitioners. If a rise in 
religiosity has taken place then it needs to be correlated with radicalisation, as the latter has 
been singled out as a major threat to national security.
35
 More than ever, therefore, there is a 
need to understand radicalisation – and what impact it is having on Muslim youth in Britain. 
For this reason, I will address some of the salient debates taking place amongst scholars in 
the national context.
36
  
 
It is clear radicalisation is a growing problem amongst some young British Muslims, but one 
cannot attribute the underlying causes of this phenomenon to a single trigger or theory. As 
explained earlier, radicalisation is a transformative process, taking place at the root of the 
personality whereby an individual adopts a radical new outlook. Some studies suggest 
radicalisation incorporates several phases: pre-radicalisation, self-identification, 
indoctrination and militancy (NYPD 2007, p. 3). After surveying the available literature, it is 
relatively clear that most scholars agree radicalisation involves three fundamental 
ingredients: (1) individual change (Ongering, 2007); (2) interaction with social environments 
and external situations (Wiktorowicz, 2005); and (3) contact with radical actors and groups 
(Segeman, 2007).
37
 As Segeman (2007, p. 3) points out, within these transformative phases 
individuals develop negative associations (e.g. discrimination or social deprivation), which 
distort their reading of the social world, making them susceptible to radical groups. 
Importantly, it is worth noting these phases are not necessarily sequential or transparent in 
nature, as they greatly depend on the contextual realities and experiences of the individual. 
Furthermore, there is general acknowledgement amongst most theorists that identifying 
generic profiles of radicals is unreliable and problematic (Home Office 2005, p. 31). A 
cursory look at Islamic radicals reveals their ‗normality‘ (Gill, 2007).  
 
At first sight, it might be difficult to rationalise why seemingly ‗normal‘ young Muslims in 
Britain join radical groups, like HT. According to Devji (2005, p. 20), radical behaviour and 
identities diverge in accordance with the plethora of reasons for joining radical Islamist 
groups. It is apparent Muslims in this part of the world contend with an array of issues 
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 Janet Williams, the commanding officer of the Muslim Contact Unit of the Metropolitan Police Special 
Branch, BBC, 22/06/2005 
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 I will explore the extensive literature related to ‗causes‘ in chapter 2: Antecedents of Radicalisation, and thus 
in this section I will only be exploring key conceptual themes related to radicalisation post 2001. 
37
 ‗Virtual‘ radicalisation (e.g. that may take place within cyber space) still involves these elements, but without 
the physical interaction (Mandaville, 2005). 
- 35 - 
 
concerning ‗identity, the adaptation of religio-cultural norms and values, and issues of 
everyday citizenship‘ (Abbas 2007, p. 3). Radicalisation is a multifaceted phenomenon, 
which in turn, raises questions concerning ‗whether Muslims can be or are willing to be 
integrated into European society and political values‘ (Modood 2005, p. viii). In particular, 
two identifiable conditions are commonly cited as catalysts for radicalisation: discrimination 
and deprivation. Despite the fact these two interrelated conditions have been developed and 
argued within a specific socio-political and economic frame, they do not deplete the entire 
range of literature.
38
 In other words, radicalisation seemingly appears to flourish amongst 
those who experience political, social and economic dislocation.  
 
1.5.2.1 Relative Deprivation: Social, Political and Economic  
 
Relative deprivation, a theory strongly equated to Gurr (1970), is frequently mentioned as a 
salient cause of Muslim radicalisation in Britain (Ferrero, 2005). Socio-economic and 
political discontent is often exacerbated by the realisation that the gap between what young 
Muslims expect to obtain from society and what they actually get are quite different. The 
bleak realities of Muslim social life in the UK – such as high unemployment and low 
academic attainment – foster a sense of dissatisfaction and frustration (Modood et al., 1997). 
Supposedly, these socio-economic conditions provide a fundamental prerequisite for 
radicalisation. However, as my study into HT radicalisation has demonstrated, formulating 
such a causal link between radicalisation and deprivation is rather problematic. Recent 
studies have shown that despite the fact British Muslims languish at the bottom of the 
economic stratum, radicals often emerge from a wide social and economic background 
(Sageman, 2004). For instance, HT activists are largely positioned amongst the ranks of the 
professional middle-classes, firmly undermining the blanket assertion equating radicalisation 
with socio-economic deprivation. Similarly, Krueger and Maleckova‘s (2003) study of 
radical support and activism in the West Bank illustrated that educated people appeared 
more inclined towards radicalisation. Although, young British Muslims appear economically 
dislocated, generating a direct correlation with radicalisation is difficult because individual 
backgrounds and experiences greatly diverge. Clearly, deprivation as a direct catalyst for 
radicalisation is difficult to substantiate, but I must acknowledge in some cases ‗relative 
deprivation‘ is a magnifying factor. In this regard, a lack of social mobility and perceived 
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inequalities seem to exacerbate a sense of exclusion, weakening young Muslim attachment 
to the state (Ferrero 2005, p 200).  
 
In terms of socio-political dislocation from the wider society, it is argued Muslims struggle 
to integrate at the political level (Modood, 2005). In particular, there appears to be 
disproportionate representation of Muslims within the institutional structures of government, 
making it difficult to identify with the political system. As a result, young Muslims feel 
greatly detached from the political process, creating less integrated citizens (Twenge et al., 
2007). This feeling of exclusion can foster a sense of not belonging, which brings into 
question issues of citizenship and identity. As mentioned earlier, the Rushdie Affair brought 
a number of these grievances to the fore, in particular, the ‗negative reaction to the anti-
Rushdie campaign shocked Muslims‘ (McRoy 2006, p. 25). This incident highlighted some 
of the blaring cultural and ideological differences between Muslims and non-Muslims in 
British society. As McRoy (2006, p. 25) affirmed, the Rushdie Affair exposed ‗a clash of 
values‘. The state‘s refusal to extend Blasphemy Laws beyond its existing remit to include 
Muslim religious beliefs inflated Muslim dislocation in some quarters. Firstly, it inspired a 
rededication to religious belief and practice, which to some degree resulted in the prioritising 
of Muslim identity (Lewis, 1994). Secondly, the perceived intransigency of the legal process 
and the lack of access to the political system encouraged some Muslims to seek out more 
extreme forms of politics. Beyond the national setting, globalised events like the genocide in 
Bosnia animated Muslims into political activism.
39
 The refusal of the government to 
intervene within the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, despite significant efforts to lobby 
the government by British Muslims, seemed to perpetuate a sense of double standard and did 
little to encourage political integration. More recently, in the aftermath of the northern riots 
(2001), a key ingredient in the civil unrest appeared to be a lack of social and political 
integration (Denham, 2002). National events, like the disturbances in the north of England 
and the Rushdie affair, appear to act as a dividing line between the white majority and 
Muslim community. In many ways, these explosive events seem to fuel Muslim dislocation 
and thus impede their political and socio-economic integration.  
 
The above issues do bring some important contextual debates to the surface. A recurring 
theme amongst Muslim experiences in Britain appears to revolve around discrimination and 
stigmatisation. This was further strengthened by the European Monitoring Centre on Racism 
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and Xenophobia (2006, p. 110), which stated: ‗it is evident that Muslims often experience 
various levels of discrimination and marginalisation in employment, education and housing, 
and are also victims of negative stereotyping and prejudicial attitudes‘. The sense of 
exclusion brought about by social discrimination may reinforce a perception that Muslims 
are not entirely accepted by the white majority. As Wiktorowicz (2004) suggests, the 
experience of racism and Islamophobia has impelled some young Muslims to re-evaluate 
their identity and how it relates to the wider society. Therefore, the radicalisation process 
allows young Muslims to interpret their negative social experiences in a seemingly positive 
light. In other words, radicalisation provides young Muslims with an idealised sense of 
society and the good, while explaining that their problem is the consequence of British 
society and its unequal power structures (and thus Islam provides a solution).  
 
1.5.2.2 Identity Crisis and Radicalisation 
 
The struggle for identity is a critical element of the radicalisation process. As mentioned in 
earlier sections, young British Muslims are fixed within a recurring cycle of identity 
negotiation. Indeed, young Muslims find themselves embedded within two opposing cultural 
frames: at home their parents‘ ethno-cultural traditions provide them with a set of rigid 
identity markers which often leave them displaced from the dominant culture. Thus, as Roy 
(2004, p. 315) suggests, young Muslims seek to reconnect to a ‗lost identity‘. Crafting a new 
identity, fashioned from an idealised perception of religion, gives young Muslims a sense of 
belonging that transcends community and society. Contemporary studies of radicalisation 
frequently cite identity crisis as a salient formula in the transformative process, which is 
often ignited by adverse social experiences (Wiktorowicz, 2004). More significantly, as 
Ansari (2004) explains, the perception of ‗othering‘ Muslims as outsiders pushed younger 
Muslims to question their place in British society. As my field work and interviews will 
show identity was a recurring theme in the biographies of young radicals. As former Islamist 
Ed Husain (2007, p. 73) explains, ‗Cut off from Britain, isolated from the Eastern culture life 
of our parents, Islamism provided us with a purpose and a place in life‘. In this respect, the 
interactions and experiences of radicals provides an insight into why they identify with 
radical Islam in adulthood. Identification with particular social groups depends on context 
and setting (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). If young Muslims struggle to relate to their social 
settings, then identity dislocation can be triggered. This implies when young Muslims feel 
their social trajectory becomes restricted by rejection (e.g. white peer group or an inability to 
relate to their own social group), then radical Islam can offer a sense of identity and 
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belonging (Abbas et al., 2007). Also, entrenching one‘s identity within a rigid religious 
dimension can lead to greater internalization, equating any real or imagined threat to Islam 
as a personal threat to their well-being (Roy, 2004). Therefore, religious discrimination may 
trigger stronger identification with Islam, and thus weaken other identity affiliations (e.g. 
national identity).           
 
1.6 Studying HT in Britain: Methodology 
 
The topic of radicalisation is highly contested amongst social theorists, who continue to 
strive for answers to such questions as, who are radicals? Are there common characteristics 
associated with radicals? Do radicals vary among themselves; and if so, how do they differ? 
A cursory survey of the literature has indicated that no single variable, or theory, exclusively 
explains why radicalisation occurs.
40
 In chapter two, I examine several leading theories such 
as ‗globalisation‘ (Roy, 2004; Ahmed, 1994), ‗secularism and modernisation‘ (Esposito, 
1992; Lewis, 1990), ‗frustration – political, social, economic, cultural disaffection‘ 
(Crenshaw, 1981; Gurr, 1970; Hoffman, 1998; Piven and Cloward, 1977; Roy, 2004), 
‗intensification of religiosity‘ (Buckser and Glazier, 2003), ‗psychological traits‘ (Crayton, 
1983; Jenkins, 1979; Post, 1990) and ‗group dynamics‘ (Sageman, 2005). The current 
research and debates on radicalisation, with which I have become familiar, have made it 
possible for me to identify my areas of interest. Firstly, my overall assessment of these 
contributions asserts that they have failed to develop a coherent relationship between theory 
and methodology. For instance, the theorists I have cited all tend not to substantiate their 
respective theories with case studies that show how some Muslims become radicalised, 
especially in a group context.  
 
Understanding the impact radicalisation has had on some young Muslims requires the 
investigation of a specific radical Islamic movement. I have decided to study HT, because 
the case of HT has rarely been cited by social scientists studying radicalisation. In my early 
encounters with members of HT, I noticed, on the surface, they appeared thoroughly 
‗westernised‘ in relation to dress, language and leisure activities. However, these young men 
had become radicalised, turning against liberal and secular values.
41
 I wanted to find out 
what processes contributed to this change. The work of fellow researchers appeared to be 
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 Refer to chapter two: Antecedents of Islamic Radicalism (pp. 58-69). 
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 Similar observations were made by Taji-Farouki (1996) in her highly acclaimed book on the formation of 
Hizb ut-Tahrir in the Middle East. 
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characterised by their fascination for radicalisation, from a distance (Esposito, 1992; 
Fukuyama, 2002; Roy, 2002; Crayton, 1983; Crenshaw, 1981; Jenkins, 1979; Post, 1990). A 
major reason for this neglect has been the difficulty in collecting primary data, because 
groups like HT operate in a clandestine manner. So, this begs the question, how does one 
study HT? 
 
1.6.1 Ethnographic Approach 
 
Although there has been significant study of radicalisation, little research has used an 
empirical approach to study this phenomenon. After reading major works, and through 
personal contact with some of the main theorists and researchers engaged in the debates, I 
noticed a number of problems concerning methodology. Firstly, there was a considerable 
lack of access to reliable data sources. This is because radical Islamic groups, like HT, 
operate in a clandestine manner and use morally unacceptable behaviour to achieve their 
goals, making it difficult to record their activities in real settings (Post, 1991). Secondly, the 
relationship between data and theory was not properly constructed, providing only a partial 
picture of the radicalisation process.  
 
After spending several years interacting with members of HT, I was able to interpret their 
social world, giving me an insight into how they became radicalised. Initially, I needed to 
overcome the major problem of accessibility in order to examine the processes of 
radicalisation. None of the existing approaches I had studied gave sufficient insight into this. 
For this reason, I adopted the ‗ethnomethodological‘ approach, because it provided me with 
an opportunity to study the activities of group members in their natural surroundings 
(Garfinkel, 1991; Atkinson, 1982). This ethnomethodological approach specifically allows 
one to study the activities of group members, to see how they make sense of their 
surroundings (Heath, 1983). A critical appraisal of previous approaches to radicalisation 
showed that most theorists rejected ‗participant observation‘ of radical groups, because it 
was adjudged impractical and unworkable (Coleman, 1968). There are two reasons for this 
view: ethnomethodology is often difficult to understand, and it is even harder to apply. 
However, I am in a very fortunate position, because my study can observe radical members 
through participant observation, which most social scientists have been unable to do when 
trying to understand processes of radicalisation in a group setting. Burgess (1984, p. 79) 
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believes ‗the value of being a participant observer lies in the opportunity that is available to 
collect rich and detailed data based on observations in natural settings‘.  
 
In essence, I seek to gain an understanding of why some young Muslims are attracted to HT, 
from their point of view. Harvey (1990, pp. 9-10) believes that ‗the emphasis for most 
ethnography is usually on forms of social interaction and the meanings which lie behind 
these‘. This is very important, because obtaining accounts and narratives from various 
respondents enables us to use a flexible methodology. This will involve extracting 
information from natural social settings, rather than ‗constructs of artificial situations that are 
provided by the researcher‘ in the form of survey research (Burgess 1984, p. 79). Thus, 
participant observation allows me to gather more detailed information, accessing the 
meaning of events and social interactions as understood by HT. Previous researchers have 
attempted to make assertions on the nature of Islamic organisations based on artificial 
situations. Post (1991) equates mental illness to the antecedents of radical behaviour among 
individuals and groups. This generic observation is based on unscientific generalisations, 
because biographical data from radical groups like HT is not readily available. However, my 
access to HT puts me in the unique position of being able to gather the biographical 
databases required for the development of a valid scientific approach. This will allow me to 
generate a truthful representation of HT.
42
  
 
The approach used to acquire data from my participants relied extensively on a large 
network of contacts within HT. This has enabled me to capture the opinions of the members, 
allowing me to articulate their views related to ethnicity, culture, religion and identity. This 
was achieved by assuming the role of a ‗participant-as-observer‘ to obtain access to a wide 
group of participants in their natural environment (Gold, pp. 217-220). This allowed me to 
get close to my respondents, which provided me with a visible picture of HT activities and 
the everyday experiences of members. According to Emerson (1995, p. 2), ‗getting close‘ to 
one‘s subjects requires ‗physical and social proximity to the daily rounds of people‘s lives 
and activities…in order to observe and understand them‘. I spent several years attending HT 
events and activities. This provided me with insight, as a participant, of the inner workings 
of the organisational structure. This, furthermore, made my fieldwork easier because I was 
not considered an outsider, and was given open access to members and to HT culture. This 
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 Representation of HT will entail: (1) data concerning the social base (social class, age, gender, and ethnicity 
etc) of HT membership; (2) the internal processes of radicalisation (indoctrination and group radicalisation); (3) 
socio-cultural backgrounds of members (through biographical studies) 
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study is unique because, for the first time, an academic is able to get close to the activities 
and everyday experiences of members of a radical Islamic movement. Thus, my research has 
two distinct aims, namely to comprehend the causes of HT radicalisation from an individual 
and also from a group perspective. In order to produce credible findings, it is necessary to 
develop an array of empirical research documenting how radicalism is stimulated. In this 
respect, I am very fortunate because this study can observe the radical group from primary 
sources, which most social scientists cannot do when trying to understand group dynamics. 
In summary, the justification for my study is primarily based on methodological grounds. I 
believe this will enable me to answer one key question: why some young British Muslims 
join HT. 
 
1.6.2 Integrating Objectivity 
 
To begin with, what distinguishes this research from other scholarly work on HT is my 
involvement with HT. However, it is precisely this involvement in HT which raised a set of 
methodological concerns. Firstly, how could I maintain ‗objectivity‘ and ‗neutrality‘ in my 
fieldwork? Well, as explained earlier, I resorted to feminist methodology as a way to anchor 
my research. This meant the value-free objectivity, ‗of neutrality and indifference towards 
research objects‘, had to be replaced by ‗conscious partiality‘ (Mies 1983, p. 122). In 
keeping with this feminist methodological tradition, HT activists were not looked upon as 
simple research objects but as mirror images of me. As a result, HT members slowly lost 
their initial suspicion that I might misuse and exploit their histories. This allowed for an 
open exchange of information, as Mies (1983, p. 123) notes: 
 
The researcher takes the side of a certain group, partly 
identifies, and in a conscious process creates space for critical 
dialogues and reflection on both sides. This enables both 
research ‗subjects‘ and ‗objects‘ to become more aware of the 
power differences and dynamics involved, and of distortions of 
perceptions to be corrected on both sides. Paradoxically, 
precisely through this process of partial identification a critical 
and dialectical distance is created between the researcher and 
the researched.  
 
This ‗conscious partiality‘ enabled me to voice my own experiences of HT membership, 
which led to an open and contextualized knowledge of subjective experiences. It was this 
method of collective perception of our experiences that lead to, what Westkott (1979) 
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described as, ‗inter-subjectivity‘. This, as Huizer (1986, p.237) points out, is a natural 
advantage that comes from ‗rejecting neutrality in the name of scientific objectivity‘.   
 
Secondly, despite adopting less conventional approaches to research objectivity, I was fully 
aware of the lack of social distance between myself and the respondents. As an ex-member 
of HT, I had already been involved in what I was studying. This meant I shared similar 
patterns of ethno-religious socialisation and life-experiences as the respondents. However, 
this is not a problem, as Mamak (1978, p. 168) observed:  
 
‗I found that my academic training in the methodological 
views of western social science and its emphasis on ‗scientific 
objectivity‘ conflicted with the experiences of my colonial 
past. The traditional way in which social science research is 
conducted proved inadequate for an understanding of the 
people I was researching.  
 
In this respect, the traditional scientific perspective that views the researched as mere objects 
of data collection are out-mounded for this research, because to penetrate clandestine actors 
required personal connection and involvement. However, as Alder and Alder (1987, p. 8) 
point out, when investigating a clandestine group the ‗researchers must assume social roles 
that fit the worlds they are studying‘. In general, scholars studying HT tend to lack insider 
perspective of HT activism, as they cannot penetrate the clandestine veil of the organisation, 
hindering their ability to formulate meaningful conclusions. However, I did not require 
immersing myself into the culture of HT to gain an insider‘s experience of the group, as I had 
already gained knowledge through my own experiences. This gave me a unique perspective 
and standpoint on HT. Therefore, using ‗conscious partiality‘, I sought not only to hear the 
life histories of HT activists, but to also observe and compare their social reality and 
experiences to my own. 
 
Therefore, from the commencement of my project, I was aware I could not divorce my 
personal involvement with HT from my research. In actuality, my subjectivity was intimately 
embroiled in the research, as it guided my choice of topic and it influenced the selection of 
my methodology. Consequently, I was concerned that my subjectivity may skew my reading 
of the social reality of HT activists. For this reason, I took steps to prevent this from 
happening. Firstly, I only selected HT activists whom I did not know, so when they revealed 
their life histories to me it was unknown. In theory, HT activists have an autonomous 
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psychology, possessing a wide range of personality traits that are different and unique.
43
 For 
that reason, I did not enter my fieldwork with a preconceived profile of HT activists. Instead, 
I wanted to rely heavily on the data I collected. This meant utilising appropriate 
methodological techniques, namely interviews and surveys, to solicit complete and 
meaningful data that could be used to construct a picture of HT radicalisation.
44
 Secondly, 
since the research focused on unravelling the back stories of activists, I disclosed from the 
outset my involvement with HT.
45
 Therefore, as complete objectivity was considered 
impractical, I made every effort to acknowledge and integrate my subjectivity within a 
contained methodological standpoint. 
 
Although, my own experiences provided the backdrop for my research, it became clear that I 
needed to place HT activists at the centre of my research. Constructing knowledge around 
the life experiences of activists within a fringe group, like HT, made it incumbent to tailor 
my methodology around the sensitivity of the respondents. This is because, as Collins (1990, 
p. 209) explains, it is activist‘s experiences that provide a concrete ‗criterion for credibility‘. 
This enabled me to objectively interpret my research findings, while acknowledging my prior 
involvement in what I was studying. As mentioned, I decided to use my previously gained 
knowledge to enhance my research. In this respect, my experiences as a former HT member 
gave me a distinct standpoint, which is not available to other social scientists who have 
attempted to study HT. For this reason, I actively used the knowledge of my former 
membership to interpret the social world of HT activists. I integrated my knowledge of HT in 
a number of ways into my research. Firstly, I used it to cut through programmed and robotic 
rhetoric often spouted to ‗outsiders‘. Secondly, most of the respondents I interviewed shared 
similar social experiences and backgrounds to me, which allowed me to ask more penetrating 
and targeted questions. These two points are very important, as respondents can easily 
sabotage any attempt to research them (Evans-Pritchard 1940, p. 13). This was unlikely to 
occur in my research as I was already inside the social world of HT. Therefore, my personal 
involvement in HT gave me an open gateway to explore the lives of HT activists, without it I 
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 As Rowe et al., (2002, p. 106) point out, based on self-agency, individuals tend to manufacture and transform 
personal meanings about their social reality. 
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 In terms of methodology, I assigned ‗meaning units‘ to interview transcripts, which identified distinct 
meanings within the respondent statements. In most cases, collection of statements formed a unit, for example, 
when respondents emphasised their ‗hatred for non-Muslims and British society‘. However, I did also identify 
single words as meaning units (e.g. racism and Islamaphobia). As Ratner (2002) asserts, meaning units 
objectively summarise personal meanings of the respondents.       
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 I also did not hide my research identity and purpose, which was received positively by most respondents. 
However, after the 7/7 London bombings, the HT leadership and some respondents became greatly sceptical 
and thus my penetration into the organisation ground to a temporary halt.  
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would not have been able to scratch the surface of HT. My experiences placed me in an 
advantageous position from which to build knowledge and construct a more accurate image 
of HT‘s social world.        
 
1.6.3 Incorporating ‘Intersectionality’ into the Research Methodology 
 
I decided to use narratives as one way of exploring HT radicalisation. As Peterson (2006, p. 
721) asserts, there is a need to study the ‗intersecting experiences‘ of activists. By drawing 
on the personal experiences of HT activists, I was able to explore HT radicalisation and its 
multiple intersections with class and ethnicity.
46
 The concept of ‗intersectionality‘ 47 , as 
framed by feminist scholars
48
, sheds light on the intersection between different social 
categories – such as gender, ethnicity, class and so on – making it possible to observe the 
social divergences that exist amongst people (Davis 2008, p. 67). It is important to look at 
the multiple categories of differentiation amongst British Muslims, because HT activists 
appear to emerge from a narrow and closed social reality. In fact, as the data in chapter four 
and five reveal, HT identity revolves around a South Asian middle class identity 
configuration. This would suggest that HT activists may experience ‗discrimination‘ in 
largely different ways then working class British Muslims.
49
 In this respect, I seek to explore 
the impact class and ethnicity has had on HT member‘s lives, and how it shaped their 
trajectory towards HT radicalisation. As the narratives in chapter four will show, the 
experiences of Abdul and Tariq fell in large part between the intersections of ethnicity and 
class. After contextualising their experiences it became clear their middle class upbringing 
and South Asian ethnicity were key features in their narratives. Therefore, it would be a 
mistake to assume British Muslims share similar life experiences, as they do not emerge 
from homogeneous social backgrounds. This means working class Muslims do not represent 
a glimpse into HT activists, and thus class and ethnicity need to be explored in a different 
way to how it has been done amongst working class Muslims. For this reason, in order to 
understand why HT radicalisation takes place amongst a homogenous group of South Asian 
Middle class Muslims, requires looking at how these activists have been shaped by class, 
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 In this section, I do not wish to get bogged down by trying to conceptualise intersectionality. This is because, 
as Davis (2008, p. 69) rightly suggests, it is a vague and open concept. Instead, I want to discuss how I intend 
to use intersectionality alongside personal narratives to explore HT radicalisation.  
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 Refer to Crenshaw (1989) and Collins (2000) for further insight into the theoretical underpinnings of 
intersectionality theory.  
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 According to Collins (2000, p. 42), discrimination is firmly connected by the intersectional structure of 
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ethnicity and religion. Therefore, by utilising intersectionality, I will be able to understand 
the different intersections of HT membership.     
 
1.6.4 Studying HT: Scholars and Literature 
 
It is clear from my methodological standpoint that I think a substantial amount of 
scholarship on HT in Britain has not contributed to a penetrative study. Instead the 
publications and research I have surveyed continue to explore HT from its ‗exterior‘ rather 
than its ‗interior‘. I define ‗exterior‘ research as an attempt to explore the internal world of 
HT radicalism, but without a penetrative method of accessing primary data sources. A 
number of articles have been furnished using ‗exterior‘ research, especially in the aftermath 
of the 2005 London bombings, which attempt to explain the appeal of HT to young British 
Muslims.
50
 However, these studies often lack access to HT members, forcing them to resort 
to either interviewing ex-members or using secondary literature. In order to shed light on the 
appeal of HT, scholars must engage with ‗live‘ and ‗active‘ HT narratives. The use of 
narrative research has revealed the ‗dialogic‘ nature of HT identities in which historical and 
psycho-social constructions of HT identity are investigated through the voices of HT 
activists, in respect to their experiences as young middle class Muslims. In other words, one 
cannot hope to explore the appeal of HT without the use of ‗interior‘ data sources.      
 
As stated earlier, although in the last decade scholars have assembled a colossal body of 
knowledge on radicalisation, much of this has seldom investigated HT. A chief explanation 
for this oversight has been the impenetrability of HT, because of its clandestine and secretive 
nature. Nonetheless, there have been several noteworthy contributions, making it imperative 
to review these studies and place them within my research context.  
 
Firstly, Taji-Farouki‘s influential piece written in 1996, ‗A Fundamental Quest‘, is the 
closest attempt by a western academic to unlock the mysterious nature of HT. Her study sets 
out to document the chronological evolution of HT in the Middle East, providing insight into 
the formative period of the organisation and its founder.
51
 At this point, I feel it is important 
to bring to light some methodological observations, which I have drawn out of her study to 
inform my own work. Firstly, the piece employs a historical methodology by which Taji-
Farouki used internal HT documents and leaflets to construct a historical picture of the 
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 Abbas et al., (2005) and (2007); Lewis (2007); McRoy (2005); Afshar et al., (2005).   
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 Refer to chapter three for discussion on the historical inception of HT (p. 72). 
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inception of the movement. How she acquired and accessed these sources is somewhat 
sketchy. She does not explain her methodology in her book, ‗A fundamental quest‘ (1996), 
which raises significant questions about how she gained access to internal HT material. 
Secondly, the piece is not concerned with the socio-cultural factors related to HT 
radicalisation; instead it is a factual exploration of the emergence of HT in the Middle East. 
For this reason, the study does not claim to investigate why some young British Muslims are 
joining HT in Great Britain, making it crucial to develop new insight into the evolution of 
HT radicalisation in this country.   
 
In contrast to this scholarly work, the autobiographical narrative written by Mohammed 
Mahbub Husain (Ed Husain) has been championed as a noteworthy insight into HT in 
Britain, yet this ignores the many contextual deficiencies and inaccuracies in the piece. 
Before I elaborate on these issues, it is worth briefly noting that autobiographical 
information relates and contains data about the self (Brewer, 1986). With that said, the book 
written by Ed Husain is based on his alleged encounters with members of HT, in the early 
1990s. These short encounters form the basis for his analysis. Yet, as he confirms, he was 
never a member of HT (Hussain, 2007). This is highly significant as his observations would 
have been greatly restricted by organisational and structural confidentiality. HT operates 
behind a set of rigid administrative codes, which are only accessible to members. In practical 
terms, this means he had no way of determining how HT operate and execute their plans. 
Many social scientists have questioned the usefulness of autobiographical accounts since it is 
difficult to ground the data into a constant and reliable measurement for analysis (Berryman, 
1999).
52
     
 
Secondly, the narrative is exclusively based on autobiographical declarations, which cannot 
be substantiated and offers little scientific value. This brings into question the quality and 
validity of his assertions, as no scientific approach was employed to acquire the data. It is 
vital when dealing with information that has been fashioned by a researcher‘s own 
experiences to use specific techniques to maintain analytical integrity and rigour (Berryman, 
1999). However, the Islamist is not an academic examination of HT and radicalisation, rather 
it is simply a piece of work based on Husain‘s own assumptions and experiences. In that 
regard, the usefulness of the piece is greatly reduced.  
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Beyond the work of Taji-Farouki, scholars have displayed a passing interest in HT. A major 
body of the literature contributing to the discourse on HT in Britain relates to unlocking the 
nature and causes of HT radicalisation. Before I reflect upon some of these contributions, it 
is clear that the individual is greatly influenced by his or her social reality and experiences. 
Hence, my personal experiences and the data collected from the respondents has shown 
personal experiences play a defining role in the radicalisation process. For this reason, my 
review of the literature begins with the generic concern that scholarship on HT of previous 
years has not contributed to unlocking the inner world of HT. This is because scholars have 
not gotten inside HT, and thus my overview of the literature will ultimately expose this 
methodological oversight as the primary reason for a lack of knowledge regarding HT.  
 
I want to start with the piece written by Parveen Akhtar, ‗(Re)turn to religion‘ (Abbas et al. 
2005, pp. 164-176). The author theorises that HT radicalisation is grounded within a 
complex spectrum of religious awakening, in which religion provides an ideological identity. 
Though fascinating, Akhtar cannot substantiate theory with empirical fact. In reality, the 
author makes no attempt to consult primary sources and extract data that may support their 
assertions, which detracts from the content and value of the piece. In particular, the author 
seeks to ‗examine the reasons why Hizb ut-Tahrir appeals to young Muslims‘ without 
articulating or giving voice to lived experience (Abbas et al. 2005, p. 173). The author 
claims ‗studying the group in isolation cannot account for why its qualities suddenly appeal 
to a generation of British Muslims‘ (Abbas et al. 2005, p. 174). This statement perpetuates a 
number of misconceptions. Firstly, HT has not procured mass appeal amongst young British 
Muslims. In fact, they have only gained support amongst a homogenous group of young 
middle class Asian Muslims. Unfortunately, despite claiming to ‗contextualise Hizb ut-
Tahrir‘, the author appears unaware of HT‘s middle class appeal. This makes it essential to 
study the narratives of HT activists, which the author fails to do, in order to gain insight into 
the appeal of HT.   
 
The analysis offered by Lewis (2007, p. 119), in his book ‗Young, British and Muslim‘, 
provides some interesting insight, especially as the author acknowledges HT as ‗a useful 
window into the recruitment techniques, appeal and ideology of radical Islam‘. However, the 
author overly relies on the testimonies of ex-members. In particular, he places significant 
credence in the narrative offered by Shiraz Maher, an ex-HT activist who joined after 2001. 
The account given by Shiraz counterpoises HT radicalism to the ‗Biradri system‘ (cited in 
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Lewis 2007, p. 122). This standpoint ignores the social reality and sociological base of HT 
membership. As my data will show, those young people attracted to HT often emerge from 
secular middle class households, and thus are not socially embedded within the traditional 
paradox of the ‗Biradri system‘. It can be analytically risky to depend solely on narratives 
from ex-activists when trying to ascertain the appeal of HT. This is because the attitudes of 
active members will strongly differ from ex-members, skewing ones research if they rely on 
a pre-selected population (e.g. ex-activists). Another problem with using ex-members is the 
phenomenon of ‗faking‘ (Beere 1979, p. 385). When I conducted interviews with ex-HT 
activists, I quickly realised through my ability to corroborate their narratives with my own 
experiences that most tended to consciously distort and give socially pleasing responses.  
 
Similarly, a piece written by Sadek Hamid attempted to assess whether HT had influenced 
the development of radical Islam in Britain. In particular, the author sought to answer ‗why 
British Muslim youth join HT‘ (Hamid in Abbas et al. 2007, p. 149). The author makes some 
crude conclusions, for example, he believes ‗young people were attracted to HT entirely due 
to their slick appearance, and their ability to be well-spoken and seemingly possess religious 
knowledge at the same time‘ (Hamid in Abbas et al. 2007, p. 150). Despite providing no 
empirical evidence for this claim, it is worth deconstructing this socially constructed 
misrepresentation of HT. Firstly, within the closed circuit of peer group relations, which is 
often the setting for HT radicalisation, young people are attracted to the familiar. As I will 
discuss in my fieldwork chapters, young HT activists were drawn to HT recruiters by sharing 
the same social upbringing and critical life-experiences. Secondly, this account ignores the 
psychological and sociological triggers of radicalisation, reducing the phenomenon to the 
radical group. Thirdly, the author articulates HT radicalisation within a traditional-modern 
paradox, believing HT offer young people a modern re-tailored conception of religion. This 
ignores the non-religious triggers of HT radicalisation, as my data will show religion is not 
necessarily a precursor for joining HT. Overall this article lacks empirical substance, 
unfortunately Hamid does not have any physical access to HT and thus attempts to craft a 
picture of HT from some anonymous ex-members. These singular accounts offer little 
substance in relation to why these men became radicalised (e.g. what is their social 
background and experience). The literature is overwhelmingly dominated by articles looking 
to explain the phenomenon of HT radicalisation from a distance. Subsequently, they do not 
offer any empirical data to corroborate theory as scholars struggle to penetrate HT, which 
greatly weakens their usefulness.   
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Despite an increased focus on HT activism, the vast majority of contributions have failed to 
develop a coherent way to study HT. Therefore, it is not surprising to find that the scholarly 
contributions on HT, presented in this overview, exhibit similar methodological 
shortcomings. Firstly, as mentioned earlier, they tend to make analytical observations from a 
distance, as they are not able to penetrate the interior of the organisation. An article co-
authored by Heleh Afshar, Rob Aitken and Myfanwy Franks, for example, tries to engage 
Muslim identity by using HT as a case study. However, the authors do not refer to a single 
active or ex-member of HT. Consequently, their findings regarding HT are limited to 
exterior observations, which they make from a distance. Consequently, the authors perceive 
HT as a male dominated space, claiming ‗it was felt Hizb ut-Tahrir...were indeed all men‘ 
(Afshar et al., 2005, p. 276). However, as my data in chapter six has shown, HT is equally 
distributed across the gender divide.
53
 Therefore, from a methodological standpoint, it can be 
highly problematic to attempt to piece together the social composition of HT without 
referring to primary data.  
 
Secondly, with the exception of a small handful of studies, there has been a lack of 
ethnographic engagement with HT.
54
 HT radicalisation is a highly complex phenomenon and 
cannot be reduced to generic variables found in broader studies of Islamic activism. This 
makes it essential to contextualise HT, as radicalisation is influenced by multiple-factors and 
variables, which takes place within a specific setting. Therefore, to gain a deep 
understanding of this closed reality, scholars will need to use ethnographic methods in order 
to unlock the closed world of HT.
55
 Thirdly, broader generalisations about Islamic 
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 A useful study conducted of Al-Muhajiroun (disbanded in 2004), a splinter group from HT, by Quinton 
Wiktorwicz (2005) provides some methodological parallels. The research was generated from interviews with 
activists, which they augmented with observation and participation (2005, pp. 30-32). However, Wiktorwicz 
(2005) was only granted surface level access to ALM. For example, he did not observe the Halaqah (e.g. the 
culturing process), and thus was greatly restricted to public activism. Wiktorwicz (2005) imposes a social 
movement theory on Al-Muhajiroun (henceforth, ALM), but utilising an established conceptual scheme can be 
problematic, as it condenses and downgrades a social reality. In particular, radicalisation is framed within the 
social movement paradigm (e.g. the collective), greatly diminishing the role of individual experiences and 
interactions. In particular, the individual is depicted as a passive subject that becomes overwhelmed by the 
social movement; this is again problematic, as the individual narrative is crucial to unlocking radicalisation. In 
order to study radicalisation processes a great deal of psychological and sociological data needs to be woven 
into the work.
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 There are some more recent representations of HT that use ethnographic data to establish scholarly theory. 
Such as Justin Guest‘s (2010) recent publication that examines the phenomenon on social alienation. He uses 
HT, as a partial case study, to explore social and cultural life in the East End. Although, the focus of his study 
is quite different from mine, he does make a number of similar observations about the group. After conducting 
his fieldwork in the East End of London, he also concluded that HT attract young alienated Muslims to the 
group, who have struggled to gain a sense of belonging and acceptance in British society (Gest 2010, p. 96). 
- 50 - 
 
movements were narrowed to fit the HT paradigm. For example, Hamid (cited in Abbas et 
al. 2007, p. 150) believes young people are attracted to HT as they ‗offer an attractive 
ideological alternative to the...inward looking politics of the older generation‘. This 
statement may be true amongst working class Muslims, who are more firmly embedded 
within the traditional identity-community politics of the first generation, but HT activists 
emerge from different social settings and realities. Therefore, trying to develop an 
understanding of HT radicalisation from the myriad of research on other Islamic groups will 
distort the inner reality of HT.    
 
1.7 Empirical Approach: Interviews, Focus groups and Surveys 
 
My primary research goal was to bring together a structured body of empirical knowledge, 
which would allow me to make generalisations and explain the data observed. The 
assemblage of data involved ethnography, in-depth interviews and surveys. The 
ethnographic method lasted several years, during which time I had access to the social 
settings and interactions of HT members. Also, as I will describe, I conducted semi-
structured in-depth interviews with over thirty HT members, providing a rich and stimulating 
source of data. After I had completed the ethnographic and interview stages, I began 
administering a survey. As Bryman (2001, p. 274) points out, it is vital for the researcher to 
use more than one ‗source of data in the study of social phenomena‘.  
 
1.7.1 Exploring Trajectories – Pathways into Radicalism 
 
As I have already mentioned I joined HT in early 1996 when I was at college. HT made 
contact with me when I attended some public talks and events. In 2000, after several years of 
intense indoctrination through ‗Halaqah‘ (private circle), I became a member.56 These initial 
encounters provided me with valuable experiences, which would later serve as my 
motivation to study the causes of HT radicalisation in Britain. The observations I made 
during this period as a member provided me with a unique source of background 
information. When I left HT in early 2002, many issues from my experiences continued to 
affect my thoughts. In particular, I could not understand why HT seemed to attract only a 
homogenous group of young middle class South Asians. From a personal perspective, I 
attributed leaving HT to several factors, but perhaps the most significant issue was to do with 
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 Halaqah is a compulsory circle designed to indoctrinate novices into the group.    
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why I joined in the first place. I was recruited into HT at sixteen. At that age I had not 
developed a stable identity nor had I experienced life, and this made me very impressionable. 
Therefore, I felt it important to address this matter in my study, which required gathering 
new data through lengthy fieldwork, participant observation and in-depth interviews. 
Although I had spent several years with HT, fieldwork experience as an outsider would 
enable me to contrast my experiences with qualitative research. This was very important 
because I wanted to avoid disrupting my findings by looking at things from a purely personal 
perspective. However, I did not want to completely ignore my previous experiences, so I 
used that familiarity to make data collection easier. As a former member, I was fully aware 
of the backgrounds of HT members before I started my fieldwork. This allowed me to locate 
suitable respondents without any difficulty, but I decided to carry out in-depth interviews 
with young members I did not know.
57
     
 
1.7.2 Interviewing Members58 
 
My research began in a participatory manner, because I wanted to monitor members‘ 
activities, thinking that this would provide insight into the social world of the radical. 
However, in documenting the types of group interaction it soon became apparent that there 
were other, much more important issues to be examined in relation to the causes of 
radicalisation. It became clear that I needed to conduct interviews, in part to examine some 
of the ideas that were emerging from the ethnography. It was self-evident that HT is not only 
made up of many separate individuals, but that some of those individuals are alike to one 
another, and so can be differentiated from other members. Thus, trying to paint a portrait of a 
typical HT member in as accurate and vivid a manner as possible is extremely difficult. In 
the end, then, detailed interviews were undertaken, in some instances, more as conversations 
in a series of natural settings. Rather surprisingly, on many occasions the ethnographic work 
and interviews became joined at the hip, particularly when members of group conversations 
began, without any triggering, to reflect on their own and each other‘s life histories. Thus, 
the interviews conducted with the male respondents revealed a rich source of narrative 
concerning the routes taken into HT.
59
 These qualitative accounts concentrate on life 
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 Many regional studies have sought to examine different Muslim communities, such as Birmingham (Joly 
1995), Waltham Forest (Jacobson 1998), Leeds (Geaves 1995), Bradford (Lewis 2002, Knott and Khoker 
1993), Southall (Baumann 1996), Coventry (Ellis 1991) and Tower Hamlets (Eade 1989). 
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 Full breakdown of interview questions can be found in the Appendix (pp. 246-252). 
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 In reference to the ethical standards employed throughout the interview stages, I made extra effort to explain 
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narratives: to be exact, their social background and upbringing, with attention given to the 
context of radicalisation (e.g. how and where they encountered HT).  
 
My research has one key goal, to determine why some young Muslims join HT. In a broader 
sense, I discovered a reciprocal relationship exists between the radical and the social world, 
which provides a pretext for radicalisation. As stated, my reference points were several 
powerful and insightful biographical accounts of HT members. I chose these case histories, 
while interacting with HT members in their natural settings, because they exemplify some 
important theoretical points and provided a rich source of narrative concerning the pathway 
into radicalism. After interviewing twenty-eight male respondents, my findings have 
uncovered some common themes. A recurring theme, which emerged in the accounts from 
my respondents, is that of identity; and how their current identities seemed greatly dependent 
on their past and present experiences. The goal of my research was to map out the ‗turning-
point moments‘ in the lives of HT members who have undergone a life-altering experience 
(Denzin, 1989, p. 7). Consequently, each of the radicals I interviewed exhibits a distinct 
social world of lived experience. Therefore, in chapter four, the accounts I have selected may 
seem somewhat dramatic, but they offer me a glimpse into the construction of a radical in 
different social settings and from rather different perspectives. 
 
The results of my research indicated common traits existed in certain individuals, especially 
prior to joining HT. I identified a host of recurring characteristics within all the respondents. 
Firstly, during early socialisation they had all endured some form of racial discrimination, 
which increased their frustration and anger towards the larger culture. These frustrations at 
being externalised led to their social alienation and developed their need to find a strong 
sense of belonging. Members had not formed stable connections with their social 
environments, which would suggest that respondents‘ current identities are the outcome of a 
failure to integrate with the social context. In this respect, the members needed the group to 
gain a sense of belonging. The HT radicalisation has some generic psychological and 
sociological characteristics, making it somewhat definable. Despite not being a homogenous 
movement, the profile of a UK HT member can be roughly sketched out, which defines the 
key features before and after radicalisation.  
 
In addition to a series of standardised interviews with ordinary HT members, I conducted in-
depth interviews with the former leadership of HT. These documented conversations were 
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designed to explore issues related to the emergence of HT in Britain, identifying the key 
pioneers. I adopted a semi-structured interview approach, as a structured interview would 
have been impossible to plan, because events and activities were not documented. Thus, 
semi-structured interviews gave the respondents flexibility to explain their experiences and 
divulge internal information concerning policy and strategy. For instance, in order to 
document how HT evolved in Britain during the early 1980s required conducting in-depth 
interviews with the key pioneers, notably Farid Kassim and Omar Bakri Muhammad. In each 
interview I constructed detailed interview guides, because members were interviewed from 
various time periods, as recruitment has been taking place over a period of three decades. 
Therefore, this study has entailed conducting lengthy fieldwork that has been carried out 
among HT members. The initial analysis is largely constructed on material collected 
personally, which has been gathered from semi-structured interviews and in part in the form 
of field investigation, among HT members. Thus, the collection of data involved intensive 
fieldwork, participant observation, interviews and specifically designed questionnaires.  
 
1.7.3 Accessing Female Members 
 
When I began this study I chose to look at male and female HT members together. After 
consulting the literature on Muslim women (Hussain, 1984), however, I realised that a 
combined approach would reduce the importance of gender. Conducting a short review of 
the literature on Muslim women, I quickly identified some distorted views about their role. 
Wade and Souter (1992), for example, asserted that Muslim women are unable to lead a 
normal, functional life because of religious and cultural constraints. This implies that 
Muslim women cannot pursue educational and career interests, as they are bound to a 
patriarchal culture. Although I do not fully accept this position, it is very important to look at 
the issue through the experiences of the female HT members. My research has pointed to 
several important themes, such as family upbringing, ethnicity, class and gender. As a result, 
I have looked closely at these and other topics.
60
  
 
1.7.3.1 Using a Focus Group61 
 
In order to access and collect data from female members, I needed to find a way to bypass 
strict HT segregation rules between the sexes.
62
 For this reason, I decided to set up a focus 
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group, because this would allow me to study female members in a more natural and 
comfortable setting than that offered by individual interviews (Marshall and Rossman, 
1999).
63
 I assembled a group of female members to discuss and comment from personal 
experience on the issue of why they joined HT. This allowed me to gain a wider 
understanding of the women‘s shared experiences of everyday life and the influences within 
other social settings. The focus group provided a rich source of data, which allowed me to 
find out why certain issues were salient. I did encounter some problems with this research 
method, however, when talking about indoctrination. The responses of each participant were 
not independent and a few of the more dominant female members skewed the discussion 
about indoctrination. Although this discussion became less reliable, the women did express 
their own definitive individual views openly and confidently.      
 
In order for the focus group to be effective, I had to spend considerable time planning how to 
set up and implement the discussion. After verifying my approach with the literature, I 
sought to gather seven female activists together. Unfortunately, owing to unforeseen events, 
two women chose to opt out and I could only manage to organise one meeting. As Litosseliti 
(2003, p. 8) observes, I had to be very careful in selecting a neutral and accessible venue. I 
chose a central London university, because I was keen to avoid any negative connections 
with the location (e.g. private dwellings and rented facilities). Trying to identify a group of 
female activists was extremely difficult and complex. After several months of contacting and 
negotiating with my inside contacts, and through the use of existing networks, I was finally 
able to secure a group discussion. Initially, I was slightly unhappy with the composition of 
the group because it seemed too homogeneous and I feared that diverse experiences and 
views might not be aired. In the event, this did not prove to be a significant problem, as the 
women appeared eager to communicate their experiences and thoughts. The case study 
presented in chapter five examined a single issue: why a group of young Muslim women 
joined HT. 
 
1.7.4 Control Group 
 
                                                                                                                                                      
62
 Strict HT policies regulate the mixing between the sexes, which is forbidden in relation to group activity.   
63
 There are other definitions used in the literature – such as organised discussion, collective activity and 
interaction (Litosseliti, 2003) – but focus group is my preferred usage. 
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In order to understand why some young British Muslims join HT, while most others do not 
required establishing a ‗control group‘.64 This entailed convening two group discussions. 
The first grouping comprised exclusively of non-affiliated young British Muslims from 
similar social backgrounds as HT activists, who seemed just as zealous about religion and 
politics yet engage in non-radical activism. This control group was very important to my 
research, as I wanted to avoid the common mistake of solely focusing on those who have 
become radicalised. This is quite crucial. If I only concentrated on HT activists, then I would 
not be in a suitable position to work out what made them so dissimilar from those who did 
not join HT. In particular, I managed to track down young Muslim activists
65
 (not affiliated 
to any organisation or group), but who had been approached by HT recruiters. It was 
interesting finding out why HT radicalisation proved to be unsuccessful on these young 
people, despite sharing similar social backgrounds and realities. The second control group 
involved ex-HT members; I wanted to discover what had led them to leave the organisation, 
because the roots of their change and departure are equally as important as those who do not 
join HT.  
 
1.7.5 Sociological Study of HT:  
 
After I conducted my interviews with male and female members, it became incumbent upon 
me to verify this information. I sought to determine whether the views and experiences 
expressed by my respondents were representative of the wider HT population. Therefore, I 
quickly recognized the inescapable necessity for administering a series of surveys. More 
importantly, the surveys became a key mechanism for unlocking the social base of HT 
membership. I needed to understand the nature of social embeddedness of HT members. In 
other words, HT members are fixed and rooted within multifaceted social realities that define 
and confine their social identities. Thus, from a social perspective, my study has 
demonstrated that most HT member‘s identities are fashioned from their social experiences 
and backgrounds – the place of their families in the class structure in which they grew up, 
university and peer groups, the significance of ethnicity and race, and the cultural gap 
between the first and second generations that defines what is expected of children outside of 
the home. This sociological analysis provides an alternative way of looking at the 
developments that have taken place amongst the membership of HT in Britain. Traditionally, 
sociologists are interested in identifying the relationships between social structures and 
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processes, as they place greater emphasis on individuals moving from one social setting to 
another (Erikson, 1950). Therefore, in my sociological chapter, I sought to expound and 
distil upon the key sociological features of HT membership – such as class, age, gender, 
ethnicity and race, and religion etc. By focusing on these interrelated components, I was able 
to formulate a quantitative image of HT‘s membership, which included: demographic 
composition, socio-economic status and origin, recruitment areas, attitudes towards family 
and religion.  
 
1.7.5.1 Sample Survey66 
 
Statistics for the total number of members in Britain cannot be independently verified, as the 
group operates in a clandestine manner. Aminur, a member from South London, suggested 
that the British branch consists of ‗approximately two thousand members‘. While Abdul 
asserted that the group has an ever-expanding membership, which currently stands at ‗five to 
six thousand‟. During my fieldwork, I noticed that this discrepancy in numbers was 
widespread. Many members tended to embellish the size and successes of HT, while others 
underrepresented the party‘s growth in order to remain off the radar, so to speak. This 
uncertainty makes it very difficult to carry out a sample survey, because it is necessary to 
define the target population from which a sample is to be drawn (Pfefferman 2009, p. 34). In 
theory, there are several methods that could be used to determine sample size: (1) national 
lists for small populations; (2) replicating a sample size of comparable studies; and (3) using 
published data (Lyman and Longnecker 2008, p. 277). Firstly, it was not feasible to make the 
entire population my sample, as I cannot locate all HT members. Secondly, no empirical data 
currently exists on HT membership, making it impossible to draw upon other studies. Thus, I 
needed to determine another way for calculating the sample size.  
 
In trying to consider the dynamics of my target population, I was aware HT is relatively 
homogenous. However, I still wanted to analyse my data in multiple ways, for example, 
differentiating between genders, age groups, and so on. After consulting various party 
documents, I found the administrative file of HT. This is a secret document that outlines the 
way in which the group must be structured and organised. I promptly realised that the file 
could be used to calculate an appropriate sample size, which would reflect the population 
being studied. In order to describe this process, I need to first explain some basic issues 
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related to the At-Takattul Al-Hizbi (party structure). Firstly, the Wilayah Committee 
(executive) is a group of elected members entrusted with safeguarding the values, the 
ideological principles and the strategic direction of HT (Anon, 1965). Secondly, the day-to-
day activities of the organisation are delegated to the Local Committees. It is important to 
bear in mind that for a particular area to be constituted as a Wilayah, there must be no less 
than fifteen members, enabling the construction of a Wilayah. Forming the Wilayah 
Committee (WC) requires the number of its members to be five until the number of members 
exceeds two hundred and fifty. Then the number of Wilayah Committee members will be 
distributed in relation to the scale of members in the area. This is determined by the presence 
of an extra fifty members, which will equate to one member in the WC. If the number of 
members exceeds five hundred, then for every extra five hundred members there will be one 
member installed on the WC.  
 
On 13 March 2004, HT announced the results of the UK Wilayah Committee elections.
67
 
More importantly, since nine male members were elected to the WC, I was able to estimate 
the target population, which equates to nine hundred members.
68
 In theory, I could extend 
this calculation to encompass novices, but this would increase the chance of error and 
inference. Indeed, a larger sample that includes novices will only make things worse, 
because it will distort the credibility of the sample. In order to apply a consistent sampling 
technique, it was necessary to establish a large sample. If the population of members is nine 
hundred, then a good sample is 200 because it equates to 22.2 per cent of the population. The 
survey encompassed two main sections: the first part was interested in demographic 
questions and upbringing. The second section of the survey was designed to obtain data on 
location of recruitment, social experiences, religiosity and peer groups.
69
 Thus, in all cases, I 
surveyed ninety-five male and ninety-one female members. 
 
1.7.5.2 Administering the Survey 
 
A general rule for administering a survey is standardisation (Chilisa and Preece 2005, p. 
114). In other words, I had to provide my respondents with a structured set of survey 
questions. However, administering the survey was not an easy task. I arranged to have some 
                                                 
67
 Press statement, 1924.org 17/03/2004 
68
 Nine female members were also elected to the women‘s WC 
69
 Three surveys were invalid, as the randomly selected respondents did not answer several questions properly. 
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casual discussions with my respondents, whom I identified from my previous research, in 
order to ask them about the best way to administer the survey. This gave me the opportunity 
to test my survey, as surveys ‗do not emerge fully fledged‘ (Oppenheim 1992, p. 47). 
Approaching similar types of members as those whom I intended to sample provided me 
with a way to review question format and structure. I realised very quickly that several 
questions had to be rephrased, because they were perceived as ambiguous. In regards to 
administering the survey, there were no simple answers to this question. However, I had to 
develop a method of accessing HT members in such a way to ensure that every member had 
an equal chance of being included in the sample. Although, most simple random samples 
require minimal knowledge of the wider population, I had to use my early observations of 
HT as a basis for accessing the sample. After careful thought, I decided to administer the 
surveys at nationwide events, namely HT‘s annual conference, because this attracts the entire 
UK party fraternity. In the survey data that follows, a total of two hundred members in the 
conference were reported upon.
70
  
 
1.7 Conclusion 
 
The identity of young British Muslims has received new-found attention after 9/11, 
especially as it became apparent that radical Islamist movements were engineering a popular 
base of support. For this reason, I have decided to study HT, because they have become a 
galvanising force within the context of emerging radical Islamist youth movements. The 
sudden rise of HT is connected to providing a growing group of estranged youth a 
meaningful identity. This has enabled them to construct identities that, to some extent, 
control the perceived complexities of western society, offering a broad platform for 
acceptance and belonging. The existing literature has shown a significant gap in empirically 
focused studies on radicalisation. Thus, many social theorists have tried to understand the 
causes of radicalisation, but without being able to study the group from within, they have 
failed to match theory with empirical fact. In contrast, my study has observed some of the 
complex processes that take place within a radical group setting. This has given me an 
invaluable source of data, allowing me to construct a workable theory. This theory will help 
me explain why some young British Muslims are attracted to HT. Thus, my research has 
been narrowed to HT radicalisation in Britain, and yet I still must be careful when drawing 
conclusions about why some young Muslims join HT. In theory, this is because 
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radicalisation is a distinctly personal process. For a radical, the pathway into HT may take a 
variety of trajectories, making the causal precursors unique to his or her experiences and 
interactions. In this respect, my research will aim first to document and catalogue multiple 
biographies of HT radicals in order to map out their trajectory into the group. This will allow 
me to determine whether commonality amongst HT radicals and specific demographic 
susceptibility exists.
71
 More significantly, I will be able to explore the social ‗triggers‘ that 
inspire some young Muslims to HT, giving me a richer portrait of HT radicalisation.       
 
This thesis attempts to tackle the issue of HT radicalisation, an issue, despite the ever-
expanding literature on radicalisation, is still not properly understood. Despite the fact that a 
better understanding of radicalisation has been achieved, there is a great deal missing in our 
knowledge about the contextualised cases of groups like HT. In particular, what kinds of 
conditions and social stimuli prompt some young Muslims to join HT? Why are young 
middle-class South Asians the most vulnerable demographic to HT radicalisation processes. 
Therefore, I seek to bridge this gap, by providing a fully developed and scientific theory of 
HT radicalisation in Britain.    
 
From a historical and contextual perspective, HT emerged as a pioneering radical Muslim 
youth movement, during the early 1980s, in Britain.
72
 What is surprising about the group‘s 
rapid growth and appeal amongst young British Muslims is the fact that its historical origins 
are disconnected from their contemporary recruits, who are primarily young South Asians. In 
order to understand HT radicalisation, it is vital to find out why its allure is focalised 
amongst a homogeneous sub-group demographic, which is uniformly represented by young, 
middle-class, Asians. This disproportionate and unbalanced stratification of HT recruitment 
makes it essential to examine class and ethnicity within the spectrum of radicalisation. More 
significantly, the appeal of HT is not a condition restricted to the poor or uneducated; rather 
their recruitment pool continues to be amongst the ranks of the educated middle-classes. This 
makes it imperative to understand why a disproportionate number of young middle-class 
South Asians appear to be more susceptible to the appeal of HT and why HT have failed to 
attract working class, ethnic minorities? These are just some of the questions I will be 
exploring through the course of this study.  
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Chapter Two: 
The Antecedents of Islamic Radicalism 
 
In this exploratory chapter, I will examine an assemblage of issues related to radicalisation. 
Events such as the 7
 
July 2005 London bombings and the assassination of Dutch filmmaker 
Theo Van Gogh, push social theoretical explanation to its boundaries. These events are often 
of global significance; the chilling testimonies of Mohammad Sidique Khan and Shehzad 
Tanweer make clear reference to the maelstrom of violence in Iraq. These disturbing 
incidents all involve Muslims, who refer to Islam as the major source of their socio-political 
actions and behaviours. But is this an accurate definition of Islamic radicalism? More 
importantly, what processes contribute to the transformation of seemingly ‗ordinary 
Muslims‘ into members of HT (radicals)? In order to focus on these specific contextual 
issues, I have broken them down into two key points. In the first section, the main emphasis 
will be on developing a coherent definition of ‗Islamic radicalism‘. This will require 
classification of the following conceptual definitions: ‗Islamism‘, ‗Islamic fundamentalism‘, 
‗Islamic terrorism‘ and ‗Islamic radicalism‘. A critical evaluation of the main concepts, 
based on existing literature, will show that all relevant debates have been identified and 
analysed. In the second section, a rigorous review of the literature on Islamic radicalism will 
outline the theoretical and the historical antecedents of this phenomenon.  
 
2.1 Definition of Concepts 
 
From my initial review of the literature, I could not avoid the difficult question of how to 
label those HT activists who refer to Islam as the central source of their identity. For the 
purpose of my study, should they be labelled Islamic radicals, fundamentalists, terrorists, or 
are they better defined as Islamists? This was a significant problem that needed to be solved, 
because there was no agreement among social theorists in the literature as to a precise 
definition. The issue of how to define Islamic activity is subject to much debate, making it 
impossible to avoid but, beyond the discussion of usage, lies the more difficult question of 
the nature of the phenomenon itself. However, the two debates, over terminology and 
analytical understanding, are in many ways inseparable in the literature. There are a number 
of reasons for this. Firstly, social theorists tend to extrapolate conceptual definitions that suit 
their methodologies. For instance, Esposito (1992, p. 7) prefers to use the term ‗Islamic 
revivalism‘, as this allows him to equate the antecedents of this broad revivalism to the 
‗failure of secular nationalism‘. He believes that this failure then triggered the greater 
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Islamic renewal (Esposito 1994, p. 7). This view has become largely obsolete, receiving 
considerable criticism, because it seemingly failed to represent the political dimension of an 
Islamic resurgence (Kramer, 1987). In contrast, Roy (1994) uses an assortment of terms such 
as ‗Islamic radicalism‘, ‗political Islam‘, ‗fundamentalist Islam‘, ‗Islamism‘ and 
‗neofundamentalism‘. Roy has been criticised for using a selective and over-generalised 
approach in defining Islamic activism (Hirschkind 2010, pp. 145-181). It is impossible to 
exaggerate the dimensions of this conceptual problem, especially as theorists continue to 
debate newer terms such as: ‗Political Islam‘ (Fuller, 2006; Kepel, 2002), ‗Islamic activism‘ 
(Esposito, 1992), ‗Jihadism‘ (Gerges, 2006; Phares, 2007), ‗Militant Islam‘ (Rashid, 2001) 
and ‗Islamic Fascism‘ (Fukuyama, 2002; Pipes, 2002). The first part of my literature review 
will be focused on resolving this conceptual problem, by evaluating the ways in which 
definitions on the topic have conventionally been organised. It is very difficult to classify 
these contrasting labels, because they have common characteristics. This makes it essential 
to place each concept within a fixed framework, allowing me to systematically eliminate 
alternative explanations and definitions.  
 
2.1.1 Islamism 
 
The concept of Islamism, its meaning and the ways in which the term can be used is a major 
source of debate. For this reason, I will need to trace the origins of the term by focusing on 
the historical features that explain its development and usage, allowing me to place it within 
a contemporary context. The term ‗Islamism‘ was first coined by French academics in the 
mid-eighteenth century (Kramer 2003, p.65). It was a generic term applied to the adherents 
of the Islamic faith, as conveyed by Muhammad. Voltaire (cited in Kramer, 2003), the 
famous French philosopher, first used the label ‗Islamism‘ to describe the religion of 
Muhammad. As a result, the term gained popularity and usage throughout the nineteenth 
century. The most meaningful example appeared in the New English Dictionary, published 
in 1900, in which ‗Islamist‘ was defined as ‗an orthodox Mohammedan‘ (Kramer 2003, 
p.66). This trend towards the recognition of Islam was focused on generating a better 
understanding of Islam as a religion, which neglected the political aspect. The term 
‗Islamism‘ failed to displace the erroneous and, at times, derogatory notion of 
‗Mohammedanism‘. Gibbs (1949, p. 1) argues that many ‗Muslims dislike the terms 
Mohammedan and Mohammedanism, which seem to them to carry the implication of 
worship of Mohammed‘. By the end of the First World War, ‗Islamism‘ and 
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‗Mohammedanism‘ had become redundant terms, as they were widely replaced by the 
favoured Arabic term, Islam. However, the term ‗Islamism‘ reappeared with the emergence 
of Islamic activism and conflict. This meant a distinction was required, to separate this 
modern phenomenon from Islam as a faith. 
 
‗Islamism‘, as a term, gained significant renewal in France during the late 1970s, despite its 
contextual problems; it was no longer seen as a synonym for Islam. The revised term was 
used to represent the political manifestations of modern Islamic movements (Kepel, 1984). It 
was seen as an alternative to the widely accepted term ‗Islamic fundamentalist‘, which 
remained embedded in its original Christian context. Fuller (1991, p. 2) argued that Islamic 
fundamentalism was an unsatisfactory term, while Islamism, he argued, is better placed to 
describe ‗the ideological merits of new Islamic movements‘. The goal of many theorists who 
use Islamism in their arguments is to give greater meaning to events and conflicts that 
provoke Muslims to action. In this sense, Denoeux (2002, p. 61) believes that Islamism 
signifies and correlatives with the upsurge of ideologically driven movements that draw 
directly upon the ‗Islamic tradition in order to articulate a distinctly political agenda‘. There 
were two distinct elements discernible in the definition of Islamism. Firstly, some theorists 
continued to concentrate on newer Islamic movements, restricting its usage and scope 
(Denoeux, 2002; Kepel, 1984; Roy, 2004). Secondly, Islamism was seen as a modern brand 
of political discourse that inspired activism (Esposito, 1992; Sayyid, 1997).  
 
Islamism has attracted considerable attention, but in many ways theorists continue to take its 
definition for granted. This has created a number of problems. Firstly, some theorists have 
focused on the contextual deficiencies of Islamism (Burgat, 1988; Munson, 1988). 
According to Rodinson (cited by Burgat 1988, p. 14), ‗if one chooses this term (Islamism), 
the reader may become confused between an excited extremist who wishes to kill everyone 
and a reasonable person who believes in God in the Muslim manner, something perfectly 
respectable‘. Islamism has received considerable criticism because it has not generated a 
new classification (Munson, 1988). Instead, it has revived an old definition of a concept that 
originated in the late 1850s. The term is extremely ambiguous: modern theorists have 
defined Islamism in many different ways. Some examples include: ‗political philosophy‘ 
(Spencer, 2006); ‗new Muslim movements‘ (Lapidus, 1984) and ‗ideological protest‘ 
(Butko, 2004). Secondly, the boundaries of the term are continually modified, allowing it to 
become aligned with acts of ‗extremism‘ and ‗militancy‘. For instance, Pipes (2001) 
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described Islamism as a ‗totalitarian ideology‘, equating it to a dangerous form of ‗fascism‘. 
In this respect, Islamism has become attributed to acts of violence, but in a British context 
‗only a small minority‘ is devoted to a program of violent confrontation (Ansari, 2007). 
 
Thirdly, Islamism is very general in its description of Islamic group phenomena, which some 
have suggested limits its usefulness (Roussillon, 2001). In 2007 David Cameron, for 
example, declared that the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) espouses Islamist ideals (The 
Telegraph, 31/01/2007). This magnifies the contextual problems of Islamism because it is 
often used to describe a wide array of heterogeneous groups. Roussillon (cited by Kramer 
2003, p. 68) argues that theorists in effect make ‗Muslims into exceptions and postulate one 
truth of Islam that supposedly defines Muslims from one end of the Islamic world to the 
other, creating a confusion between Islam and Islamism, which reduces the analysis of 
contemporary Muslim societies to the discourse and practices of their most radical and 
marginal components‘. Roy (2001) rejects this view, arguing instead that Muslims 
themselves constructed this term. However, Roy ignores the fact that this is a western-
engineered term, originating in France, making it very difficult for many Muslims to 
embrace (Burgat and Dowell, 1993; Yousef and Jobain, 1992).  
 
Fourthly, Islamism does not make a clear distinction between ‗reformist‘ Islam and radical 
Islam.
73
 This is important, because reformists reject the term with respect to themselves. For 
instance, I remember having a lengthy discussion with Imran, a twenty-three-year old 
student and member of the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), about the 2006 transatlantic 
terror plots.
74
 In the midst of the discussion, he suggested that ‗Islamism is a term used by 
liberal Muslims to separate their beliefs from politics‘. Some Muslims find this view of 
‗Islamism‘ rather troublesome, because it offers an excessive partition between ‗Islamism‘ 
and ‗Islam‘, which some find difficult to acknowledge. For instance, during the same 
discussion a number of Muslim spectators interrupted. Ali (student, 21) proudly claimed that 
‗Islam was a complete Deen (way of life)… (And) Islamism implies a deviation from Islam‟, 
while Tariq (Consultant, 28) suggested it was wrong to define those who advocate living 
according to the legal, social and political principles of Islam as Islamist, because most 
Muslims hold these principles. In essence, they were trying to say that one could be a 
Muslim without being an Islamist. For instance, Tariq advocated greater political 
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 ‗Reformist‘ refers to those Muslims that seek to gradually inject the public sphere with Islam and they tend to 
operate within the political system.   
74
 The Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) is a reformist organisation that advocates ‗special‘ group rights for 
Muslims by lobbying various governmental bodies. 
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participation and wider identification with British culture. Ali, wearing his England football 
top, embraced his British identity, feeling well adjusted and fully integrated. However, the 
ideas put forward by them still appear Islamist, as they believe Islam has a political and 
ideological bearing on their social life. 
 
These four contextual problems need to be resolved before trying to develop a broad 
understanding of the term Islamism. According to Burgat (1988), the term Islamism covers:  
 
1) quite a variety of institutional forms, be they local groups or 
international networks, 2) very different political forms, 
underground as well as tolerated, in opposition, and 3) very 
different methods of action, ranging from encouraging 
conversion from within the mosques to more radical social 
action and this also includes violent action (cited in Pederson 
1999, p 16).    
 
This view of Islamism provides a more succinct way of looking at this phenomenon, because 
it encompasses the whole political field.
75
 As Ansari (2007, p. 3) notes, ‗What these trends 
have in common is that they derive their source of legitimacy from Islam‘. This, as Fuller 
(1991) believes, allows Islamists to provide an alternative way of ordering modern society. 
In this respect, much of the confusion surrounding Islamism is to do with its perceived 
monolithic properties. According to Ansari (2007, p. 4) ‗it is necessary to challenge this 
simplistic assumption in order to appreciate properly the complex character of Islamism‘. In 
the context of Britain, for example, there exist numerous Islamic groups with divergent 
viewpoints and objectives. With a few exceptions, most of these groups have non-violent 
aspirations. However, telling these groups apart is difficult, because they all strongly contest 
how Muslims should live and the sorts of government that they should support in Modern 
Britain.  
 
2.1.2 Islamic Fundamentalism 
 
At this point, I want to understand the process by which Islamic fundamentalism emerged 
and the causes attributed, within the literature, to its appeal. Islamic fundamentalism is often 
seen as a ‗distinctively modern movement‘ albeit one with historical antecedents (Woodhead 
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 The ‗political field‘ comprises a host of different political positions that range from liberal to conservative, 
from modern to traditional, from moderate to radical, from democratic to theocratic, and from peaceful to 
violent (Ansari, 2007). 
- 65 - 
 
and Heelas 2000, p. 32). Islamic fundamentalism, as a label, gained notoriety largely due to 
the media coverage of the Iranian revolution (1979), which made it the most cited form of 
fundamentalism (Kramer, 2001). According to Lewis (1988, p. 117), the term is broadly 
recognised, but it can be ‗misleading‘. This is because, from a historical perspective, 
fundamentalism was used to describe Christian doctrines that were based on a literal 
interpretation of the Bible (Armstrong, 2001). However, as a broad term, it is widely applied 
to a multitude of groups outside the corpus of Christianity, especially, but not exclusively, to 
Islamic actors. In this regard, fundamentalism can be applied to those Islamic groups that 
relate contemporary developments to literal interpretations of religious text (Haynes, 1999). 
Omar Bakri Muhammad, for example, uses religious texts both to challenge secular laws and 
to propose a programme for fundamental change.
76
 Under these circumstances it was often 
relatively easy for Omar Bakri to gain the support of those who felt that in some way the 
development of society was not proceeding according to God‘s will. Therefore, Islamic 
fundamentalism is rooted in its ‗aggressive rejection of western secular modernity‘, such as 
declining morals (Woodhead and Heelas 2000, p 32).    
 
Esposito (1992, p. 7) argues that Islamic fundamentalism, as a generic term, fails to represent 
the nature of ‗Islamic activism and Islamic revivalism‘. Similarly, Said (1997. p. xvi) is very 
sceptical of the term Islamic fundamentalism, as he argues that it is employed deliberately in 
association with Islam to ensure that people see ‗Islam and fundamentalism as essentially the 
same thing‘. These contributions suggest that Islamic fundamentalism is an ‗empty and 
therefore meaningless term‘, erroneously and casually employed ‗to refer to a broad 
spectrum of religious phenomena‘ which have little in common (Woodhead and Heelas 
2000, p. 32). Notwithstanding such criticism, the idiom has become progressively more 
common within academic and mainstream circles. Voll (1982) argued that fundamentalism 
remains the most commonly used identification for the various revivalist impulses among 
Muslims. However, since 11 September 2001, the term has lost considerable relevance and 
applicability, since many Islamic groups desire to influence the public arena, while others 
actively work to disengage from social and political issues. As a result, it is asserted, the 
‗broad use of the term has become increasingly irrelevant‘, especially as it is seen as a 
derogatory label, tied to Western presuppositions (Hallencreutz and Westerlund 1996, p. 4).  
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 Omar Bakri Muhammad is a radical Islamist scholar. He was the leading figure in several radical Islamist 
movements, such as HT (UK leader), Al-Muhajiroun (founder 1996) and Al-Ghurabaa (founder, 2003). He fled 
the UK in 2005, seeking refuge in Lebanon, following stories that he would be prosecuted under treason laws.  
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There are still many advocates of the term, despite the analytical flaws inherent within it. 
Munson (1988), for example, accepts the relevance of the term Islamic fundamentalism, as 
he states: ‗I cannot think of an adequate alternative term to characterise those Muslims who 
advocate a strictly Islamic policy‘. Fuller (1991) strongly rejects this view, suggesting it 
implies a narrow return to the primitive structures and traditions of early Islam. He believes 
that Islamic fundamentalism is more reflective of traditional views, and that the term fails to 
recognise the ideological tenets of modern Islamic movements. Similarly, Pelletreau (Middle 
East Policy Council, 1994) warned that Islamic fundamentalism had to be used with 
requisite caution, especially when related to the broad revival of Islam. Muslim activists also 
emphatically reject the use of the term Islamic fundamentalism, principally because it 
reflects negative connotations implied by Western usage (Yousef and Jobain, 1992). 
According to Madani, the leader of the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), 
fundamentalism and Islamism are both unacceptable, because any term but Muslim is 
pejorative by definition. He states: ‗it is Islam that is at work in Algeria, nothing but 
Islam…we are Muslims‘ (cited in Burgat and Dowell 1993, p. 10). In contrast, Sayyid (1997, 
p. 7) describes Islamic fundamentalism ‗as a way of representing and analysing a series of 
events involving Muslim communities‘. This view oversimplifies the divergent trends of 
Islamic activism, reducing its usefulness as a descriptive term. In short, Islamic movements 
are not all fundamentalist and thus cannot be grouped together into one categorisation.  
 
2.1.3 Islamic Terrorism 
 
The rise of terrorism in many western nations is often linked to watershed events, most 
notably 11 September 2001 and 7 July 2005.
77
 In the aftermath of such terror attacks, intense 
and wide-ranging debate has ensued regarding the subject of terrorism. After the 7 July 2005 
attacks, Tony Blair declared that the ‗evil ideologies‘ of Islamic radicals must be combated. 
In doing so, he crucially redefined the phenomenon of global terrorism, as an ideology that 
‗can be used to engage young people at a certain level and in a certain way‘ (Blair, cited by 
BBC 2005). Not surprisingly, a vast amount of research is focusing on the subject of 
terrorism. Parliament and the media are becoming embroiled in combating terrorism, while 
social scientists appear more concerned with uncovering the causes behind the phenomenon. 
Reich (1990, pp. 25-26) suggests that terrorism is ‗a strategy of violence designed to 
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 These are recent events however; earlier examples, such as the Iranian Revolution (1979), the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan (1979-1989), the establishment of Israel (1948) and even the destruction of the 
Ottoman Empire (1924) provide a historical context for Islamic terrorism.    
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promote desired outcomes by instilling fear in the public at large‘. Johnson (1978) makes the 
claim that terrorism is the methodical and measured killing of the innocent in order to 
stimulate panic and fear. It has become increasingly problematic to provide a clear picture of 
what terrorism is, as applied to the contemporary situation, because most definitions are 
vague and subjective (Schmid and Jongman et al., 1988). Clearly, what is termed terrorism 
appears to be contingent upon one‘s perspective and standpoint (Jenkins, 1975).   
 
With regard to my study, it is important to assess whether the term Islamic terrorism can be 
correctly applied to the emergence of Islamic activism. Terrorism, in its most conventional 
usage, is essentially a violent act that deliberately seeks to subvert the social order (Schmid 
and Jongman et al., 1988). By attempting to define terrorism, in its most widely accepted 
usage, it can be appreciated that this term has very little importance to my study. This is 
because most Islamic groups, like HT, cannot be labelled as terrorists according to the most 
common definition.
78
 The problem of definition is exacerbated by the fact that most Islamic 
groups have political ambitions, but openly reject the use of violence. The danger of 
labelling groups like HT as terrorist is compounded when governments try to depict the 
organisation as fanatical and irrational so as to instate a ban on it. Crenshaw (1995) makes an 
interesting point when she asserts that it is difficult to be neutral in the task of definition. For 
instance, by defining the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organisation) as a terrorist organisation, 
the Israeli government precluded recognition or negotiations with it. Thus, for the purpose of 
my research, it is problematic to review the activities of Islamic groups, especially HT, from 
a terrorist perspective. The term ‗terrorism‘ cannot be accurately applied to HT because they 
do not use violence in the pursuance of their beliefs, even though they hold extreme and 
radical ideals. Islamic Radicalism should not be confused with terrorism, as it has distinct 
properties that make it a separate phenomenon altogether.  
 
2.1.4 Islamic Radicalism 
 
One of my earliest discoveries regarding HT was that, to my surprise members often labelled 
themselves as ‗radical‘, thinking it a somewhat less negatively connoted term. Yet, HT is 
desperately anxious not to be thought ‗extremist‘, a view echoed by Imran Waheed 
(spokesman for HT, UK) who said, ‗Muslims want to be able to engage in legitimate 
political expression…without fear of being branded extremist‘. To what degree, I asked 
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myself, could one postulate a difference in definition between ‗Islamic extremism‘79 and 
‗Islamic radicalism‘? These terms are not mutually exclusive, as I came to recognise the 
great heterogeneity among Islamic groups. Nevertheless, one can attribute the use of 
violence more easily to extremism (Keane, 2004). This draws attention to the subjective 
ways in which terms apply to situations, so that acts that appear irrational to one observer 
can seem rational and sensible to another (Wetherell, 1987). For instance, HT is incensed 
when the label ‗Islamic extremist‘ is attached to their activities. This term is seen as 
pejorative, since it implies that their ideology is irrational and unrealistic. In some respects, 
this aversion to ‗extremism‘ is linked to the recent proposal by Tony Blair to ban HT, despite 
the objections of senior police officers (BBC, 19/11/2006). The logic of a ban appears 
grounded in the government‘s assertion that Islamic radicalism is a catalyst for breeding 
extremism and violence (Blair cited by BBC, 19/11/2006). The usage of the term ‗extremist‘ 
does evoke a sense of illegitimacy, but is Islamic radicalism any different? The answer to 
this question lies in the historical context in which ‗political radicalism‘ emerged. The idiom 
‗radical‘ is derived from the Latin word ‗radix‘, which simply means ‗pertaining to the root‘ 
(Heinemann English Dictionary, 1987 pp. 888-89). In a political context, the term ‗political 
radical‘ has various meanings, diverging from a host of political positions, such as extremist, 
fanatic and revolutionary, or it can refer to a progressive liberal.
80
 The disorderly nature of 
the term is caused by its ambiguous history which leads to multiple usages in a host of 
disciplines. 
 
The concept of Islamic radicalism cannot be understood without grasping the meaning of 
political radicalism and offering a historical explanation for its emergence and usage. The 
first person to be described as a ‗political radical‘ was Charles James Fox, in 1797 (Mitchell, 
1992). During this period, the aims of political radicalism were strongly connected to 
electoral reform in Britain, widening to include ‗republicanism‘ (Horowitz 1968, p. 109). 
This became more apparent in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, when it became 
unlawful to publically promote republicanism in France until 1848, so republicans often 
referred to themselves as ‗radicals in order to avoid oppression‘ (Methvin 1978, p. 102). By 
the late 18
th
 century the term was confined to the middle-classes, referring to all those who 
supported the movement for parliamentary reform (Thompson, 1978). However, when the 
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 Extremism is actions and behaviour taken outside of the mainstream political framework, e.g. those who 
advocate violence (Oxford English Dictionary, 2002). By extension, Islamic extremism is the advocacy of 
violence to achieve Islamic ideological and political aims (Wintrobe 2011, p. 5).    
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 Radicalism may also apply to the ‗radical right‘, which is a term often used to describe the politics and 
position of right-wing groups (Hiliard and Michael, 1999). 
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‗popular radicals‘ emerged, they generated extensive agitation amongst the working classes 
in the face of severe government suppression.  
 
‗Political radicalism‘, when it came into popular usage, was applied to mean a total 
opposition to the existing political and social order (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1999). This 
definition was restricted to the ideas of those perceived to be holding extreme ideological 
beliefs, not to their political methods of action. In contrast, contemporary usage of the term 
extends beyond extreme political beliefs, encompassing both ideals and methods. In this 
context, political radicalism could be used to describe those actively pursuing or supporting 
extreme ideological change in society (AIVD, 2006). The point I want to emphasise here is 
that this description does not necessarily imply the explicit use of violence. Why define it in 
this way? One clue is hinted at in the description itself: there must be complete opposition to 
the existing political system. Terrorism is used to subvert the functioning of the existing 
social order, and thus it is not expected to bring about a holistic change. In contrast, political 
radicalism will identify the roots of a social problem, such as institutions and systems, in 
order to begin afresh on seemingly superior foundations. In essence, political radicalism 
seeks to change people‘s ideas and concepts about the social order81, while terrorism is 
designed to exact a measure of revenge and to inflict fear among a target audience (Laqueur, 
1977). In summary, political radicalism refers to fundamental social change, focusing 
political action on the systems and institutions, so as to overthrow the existing social order 
(Bealey, 1999). Therefore, political radicalism involves creating a social change, which 
targets the nature of social structures, institutions, norms and systems (Diamond, 2005).  
 
I have provided a definition of political radicalism, but how can this generalisation be 
extended to encompass the character of Islamic radicalism? Firstly, I need to extract my 
definition of Islamic radicalism from western discourse, or more precisely from political 
radicalism. This is because political radicalism is rooted within a western ideological 
framework which confines it to the extreme right of the political spectrum (Horowitz, 1968). 
There are key elements in the definition of political radicalism that can be incorporated in 
the definition of Islamic radicalism. As discussed earlier, ‗political radicalism‘ refers to a 
comprehensive change of the existing social order (Oxford English Dictionary, 2002). The 
key elements of this definition are ‗comprehensive change‘ and ‗social order‘, which places 
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 It should be noted that ‗social order‘ is a highly contested concept, as many theorists have proposed different 
explanations for what a social order consists of (Hobbes, 2002; Locke, 1998; Rousseau, 1998). In its simplest 
sense, social order refers to a set of interconnected institutions and systems, which remain relatively constant 
over time. 
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Islamic radicalism within a nexus of social and political issues revolving around state-society 
interactions. Islamic radicalism is a distinct doctrine that addresses the social, political, 
economic and cultural problems faced by Muslims in order to provide solutions to them. 
Hasan al-Banna, the founder of ‗Ikhwan al-Muslimun‘ (Muslim Brotherhood) in Egypt, for 
instance, reacted against western imperialism by advocating violent political opposition, in 
order to alter the prevailing social and political realities of the existing system. Ultimately, 
al-Banna sought the total abolition of all political parties in Egypt and the creation of a single 
Islamic party, which he modelled on the one-party system of the Soviet Union (Choueiri 
2002, p. 55). Thus, Islamic radicalism ‗provides a comprehensive critique of the existing 
order‘ (Denoeux 2002, p. 61).  
 
In this respect, a clear distinction can be made between Islamic radicals and Islamic 
fundamentalists.
82
 The latter are inclined towards maintaining traditional values, which are 
perceived to be under threat from unwelcome alien influences, especially secularly 
orientated governments (Fuller, 1991). As a result, Islamic fundamentalists, believing 
themselves threatened by ‗modernisation‘ have sought to reform society in accordance with 
what they believe are suitable Islamic tenets and to change laws, morality and social norms 
(Sivan, 1985). Islamic fundamentalists ultimately seek ‗reIslamisation‘83 in order to create a 
traditional Islamic society, which is less modernised (Roy, 2004; Fukuyama, 2002). In 
contrast, Islamic radicalism is directed towards the political and social configurations of their 
polity, directing their attention towards a complete social upheaval. Al-Ghurabaa, for 
example, is a proscribed radical Islamic group that seeks to destroy the social order in 
Britain, because it represents man-made systems and institutions. According to Abu Hafs 
(member, 31), Muslims living in Britain must ‗distinguish themselves from the social order 
and systems‟ by openly condemning man-made law‘. The goal of Islamic radicalism is to 
replace the existing man-made laws and systems (social order), with the Islamic social order. 
Furthermore, it is crucial at this point to make a clear distinction between ‗Islamic radicals‘ 
and ‗Islamic reformists‘. Those who advocate reform do not seek to comprehensively 
transform the political and social order; rather they desire specific changes to the existing 
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 Both these descriptive labels seek ‗revivalism‘; however, they can be qualified in a way that accounts for 
there contrasting political ends. To start with, Islamic fundamentalism seeks to revive the past, forcing society 
to return to the practice of medieval Islam. In contrast, Islamic radicalism seeks to establish a modern Islamic 
state that incorporates Islamic law, but using components fashioned from modern nation-states (e.g. education 
system, electoral voting for the ruler, decentralisation of political power, and public sector institutions).             
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 Salafi inspired groups seek to establish a society fashioned on the model of Prophet Mohammed, this would 
entail a literal application and dogmatic revival of early Islam (e.g. traditional clothing, banning of television, 
segregation and so on).   
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system. Al-Afghani, for example, advocated political reform, which sought to overthrow 
individual rulers whom he perceived as subservient to foreigners (Keddie 1972, p. 226). 
Similarly, Navvab Safavi advocated elections, but all representatives had to be ‗devout 
Muslims‘ (cited Arjomand 1984, p. 210). Reformists do not challenge the existing social 
order; instead they use religion to contest legislation as to propose a programme for reform.
84
    
 
In many respects, Islamic radicalism and Islamism have very different properties. Islamism 
is a broad term that spans the whole political spectrum, while Islamic radicalism is more 
identifiable. Radicals, for example, have constructed an ideological critique of western 
society, ‗and, on the basis of their critiques of the existing political and socio-economic 
system, they aim to change fundamentally the structure of society, their ambition being to 
replace this system with al-hakimiyya (God‘s governance)‘ (Ansari 2007, p. 6). Most threads 
of Islamism desire political power; on the other hand, there are those who seek gradual social 
and political reform. The MCB, for example, promote greater Muslim participation within 
the existing system as to provide a voice for Muslim issues. However, some political 
commentators have argued that the MCB is an Islamist organisation, albeit with a reformist 
slant (Macloughlin, 2003).
85
 This is clearly a problem, how can I distinguish between 
radicals and reformists? Firstly, Islamic radicalism has to account for the diversity of Islamic 
movements, which can be achieved by positioning it opposite to reformist Islam. This will 
allow me to distinguish between reformists, who choose to practise their religion devoutly, 
and radicals, who use this devotion for political ends. Therefore, ‗Islamic radicalism‘ is 
better suited to my purpose, since it implies that radical groups object to the existing political 
and social order, challenging it, as they ultimately seek to provide a clear political 
alternative. The HT slogan, for example, ‗Khilafah is the solution‘ is a radical notion used to 
attract and mobilise the masses in defiance of the current political systems (Anon, 1996, p.1). 
This makes it easier to separate reformist Islamists, like the MCB, as they are not concerned 
with radically altering the societal infrastructure. Thus, ‗Islamic radicalism‘ refers to a 
movement to overthrow an old regime and effect complete change in the fundamental 
institutions of society.  
 
I have used the term ‗Islamic radicalism‘ from specific theoretical and historical sources, 
making it easier to identify the characteristics of radical Islamic groups. At this point, it is 
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 The MCB support of Yusuf al-Qaradawi and Hamas has been seen as an illustration of its Islamist 
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crucial to document briefly the radical attributes of HT, providing a practical illustration of 
Islamic radicalism.
86
 There are two identifiable characteristics that make HT a distinct 
radical group: its ideology and its dogmatic interpretation and implementation of its ideology 
(often referred to as its methodology).
87
 Firstly, the ideology is the fundamental principle on 
which HT has developed its distinct ethos. According to al-Nabhani (2002b, p. 21), an 
ideology ‗is a rational doctrine from which a system emanates‘. The ideology is defined as 
an all-encompassing theory, making it the central point of reference for temporal and 
spiritual problems. The advancement achieved by non-Islamic ideologies is false, according 
to HT, because the growth accomplished is ‗devoid of the relationship with God‘ (Al-
Nabhani 2002a, p. 14). Secondly, by implementing HT ideology, the problems of the 
Muslim and non-Muslim world will be resolved. The current decay is a human problem, 
affecting all societies, the solution of which requires the seizing of political authority. The 
Islamic ideology will transform all the existing state institutions and systems (educational, 
political, social, judicial and economic), giving full political sovereignty to Islam (Al-
Nabhani, 2002a). Finally, HT is the sole interpreter of ideology, making their ideology 
uncompromising and dogmatic, since they claim to speak with divine mandate. HT‘s 
ideology is a useful example of Islamic radicalism, because it wants to establish a ‗new 
social order‘, namely Islam, over the whole world.88   
 
2.2 The Antecedents of Islamic Radicalism  
 
This section will provide a thorough review of the relevant literature, which has contributed 
to my understanding of the causes of Islamic radicalism. Islamic radicalism does not emerge 
randomly, or in a vacuum. Rather, it is stimulated by specific causative factors that differ 
according to the context in which Muslim radicalisation has emerged. Although multiple 
predictive variables tend to recur throughout much of the research, many theorists do 
acknowledge that no single variable or theory exclusively explains the processes of ‗Islamic 
radicalism‘. To understand Islamic radicalism and its impact on Muslim identity, especially 
in a global context, a proper investigation of the following relevant causes needs to be 
carried out: ‗globalisation‘ (Ahmed, 1994; Ameli, 2002; Roy, 2004), ‗secularism and 
modernisation‘ (Esposito, 1992; Lewis, 1990), ‗frustration – political, social, economic, 
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 Refer to chapter three for more insight into HT ideology (pp. 73-83). 
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 Unlike traditionalist and fundamentalist groups, HT does not seek to establish a state literally based on early 
Islam; rather it wants to create a modern Islamic state that incorporates modern institutions but retaining Islam 
as the sole source legislation.  
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cultural disaffection ‘ (Crenshaw, 1981; Gurr, 1970; Hoffman, 1998; Piven and Cloward, 
1977; Roy, 2004), ‗intensification of religiosity‘ (Buckser and Glazier, 2003), ‗psychological 
traits‘ (Crayton, 1983; Jenkins, 1979; Post, 1990) and ‗group dynamics‘ (Sageman, 2005). 
Since these contributions to the literature have offered significant insights, I have abridged 
the most relevant theories, in the subsequent sections, in order to help me identify the 
context in which Islamic radicalism has emerged among some Muslims.  
 
2.2.1 Globalisation 
 
I have confined my study of globalisation to its cultural domain, because this overriding 
characteristic penetrates every facet of society (Baudrillard, 1993). In a general sense, 
‗cultural globalisation‘ has facilitated greater interconnectedness, especially concerning the 
global flow of culture, which has prompted a few dominant cultures to influence native 
cultures (Andrews, 1998; Beyer, 1998; Pieterse, 1995). The key issue that needs to be 
addressed here is whether ‗cultural globalisation‘, at the local and global level, has had an 
impact on Islamic radicalism. According to Roy (2004), Islamic radicalism is largely the 
result of the globalisation of Islam, and not just a by-product of the crisis in the Middle East. 
Haddad and Esposito (1997, p. xvi) believe that for Islamic radicals the ‗primary threat of 
the West is cultural rather than political or economic‘. This cultural dependency, they argue, 
deprives people of their identity, destroying ‗Islam and the Islamic community far more 
effectively than political rule‘ (Haddad and Esposito 1997, p. xvi). Globalisation processes 
are therefore often thought to have consequences for Islamic radicalism, because of the 
cultural reaction to ‗westernisation‘ by traditional Muslim societies (Roy, 2004). In this 
context, globalisation is perceived as a fragmenting process, synonymous with 
‗westernisation‘, which erodes the socio-religious identity of Muslims (Beyer, 1994; 
Featherstone, 1995; Pieterse, 1995; Waters, 1995). This view would suggest that 
globalisation is a highly destructive process, tantamount to a newly conceived form of 
Western imperialism (Cvetkovich and Kellner, 1998). Some theorists have questioned the 
assumptions underpinning this position, drawing a distinction between ‗westernisation‘ and 
globalisation (Giddens, 1990). In contrast, Beyer (1994, p. 82) argues that globalisation has 
introduced western modernity to the ‗non-west‘, which is perceived as ‗less global‘. This is 
further complicated by the fact that western values originate from a secular tradition, while 
Islam derives much of its cultural heritage from religious sources. Within this context, it is 
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important to try to understand how Islamic radicalism arose, and why secularism and 
modernism have helped incite Muslim radicals to action. 
 
2.2.2 Secularisation and Modernisation 
 
Why has Islamic radicalism become such an important political and social actor in the 
world? A number of competing explanations have been put forward, yet the most 
consistently proposed explanation is still the assumption that Islamic radicalism is a response 
to secularism and modernisation (Esposito, 1992; Huntington, 1997; Lewis, 1988; Roy, 
2004). According to Kepel (2005, p. 225), Islamic radicals are ‗living symbols‘ of the failure 
of modernisation. Fukuyama (2002) argues that the emergence of Islamic radicalism, in a 
sociological sense, is not dissimilar from the antecedents of ‗European fascism in the early 
20
th
 century‘. He believes that the Muslim world has experienced large-scale population 
displacement, making this ‗new form of radical Islam‘ more appealing as it emphasises ‗the 
loss of values and cultural disorientation that the modernisation process itself has 
engendered‘ (Fukuyama, cited in Newsweek January, 2002). It was widely believed that the 
developing world would become secular as it modernised, urbanised and industrialised 
(Haynes, 1999). When these states emerged from the legacy of colonial rule, it was thought 
that they would adopt the western model, in which religion lost its public significance. 
Instead, greater connections were forged between religion and politics, for instance in the 
Iranian revolution (1979). According to Falk (2001, p. 61), the failure of secularism was 
inevitable, as such a tradition ‗is not indigenous to such countries and as an artificial implant 
is not nearly as deeply rooted in the cultural life of such societies‘. Consequently, Lewis 
(1988, p. 52-58) argues that the global expansion of secularism has triggered the Muslim 
world into a reactionary struggle against the West‘s secular heritage. Secularism excluded 
the consideration of religious identity as a viable expression of ‗sovereignty‘, invoking 
greater resistance towards the privatisation of religion (Jorgensen, 1992).    
 
Globalisation processes have had a major impact on developing countries, most notably in 
strengthening ethno-religious identities, which has reduced the relevance of secularism. 
According to Weigel (cited in Huntington 1993, p. 26), a global religious revitalisation is 
taking place, in which religious actors are actively advocating the ‗un-secularization of the 
world‘. This assumption has, in some respect been supported by the revival of religious 
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markers in many parts of the world.
89
 According to Esposito (1998, p. 19), the ‗global 
religious resurgence has challenged the expectations of modernisation theory, the 
progressive secularisation and Westernisation of developing societies‘. He believes that 
religion has become a major ideological, social and political force (Esposito 1998, p. 19). 
The emergence of radical Islamic groups concerned with political and social issues indicates 
‗undeniable evidence of a deep malaise‘ in Muslim society (Kepel 1994, p. 24). In recent 
decades, the increasing appeal of Islamic radicalism has coincided with the intensification of 
globalisation. This demonstrates in some way that this is a reaction against the expansion of 
western culture. However, this is not a phenomenon restricted to the Muslim world. In fact, 
the great majority of the third world, as well as some countries in the west, have recast 
religion as a significant source of identity. According to Marshall (1998, p. 16), this vital 
quest for identity and authenticity is a native response to the changing conditions brought by 
globalisation. It would be problematic to assert that modernism and secularism are definite 
preconditions for Islamic radicalism, given the diversity of political circumstances in 
different parts of the world – from Latin America to Asia and Africa.  
 
For the purposes of my study, it is important to note that globalisation has aided the growth 
and influence of radical Islamic groups. In fact, the expansion of Islamic radicalism, and 
much of its appeal, is owed to global networks for information exchange. Islamic groups 
have quickly harnessed the strengths of modern technologies, and advancements in global 
communications have allowed radicals to spread their message across the globe in seconds. 
For instance, the countless videotapes featuring Osama bin Laden, which have surfaced over 
the years, are distributed via the internet to a global audience. According to Rudolph and 
Piscatori (1997), Islamic groups use global networks to exchange ideas and raise funds for 
activism. This was made more apparent by the efforts of the United States to cut off financial 
support for al-Qaeda by confiscating assets and strictly controlling the flow of global finance 
(Levitt, 2006). George (1996, p. 12) believes that Islamic groups in the Middle East have 
‗spread very quickly‘ in a global manner, through a ‗network of intellectual and political 
contacts between societies‘. The use of global networks has one primary objective: to 
maintain the integrity of the global Muslim community. Roy (1994) asserts that Islamic 
radicals‘ vision of global Ummah is both a mirror of, and a form of revenge against, the 
globalisation that made them what they are. For instance, the issue of Bosnia drew many 
                                                 
89
 This religious upsurge is not restricted to the developing world. A Christian revival, for instance, has taken 
root post-9/11 in the United States. In fact, former President George W. Bush described this newfound religious 
devolution as the ‗Third Awakening‘, taking place in the backdrop of ‗a confrontation between good and evil‘ 
(The Washington Post, 13/09/2006).   
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young Muslims into greater action, creating a renewed sense of global community (Ahmed, 
1994). The notion of a global community, or Ummah, constitutes a shared sense of 
belonging, and provides a devotee with a ‗collective identity‘ (Ahmad, 1997; Dallal, 1995). 
Globalisation has been crucial to the development of a global community, helping Muslims 
become increasingly religious and politically active (Rudolph and Piscatori, 1997). As Beyer 
(1994, p. 1) puts it, ‗we live in a globalizing social reality, one in which previously effective 
barriers to communication no longer exist‘. As a result, many young Muslims appear more 
politically aware of perceived Muslim suffering, such as that in Iraq and Afghanistan 
(FOSIS, 2005). Paz (2002, p. 1) describes this reaction as the ‗brotherhood of the oppressed‘. 
These global events have triggered an acceleration of recruitment among young Muslims 
into radical Islamic movements, illustrating the effect of globalisation (Fawaz, (2006).  
 
More importantly, the national context has been greatly affected by globalisation; Islamic 
movements have been inspired by global developments which have had an impact on their 
political and social goals (Haynes, 1999). The effects of modernisation, especially on the 
national and local levels, challenge traditional values. According to Jameson (1998, p. 58), 
the concept of ‗national culture‘ has been significantly weakened by cultures that have been 
imported through the flow of cultural globalisation. This aroused a new sense of religious 
identity, providing considerable renewal, which is not restricted by class or gender. Clearly, 
one cannot describe this phenomenon as simply a modern expression of class upheaval, 
using religion as a substitute for class. Recent studies have shown that Islamic radicalism has 
a high level of appeal among the educated middle classes, concentrating its recruitment in 
urban centres – areas greatly shaped by globalisation processes (Crenshaw, 1981).   
 
2.2.3 Frustration – Socio-Political, Economic and Cultural Disaffection 
 
In order to identify the most likely settings for Islamic radicalism, one must explore the 
political, social, economic and cultural causes of this phenomenon. A commonly cited 
trigger of Islamic radicalism is frustration, which is usually inspired by environmental 
conditions. The underlying assumption is that frustrations are a predictable reaction to 
defined stimuli, prompting extreme behaviour and collective action (Burgat and Dowell 
1993; Dekmejian 1995; Keddie 1995). Empirical research conducted by Buss (1961), 
Berkowitz (1962), and Himmelweit (1950), has shown that frustration can be caused by a 
diverse set of social conditions. The anger induced by frustration can be a strong motivating 
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factor, which if sufficiently prolonged, might trigger radical behaviour. According to 
Appelbaum and Chambliss (1997), a precipitating event is required before a change in 
behaviour occurs, which they refer to as a ‗trigger‘. According to Gurr (1970, p. 36), ‗men 
who are frustrated have an innate disposition to do violence to its source in proportion to the 
intensity of their frustrations‘. If frustration is believed to occur once a sufficient stimulus 
has been triggered, then what are the sources of Muslim disaffection?  
 
2.2.4 Economic Disaffection 
 
The division of wealth and rising inequalities have been suggested as possible causes of 
Islamic radicalism. Brandt (1980) famously proclaimed ‗while hunger rules peace cannot 
prevail‘. This rather apt statement simplifies the poverty argument, which has been 
suggested by Murphy (1999), Hoffman (1998) and Fukuyama (2002). According to Hoffman 
(1998, p. 209), poverty is a significant factor in stimulating radical Islam because it leads to 
‗desperation and desperation to violence‘. Similarly, Lewis (2004, p. 119) asserts that 
‗massive unemployment‘ appears to be a significant factor in fostering young Muslim 
disaffection, providing a pathway into radical Islam. Recent trends concerning global 
poverty indicate a considerable increase. For instance, between 1995 and 2001 the number of 
impoverished people rose by twenty per cent (Azam, 2001). Galtung (2002) believes that the 
‗Third World – First World dichotomy‘ has reformatted traditional class conflicts based on 
structural violence. However, varying economic conditions across the globe do not directly 
correspond with the occurrence of Islamic radicalism or social upheaval (Hafez, 2003; Tilly, 
1978). The problem with this assertion is amplified by the lack of social upheaval in the 
developing world, which makes it difficult to apply this view of structural violence as a 
causative feature of Islamic radicalism. Economic deprivation may be a trigger that leads to 
frustration among the working classes, but Islamic radicalism is not inherently a working 
class phenomenon. For instance, the Iranian revolution took place under stable economic 
conditions, and from a wider Muslim context this argument fails to match the antecedents of 
Islamic movements (Hafez, 2003). Some social theorists have attached too great an 
importance to this variable, because the vast majority of profiles of Islamic radicals indicate 
that they are from economically stable backgrounds (Crenshaw, 1981; Hovland and Sears, 
1940; Mintz, 1946). A survey of Hizballah found that the group has minimal support among 
the working classes. Instead the vast majority of its affiliates come from the ‗middle and 
upper classes‘ (Harik 1996, p. 55). Furthermore, Snyder and Tilly (1972) conducted a 
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significant study which showed no substantial correlation exists between collective violence 
and economic hardship; instead they found that levels of collective violence were determined 
largely by the degree of conflict over resources, amount of political activity and the extent of 
state repression. This motivating factor does not therefore provide insight into the causes of 
Islamic radicalism, especially among young Muslim radicals in Britain, since the majority 
emerge from middle-class backgrounds.  
  
2.2.5 Cultural Disaffection 
 
The formation of strong cultural attachments can shape and motivate people to commit acts, 
such as ‗martyrdom operations‘, which appear unreasonable to outside observers. These 
deep-seated associations stem from a ‗tradition of learnt rules of conduct‘ (Hayek 1992, p. 
12). For instance, religion is considered to be the most intense of cultural identifiers, because 
it entails an association with a deeply-held belief system. Schiffman (1999, p. 2) argues that 
cultural identity is shaped from a sense of ‗people-hood‘, which he believes is a natural 
aspect of group identity. He contends that this collective identity is passed down from each 
generation, connecting individuals by solidarity with a larger collective that differentiates 
members of the group from non-members. According to Monroe and Kreidie (1997), a major 
determining factor behind Islamic radicalism is ‗perspective‘, because radicals see 
themselves as symbols of their religion. This assumes that radicals perceive ‗outsiders‘ as a 
threat to their cultural heritage, which gives vigour to Islamic radicalism. According to 
Sayyid (1997, p. 22), Islamic radicalism is an indigenous ‗response to inclusion in a western-
led global system‘. Similarly, Moore (1966) believes that when an established culture has 
begun to be eroded, threatening some of the population, people have responded by 
reaffirming the traditional ways of life with increasing energy. This fear, pertaining to a loss 
of culture, is stimulated by what Taylor (1991) described as the ‗malaise of modernity‘. 
Eisenstadt (1983) believes the ‗clash of cultures‘ has a destructive effect on members of the 
weaker culture, who become socially excluded and reviled.  
 
Within this context, some social theorists contend that cultural differences and religiously 
based identities are the primary sources of conflict (Fukuyama, 1992; Huntington 1997; 
Kaplan, 1994; Lewis, 1990). According to Lewis (1990, pp. 52-58), this conflict is rooted in 
ancient tensions between ‗two rival civilisations‘. Similarly, Huntington (1997) equates this 
conflict of cultures to deeply-held beliefs which are incompatible with western tradition. He 
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believes that this will create a ‗clash of civilisations‘ (Huntington 1997, p. 109). 
Furthermore, Kaplan (1994, p. 56) believes that cultural differences will erupt in ‗extreme 
global violence‘. However, this monolithic view of cultures is problematic. Firstly, there is 
no single unifying conception of Islam. This makes it difficult to assign a fixed monolithic 
meaning, because Islam is shaped by diverse historical, ethnic and traditional interpretations 
(Hunter, 1998). Secondly, these culturally based explanations do not account for internal 
tensions within the Islamic civilisation, such as the Sunni-Shiite conflict. Thirdly, this view 
assumes that religion will become the most pronounced marker of identity, yet in other parts 
of the world religion is less active (Mahbubani, 1993). Culturally based explanations tend to 
create a position of incompatibility between the west and the Muslim world, giving rise to a 
fixed monolithic entity. In reality, this oversimplification neglects the complexities of the 
Islamic tradition, even as a strong primordial bond, Islam does not induce its followers to 
form a cultural bloc. 
 
2.2.6 Socio-Political Disaffection 
 
Causes of Islamic radicalism can be found in influences emanating from the socio-political 
environment in diverse global and national settings, encouraging individuals to interpret their 
experience of harsh conditions in a negative way (Fanon, 1968; Piven and Cloward 1977; 
Swilling, 1987). This type of disaffection has been described as the subjective feeling of 
powerlessness and a lack of confidence in the processes, systems and institutions of a given 
society (Di Palma 1970, p. 30). Socio-political frustration can be a strong motivator in 
seeking better conditions, heightening widespread disaffection. In the wake of the French 
Revolution, de Tocqueville (1856, p. 176) declared that if the source of socio-political 
disaffection were ‗patiently endured‘ then it would become ‗intolerable once the possibility 
of removing it crosses men‘s minds‘. This type of disaffection can be aroused in a number of 
different ways. Some examples include: ‗casual conversations‘ (Perry and Pugh, 1978), 
‗exposure to rhetoric‘ (Reich, 1948), and ‗exposure to the media‘ (Posel, 1989). However, 
the most powerful source of this disaffection occurs when individuals become active 
participants in a movement that makes these socio-political issues a distinct cause (Coser, 
1974; Swilling, 1987).  
 
In a British context, Lewis (2004) argues that young Muslims are drawn to the cause of 
radical Islam by political and social disaffection. In particular, he believes that Muslim youth 
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lack a sense of ‗belongingness and togetherness‘ inside British society (Lewis, 2004, p. 201). 
The 2001 riots in the North of England highlighted a cluster of attitudes relating to a lack of 
engagement and under-representation, which left many young Muslims feeling disaffected 
from the state. Generally speaking, this disaffection is stimulated by various frustrations that 
are connected to unfulfilled expectations (Gamson, 1975). In a political context, disaffection 
can occur when an individual loses confidence in the government‘s ability to resolve 
problems they regard as important (Dahl, 1971). This socio-political imbalance has 
considerable impact on identity construction, as young Muslims struggle to think, feel and 
act in accordance with their national ‗level of self‘ (Turner, 1991). From a global 
perspective, the Muslim world is stimulated by diverse socio-political conditions, which are 
likely to be affected by changing social forces, such as ‗urbanisation, modernisation and 
industrialisation‘ (Hayness, 1999). Piven and Cloward (1977) argue that active resistance 
groups form when newfound political awareness is achieved. Thus, political disaffection is 
linked both to social changes and to authoritarian politics in the Muslim world, which are 
combustible material for political radicalism (Fukuyama, 2002).  
 
In summary, frustration relates to unfulfilled expectations; if this condition persists it can 
result in disaffection (Crosby and Hennigan, 1977). In this situation a precipitating event is 
required before a change in behaviour occurs. A recent survey of Muslim students found that 
83 per cent were frustrated by US aggression towards the Muslim world (FOSIS, 2005). The 
relationship between disaffection and frustration can be strengthened if an individual 
perceives that change will not occur, such as the failure of mass protest to change a political 
outcome, intensifying disaffection. Frustration can breed disaffection, as it emphasises 
feelings of loss and powerlessness, often becoming more violent (Kelly and Nicholson, 
1980). This view is problematic because many parts of the world experience disaffection and 
frustration, but they do not exhibit higher levels of violence. Therefore, it is somewhat 
problematic to assign fixed or monolithic causes to Muslim frustration, because this 
oversimplifies the complexities of Muslim communities, states, and groups (Nair, 1997). In a 
British context, Muslims are one of the most deprived social groups in the UK, but this alone 
does not account for frustration. HT, for instance, is predominantly composed of white-collar 
professionals, educated to degree level, many of which are employed in large commercial 
firms in the city.
90
 Why do some Muslims with similar levels of frustration and disaffection 
decide to join different Islamic groups? The Iraq War, for example, can trigger different 
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social responses among Muslims, such as depression, apathy, non-violent demonstrations, 
and in some extreme instances ‗Jihadism‘. If Muslims can be stimulated by the same 
frustrations, then frustration alone cannot distinguish non-radical and radical behavioural 
choices.
91
 Frustration is only one, and not necessarily the most important, factor affecting the 
expression of radical behaviour (Bandura, 1977).  
 
2.2.7 Intensification of Religiosity 
 
Many social theorists view religious renewal as a salient dynamic of identity change 
(Buckser and Glazier, 2003). This argument presumes that a radical is first galvanised by a 
spontaneous, in some cases gradual, intensification of religiosity. According to Esposito 
(1992, p. 12), ‗the indices of an Islamic awakening in personal life are many: increased 
attention to religious observances, more emphasis on Islamic dress and values‘. Esposito 
(1992) believes this extensive renewal of religion has been supplemented by Islam‘s 
reaffirmation within civil society, through governments and opposition movements both 
seeking to appeal to the popularising of Islam. According to Browers and Kurzman (2004, p. 
165), in times of ‗great social transformation‘, a natural recourse is the ‗revival of religion‘. 
However, recent studies have generally shown that this variable is not significant, especially 
since very few Islamic radicals undergo a powerful transcending religious experience. 
Merari (1980, p. 206) conducted extensive interviews with Islamic radicals; he noted that 
religion seemed to be relatively unimportant in the phenomenon of Islamic radicalism. The 
more evidence of debates about Islamic radicalism that I amassed, the more unimportant 
‗religiosity‘ became. Hussain Osman, one of the 21/7 failed suicide bombers, insisted that 
‗religion‘ played no role in his motivation to carry out terror attacks (Campbell and Hooper, 
2005). In contrast, he suggested that the sight of war in Iraq, as portrayed through ‗Jihadist‘ 
propaganda videos, stirred his response. It can be greatly problematic, when trying to 
identify the causes of Islamic radicalism, to focus on religion, because there is no correlation 
between religiosity and membership of radical Islamic groups. According to Harik (1996, p. 
41), members of Hizballah in Lebanon do not display greater levels of religiosity than do 
adherents of secular parties. This sentiment agrees with surveys conducted in Palestine, 
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frustrations as HT activists, the respondents opted for non-radical trajectories. This is because there are 
different channels for frustration. In particular, most non-radical activists sought either local community 
outreach projects or charity organisations. According to Irfan (participant in control group 1), ‗HT ignore local 
problems and issues…they only care about politics and establishing the Islamic State but this does not address 
the needs of Muslims in the community‘ 
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which indicated that less than three per cent of Palestinians desire an Islamic state (Public 
Opinion Poll No. 42, 2001).  
 
2.5.8 Psychological Explanations  
 
In approaching the problem of why some individuals become drawn to Islamic radicalism, 
psychologists tend to view personalities as single entities (Fromm, 1939; Lecky, 1945; 
Mead, 1934; Rogers, 1951). There is an implicit assumption here that I find problematic. 
Psychology, in the broad sense of the term, has a tendency to remove phenomena from their 
social context. For instance, some psychologists wrongfully assert that Muslim radicals 
exhibit a mental imbalance, as a result of suffering ‗narcissistic injury‘ during childhood 
(Crayton 1983, p. 37; Post 1990, p. 25). It is difficult to validate such a narrow perspective, 
since it presumes that radicals are mentally dysfunctional, and neglects other social stimuli. 
According to Crenshaw (1981, p. 12), ‗the outstanding common characteristic‘ of Muslim 
radicals is their ‗normality‘. Likewise, Merari (1980, pp. 279-80) conducted extensive 
interviews of the friends and family of suicide bombers; he concluded that such radicals 
were not ‗psychopaths‘, and in most cases they did not have any ‗psychological flaws‘ that 
set them apart from ordinary citizens. Silke (1998) argues that it is very rare to find a radical 
who suffers from a clinically defined personality disorder, or who could be regarded as 
mentally ill in any other way. Therefore, it appears that, in most instances, radicals do not 
exhibit any mental illness. The causes of Islamic radicalism cannot be explained simply by 
innate psychological traits, because this neglects the social settings from which radicals 
emerge (Fanon, 1968; Gurr, 1970; Piven and Cloward, 1977; Swilling, 1987). Having 
established this, profiles of mentally unstable individuals would seem to be of little, if any, 
use in determining why some young Muslims become radicalised.  
 
2.5.9 Group Dynamics  
 
An increasingly powerful argument, that has been given greater currency in recent years, 
relates to the radical group itself (Gould 1991; McAdam 1986; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; 
Stark and Bainbridge 1980). According to McAdam (1986), social networks provide a 
consistent pathway into social movements. Within these movements the individuals are 
organised into small cells and given countless hours of intense spiritual training, resulting in 
the creation of a collective identity (Brooks, 2002). However, within the field of social 
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psychology, theorists have conceptualised the notion of the group in multiple ways. Sherif 
(1969) associates group dynamics with social structures in the form of a family, which 
determine status and role relationships. According to Mead (1934), Asch (1952) and Lewin 
(1948) the individual and group identities need to be examined in connection. However, the 
most vital component in the group dynamic is a shared conception of the members as 
belonging to the same social unit (Hitch, 1983). Therefore, identity emerges from people‘s 
common perceptions of themselves as members of the same group. Islamic radicals enter the 
group and are immediately subjected to indoctrination that contains aspects of glorification 
of their own group, religion and extensive anti-enemy propaganda (Moghadam, 2003). More 
importantly, the group acts as the sole interpreter of ideology, forcing the novice to be 
completely dependent upon the radical group. Knutson (cited in Sprinzak 1990, p. 79) 
believes that as radicalisation becomes more embedded, ‗the collective group identity takes 
over much of the individual identity of the members‘. According to Sageman (2005), the 
social networks of friends, formed while uprooted from their home environment, provide the 
radical group with a wealth of recruitment.
92
 However, some have argued that this 
hypothetical explanation of the causes of Islamic radicalism greatly ignores the individual 
life histories which directly contribute to the following of radical pathways.  
 
2.3 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has posed many theoretical questions concerning Islamic radicalism. My initial 
focus was on navigating the immense confusion caused by ambiguous definitions, in which 
interconnected theories were respectively used to understand divergent issues such as 
‗terrorism‘, ‗Islamism‘, ‗fundamentalism‘ and ‗radicalism‘. Although these terms appear 
broadly connected, they are in fact unsystematically applied to similar realities, 
compounding the problem. Moreover, they do not necessarily refer to the same phenomenon. 
Fundamentalism, for example, is still used to describe Islamic activism, but it is firmly 
embedded within a religious dimension. Despite the fact that I prefer using the term Islamic 
radicalism to describe HT activism, it is not a blanket description of all forms and types of 
Islamic activism. Rather, the framework of Islamic radicalism is relatively restricted to 
Islamic groups that seek to change the whole social and political structure of society, which 
implies they are more politically orientated. This does not provide systematic insight into the 
discrepancies and evolutionary character of Islamic movements. Therefore, the aim of 
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addressing the terminological issues was to make some formal distinctions in the application 
of radicalism, as it applies to HT, so its meaning is distinguished from similar terms like 
fundamentalism and Islamism.       
 
Even though this chapter has brought different threads of radicalisation theory together, it is 
still extremely difficult to fit and frame HT radicalisation into one of these theoretical 
threads. It is rather clear that a large portion of young British Muslims feel frustrated and 
socially excluded, but what pushes some of these young people to join HT. Within the broad 
literature regarding radicalisation, there is a great deal of emphasis placed upon trying to 
unlock the causative triggers of the phenomenon. For this reason, theorists have sought to 
identify the roots of young Muslim grievances. The theories that have sprung forth as a result 
are quite extensive and far-reaching: such as, social deprivation, increase in religiosity, 
identity crisis, and a host of others. However, none of these theories provide a satisfactory 
insight into why some young British Muslims join HT. When I surveyed the plethora of 
possible causes behind young Muslim frustration, I was struck by the fact that these 
grievances are largely prevalent amongst British Muslims, but HT recruitment is not. In fact, 
HT radicalisation is exclusively restricted to a homogenous grouping of young, middle-class, 
south Asians. This would suggest HT recruitment and radicalisation is greatly contextualised 
to the realities and experiences of its activists, and thus a penetrating study is required to 
unlock the question of why a specific social demographic is attracted to HT in the UK.  
 
The contextual reality plays a large role in unlocking radicalisation – modernity and the 
clash with western culture, authoritarianism and lack of democracy – are theories more 
relatable to the development and situation in the Arab world. While economic deprivation is 
more likely to trigger young Muslims from working class backgrounds. More significantly, 
the preceding literature has revealed that radicals do not correspond to a given theory or 
profile. As Sageman (2004) has suggested, radicals emerge from diverse social realities and 
settings. This would imply that no uniform theories of radicalisation can be applied to young 
British Muslims, because there is a great deal of ethno-religious and class diversity. Within 
the complexity of causes, it is easy to lose sight of the group. HT has successfully mobilised 
young Muslim frustrations and channelled it into radicalism. Therefore, there are two key 
elements of my study: the activist and the group. These two lines of inquiry provide a useful 
insight and guide to my study of HT radicalisation.  
 
- 85 - 
 
Chapter Three: 
The Evolution of Hizb ut-Tahrir (The Liberation Party) 
 
Historically, HT was one of the most vocal radical Islamic movements in Britain, becoming 
a galvanising force among some young Muslims. HT emerged as the pioneering radical 
Muslim youth movement during the early 1990s; it was dubbed ‗Europe‘s fastest growing 
Muslim group‘ (The Observer, 13/08/1995). It infiltrated university campuses in a concerted 
effort to create an Islamic awakening among the placid student population. As a result, it 
quickly gained media-wide notoriety for its combative public activity and evangelical style 
of recruitment. The national press branded it a ‗fanatical group of Muslim extremists‘ (Daily 
Mirror, 04/03/1994).
93
 The rise to national prominence, in part, was achieved due to their 
sheer determination to take full control of university campuses and to build a strong 
recruitment base among second generation South-Asian British Muslims. However, it is 
difficult to rationalise this success, especially since the movement was inspired by historical 
events which occurred after World War II in the Middle East. In my search for explanation, 
it became clear that I had to begin my investigation by looking at the historical triggers that 
inspired the inception of the movement. This chapter seeks to unlock two very significant 
historical realities: (a) the inception of HT in 1952 and (b) its transportation to the United 
Kingdom in the early 1980s. These two distinct periods are quite disconnected from each 
other, yet the growth of HT in Britain cannot be properly explored until I shed light on the 
background of HT‘s launch. 
 
3.1 Origins of HT: Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani  
  
According to Taji-Farouki (1996, p.114), the inception of the movement ‗lies in the 
response...to the break-up of the Ottoman Empire, the fragmentation of its territories into 
nation-states, the creation of Israel and the impotence of Muslim societies in the face of neo-
imperialism‘. These historical events induced Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani to respond by 
establishing a new political party, HT. Nabhani was a relatively unknown scholar with little 
political experience, except for the time he spent under the tutelage of the famous Sheikh Izz 
ad-Din al-Qassam. After completing his studies at Al-Azhar University in 1932, he returned 
to Palestine, even more disgusted with the continued supremacy of western imperialism. 
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However, it took the establishment of Israel to entice Nabhani to greater activism. His early 
writings and political views were greatly influenced by al-qawmiyya al-`arabiyya (Arab 
nationalism).
94
 In 1950 he published his first book entitled ‗Inqadh Filastin‘ (Saving 
Palestine) followed by ‗Risalat al-Arab‘ (The Message of the Arabs). Initially, he sought to 
establish a legitimate political party, making a formal request to the Jordanian authorities on 
17
th
 November 1952, in accordance with the new constitutional guidelines (Taji-Farouki, 
1996). Nabhani (2001, p.1) described the new group as ‗a political party with Islam as its 
ideology and the goal of resuming an Islamic way of life by establishing an Islamic State, 
which will implement Islam and propagate it worldwide‘. However, his request was denied, 
because his political party operated on a platform that was considered incompatible with the 
newly conceived Jordanian constitution. Nevertheless, the movement continued to operate, 
expressing a collection of revolutionary ideals aimed at re-establishing the Dawlah Islamiya 
(Islamic State)
95
. As a result, the Jordanian authorities sanctioned a strict decree proscribing 
HT and declaring its activities unlawful. However, this did not stop the movement from 
gaining considerable support, as it established new cells throughout the Muslim world.  
 
3.2 Deconstructing HT: Ideology, Aim and Methodology
96
  
 
The mabda‟a (ideology) of HT was conceived by Nabhani within a specific historical and 
political frame. Nabhani was disgusted with the continued supremacy of western 
imperialism, which he sought to vanquish by reviving the Muslim populace. ‗The Western 
culture was the dagger drawn by the West in the face of the Islamic State and by which it 
fatally stabbed her‘ (Nabhani 1953a, p. 4). This heightened fury towards western culture 
plays a significant role in the construction of HT ideology. Nabhani‘s cardinal ideological 
beliefs seem to be greatly inspired by two fairly narrow responses. The first, as Davis (1984, 
p. 134) has identified within Islamic radicalist thought, is to a perceived ‗culture conflict‘ 
with the west. The ideology of HT is deeply laced within the dogmatic narrative of 
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 Al-qawmiyya al-`arabiyya: Arab Nationalism was the notion that the Arab people shared a common sense of 
language and history, giving rise to a distinct national identity (Hourani, 1998). This phenomenon gradually 
became an articulated political doctrine, with specific political aims, linked to Arab independence. Arab 
nationalism grew as a phenomenon during the colonial period. It articulated a response to foreign aggression 
based on the need to emancipate the Arabian Peninsula under the banner of an exclusive nationalist ideology. 
This ideology generated intense solidarity amongst Arab people, who apart from celebrating their civilisation 
and culture had a framework to regain political hegemony (Choueiri, 2001).    
95
 Dawlah Islamiya (Islamic State) is a state that implements Islamic law at all institutional levels and in 
particular the source of legislation and governance is Islam.     
96
 According to HT‘s manifesto, HT is a ‗political party whose ideology is Islam, so politics is its work and 
Islam is its ideology. It works within the Ummah [Muslim Nation] and together with her, so that she adopts 
Islam as her cause and is led to restore the Khilafah and the ruling by what Allah [God] revealed‘ (Anon 2000, 
p. 1). 
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confrontation. The ‗west‘ is identified as a significant source of conflict. Nabhani perceived 
secularism, for example, as purely a western construct that was alien to Islam. The 
disintegration of the Dawlah Islamiya (Islamic State) was exacerbated by the influx of 
western secular ideas which challenged the role of Islam in state practice. The second 
conforms to Dekmejian‘s (1988, p. 4) observation that most Islamist groups express their 
revivalist programme in response to ‗internal decay‘. These two rather predictable facets of 
Nabhani‘s rhetoric and discourse are greatly perpetuated across the spectrum of Islamist 
movements (Ismail 2006, p. 32).    
 
3.2.1 Ideology of Confrontation 
 
The development of HT ideology can be traced back to the colonial and post-colonial period. 
It was articulated in response to the perceived cultural and political dominance of the West, 
and thus was contrived within a specific framework of confrontation.
97
 Firstly, Nabhani 
framed the conflict with the West into a religious dichotomy, as the inevitable clash between 
‗Iman‘98  and ‗kufr‘99  (Nabhani 1953c, p.23). This, as Kurtz and Turpin (1999, p. 641) 
explained, gives the confrontation a ‗larger-than-life‘ dimension. Secondly, as the interaction 
with the West matured, Nabhani sought to fabricate a distorted narrative of confrontation 
with the West, depicting it as monolithic and dangerous. In particular, Nabhani was 
particularly concerned with the Western cultural and intellectual invasion of Muslim society. 
As he warned: 
 
The Muslims failed to realize the contradiction between the 
Islamic and European concepts. Another cause was their 
failure to distinguish between science, industry and inventions 
which Islam encourages Muslims to acquire, regardless of the 
source, and culture and ideology which can only be adopted 
from Islam (Nabhani 1953, p. 173) 
 
Nabhani was deeply critical of the Arab response to the internal decay, especially those who 
espoused the intellectual superiority of western culture and ideology. This is because 
Nabhani manufactured a dogmatic cultural polarisation between Islam and the west. He 
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 This antagonist reading of the ‗other‘ was not entirely imagined. History is ripe with extremely bigoted 
examples of colonial attitude towards native Arabs, such as Lord Cromer, who believed Arabs ‗were an 
inherently backward people‘ in need of colonisation (cited in Armstrong 2001, p. 161). Therefore, to some 
degree, Nabhani‘s adversarial framing of Muslim relations with the other reflects a ‗discourse of protest against 
the West‘ (Milton-Edwards 2006, p. 81).  
98
 Iman relates to Islamic belief (the righteous Muslim).  
99
 Kufr is the opposite of Iman, it relates to disbelief in Islam (those who conceal or reject the truth). 
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viewed Islam as a complete system of human governance that deciphers all facets of human 
identity, and thus the world is thereby composed into a single frame of competing cultures, 
between ‗Haq‘ (Truth, Islam) and ‗Batil‘ (evil, non-Islam) (Nabhani 1953c, p. 18). 
Therefore, anything that emanates from the ideology of western society is Batil and thus 
must be excluded from Muslim society and identity. The demonising of Western culture 
allowed HT to establish a framework of action in which Muslim people could reinforce a 
perception of shared Muslim identity. 
 
Thirdly, Nabhani identified the transformative effects brought about by those Muslim 
intellectuals and reformers who have been ‗seduced by Western culture‘ (Nabhani 1953, p. 
1). These intellectuals are viewed as a corrosive force within Muslim society. Therefore, HT 
ideology was counter-poised not just to the West, but also to some Muslims within the Arab 
world, and thus HT had created a ‗multi-faceted other‘ (Ismail 2006, p.37).100 Mohammed 
Abdu‘s views were wholly condemned by Nabhani, for instance, as they promoted western 
ideology through the backdoor.
101
 Abdu strongly believed secular ideology was being 
introduced far too rapidly into a religiously orientated society, and thus advocated a more 
gradual reformation of Islamic faith in the public sphere (Armstrong, 2001; Hourani, 1998).  
   
3.2.2 Reconstructing History: Muslim Decay 
 
The theme of internal decay constitutes an important fragment in HT ideology, which I feel 
merits further exploration. As mentioned, Nabhani‘s intellectual outlook was to a great 
extent provoked by colonisation. This encounter awakened his consciousness regarding the 
plight of the Arab world, which he felt had sunk into the ‗abyss of decline‘ (Al-Nabhani 
2002d, p.1). As Dekmejian (1995) noted this type of reaction is often embedded within the 
religious revivalist paradigm. In other words, HT ideology is rooted in generic cycles of 
revivalism that were a response to perceived crisis and internal decay (Dekmejian 1995, p. 
4). To begin with, Nabhani sought to understand why the Arab world had lost its high 
standing, seeing that ‗for many centuries the world of Islam was in the forefront of human 
civilisation and achievement‘ (Lewis 2002, p. 3). In pursuing an answer to this question, 
Nabhani acknowledged that the internal decay had commenced well before the first 
                                                 
100
 According to HT, ‗it is prohibited for Muslims to establish groups on the basis of Capitalism, Communism, 
Socialism, Nationalism, Patriotism, Sectarianism or Masonic parties or to associate themselves with such 
parties or to promote them, since they are Kufr parties which call for Kufr‘ (Nabhani 2002b, p. 6)  
101
 Mohammad Abduh was an early 20
th
 century Egyptian reformer, who sought to bridge the intellectual gap 
that had been created between the West and the East, through reason and rationality (Hourani, 1998).  
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colonialists had stepped foot on Arab soil. Thus, Nabhani made the history of Islam and 
Muslims his initial point of departure. The socio-political contexts in which Nabhani 
engineered his ideology were to some degree preceded by his assumptions that the continuity 
of the Islamic historical narrative had become disrupted. For him determining the exact 
formula for the processes that resulted in the internal decay were considered integral to 
producing a coherent and workable model of revival for the contemporary Arab world. The 
evolution of Nabhani‘s radical thought in large part corresponds to Esposito‘s (1983) theory 
of Islamist revivalist movements. Esposito in Islam and Politics (1983, p. 30) outlined the 
need for the Islamic radical to construct the ‗totality of Islam‘. This entailed extending 
Islam‘s continuity and history, from the idealised period of the Prophet Mohammad to the 
present, in a way that merged the political and spiritual. As Esposito (1983, p. 32) explains, 
the reactionary development of ‗pre-modern revivalism‘ to the socio-political decay is a key 
component in ideological construction. For Nabhani, the process of comprehending ‗what 
went wrong‘, lead him to articulate the precise causes for the intellectual decay in relation to 
the idealised.
102
 
 
The Muslim world did not reach such a cataclysmic state of unconsciousness, it was 
asserted, through a single lapse rather it was due to many historical factors accumulating 
over a lengthy period of time, which according to Nabhani was caused by the correct 
understanding of Islam being eroded (Nabhani, 2002d). This ‗moralising discourse‘ grew 
from Nabhani‘s discontent towards a general state of decay amongst Muslim society, which 
he felt had become far removed from the idealised condition as laid down by Mohammad.
103
 
Voll (1982) provides a seminal deconstruction of how Islamic radicals, like Nabhani, 
perceive continuity in Islamic history, which greatly informs their ideology and methods. 
Voll (1982, p. 4) makes two highly significant observations: firstly spiritual incentive guides 
the revivalism and second the past plays a notable part in directing contemporary behaviour 
and action. Nabhani‘s revivalism sought to recapture the strength of Islam by providing a 
simple framework for understanding the earlier historical periods.   
 
For Nabhani, the Muslim decay came about due to the ‗mighty weakness that overtook the 
minds in understanding Islam‘ (Nabhani 2002b, p 1). This lack of understanding arose as a 
direct result of detaching the spirit of the Arabic language from the authority of Islam. The 
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 The idealised refers to the ideal Muslim society as constituted by the Prophet Mohammed in Medina.  
103
 ‗Moralising discourse‘ relates to those individuals or groups that uphold and claim moral authenticity 
(Marsden 2005, p. 67). 
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Arabic language is bestowed with indispensable attributes when attached to the Quran, 
which according to HT is the language of Islam (Nabhani 1953b, p 1). When the Islamic 
State spread across vast quadrants it failed to establish the vitality of the Arabic language. 
Consequently, the Arabic language began to be ignored and became absent from the State‘s 
apparatus, especially during the Ottoman rule. Progression was suspended, as the extraction 
of divine rulings through the process of Ijtihad
104
 became neglected (Nabhani 1953, p. 167-
68). ‗The understanding of Islam from its sources does not come about but in Arabic and the 
extracting of the divine rules cannot be accomplished except in Arabic‘ (Nabhani 1953a, pp. 
186-7). This very simplistic reading of Muslim decay, greatly underplays the complexity of 
Islamic historiography. Some historians believe that a reliable and authentic rebuilding of 
Islamic religious tradition cannot be exclusively extrapolated from Muslim source material 
alone (Crone 1987, p. 204). Crone (2003, p. 7), for instance, asserts that religious tradition 
from Muslim sources is a ‗monument to the destruction rather than the preservation of the 
past‘. Dormer (1998, p. 26) provides a more balanced nuance to this problematic issue, he 
insists upon making a division between ‗information‘ and ‗historicisation‘.105  Nabhani‘s 
skewed appraisal of Muslim history reflects his overreaching tendency to manufacture a 
narrative that fits his socio-political agenda. This reconstruction of narrative about Muslim 
decay is embedded within his personalised reading, and thus little consensus exists 
concerning this ‗historicisation‘ (Hourani, 1998; Lapidus, 1998).  
 
3.2.3 Contextual Influences on Ideology: Merging Religion and Politics 
 
Within the academic literature concerning the evolution of Islamic radicalism, significant 
weight has been attributed to the socio-political causes of this rather disturbing trend.
106
 
Nabhani was not immune to the wider debates taking place across the Arab World. HT 
ideology was certainly contrived within a particular framework of understanding and in 
relation to competing intellectual responses to the socio-political decay: such as, (a) Arab 
reformers and modernists; (b) Arab nationalism; and (c) other radical Islamist movements 
(e.g. Muslim Brotherhood). These intellectual movements, including HT, were essentially 
the native response to two distinct social phenomena – colonisation and independence 
(Sayyid, 2003).  
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 Ijtihad relates to the ‗effort exercised by a jurist to extract a law or ruling from non-explicit scriptural 
sources or to formulate a specific legal opinion in the absence of texts of reference‘ (Ramadan 1998, p. 239).  
105
 ‗Information‘ relates to recollections of significant events, while ‗historicisation‘ is associated with the 
manufacturing of historical narrative (Dormer 1998, p. 26).  
106
 Refer to chapter two, pp. 58-69. 
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Arab reformist and modernist movements emerged rapidly during the early colonial period, 
but this intellectual tradition faded, to some degree, and generally had mixed influences on 
the post-independence period (Hourani, 1998). These movements initially sought to attest 
Islam‘s compatibility with western civilisation in response to colonial assertions of its 
backwardness (Armstrong 2001, p. 162; Ismail 2006, p. 44). A shift towards modernisation 
projects eventually proceeded, which sought to resurrect the Arabian Peninsula by following 
‗western achievements‘ (Dabashi 1993, p. 326). Secular ideals and institutions were seen as 
the intellectual backbone of Western modernity, and despite its introduction into an 
excessively religious setting, began to take root. Even though a number of these 
developments took place before Nabhani, it is clear that these events shaped his 
understanding of Arab history during the 1950s. In particular, he was trying to formulate a 
new manifesto that could transcend the national and regional context of the Middle East. In 
order to achieve this grand vision, he grounded his political readings of the period within a 
dogmatic Islamic framework. Nabhani perceived Islam as a divine doctrine which gives 
individuals systematic answers to a whole range of human quandary. So, it is no surprise that 
Nabhani believed ‗political thought‘ is the ‗highest types of thought‘ (Nabhani 1956, p. 1). 
But for this conception to be realised within a newly formulated manifesto, Nabhani needed 
to merge Islam with politics. In this regard he said: ‗the Islamic Aqeedah (doctrine) is a 
political idea…distinguished from other Aqeedahs and ideologies in that it is spiritual and 
political‘ (Nabhani 1956, p. 1). This rendering of Islamic belief, as an all-encompassing 
system, naturally signified opposition to secularism. Secularism, in the sense of separating 
the spiritual and political realms, became an alien concept to HT. Consequently, as Nabhani 
(2002a, p. 6) noted, Mohammad established the first Dawlah Islamiya (Islamic state), a state 
in which divine rules were amalgamated within a political dimension and reality, resembling 
theocratic states in Christendom.  
 
This demonising of Arab nationalism was greatly reactionary to the historical and modern 
developments taking place around Nabhani. Yet, his rejection of Arab nationalism can be 
traced to his rather simplistic reading of the decline of the Arab people and nation. As 
mentioned, Nabhani‘s early writings were monopolised by two distinct questions: why the 
Arab world declined and how can it be revived? The process of deconstructing Arab decline 
necessitated understanding what made the Arabs great in the first place? In simple terms, he 
concluded that Islam was the primary catalyst for the Arab ascent. Pre-Islamic Arabia was a 
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backward wasteland in which lawless tribes fought in protracted feuds (Crone, 2003). 
Therefore, the advent of Islam liberated the Arab, as it unified tribes under a single banner 
and provided an ideological platform to seek progression. This logic eventually saw Nabhani 
discard Arab nationalism in all its guises. He concluded that the Islamic thought had to have 
complete clarity, for it to be pure, and thus nationalistic revivalist theories were totally 
incompatible with Islam. Arab nationalism, as a movement, sought to establish an Arab 
revival upon an ambiguous basis that was non-Islamic, which became transparent with the 
rise of the Ba‘th party, in Damascus during the 1940s, as they promoted religious secularism 
and nationality as an integral whole (Nabhani 1953c, p. 1).  
 
Socio-political factors, as discussed in the introduction chapter, provide important contextual 
insight into the evolution of radical Islam. For Nabhani, witnessing the social disintegration 
of his homeland and the establishment of Israel certainly had a transformative effect on him 
in terms of his ideology. These events transformed the geo-political map of the Middle East, 
and so it is not surprising that HT ideology evolved from this socio-historical frame. Firstly, 
HT ideology was configured against the backdrop of regional socio-political shifts and 
various dislocations. Socio-political dislocations
107
 were linked to all facets of state 
functionality which were purported as clear and definitive signs of the failure of man-made 
ideology.
108
 Essentially, HT ideology was crafted in response to these perceived problems. 
This socio-political reading of the inception of radical Islam is somewhat skewed towards 
the outcomes of the milieu caused by modernisation: such as urbanisation and 
industrialisation, disaffection of people towards the failures of incumbent Muslim rulers 
(Ayubi, 1991; Esposito, 2002). In particular, Ayubi (1991, p. 179) believes the evolution of 
radical Islam can be explained through the ‗paradigm of frustrated expectations‘ in relation 
to the failure of modernisation. For HT, the failure of Muslim nation-states to resolve the 
frustrations of its citizenry provided fertile soil to plant their radical ideology. As Anderson 
(1997, p. 23) explained, radical Islam manifested itself as a result of the milieu created by 
Muslim governments. In sum, the socio-political context surrounding Nabhani played an 
instrumental role in the development of his ideology and activism.  
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 Socio-political dislocations were explained in terms of economic (unemployment, inflation and corruption), 
social (conflict, immorality and western cultural invasion), political (state failures, non-implementation of 
Islamic law, occupation of Muslim land etc.).   
108
 HT proclaims three ideological theories exist in the modern era: democratic capitalism, communism and the 
Islamic system. The advancement achieved by non-Islamic ideologies is false as the growth accomplished is 
devoid of the relationship with God. Nabhani outlines his opposition to capitalism, in the book ‗Nidham al-
Islam‘ (System of Islam), as a materialistic philosophy that denies the instinct of religiosity (Refer to Nabhani 
2002c, ‗Nidhan al-Islam‘, pp. 14-20). 
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3.2.4 The ‘Utopian’ Ideology: Dawlah Islamiya (Islamic State) 
 
For HT, the mabda‟a (ideology)109 is considered the ‗soul of its existence‘ (Nabhani 1953d, 
p. 1). Consequently, HT has adopted Islam as its ideology. From this ideology emanates a 
host of systems that deal with all of man‘s perceived problems (Nabhani 1953c, p. 18). As 
Mannheim (1936) pointed out, ideology is a means through which individuals make sense 
and interpret their social world.
110
 According to Nabhani (1953c, p. 13), an ideology ‗is a 
rational doctrine from which a system emanates‘. In its practical formation, the ideology is 
fashioned from an intellectual ideal that generates a host of conceptions, which in theory 
supply detailed solutions to temporal and metaphysical problems. The doctrine has been 
defined as an all-encompassing theory that is established upon ‗a comprehensive idea about 
the universe, man and life‘ (Nabhani 1953c, p. 13). Theoretically, this conclusive idea leads 
to a comprehensive set of solutions resulting in progressive ascent for humankind. As Bloch 
(1986) suggested, ideologies contain within them the notion of supremacy and utopianism. 
Consequently, ideology imposes itself into all facets of human existence, making it 
excessively overbearing and dangerous.     
 
The term ideology appears frequently in the philosophical principles of Nabhani; however 
the term has evolved a distinct ethos that defines HT theology. Theology, in the sense of 
supplying the basic tenets of Islamic faith and practice, became integrated with politics 
which gave rise to HT ideology. This rendering of HT ideology possesses significant 
problems. In particular, the ideology is only a theoretical model, which is a revised 
interpretation of the Islamic tradition that has encapsulated modern dimensions. Many 
theorists have displayed strong scepticism towards theories that proclaim to be all 
encompassing, as unrealistic and unworldly (Heywood, 2003). HT ideology exists simply in 
theory, which a group of individuals seek to establish, and thus according to these 
individuals it is a workable theory that has a real dimension to it. Nahbani stipulated the 
essential importance of a method that implements the ideology, as he states without it ‗the 
idea (ideology) would turn to be a hypothetical and fanciful philosophy in pages of books 
without any effect in the life‘ (Nabhani 1953c, p. 13).  
 
                                                 
109
 Ideology is not an easy term to define and there are broad definitions that can be used. One such definition, 
taken from the Britannica encyclopaedia, states the term ideology as a doctrine that wants to change the world 
(Britannica online encyclopaedia, 2002). 
110
 Mannheim (1936) dissected ideology into two distinct forms: ‗Particular‘ and ‗total‘.   
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This ideology cannot be enacted or brought into practice since the Dawlah Islamiya (Islamic 
state) was destroyed in 1924, and therefore HT ideology is only a conceptual model 
embedded within the minds of its members. Despite the Dawlah Isamiya being a highly 
vague and idealised concept, it has become entrenched within HT ideology and rhetoric. HT 
was established with one overriding aim to re-establish the Dawlah Isamiya, which is 
considered the practical instrument of implementing HT ideology.
111
 The state envisaged by 
Nabhani was greatly inspired by two contradictory state systems: (1) Mohammad‘s Islamic 
State in Medina (632 CE); and (2) the modern nation-state system. Essentially, he extracted 
the key mechanisms of the nation-state and gave it an Islamic twist. However, this to some 
degree is an over simplification, as Nabhani‘s ideology advocates the institutionalisation of 
Islamic laws and values through the state. HT sought to revive the Islamic world based upon 
a new ideology that could recapture the idealised message of Mohammad. In fact, Nabhani 
perceived Mohammad as a divinely appointed statesmen and prophet, with no formal 
distinction between religious and political practice. In sum, the utopian nature of HT 
ideology makes it radically counter-opposed to the west, as HT only accept one conception 
of Islam and thus this boundless version of Islam transcends theology to impact all aspects of 
socio-political life.  
 
3.2.5 Methodology: Violent or Political ideology112 
 
What kind of label best defines HT ideology: political or violent? On the surface, politics 
appears to be the central defining feature of HT ideology. This might be a somewhat 
contentious description, since HT ideology is also shaped by religious proclamations (e.g. 
Shariah law) and to a much lesser extent violent militancy. It is therefore problematic to 
reduce the complex ideology of HT to a single thread, such as politics or violence. Clearly, 
HT cannot exist without theology, but politics brings HT ideology to the physical world. I 
feel the convoluted nature of HT ideology makes it difficult to classify its ideology into 
single bloc, and thus requires me to list the lines of distinction between violent and political 
ideology. Firstly, HT does not promote violence as a means to secure power and re-establish 
the Dawlah Islamiya. This is an important demarcation between HT and other violent radical 
ideologies (e.g. Hizballah or Al-Qaida). Groups espousing violence as a means for creating 
ideological change are wholly condemned by HT. As asserted by Imran Waheed, in the wake 
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 The Islamic ruling system, as defined by Nabhani (1953g), requires the installation of a religious and 
political figure, commonly referred to as the Caliph (Fuller 2003, p. 14).  
112
 For further insight into the debate surrounding HT militancy refer to chapter seven (pp. 202-218).  
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of the 7/7 London bombings: ‗The entire Muslim community has made its position on the 
London bombings clear — these actions have no justification as far as Islam is concerned‘ 
(worldpress.org, 12/09/2005). 
 
 
Secondly, violent radical ideology is often rationalised in accord with the paradigm of 
conflict: namely between Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Kufr (land of Islam and land of infidels). 
Violent ideology emanates from groups sanctioning armed struggle against regimes that 
implement non-Islam, because sovereignty belongs to God (Ismail 2006, p. 28). HT is 
critical of such movements, especially those who endorse material struggle, as they failed to 
differentiate properly between ‗Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Kufr‘. Nabhani felt Muslim society 
resembled Mecca at the time of Mohammad, because the rules and systems were non-
Islamic, making the Muslim world ‗Dar al-Kufr‘. Therefore, HT activism and ideology must 
be performed through ‗political action and not by material means‘ (Anon 1994, p. 9).  
 
HT, above all, considers itself to be a political party (Anon 1994, p. 3). This means its 
ideology is skewed towards radical politics. This inference of ‗radical‘ is quite important, 
since HT are not ‗passive radicals‘ (Dekmejian, 1995). Firstly, HT, as the principle actor, 
identifies and portrays their ideology as ‗radical‘. In other words, they do not seek gradual 
reform nor do they participate within the political process, rather they advocate radical 
transformation. Secondly, HT believes their approach is in keeping with Mohammad, who as 
Lewis (1988b, p. 2) suggests: (The Prophet) ‗as rebel has provided a sort of paradigm of 
revolution—opposition and rejection, withdrawal and departure, exile and return‘. This 
representation of Mohammed as a political radical, allows HT to express their ideology in 
the language of Islam, despite following a purely political project (e.g. pursuit of political 
authority). What then of violence? This is a complex and problematic question, from which I 
would like to focus on one key issue. As mentioned, HT does not endorse violence or armed 
struggle against Muslim governments. However, upon the establishment of the Dawlah 
Islamiya HT advocate Jihad against all non-Islamic nations in order to institute Islamic law 
across the globe. Thus, HT accepts violence within their ideological framework, but in terms 
of activism they are non-violent.
113
 Subsequently, from this perspective, I would argue that 
HT augments varying forms of politics, theology and violence into its ideology at different 
stages of its activism.    
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 This apparent contradiction is qualified by the assumption that HT does not engage in violence at any stage 
(e.g. the Islamic state undertakes Jihad not HT).    
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3.3 The Origins of HT Activism in Britain 
 
In chapter four, I explain how HT, with its middle class social base, is not orientated to 
attracting young working class Muslims to their radical cause.
114
 This greatly limits their 
mass appeal. HT members exclusively prioritise non-welfare politics, as their economic 
interests are secured and thus, on the surface, ideology plays a fundamental role in 
recruitment and activism.
115
 This begs the question, how and why the ideology of Nabhani 
had an influence on the behaviour and minds of a specific demographic of British Muslims 
(namely middle class South Asians)? Trying to work out how and why HT successfully 
recruited a large homogenous cluster of young Muslims will invariably be the focus of my 
attention for the following chapters. At this stage, I have two rather simple, but ambitious, 
aims: (a) Firstly, I want to understand the background of HT‘s historical development in the 
UK, and (b) I hope to use some of the large body of academic literature on radicalisation to 
dissect the actions, actors and activities of HT in Britain.   
 
After looking over the extensive literature, it was clear radicalisation had come sharply into 
view as a subject of scholarly debate and enquiry, but I realised the development of HT had 
received little attention. Taji-Farouki‘s (1996, pp. 171-187) contribution still remains the 
most noteworthy research on HT, despite the fact she only devotes a handful of pages to the 
UK branch. She believes the appeal of the movement within a national context lies in its 
ability to offer disgruntled young Asian Muslims a ‗simple message‘ (Taji-Farouki 1996, p. 
177). This message advocates the supremacy of Islam in two distinct ways: firstly as an 
ideology that addresses all human problems and secondly through the reestablishment of the 
Caliphate which enacts the ideology. This rather simplistic assessment of HT attraction fails 
to engage with more critical questions, such as why increasing numbers of indigenous Asian 
Muslim youth became radicalised by HT. The reason for this lack of engagement can be 
attributed to when the research took place, namely in the early 1990s, and thus radicalisation 
is of little interest to her. Also, the context of the piece centres on a historical narrative of the 
movements inception in 1952 and its subsequent development in the Middle East. 
Consequently, only a cursory overview of HT activism in the UK is provided, but Taji-
Farouki (1996, p. 186) does acknowledge the need to explore further ‗the British experience‘ 
of HT, as it forms a ‗fascinating chapter in HT‘s career‘. Interest in HT activism grew in 
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 The social base of HT membership is examined in chapter 6: A Sociological Study of HT in Britain  
115
 The polarisation of working class and middle class politics is discussed in chapter 6: A Sociological Study 
of HT in Britain (pp. 175-178). 
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conjunction with the 2005 London Terror attacks. Several minor contributions have been 
made, but these pieces frequently lack empirical depth.
116
 In particular, two specific features 
are often missing: (1) insight into HT‘s evolution in Britain, and (2) empirical data 
concerning HT radicalisation (e.g. sociological data on demographic support, biographical 
accounts of radicalisation and interviews with senior members etc.). For these reasons my 
study, in the proceeding chapters, is an attempt to explore the contextual factors that 
contribute to HT radicalisation in Britain.  
 
Trying to put together a historical narrative of HT was very challenging, because locating the 
relevant members would be extremely problematic since most of them had left the group. 
After several discussions with some senior members, I was able to identify a list of members 
– who were considered the pioneers, namely Farid Kassim and Omar Bakri Mohammed. 
Arranging interviews proved to be a long process, as in most cases, I had to use wider 
contacts and networks to establish contact with the members. Before conducting the 
interviews, I realised the best way to elicit information was through unstructured interviews 
and in-depth conversations. Thankfully, this technique proved very effective, seeing that I 
gained considerable insight into the activities and strategies as they were formulated and 
applied. However, to my great surprise, the accounts did not match. In fact, both men 
provided me with two opposing chronologies. In some ways this disparity was 
understandable since the men recounted and drew upon divergent social and political 
realities. Thus, trying to locate the truth was not an easy task.  
 
3.4 Farid Kassim: The Starting Point for UK Activism     
 
The unexpected rise of HT during the early 1990s came as a shock to some Western 
academics (Taji-Farouki, 1996). In reality, their growth and development had been underway 
since the early 1980s, which had been orchestrated by a few home-grown affiliates. Farid 
Kassim became the first indigenous member of the UK branch, as he stated: ‗There is 
nobody in Hizb ut-Tahrir (UK) that was around when I was, when it began‘ (Kassim, 
interview 26/06/2004). Farid was born and educated in the United Kingdom, with part of his 
secondary school education at the acclaimed Furzedown grammar school in Battersea. 
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 McRoy (2006, pp. 186-194); Hamid (2007, in Islamic Political Radicalisation, ed Abbas, pp. 145-159); 
Jacobson (1998).  
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Although Farid emerged from a middle class background
117
, it was immediately noticeable 
that he did not want to indicate which social class he felt he belonged to growing up. His 
refusal to talk about class, and his subsequent attempts to devalue his middle class 
upbringing, indicated that his political sympathies did not lie with his own class. Indeed, his 
family had extended ties to the Labour Party; his maternal grandfather was a well-respected 
member of the Labour Party.
118
 This legacy had a substantial influence on Farid, and by the 
age of sixteen he became a member of the Labour Party. Reflecting on this period, Farid 
commented: ‗I sincerely thought that I could make a difference within the Labour 
Party…believing that society could be alleviated by greater distribution of wealth‘ (Ibid., 
26/06/2004). In spite of this, his political outlook started to change, and he adopted a more 
Marxist ideology. This newfound ideology, in many ways, was not amenable with his 
middle class status. This somewhat subtle contradiction was brought out in the interview, as 
it became clear that he exhibited symbolic signs of withdrawal from activities linked to his 
class culture. Despite his family‘s income and background, he continued to identify with the 
radical left.        
 
By the end of 1980, Farid enrolled at Nottingham University, completely unaware of the life-
altering experience that awaited him. As he commented: ‗I was a student at Nottingham 
University, and I embraced Islam there, from a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir‘ (Ibid., 
25/06/2004). This chance encounter had formally introduced him to a small group of 
transient members, belonging to the relatively unknown HT, who were studying at the same 
institution. These enigmatic characters were enrolled as foreign students, holding citizenship 
of a host of Middle Eastern countries, which enabled them to conduct activity in a 
clandestine manner. They were primarily responsible for Farid‘s eventual conversion to 
Islam, as he described in vivid detail: 
 
Before I embraced Islam I was an agnostic, I thought of myself 
as a Communist…He [member of HT] approached me in a 
very puristic way, in terms of the Aqeedah [doctrine] of Islam. 
He really opened my eyes, showing me how you should think, 
not in terms of thinking logically or scientifically, but thinking 
rationally. So, after a lot of discussion, I embraced Islam… it 
[Islam] gave my life meaning. (Ibid., 26/05/2004)  
                                                 
117
 Farid‘s father arrived in the UK from Iraq in the late 1950s, with the pinnacle of Iraqi elite and intellectuals. 
His father was an Arab nationalist and for him Islam was not a clinical part of modern political theory. 
Therefore, Farid was not brought up in a traditional Islamic environment. In contrast, his family had strong 
affiliations with the Labour party. 
118
 Donald Algure, Farid‘s maternal grandfather, was a well-respected member of the Labour party. He was a 
significant figure during the 1960s for transport and health within the Labour movement. 
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This period proved to be a significant turning point in his life. Farid had become greatly 
invigorated by his discovery of HT, as he explained, ‗When I first started with Hizb ut-
Tahrir I felt excited, it brings light to you, which you want to bring to the Ummah [Muslim 
community]‘ (Ibid., 26/05/2004). Clearly, a central part of this overall experience is about 
finding, or searching for, meaning. Farid struggled to gain a deep sense of purpose with his 
involvement in left wing politics, because he found it tough to be committed to the 
achievement of material goals. In contrast to this, HT provided him with a definite ideology, 
which was far less orientated to the attainment of material or economic advantage. This gave 
Farid a new way of looking at the world around him and an appreciation of how it can be 
changed. Thus, swapping his political and ideological allegiances was a relatively easy 
affair, since he had been strongly opposed to the major values of capitalist society.   
 
3.4.1 The Educated Middle Class 
 
The empirical research, which I present in subsequent chapters, has indicated membership 
within HT embodies a kind of radicalism that is typically middle class in nature. As Esposito 
(1998, p. 167) notes, this is not entirely surprising since radical actors are often economically 
privileged and well educated individuals who have become disenchanted by western society. 
Likewise, the study conducted by Glynn (2002) of Muslim groups in Tower Hamlets 
observed that non-radical organisations attracted a disproportionate number of educated 
middle-classes. While trying to chart the way HT developed, I was struck by the need to ask 
whether early members were drawn from the ranks of the educated middle classes. The 
answer to this question was somewhat complex, as it greatly hinged upon Farid‘s 
recollections. To start with, Farid acknowledged enlisting the help of a small band of 
students, allowing him to initiate a starting point for wider campus activity. As he states: ‗we 
all came from very similar economic backgrounds‘ (Ibid., 26/05/2004). The attraction of 
middle-class youths to HT was greatly advanced by their identification with Muslim students 
who shared their own middle-class background and experiences.   
 
From my discussions with Farid, it was clear that he made deliberate and frequent reference 
to the context of Islamic activism on university campuses. In particular, native students felt 
deprived of a voice. So, the few individuals who had been co-opted by Farid became 
increasingly frustrated by the absence of scholarship, as transient members solely directed 
their activity towards Arab nationals. However, this difficultly would eventually be 
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overturned by the persistence of Farid, who negotiated a source of culture from transient HT 
members. As he stated:  
  
We were frustrated, we wanted knowledge, and we knew that 
there were some guys from Hizb ut-Tahrir, they had a great 
command of politics and a great command of intellectual 
issues, they talked about issues in a radical way, but they were 
all Arabs…so we pushed them hard. Everything had an 
intellectual thread to it. They convinced us of the method to 
establish the Khilafah [Islamic State] and the need to revive 
Muslims. So from that they could see our interest, and we were 
intellectuals. There were a few non-Arab speakers in 
Nottingham, and we were very enthusiastic to get the culture. 
So, they appointed one brother to go through Dowla Islami 
(Islamic State)…this was the first time, certainly in Britain, 
any non-Arab had got culture from Hizb ut-Tahrir from a book, 
in a formalised manner, it was not a formal Halaqah, but they 
were going through the book, a paragraph at a time, which is 
the style of Halaqah.  
 
This account indicates that the core recruits considered themselves to be ‗intellectuals‘. 
Although the term is highly ambiguous, in this context, it was almost certainly used to 
describe a Marxist view. In a Marxist context, ‗anti-establishment intellectuals‘ are often 
seen as those individuals continuously occupied by political and intellectual struggle against 
the state (Jennings and Kemp-Welch 1997, p. 69). In a broader sense, intellectuals should not 
be classified in relation to their profession, but rather by the values they uphold and 
propagate (Furedi, 2005). More significantly, as Hoffer (1982) points out, an intellectual‘s 
involvement with radical politics is often a symptom of personal anxieties and disaffection. 
On the surface, as Taji-Farouki (1996, p. 177) notes, the attraction of HT lay in it‘s 
outwardly perception of being considered ‗intellectually sophisticated‘ by early recruits. By 
projecting themselves as radical intellectuals HT were able ‗to exploit the growing cultural 
chasm between such youth and their tradition bound-elders‘ (Taji-Farouki 1996, p. 177). In 
other words, HT took advantage of disaffected youth who were struggling to develop a 
stable identity, as they found themselves ensnared by their parents‘ sub-continent values and 
issues. If this is true, then it is important to understand why some young Muslims felt 
discontent.  
 
It was noticeable that the majority of early activists emerged from similar social realities. A 
variety of educated, middle class Muslim students were making the conscious choice to join 
the group. Many of these activists were drawn to HT, not by Islam, but through a variety of 
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political and social issues. The reason for this is explained by Halliday (1999, p. 896), who 
suggests: ‗Islam may, in some contexts, be the prime form of political and social identity, 
but it is never the sole form and is often not the primary one within Muslim societies and 
communities‘. The new HT recruits sought to structure their ethnicity, nationality and 
religion in a manner that brought them into conflict with British society. Trying to decipher 
the pathway early recruits took towards HT can be somewhat problematic, since on the 
surface ideology is suggested as the sole trigger for their activism. According to Stratham 
(2003), two overriding markers can be identified concerning Muslim activism: Firstly, if 
Islam is interpreted as a doctrine that amalgamates the temporal and spiritual, then it is 
natural for it to seek expression beyond the private realm. For Farid, ‗the party ideology 
exposed the fallacy of man-made law‘, which meant HT mobilised recruits to focus on the 
public sphere (Ibid., 26/05/2004). Secondly, by focusing on the public sphere HT recruits 
became acutely aware of socio-economic deprivation and corruption, making much of their 
activism a very real response to these perceived injustices. Consequently, the outcome after 
joining HT appears to be increased in-group solidarity and empowerment (Samad, 1996; 
Saeed, 1999).  
 
Farid suggested the instability of the political landscape during the early 1980s provided a 
natural source of activism and recruitment. In fact, student activists were greatly animated by 
the plight of the Muslim world, and HT was seen as the champion of the oppressed and 
exploited. The global situation concerning the Muslim world during this period was 
undergoing immense transformation: the Iranian revolution (1979); the Iran-Iraq war (1980 - 
1988); and the continuing war in Afghanistan (1979 - 1989) generated an increase in Islamic 
militancy. Farid attempted to describe the contextual reasons behind the rapid evolution of 
HT, as he saw it: 
 
Think about it politically, at that time, the Iranian Revolution 
had taken place. The war in Afghanistan was happening…So 
Muslim students were talking about these issues, but groups 
like the Islamic Foundation had a namby-pamby approach. So, 
when we would talk we‘d speak out openly against what 
happened in Iran and Afghanistan
119
, although we were a bit 
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 HT opposed the Iranian Revolution and was greatly critical of the Muslim response to the war in 
Afghanistan. As Farid explained: ‗Think about it politically, at that time, the war in Afghanistan was taking 
place, CIA backed Jihad sponsored by coca-cola, and the Iranian revolution in 1979, and at that time Hizb ut-
Tahrir produced a leaflet, which stated this Jihad is not the right method to establish the Islamic State, because 
these groups were mixing the objective of getting ride of the enemy and establishing the state, but as it 
transpired the whole thing was well orchestrated by the CIA. And then there was the Iranian Revolution, which 
Hizb ut-Tahrir was very clear about that America had organized that‘ (Ibid., 26/05/2004).  
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careful, because people were very naïve…but we made an 
impact…these became Muslim issues. We sought to elevate 
Muslim thought by attacking concepts like nationalism (Ibid., 
26/05/2004).  
 
HT‘s ideology certainly provided a new basis for self-identification and empowerment. As 
Ballard (1996) explained, a rather palpable example of Muslim mobilisation was the 
preferred usage of the label ‗Muslim‘ compared with other ethnic identifiers, which reflected 
their feelings of marginalisation from the majority culture. HT ideology, which for recruits 
was synonymous with Islam, became paramount to their identity because it was considered 
the solution to all worldly problems and provided a road map to ‗political mobilisation‘.       
 
This historical overview of campus activism during the early 1980s is somewhat difficult to 
quantify in relation to the rise of HT. Farid insisted a key motivating force behind student 
mobilisation was Muslim conflict, which he defined within an international context. 
However, the events he described gradually wound down during the middle of the 1980s, 
when HT started to gain a presence on campus.
120
 Although, these global conflicts were 
widely unpopular across campus, the supporters failed to mobilise the student body. More 
significantly, they lacked tactical direction, contributing to their inability to expand or 
recruit. Despite these obvious shortcomings, Farid strongly believes the supporter‘s 
deliberate focus on international issues, at the expense of local problems, helped create a 
starting point for national activity. As I will show later, this is one of the major issues of 
contention between Farid and Omar Bakri.  
 
Farid mentioned that local problems, which he described as pragmatic, dragged HT away 
from its global ideology and message. Therefore, those attracted to local affairs are often 
driven by materialistic concerns, and thus not disposed to idealistic politics (Parkin, 1968). 
In contrast, rival Muslim groups, like Young Muslims, Jamaati Islami and the Islamic 
Foundation, were operating from a pre-defined position that centred on developing their role 
within the immigrant Muslim communities. Professing this as a critical error, Farid 
described how their oversight had negated Islam as a global entity, and this to some extent 
explained the initial inroads HT made among Muslim students. The Muslims from the sub-
continent have a broad association to the culture of their origin. However, they have an equal 
affinity to the global Ummah, and, as a consequence, they were deeply affected by the 
continuing war in Afghanistan and the conflict between Iran and Iraq. It was argued, by 
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 The Gulf War (1991), according to Farid, proved to be a very big catalyst in mobilising student activism.  
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Farid, HT was the only significant political actor, as other groups were largely concerned 
with localised issues, giving HT full supremacy to articulate the Muslim student response to 
global events.     
 
3.4.2 Lack of Islamic Activism 
 
The beginnings of HT in Britain can be traced back to transient members and the small 
group of indigenous Muslims who became affiliated to the movement. After the transient 
members returned home, the home-grown affiliates began to initiate activities on their own. 
This period marked a significant turning point for the indigenous affiliates, as the student 
population was gradually becoming more politically active, notably characterised by the 
sudden emergence of opposing Islamic movements, like the Young Muslims in Whitechapel, 
Jam‘iat Lhyaa‘ Minhaaj Al-Sunnah  (JIMAS)121, and to a lesser extent HT. For these three 
fledgling organisations, it marked a new stage in the history of Muslim activism in the UK. 
As Farid explained: 
 
…By about 1985 I had travelled to London, and if you‘re 
talking about Hizb ut-Tahrir in Britain then you need to 
understand the scene at that time you had Jimas, Young 
Muslims and Hizb ut-Tahrir. So, we were three new groups 
just starting out, so it was a really interesting time in the 
Muslim community at that time…so they perceived us as being 
a competitor, although I didn‘t, but they did. So, I moved down 
to London and we started to attend different events that were 
taking place. The Islamic activity at that time was very 
different; you had very few circles and lectures. I remember 
attending some exhibitions. More or less anything taking place 
in London would be covered, for example YMO circles in 
Whitechapel. At that time we started to get more people into 
Halaqah, and Halaqahs started to grow, then later on more 
people came in (Ibid., 26/05/2004).  
 
It is understandable that Farid did not consider HT as a realistic competitor, as they only had 
a few affiliates, yet these organisations immediately perceived HT as a credible rival. The 
reason for this agitated response to initial HT activity concerned the scope of political 
discussion that they introduced to the landscape, which was previously lacking a political 
dimension.  
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 JIMAS is a UK based Muslim charity organisation that was established in 1984 (for more information refer 
to: http://www.jimas.org/aims.htm). 
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Farid prior to his arrival in London had made intermittent visits; in particular during the 
summer of 1984, he attended the ‗third Islamic exhibition‘ at the University of London. This 
conference saw a host of Islamic scholars debate the contemporary problems of the Muslim 
world. Farid‘s initial observations of the event were positive, as conferences of this nature 
are important. However, after further reflection he became deeply sceptical, especially as it 
was convened with the support of Muslim leaders, which undermined the very essence of the 
event. In an article in the newly launched Al-Fajr magazine, they articulated their position, 
as the following passage demonstrated: 
 
Indeed we challenge those dignitaries and participants who 
attend such conferences to speak the truth; both to the leaders 
and our people. The fact is that all the rulers of the Muslim 
countries do not intend or wish to solve the problems of the 
Ummah. Their participation in Islamic conferences is nothing 
more than pretentious, merely to satisfy the people of their 
countries who strongly feel for the teachings of Islam. (al-Fajr 
Magazine, Oct 1986)     
 
Furthermore, Farid and his associates attended the annual winter gathering of the Federation 
of Student Islamic Societies (FOSIS), convened in December 1984 under the auspicious title 
of ‗Reconstruction of the Muslim Ummah‘. Once again, HT affiliates empathised with the 
delegate‘s enthusiasm and optimism, yet as Farid commented, ‗Conferences of this nature 
failed to get to grips with the vital problem‘ (Kassim, 26/05/2004). The group continued 
their observations of Islamic activity, attending other such events, which revealed a recurring 
theme of failure to address the vital issues. This has critical importance because it places the 
pending expansion into a better context, as HT members were exploring gaps in the 
discourses taking place at the time.  
 
3.4.3 Organisational Problems and Lack of Scholarship 
 
Farid was established in London, yet this did not restrict his ‗shuttle diplomacy‘ across the 
country. In particular, on a small stay in Bristol he was able to establish a group of contacts 
who soon became the platform for activity in the west of England. Preceding this, Farid had 
successfully established a number of contacts and a stable cell had been convened in 
Cardiff.
122
 The UK affiliates were meticulously erecting contacts and cells, in an endeavour 
to expand the interior platform of HT. The foundations of the UK branch had been 
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established by indigenous affiliates, which owed greatly to Farid‘s extraordinary enthusiasm 
and dedication. Although young Muslims joined the group in growing numbers, it became 
more difficult to control and organise the affiliates. Farid, for example, mentioned that a 
central theme discussed by senior officials during the 1980s was concerned with how to 
organise the UK activity.  
  
The founding Amir [leader] of Hizb ut-Tahrir never envisaged 
that Hizb ut-Tahrir would be firmly rooted in Europe or will 
have any structure in Europe…As Hizb ut-Tahrir was 
developing during the 1980s, growing in size, it became an 
issue of how do we structure and organise ourselves. The 
Halaqah and the party culture is the bedrock of Hizb ut-Tahrir, 
so it was a new subject for the party. We tried to make 
analogies with Masab ibn-Amir [Medina], but neither of these 
quite fit our reality. Also, it wasn‘t a global village, back then, 
and thus it was a new subject for the party. (Ibid., 26/05/2004)      
 
HT ideology does not establish any protocols for the group structure to exist outside of the 
designated area of work (Majal). Therefore, as HT began to expand throughout the 1980s, it 
became an issue for the affiliates to address the question of organising the party body. This 
vital component had to be incorporated into a developing body of individuals, yet the tools 
required to accomplish this goal were greatly lacking. HT was still a small dysfunctional 
group of individuals who lacked the ability to transcend to the next stage. This disordered 
approach to the organisation of the fraternity left Farid extremely frustrated, as he stated: 
 
To be honest with you when talking about the enthusiasm we 
had. I used to moan about the Hizb in Britain, we‘re not 
moving, not doing anything, were not making contacts 
etc...There was no structured approach, but from the late 1980s 
we started to structure ourselves really properly. We took 
advantage of the people we had to organise it properly, to 
organise circles, lectures, Regents Park Mosque circles were 
established [1987]. We had the old red and white Khilafah 
Magazine, which we used to produce once every two weeks. 
(Ibid., 26/05/2004)               
 
Clearly, they were in need of expertise in the art of organising public activity. This disparity 
appeared to be rectified by the arrival of experienced members from the Middle East by the 
late 1980s. 
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3.5 Omar Bakri Muhammad123: Radicalism and Scholarship   
 
The Islamic political landscape would be forever transformed by the arrival of Omar Bakri 
Muhammad, on 14 January 1986. Since his arrival, Bakri had been shrouded in controversy, 
yet his central goal to establish a global Islamic State, ‗starting here in the UK‘, remained the 
same (Ibid., 02/06/2004). Surprisingly, the British press had given Bakri extensive coverage, 
enabling him to voice his extremist rhetoric. This made Bakri a divisive figure among the 
Muslim community, but what is less clear is how he helped engineer the birth of Muslim 
youth radicalism. On his immediate arrival he established regular public circles at the 
Muslim Welfare House (Finsbury Park), ‗concerning Fiqh and other political issues‘, which 
were conducted exclusively in Arabic (Ibid., 02/06/2004).  The arrival of Bakri provided 
Farid, and his small band of affiliates, with a new sense of constructive purpose and a stable 
outlet for scholarship.  
 
3.5.1 Activism in Britain: Bakri’s Perspective 
 
It is interesting to note on his arrival in the UK, Bakri made several observations of the state 
of Islamic activism that sharply contrasted with those made by Farid. He was initially very 
sceptical, as his early perceptions were formed from media reports and the general Muslim 
public. As he stated:      
 
When I come to Britain…I find Muslim talking about halal 
meat that‘s [the] main discussion about Islam with non-
Muslim. I was surprised really, they were discussing minor 
issue, like [the] circumcision of woman, is that Islam as a way 
of life? Islam is great civilisation for 1300 years of rule, in the 
end we don‘t want Islam to be about the circumcision of 
woman or halal meat. 
 
This rather simplistic overview of Muslim interaction with the British state is quite 
interesting because it reveals how Bakri views Muslim demands for acceptance in British 
society as a negative development. According to Ansari (2004), early Muslim migrants made 
little demands on the state for acceptance since they subscribed doggedly to the myth of 
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 Omar Bakri Mohammed was born in Syria, into an affluent upper middle-class family (Ronson, 2002). 
According to Bakri, he was sent to al-Kutaab Islamic school where he studied the Islamic core sources. As a 
teenager, Bakri joined the Muslim Brotherhood. However, by the age of seventeen he had joined HT in 
Lebanon, growing increasingly critical of his association to the Muslim Brotherhood, which had fragmented 
into a politically apathetic organisation leading to the holistic erosion of its cardinal principles (Ibid., 
02/06/2004). 
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returning to their homelands. More significantly, Bakri fails to acknowledge the need for 
Muslims to advocate demands in response to the host country‘s unwillingness to recognise 
Muslim religious practice in the public sphere. As Ansari (2004) notes, this forced Muslims 
to generate closer communal connections in order to overcome segregation, which left them 
a sporadically integrated community.  
 
Furthermore, Bakri was greatly restricted by language and geography, making these 
preliminary observations difficult to substantiate. Despite these obvious limitations, Bakri 
was partially correct in his appraisal of the lack of radical activism in the UK. This inability 
to project political Islam into British society left a lasting impression on Bakri, since he was 
deeply cynical of the recurring themes of discourse that he had encountered. In particular, 
the Muslim community lacked intellectual and political leadership. This form of leadership 
is very different from the traditional and modern cultural leadership that is often found in 
Muslim communities (McLoughlin, 2002).
124
 In particular, traditional leaders found it 
extremely difficult to communicate with newer generations as they often lacked basic 
linguistic competency and thus struggled to relate to young people. More significantly, as 
Michael (2004, p. 20) points out, young Muslims found it hard to gain access to local and 
national political structures because the older generation monopolised local institutions. For 
this reason, Bakri immediately singled out Muslim students, because they were perceived to 
be at the forefront of social protest and change. Also, they had no outlet within the 
community to express their socio-political interests, which arguably reinforced their 
alienation from both community and society. Bakri proclaimed ‗the future of the Muslim 
community‘ was the youth, because from within their ranks revival would take place (Ibid., 
25/06/2004). As a result, Bakri immediately enacted a plan to culture British Muslims. This 
provided Farid and his small band of affiliates with a new sense of constructive purpose and 
a stable outlet for scholarship. Thus, Bakri‘s arrival heralded the launch of a sustained 
campaign on the Muslim youth of Britain.   
 
Bakri developed a strategy to target university campuses, as this offered HT a natural way to 
contact the youth. They quickly began visiting universities across the country, forming 
societies and holding talks. Initially, the activity was instigated in a very simple and informal 
way, as Bakri explained:  
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 Traditional leadership relates to religious figures or ulama, while recently more modern forms of leadership 
have emerged relying on educated, business professionals (McLoughlin, 2002).   
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…we put stall[s] outside just [a] table, Farid and me. I get 
anyone who speak[s] Arabic, while anyone English speak[s] to 
Farid. And we convince them Islam is supreme way of life, 
Islam [is] total submission to God, Islam [is] unique way of life 
and it duty to call for Islam to implement Islam. So we say be 
proud of your Deen [Islam], we [Muslim] were great 
civilisation because we establish Islam, there is no Islamic state 
today…So, people start to sympathise with us, we should do 
something, we can do a lot, we can form societies, so they start 
to form societies and we enter into universities. Now we have 
students inside. (Ibid., 02/06/2004)  
 
This enabled them to recruit novices at these universities, providing them with a permanent 
link to these institutions. This groundwork formed the method of introductory activity, 
which was replicated nationwide allowing the men to generate active cells. HT during this 
period operated almost exclusively on university campuses, in order to build and indoctrinate 
a large body of student activists. HT radicalism was built on two key recruitment triggers: 
external plight and internal identity.
125
 The construction of internal empowerment provided 
HT with the means to draw disaffected Muslim students to its ranks. Glynn (2002) noted, 
Islamic organisations provide identity reinforcement and connection to an idealised past. As 
she states: ‗Islam is something to be proud of, with a great history and international presence 
as well as religious promises of future glory, which can all transport its followers from the 
grey confines of the inner city‘ (Glynn 2002, p. 980). This approach enabled HT to recruit 
novices at universities, providing them with permanent links to these institutions. This 
groundwork formed the method of introductory activity, which was replicated nationwide 
allowing the men to generate active cells. HT during this period operated almost exclusively 
on university campuses, in order to build and culture a large body of activists. This secretive 
period of recruitment was essential, because it allowed the movement to make contact with 
the student population and turn some of them into activists who believed in the ideology of 
HT.  
 
3.5.2 Focusing on Britain: Targeting Muslim Youth 
 
It was asserted by Bakri that young Muslims were deprived of intellectual leadership 
concerning political Islam. Bakri immediately went about defining a way to target Muslim 
students. He started discrediting minor topics, namely issues about halal meat, and focused 
on the discord of Western society and ideology. More significantly, Bakri wanted to single 
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out the ‗educated younger generation‘, as he felt the older generation would be reluctant to 
embrace HT‘s radical ideology. Lewis (2007) makes an interesting observation about recent 
trends amongst educated British born Muslims, who appear to be actively making space for 
themselves in civil society with Islam. Thus, it was not surprising Bakri assigned such 
emphasis to this specific sub-demographic of young educated Muslims. In contrast, in the 
case of the first generation, Bakri felt they were wedged firmly within the confines of their 
immigrant culture, which they had transported from their countries of origin. ‗All they 
wanted [first generation] was money, roof over their head, some halal meat and a place to 
pray, that‘s all‘ (Ibid., 02/06/2004). The young recruits felt HT could provide them with a 
way to oppose the negative culture of the first generation, as they fused religion and culture 
together (Archer, 2001). In contrast, young recruits were mindful of the distinction between 
‗Islam‘ and ‗culture‘, and thus acceptance of HT ideology meant they were explicitly 
rejecting ethnic cultural traditions (like dress and marriage practices) (Knott and Khokher, 
1993). Bakri explained that immigrant parents failed to understand, or were incapable of 
empathising with, their children‘s experiences in Britain. As he described: ‗They just work 
and go home…they isolated themselves from British society‘ (Ibid., 02/06/2004). Dwyer 
(1999) suggests, those young Muslims that seek greater identification with Islam often use it 
as a means to repel parental cultural norms and control. Through espousing religious 
authority HT recruits were able to define their identity away from cultural interface. In this 
respect, HT ideology allowed recruits to construct a positive framing of their identity, which 
gave them a way to adapt to British society, and thus religiosity was only a paradoxical 
outcome (Gardner and Shuker 1994, p. 164; Samad 2004, p. 17).  Thus, Bakri swiftly 
identified race and identity as integral issues for young British Muslims.  
 
It was clear to Bakri that young Muslims struggled to balance their Western identity with 
their cultural and religious values. Young Muslims often develop multiple identities, which 
shape their attitudes within different social contexts (Phinney, 1993). This perpetuated what 
Bakri described as the ‗Bobby and Abdullah syndrome‘ (Ibid., 02/06/2004). The inability to 
adapt to changes and resolve problems during socialisation created a hybrid identity. At 
home the Abdullah persona would revert to an ethnic association, speaking the language of 
his forefathers and adhering to their customs. However, beyond this remit the Bobby persona 
would materialise; he would drink, go clubbing and be a fully integrated member of British 
society. Some social theorists contend that this duality signifies the formation of ‗dynamic 
mixed cultures‘ (Cohen and Kennedy 2000, p. 363). In theory, a hybrid identity allows 
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individuals to interact with opposing cultural mores, creating new identity options. In spite 
of this, Bakri asserted that this hybridisation could not be preserved and in due course 
stimulated identity problems, which prevented assimilation. As he commented: 
 
This is where [universities] I met Bobby, because when he 
starts to rave and dance with them [non-Muslims], they call 
him Paki, now that‘s a crisis. He sacrifice[d] everything, then 
you call me Paki…we tell him no you are Abdullah; you 
belong to [a] great nation, to the ummah [nation] of Islam. So, 
we invite them, we integrate them to our beliefs not to integrate 
with their [non-Muslims] beliefs. They‘re supposed to accept 
to integrate with our way of life not integrate with their way of 
life, it‘s completely opposite. Come with us let‘s interact, so no 
isolation, no integration, there is only interaction, let‘s interact 
with the belief we carry and be proud about it, be proud to be 
Abdullah and Muslim. (Ibid., 02/06/2004)  
 
This rather revealing extract shows, in a nutshell, according to Bakri, the fallacy of 
assimilation into British society. To start, it seems pretty clear having a preference towards 
the host identity is regarded as artificial, since non-Muslims are believed to be inherently 
ambivalent towards minorities. Furthermore, the mixing of identities is prone to 
contradictions since the ethno-religious culture cannot be reconciled within new cultural 
settings, like university. Bakri constantly stressed the importance of universities and 
colleges, because these local environments allowed HT to locate disaffected young people. 
Parkin (1968) has suggested that socially alienated people are more inclined to the appeals of 
radical movements. In general, for ethnic minorities, identity and race are very powerful 
markers that can affect psychological well-being (Lecky, 1945; Jacobson, 1998). Thus, it is 
not surprising that local issues were used to generate party cells.  
 
Assuming the recollections of Bakri are accurate, one could surmise that greater emphasis 
was placed on local issues and events. In fact, throughout my interview, he made it clear that 
HT strategy focused on the social realities of young British Muslims. Although, international 
issues were important to him, Bakri prioritised the local in order to inspire an Islamic 
awakening. This meant targeting problems that young Muslims experienced growing up in 
Britain, and giving them an Islamist spin. As he described: 
 
So, when we carry Islam in British campuses or [in] society, 
we invite non-Muslims as [a] spiritual belief if he accept ok, 
Allah guides, if not then as political belief. So he can solve his 
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own economic and political problems. So we start to pick on 
[the] problem[s] in society and give solutions from Islam, 
racism, housing problem, moral decline, mortgage, 
homosexuality, this dawah [was] carrying Islam as [an] 
intellectual belief, and with the help of God we [were] very 
successful. (Ibid., 02/06/2004)  
 
This approach gave HT the illusion of being able to define and solve individual problems. 
They catered their message to young educated Muslims. Global phenomena, like the Iran-
Iraq war, had little, if any, impact on HT recruits. In reality, by talking about local Muslim 
issues, HT was able to directly agitate a person‘s immediate interests. Bakri makes reference 
to a range of localised problems, which broadly relate to the religious, social, political and 
economic fields of life. In essence, HT activists shared the experiences of young British 
Muslims, but their socialisation was rooted in a more middle class framework. As a result, 
HT appealed to middle class Muslims, because its activists sought out relationships that 
reflected similar social backgrounds.  
 
Trying to understand the social bases of membership for HT is not an easy task, so I decided 
to ask Bakri why such a large number of middle class Asians joined HT. To my surprise he 
was willing to engage this issue, unlike Farid. Although Bakri was reluctant to limit HT 
recruitment to a particular social class, he accepted the fact middle class Asians formed the 
largest pool of activists. Bakri had several explanations for this attraction. To start with, he 
suggested students found the intellectual message of HT very appealing. As he asserted, ‗we 
attract them [middle class Asians] to our concepts, because [its] new for them…and they 
[are] educated so they want to discuss with us‘ (Ibid., 02/06/2004).  In other words, the 
educated middle class had a greater appreciation of the intellectual spirit of HT, which they 
presumably felt was superior to their own. According to Lenski‘s (1954, pp. 405-414) theory 
of status crystallisation
126
, despite HT members acquiring middle class status they still felt 
frustrated by discrimination and racial prejudice. Therefore, individuals who feel socially 
isolated from society are more typically drawn to radical movements, especially if it brings 
about greater class solidarity (Arendt, 1988; Hoffer, 1951; Parkin, 1968).   
 
Bakri espoused a shared sense of belonging as another possible reason for why middle class 
Asians seemed more inclined to HT radicalism. To some extent, this argument is consistent 
with the conclusions reached in previous chapters, but it is worth revisiting from Bakri‘s 
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perspective. Bakri talked about the social realities of campus life, namely racism and 
alienation, which left a mark on many Asian students. According to Bakri, the students he 
encountered were ‗lost‘, having ‗no personality of their own‘ (Ibid, 02/06/2004). These 
middle class Asians were stripped of their identity, as Bakri commented, ‗Their identity is 
corrupt, you feel pain, because the Western culture created racism, you have [the] Western 
personality, [this] must be taken out‘. Consequently, Asian students had a tendency to seek 
out HT members, as Bakri suggests, ‗They come to HT for true brotherhood… kufr [non-
Muslims] cannot give this‘ (Ibid., 02/06/2004). There are two simple justifications for this 
type of attachment: biological necessity and ‗preference for similarity‘ (Rubinstein, 1988). 
Firstly, from a social context, it is beneficial for people to seek out attachments to groups, as 
they offer protection in unfamiliar and hostile settings (Darwin, 1998). Secondly, certainly 
among the members I interviewed, the overwhelming majority of HT activists emerged from 
a similar social background and upbringing. Several studies have shown a strong link 
between peer group friendships and class background (Howe, 2010). Thus, it is not 
surprising to see recruits finding solidarity according to social cleavage, as they share 
interests and lifestyles. 
 
The final, and perhaps most noteworthy, cause of skewed HT recruitment related to agitation 
of localised problems. Bakri confidently proclaimed working class Muslims were motivated 
by ‗bread and butter politics‘. In contrast, middle class HT members, he suggested, were 
more inclined to intellectual concerns because they were not materialistically orientated. In 
other words, middle class recruits are not usually motivated by economic conditions, rather 
they appear more inclined to idealistic causes (Parkin, 1968). More significantly, Bakri 
claimed that they agitated young people‘s needs and interests. This could mean HT tapped 
into the psychological needs of middle class Asians. Some historians, like Kulikoff (1988), 
believe class identification helps individuals to reinforce their place in the wider society. As 
a result, young activists exerted their collective class identity through HT, which offered 
them a way to develop a coherent ideology that met their social needs. This may partially 
explain why middle class Asians showed greater attraction to the socio-political issues raised 
by HT. But were these issues manufactured deliberately by HT to target middle class 
students? Although, Bakri accepted social needs were agitated by HT, he refused to simplify 
recruitment within a class paradigm. Yet, if HT, as he acknowledged, targeted the social 
realities of middle class students, then it is fair to attribute recruitment to aspects of class 
manipulation. Bakri himself declared that the politics of middle class students was different 
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from those of the working class. Throughout the interview, he suggested that working class 
parents placed added emphasis on seeking out immediate economic reward. This created two 
opposing social realities and value systems, which, in turn, made it easier to recruit middle 
class Asians as they were more responsive to idealistic messages.  
 
3.6 Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, I have looked at two historical episodes. It was vital to understand the 
emergence and consolidation of HT in Britain since its inception in the Arab world. HT from 
its commencement had a skewed political outlook, which can be attributed to its founder, al-
Nabhani, who had been deeply affected by European colonisation. HT adopted a dogmatic 
and confrontational ideology, in which the world was dichotomised into us and them. Not 
surprisingly, this ‗othering‘ of non-Muslims can be vividly seen in the narrative of Omar 
Bakri and Farid Kassim. However, trying to understand the appeal of HT in Britain is not an 
easy task, especially since the movement has only carved out its membership from a 
particular social demographic: namely young middle class Asians. Taji-Farouki (1996, p. 
177) equates this to a ‗growing cultural chasm‘ between the younger and older generations. 
This may be true, but the depth of HT appeal and radicalisation stretches much deeper. In 
particular, a recurring thread in the narratives of both founding members was ideology, 
which was seen as the precursor for youth involvement and engagement. According to Bakri, 
young middle-class Muslims were plagued by all sorts of social problems and difficulties 
(such as racism, alienation, identity crises and so on). This, as Bakri candidly revealed, 
allowed HT members to exploit the social realities of educated young Muslims at British 
Universities. In particular, HT ideology was visualised as the only solution to all human 
problems. For young recruits, this created a strong attachment to HT ideology, as novices 
equated their social deficiencies and dilemmas to western society and culture. In this context, 
HT was seen as a means to counteract the west and the social frustrations they had 
experienced.   
 
There were several noteworthy debates taking place amongst the members about HT 
activism in the UK. This was to be expected since HT had not set or defined any clear 
protocols for activism outside of the Arab world. One such debate, namely between 
internationalism and localism, had been underway since Bakri arrived. This created a 
number of internal tensions and conflicts, as members struggled to find agreement. 
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Throughout the early 1980s, HT was engrossed by international events, which seemed 
natural given that they wanted to generate a global revolution. In spite of this, Bakri‘s arrival 
marked a sizeable shift in strategy towards Britain. In other words, he wanted to engage in an 
―intellectual and political struggle‖ against the British way of life. It was not surprising, 
therefore, to find that HT Dawah was rarely divorced from political and social events 
throughout the 1990s. More significantly, events like the Gulf War and Bosnia were 
localised. As exemplified in one local leaflet entitled: ‗Bosnia today Bradford Tomorrow‘. 
HT rhetoric, as orchestrated by Bakri, prioritised the problems faced by young middle class 
Muslims (e.g. identity crisis, racism and social alienation).
127
 At the initial stage of 
recruitment, these issues provoked greater sensitivity as they aroused feelings of personal 
dissatisfaction. In contrast, international events were detached from the recruit‘s reality, and 
only after joining HT did activists become agitated by Muslim global plight. More 
significantly, HT recruitment was relatively low during the late 1980s and early 1990s, but 
rapidly grew once Bakri shifted emphasis to localised issues and problems.       
 
One of the key conclusions to draw from this chapter is the types of young people attracted 
to HT. There are complex and diverse factors driving radicalisation, making it very difficult 
to define a theory that provides a single answer. However, an intrinsic component of HT 
radicalisation appears to be the homogeneity of its social base, which is drawn almost 
exclusively from young middle class Asians.
128
 Trying to formulate a hypothesis for the 
mobilisation of this specific social demographic is critical. As Bakri asserted, this group of 
young people reacted to social discrimination by joining HT. This is somewhat difficult to 
resolve. Firstly, as Ansari (2004) points out, the first generation opted for accommodation, 
placing them outside the majority culture framework, which denied them recognition. 
However, this contextual reality seemingly dissolved with the emergence of the second 
generation. Then, why do some young Muslims join HT? Do they feel the host culture 
continues to withhold its social acceptance of them? In order to unlock the deeper facets of 
HT radicalisation and its disproportionate recruitment required carrying out extensive 
fieldwork. For that reason, as chapter four and five reveal, I examined the social realities and 
backgrounds of HT activists. This provided insight into the trajectories taken by young HT 
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activists. Secondly, in chapter six, I present my fieldwork findings of the social base of HT 
and thus attempt to answer why a specific social demographic is disproportionately drawn to 
the organisation. The fieldwork is critical as it will substantiate a great deal of the issues 
raised from my interviews with the founding members.  
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Chapter Four: 
Radical Pathways I - Profiles of Male HT Members 
 
When reading the newspapers today it is difficult not to be confronted with examples of 
Islamic radicalism. One might recall the 2010 European terror plot
129
 (The Washington Post, 
29/09/2010), or that of Roshonara Choudhry, a student from East London, who attempted to 
murder British MP Stephen Timms in 2010 (The Guardian, 02/11/2010). Social scientists do 
not attribute these disturbing incidents to a single observable cause, except perhaps for their 
acknowledgment that radicalisation constitutes a distinct and real change in the individual 
(Crenshaw, 1981; Hoffman, 1998; Roy, 2004). One of the issues I will need to investigate in 
this chapter, as I think about the causes of radicalisation, is whether the motives and 
pathways of Islamic radicals can be sketched out. It should be emphasised, however, that my 
empirical research does not aim to investigate radicalism merely as a psychological process, 
but to analyse how the radicals‘ attitudes were affected by the world around them. Without 
wishing to pre-empt a necessary discussion of these issues, my research in this chapter can 
be characterised as a case study of male members of HT. Personal accounts of, and 
reflections on, the radicalisation process are replete with stories of members ‗finding 
themselves‘. Clearly, one could not hope to provide a definitive explanation of radicalisation, 
but these reflective accounts have the advantage of making the social world of the radical 
open to investigation.  
 
4.1 The Context of the Case Studies 
 
The studies reported in this chapter are set in the national context of Britain, a country 
struggling with radicalisation. Some political commentators believe the message of HT, for 
example, ‗is attracting more and more young Muslims, and this is worrying Britain‘s wider 
Islamic community‘ (Newsnight Report, 27/08/2003). HT tends to operate in a clandestine 
and murky manner, which makes an investigation into its activities difficult. However, in 
this study, I will provide detailed analysis of several selected case studies by which, it is 
hoped, the process of radicalisation may be better understood. Two main case studies are 
presented in this chapter, each of which could in itself provide a good starting point for a 
discussion of the development of radicalisation. Each is like a sketch, from a particular 
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perspective, of a partially glimpsed event. These sketches, or cases, relate and overlap, but 
they are not reducible to a single view. And, although, when combined, they offer the 
beginnings of a complete description, my knowledge of the whole is still imperfect. The 
meaning and significance of these cases will become clearer as each is developed and 
interpreted. But the cases are not self-contained. Each takes as its focus a different aspect of 
the same whole process. Each draws upon the same essential phenomenon – the process of 
radicalisation.     
 
After interviewing and observing twenty-eight respondents
130
, my findings have uncovered 
some common themes. A recurring theme, which emerged in the accounts from my 
respondents, is that of identity; and how their current identities seemed greatly dependent on 
their past and present experiences. Although, I was not surprised that this topic came up so 
frequently, it was difficult to deal with because identity is crafted from many different 
sources. Thus, a number of themes and issues must be discussed to reveal the importance of 
the social settings in which my respondents are embedded.
131
 Some respondents, for 
example, concentrated particularly on race and ethnicity, but other respondents picked up on 
other features such as religion, home environment and family background, class, and so on. 
The goal of my research is to map out the ‗turning-point moments‘ in the lives of HT 
members who have undergone a life-altering experience (Denzin, 1989, p. 7). Consequently, 
each of the radicals I interviewed exhibits a distinct social world of lived experience. 
Therefore, the two accounts that I have selected may seem somewhat dramatic, but they 
offer me a glimpse into the construction of an HT radical in different social settings and from 
rather different perspectives. 
 
4.2 Case Study One – Abdul132 
 
Abdul, 27, is a senior software engineer living in London, and is a member of HT. In order 
to understand why Abdul, at the age of nineteen, joined HT requires dissecting the narratives 
of his past. This case study explores the impact of change and transition on the subject 
during specific stages of his life-cycle development. Many social theorists have pointed out 
the complexities and diversities of youth transitions to adulthood (Beck, 1992; Coleman, 
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1961; Griffin, 1993). The paradoxes that young Muslims have to cope with on a day-to-day 
basis are immense. As Abdul explained: ‗integrating into a society, where the culture and 
viewpoint is different, is impossible‘. To some extent, this somewhat bleak view may be 
traced to Abdul‘s upbringing in an isolated community that was predominantly white. This 
makes understanding his early social interaction crucial, because individuals belonging to 
minority groups may develop multiple pathways to adulthood (Rodney and Bainbridge, 
1980).  
 
4.2.1 Home Environment: Family Life 
 
Historically, traditional Pakistani families tend to exhibit similar features, which typically 
consist of several generations living together within the same household (Anwar, 1982).
133
 
The family is usually patriarchal, with elder males dominating the social affairs of the 
family. Within any family structure, children are considered as dependents, making them 
subject to parental control and authority. In other words, the family is a very important social 
institution, acting as the means by which persons inherit religious and class identity 
(Annette, 2003; Bandura and Walters, 1959). So what role did Abdul‘s family life play in 
shaping his identity? Firstly, as a child Abdul did not experience severe family disruption or 
upheaval, as he suggested: ‗my home life was stable, loving and quite normal‘. In dealing 
with Abdul‘s family life, it is clear that his parents created a stable and caring home 
environment in which he received love and encouragement. Secondly, one must understand 
the patterns of interaction among family members in different generations because this will 
provide insight into the customs and beliefs transmitted between one generation and another 
of Abdul‘s family: 
 
‗My parents were not a traditional Pakistani family. Of course, 
they wanted us [children] to have an appreciation of our 
cultural heritage, but like most parents they found it difficult to 
pass on their beliefs. For instance, none of my brothers and I 
can speak Urdu. Also, my parents were very secular and for 
them religion was not an important part of life. So, they‘d drink 
at social occasions, we‘d celebrate Christmas. And, in relation 
to Islam, we were not taught how to pray nor did we fast at 
Ramadan. [Did your parents try to enforce any subcontinent 
values or customs?] Yes. My parents were quite traditional 
when it came to having girlfriends, for example, so we had to 
hide that from them… They‘d want us to be connected more to 
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our culture but they couldn‘t enforce it because there were too 
many contradictions with their beliefs and our beliefs.‘ (Abdul; 
Interview 1, 05/11/2004).  
 
To some extent, Abdul and his parents have different cultural standpoints. His parents appear 
concerned with the continuity of cultural values, which they inherited in Pakistan, while 
Abdul is attempting to establish independence from his parents‘ value system. More 
importantly, his parents appear to construct tradition differently, when compared with other 
Pakistani parents. The background of his parents may offer an explanation for this perceived 
difference. Firstly, both his parents are university graduates, albeit from Pakistan, which 
gave them greater opportunities when they settled in the UK. His mother, for example, is a 
regional manager for a small UK-based firm and his father is a senior accountant for a large 
commercial bank in the city. Secondly, because of his parents‘ secular beliefs they seem 
more willing to adopt the values of the majority culture, unlike working-class Pakistani 
parents who often remain more attached to their cultural and religious heritage (Joly, 1995; 
Lewis 2002). Abdul explains, for example, that his mother ‗rarely wore traditional Pakistani 
dress, except for special occasions‘ (Abdul; Interview 1, 05/11/2004).       
 
4.2.2 Family Structure: Control and Power 
 
As mentioned earlier, traditional Pakistani families tend to be strongly patriarchal; this 
assumes that women perform the housework, while men are the economic providers. In 
Abdul‘s case, his parents appear to function more as a unit, as he described: 
 
‗My father acted as the head of the family, but my mother had 
a leading role, mainly because she worked. Also, my dad 
worked very long hours, so my mother had a more dominant 
role in the house. Overall, they operated like a partnership, 
they‘d make joint decisions about how to manage money, 
about where to live, schooling and so on.‘ (Ibid., 05/11/2004).    
 
In theory, the structure of Abdul‘s household is hierarchal, with the father at the head, but in 
practice both parents assume the role of head. Abdul‘s mother has equal power in relation to 
decision-making. For example, she hires a maid to help with household chores. According to 
Blood and Wolfe (1960), power within a family was apportioned between husbands and 
wives based on the relative resources that each contributed to the family. In the context of 
Abdul‘s family, both parents have equal access to educational, financial, and occupational 
resources in society, providing a more evenly balanced distribution of power within their 
- 120 - 
 
family. Similarly, Chibucos (1983) found that when men earned more income than their 
wives, they were more likely to exercise greater control in financial decision-making when 
compared with husbands that made about the same income as their wives. Also, Oropesa 
(1997) discovered that wives with higher education were equal to their husbands in family 
influence and experienced greater fulfilment with their power in the family. Thus, Abdul‘s 
parents have a mutual understanding about their role and influence within the family, which 
is not solely based on gender.    
 
4.2.3 Family Aspiration: Education 
 
Within a developmental context, a growing body of literature has shown that the quality of 
family interactions has important links with children‘s academic achievement (Kellaghan, 
1993). In Abdul‘s case, the family environment was a powerful influence in determining his 
academic achievement. As Abdul explains:  
 
‗Education was assigned high importance by my parents, even 
my father took an active role in our education because 
expectation was so high…there was an unwritten rivalry 
between my brothers that was endorsed by our parents because 
it meant better grades.‘ (Ibid., 05/11/2004).  
 
His parents‘ involvement in learning development had substantial emotional and intellectual 
benefit. Certainly for Abdul, school success was strongly influenced by a supportive family 
structure, unlike children that experience family upheaval (divorce or separation).
134
 It 
should already be apparent from Abdul‘s account that a close correspondence exists between 
family aspiration and schooling. The competition evident among his siblings and the ability 
to display individual success were converted easily into the school setting.  
 
4.2.4 Family Lifestyle and Class  
 
Like most children, Abdul‘s lifestyle was dependent on his parents‘ income and their 
decisions about how that income should be spent.  
 
‗I received a weekly allowance when I was younger, but that 
was dependent on good behaviour and keeping my room tidy. I 
could spend the money on anything I wanted, but most of the 
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time my parents would buy us gifts and stuff we wanted like 
football shirts and sports equipment etc.…my father had a 
tendency to spoil us.‘   
 
In the context of a labour market, Abdul‘s class position can be measured in terms of the 
income and wealth enjoyed by his parents. His parents have gained upward social mobility 
through education, occupation and property. As Abdul described, ‗By the time I was four or 
five my parents had bought another house so we had a relatively lavish lifestyle‘. When his 
parents entered the social hierarchy, as immigrants, they were positioned near the bottom. 
They improved their social position mainly through occupation and they ‗invested in shares‘ 
when the government privatised state industries. As a result of all these factors, Abdul‘s 
parents‘ social status improved throughout the course of his life. Moreover, Abdul thinks of 
himself as middle class, as he stated: ‗I consider myself middle class because of my parent‘s 
social standing‘.135   
 
4.2.5 Social Environment: School 
 
An examination of Abdul‘s social life will show the differences that exist between the home 
environment and the social environment. Although, both are interconnected, it is important 
to isolate the way each impacted his identity. Abdul described with vivid detail his early 
childhood experiences, as he commented:   
       
‗When I was young, everything was ok; I had no Muslim 
friends, but felt perfectly normal, even though all my friends 
were white. But everything changed at secondary school; when 
we moved to a different area, it was a complete shake-up. I‘d 
never been called a Paki in my life, but it soon became a 
regular occurrence. I remember the first time I experienced 
racism; being called a Paki at age eleven is a hard thing to deal 
with. At first I became ashamed of who I was, I wanted to be 
normal and normal meant being white…so I felt like an 
outsider, which made me feel depressed. As time went on I 
hated myself; then, I hated those kids that abused me, until I 
started ignoring it, and that‘s when you get accustomed to it 
[racism]. I was small back then and didn‘t know how to handle 
myself; besides, I didn‘t want to get into fights, so I kept to 
myself, making friends with Asians – we understood each 
other, because anyone non-white was a victim.‘ (Abdul; 
Interview 1, 05/11/2004)  
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Abdul mentioned that he found it easier to mix with white children at primary school, but 
then found it increasingly difficult at secondary school. This begs the question, what 
changed? His primary school was located in an affluent area outside of London, but his 
parents decided to move to London in order to gain access to better resources. As Abdul 
suggested: ‗My parents moved to a large house, but unknowingly enrolled me in a nearby 
school that was very close to a council estate, full of working class yobs‘. Thus, at primary 
school, Abdul developed a sense of shared identity, an ‗us‘ which contained his early 
patterns of interaction with other children. As he explained: ‗I got on well with them [whites] 
at primary school‘ (Abdul; Interview 1, 05/11/2004). In contrast, when he moved to 
secondary school, he encountered, for the first time, considerable racism. In the broadest 
sense of the term, ‗racism‘ is the process of marginalising and discriminating against those 
perceived as different on the basis of their skin colour or ethnicity (Wetherell, 1996, p. 178). 
In Abdul‘s case, racism was perceived as a shared way of behaving, especially amongst his 
fellow classmates. It is apparent that not all norms are shared, and that people see different 
norms as requiring different degrees of adherence. Yet, Abdul does not accept this; he 
believes ‗they‘re all racist…some just hide it better‘ (Abdul; Interview 1, 05/11/2004).  
 
Abdul was not discriminated against purely because of his racial composition, as he asserted: 
‗They hated me because I was seen as a rich Paki, which made them hate me even more 
since they were all poor‘. Abdul‘s exclusion from the dominant social group was a source of 
conflict and tension for him at school. However, before I examine this issue, it is important 
to understand why his parents seemed unaware of the negative school environment. Abdul 
reflects on this point, as he stated: 
 
‗My parents were very naïve about schooling in the west, their 
education took place in Pakistan and so they were influenced 
by the Raj mentality…they had no comprehension of the social 
conditions of the area, they thought that Britain was a magical 
place where all people sought academic excellence…they 
realised far too late for me. Thankfully my younger brothers 
went to private school.‘     
 
To some degree, Abdul places the lack of parental involvement in context, but what he does 
not mention here is his own lack of communication. He failed to express to his parents the 
feelings of exclusion and harassment that he was experiencing, as he suggests, because he 
did not ‗want to worry them or involve them‘ in his problems. 
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Returning to the issue of exclusion, it is very difficult to address the multitude of problems 
that Abdul experienced, but it is important to understand the origins of his exclusion and the 
effects it had on his development. Children began to exclude Abdul on the basis of his race, 
ethnicity and class. Recent research in the field of developmental psychology has focused on 
peer rejection and peer victimisation in the context of exclusion from social groups (Graham 
and Juvonen, 1998). These studies have shown that children, like Abdul, who are rejected 
from social groups experience ‗self-destructive‘ tendencies (Chansky, 2001). For example, 
young people who are rejected by social groups are at risk of poor academic achievement, 
increased depression and delinquency (Chibucos, 2005; Bandura and Walters, 1959). Did 
Abdul experience any of these negative conditions? In Abdul‘s account, he does not cite any 
circumstance of poor academic achievement or delinquency. On the contrary, his grades 
were excellent and he never received any bad reports from school concerning behaviour. 
This is testimony to his positive home environment, which provided a sense of order and 
motivation, and which allowed him to achieve high grades.  
 
However, it is clear that Abdul became frustrated when his fellow classmates did not 
consider him normal. His expectations evaporated, and he forcibly adjusted his personality to 
cope with his hostile surroundings. He expressed passive anger towards those who were 
responsible, which was then displaced towards his family members. As he says: ‗I don‘t 
know why, but I‘d take out my frustrations on my parents. They were an easy target and, 
perhaps, there was a sub-conscious hate there for being Pakistani; I‘m not sure‘ (Abdul; 
Interview 1, 05/11/2004). This frustration was eventually directed towards those culpable; 
but it was a passive response, which then became indifference by his acceptance of being an 
outsider. During early socialisation, racism is extremely destructive, especially for the 
victim, as it emasculates a person (Graham and Juvonen, 1998). This was certainly the case 
for Abdul, who, as the victim, suffered by believing the distortions that were created. This 
had an adverse effect on his identity development.  
 
4.2.6 Identity, rejection and exclusion 
 
A recurring theme in Abdul‘s childhood was his inability to resolve the question of his 
identity. At first, he found it very difficult to understand, responding immediately by 
forming a closer association with his ethnicity. He made friends with Asians and began to 
distance himself from British culture by supporting the Pakistan cricket team. As he 
explained: 
- 124 - 
 
  
‗The day I realised I wasn‘t British was the day a few of my 
friends were set upon by a gang of white youths. Being called a 
Paki was normal, but being physically attacked, because you‘re 
not white, was shocking! That‘s when I started hating 
everything British; I stopped supporting England and started 
supporting Paki-land at cricket. I felt helpless and angry. I just 
wanted to be around my own people, if you know what I mean, 
but I was trapped among a population of racist thugs.‘ (Abdul; 
Interview 1, 05/11/2004) 
 
Throughout Abdul‘s schooling social groups excluded him, because he did not conform to 
the expectations of the group, and these expectations reflect criteria regarding group 
membership, such as race and class. This form of rejection was not a result of his lack of 
social skills but was an outcome of prejudice and stereotyping. It is important to find out 
how Abdul evaluates the social events, issues, and transgressions he experienced: 
 
‗I felt completely alienated and frustrated from British culture, 
my school, and friends [why your friends?] They were Asian, 
so they acted like Pakis. They saw me as a coconut, white on 
the inside and brown on the outside. And to tell you the truth I 
felt much more alienated from them.‘  
 
Abdul‘s reactionary attempts to disassociate himself from British culture were based on 
localised triggers. From his remarks, one can identify three social contexts; friends, peer 
group and school. Abdul found it extremely difficult to adjust to these settings. In relation to 
the peer group that rejected him, he embraced a form of defiance: ‗If you don‘t want me, 
then I‘ll go to someone that will‘ (Abdul; Interview 1, 05/11/2004). Witnessing racial 
violence in the form of an unprovoked physical attack only accelerated his exclusion, as he 
suggested: ‗After the attack I never felt British again. [Did you want to punish those 
responsible?] Yeah, but they were much older and I feared the consequences‘. Although 
Abdul did not act on his desire to seek retribution, it is clear that if he could have hurt the 
culprits without any form of reprisals, then he would have no moral objection to violence. 
Thus, this would indicate that the effects of adverse socialisation, like exclusion, could lead 
to increased instances of aggression and violence. Abdul showed a strong desire to punish 
and hurt those responsible for inflicting suffering, in order to restore the imbalance of his 
feeling powerless. From a psychological perspective, it appears that Abdul could not express 
his feelings and emotions after the attack, which may have forced him to cope with the 
situation by internalising his anger (Chansky, 2001). Thus, a negative identity was created. 
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Negative identity is the perceived notion that an individual develops a covert antagonistic 
rejection of the roles and rules laid out for them by their family, community and society 
(Knutson, 1981).  
 
It is clear that Abdul‘s identity is greatly influenced by his rejection from social groups. He 
slowly felt alienated; his rejection of British culture was a formal divorce from society. 
However, after a long family trip to Pakistan he returned even more disconnected and 
disillusioned, as he described:  
 
‗I was looking forward to our family trip to Paki-land, but as 
soon as I got off the plane and onto the runway, I realised that 
Paki-land was a complete shit-hole. Out there, I realised that I 
hated Pakistan more than England. Everything was foreign: the 
people, the food, the language. I couldn‘t fit in and, worse than 
that, they would call me Gora [white person], because I 
couldn‘t speak Paki. That drove me over the edge; I felt 
rejected; what was I? I wasn‘t English and I wasn‘t Pakistani; 
Islam had no role in my life at the time, so I was lost. So, in 
answer to your question, ethnicity to me is an empty concept; I 
realised that at age fifteen.‘ (Abdul; Interview 1, 05/11/2004) 
 
His visit had illustrated the complete lack of association with Pakistani culture – he did not 
speak Urdu, nor could he understand the cultural and traditional differences. The trip to 
Pakistan made him feel even more isolated and excluded. Inevitably, Abdul became deeply 
cynical and hateful, and this only furthered his withdrawal from society, especially with his 
Asian friends. As he commented:  
 
‗When I came back [from Pakistan] I just became unsociable. I 
concentrated on my studies and passed the time watching TV 
and playing computer games. I only had contact with my 
friends at school, because I just didn‘t feel comfortable; they 
were Asian, and I just was incapable of understanding them. 
So, I retreated to my home that was my only sanctuary… [Did 
you feel alienated?] Of course I did. I wasn‘t British; I wasn‘t 
Pakistani or Asian; so what was I? I didn‘t have a clue; I 
couldn‘t answer that question.‘ (Abdul; Interview 1, 
05/11/2004) 
 
A primary function of early socialisation is to integrate the individual into the cultural norms 
of the society to which he or she resides, which would entail the roles they are to play in life 
(Talcott, 1960). However, Abdul‘s passive rejection of these forms resulted in the adoption 
of an opposing behaviour pattern. Abdul‘s voluntary rejection of his nationality had 
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excluded him from society, making him susceptible to radicalisation. Socialisation is an 
essential process of personality formation, and if it is conceived wrongly it will lead to the 
individual‘s estrangement from society (Talcott, 1960). Also, it is important to illustrate that 
Abdul completely rejected his ethnic tradition; this was manifested in a total revolt against 
the traditional language, feeling disconnected from his Asian friends and, thus, leading to a 
withdrawal from sub-continent culture. After completing his A-levels, he went to university, 
and there he encountered Muslims for the first time. This initial encounter enabled Abdul to 
forge strong relationships, providing him with a perceived sense of belonging.  
 
4.2.7 Encountering HT: The ‘Turning Point’ 
 
Radicalisation is a highly complex process, for Abdul it involved a major life change. In fact, 
apart from the changes one undergoes during infancy and adolescence, it is unlikely that 
Abdul will experience greater changes at any other stage in his life cycle. So, how can we 
understand such a fundamental shift in his personality development, and make sense of the 
effects that they have had upon him? In general, there are two distinct methods I can use to 
account for Abdul‘s radicalisation. Firstly, I can look to theory, as I did in chapter one, to 
establish the strength of different theoretical notions and approaches to radicalisation. 
Secondly, I can look at the empirical evidence collected from my interview with Abdul, 
which provided me with a factual base upon which to make an assessment of his life cycle. 
However, it should be noted that it is my view that neither approach can provide a complete 
answer, but they will yield some valuable insight into the process of radicalisation.      
 
4.2.8 University Life – Peer Groups 
 
As Abdul‘s initial accounts have described, his route towards adulthood was far from 
straightforward. However, he saw university as an opportunity to start afresh, but his 
newfound independence was a daunting prospect at first. As he explained:  
 
‗I was really looking forward to moving out of my parents‘ 
house and going to live on my own at university. My first few 
weeks, however, were a little unsettled. I‘d never lived away 
from home. So I felt homesick, but that changed when I met 
the brothers [members of HT]‘.   
 
Many students consider the first year to be one of the hardest, because a lot of adjustments 
have to be made. In Abdul‘s case, he was leaving home for the first time and naturally 
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suffered from a bit of homesickness. He suddenly found himself missing the familiarity of 
home, and did not know quite how to cope with the resulting emotions. This is entirely 
normal, especially in the first few weeks, and often students long for the secure and the 
familiar (Newcomb and Feldman, 1994). However, during this period of uncertainty, I think 
it is quite significant that Abdul encounters HT: 
 
‗I remember that I was headed towards the canteen, when I saw 
a mass of students gathered around outside. I stopped to see 
what was happening, to my surprise a few Muslims had a stall 
outside, and they were debating and discussing issues that were 
totally foreign to me. [What kinds of issues were being 
discussed and did you know that they were members of HT?] I 
didn‘t know that they were members nor did I know about 
Hizb ut-Tahrir…they discussed many issues, such as proof of 
God, how Islam is a complete system and so on. I was really 
impressed by them, in particular, one of the members was 
debating with a socialist and he totally destroyed him 
intellectually and rationally. [Did they target you as a potential 
contact?] Possibly, I‘m not sure…I was invited to a talk, I think 
it was about the Islamic civilisation, I can‘t quite remember. 
After the talk I met with a couple of members, we went to their 
halls and had some food. I remember we had a long discussion 
about my purpose in life, and to tell you the truth I‘d never 
really thought about it…I started to meet with the brothers 
regularly after that, we‘d go to talks together at other 
universities, I‘d help with the stall from time to time, but 
mainly we‘d just chill out in the halls…we became very close. 
The brothers helped me a lot, for instance, they taught me how 
to pray, so I‘d try and pray with the brothers as often as I could. 
It was a real turning point in my life, so I am very grateful to 
Allah [God] for guiding me to the truth.‘  
 
A couple of key points emerge from the above account: first, the creation of a peer group, 
and second the transition towards greater religiosity. In Abdul‘s biography, it is important to 
consider his university friendships, because on the surface these ties appear to be freely 
chosen. How he forms his friendships, what activities he engages in, who his friends are, all 
seem to be extremely relevant to the radicalisation process. Firstly, Abdul is able to form 
successful relationships with his university peers, spending an ever-increasing amount of 
time with his friends. As he recalls, ‗I know it sounds bad, but I hardly went back home to 
visit my family…I‘d do everything with the brothers from cooking to washing my clothes‘. 
The role played by peers during this period of Abdul‘s life is very critical. To some degree, 
the peer group replaces parental influence, allowing for a transfer in closeness from parents 
to peers. As Howe (2010) points out, teenagers spend twice as much of their time with peers 
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as with parents. He suggests that the influence of peer groups becomes stronger when family 
relationships are not supportive, turning young people to a peer group for emotional comfort.   
 
According to Howe (2010), as the amount of time spent with peers‘ increases, so does the 
influence and support they provide. So, why is Abdul attracted to the peer group? Loosely 
defined peer groups provide a sense of identity and belonging (Howe, 2010). On the surface, 
Abdul‘s peer group opted to associate with each other based on a common identification 
with Islam. Young people tend to be friends with those who are most like them, which 
explains Abdul‘s attraction to the members. Indeed, recent research has shown that socio-
demographic characteristics are key components in peer group formation (Way and Hamm, 
2005). Thus, what is the composition of Abdul‘s peer group? According to Abdul: 
 
‗The brothers‘ backgrounds were very similar to mine…they 
came from all across the country…I‘m fairly sure that they 
were all middle-class because their parents were doctors, 
accountants or teachers. I had this very superficial worldview 
growing up that Pakistanis were all poor and unemployed, and 
that my family was the only well-off family. But the brothers 
were just like me…we even had similar experiences growing-
up [Racial harassment?] Yes. The kuffar [non-Muslims] can 
tolerate you under their feet, but if you have money then you‘ll 
see how much they despise you. So the brothers, like me, 
suffered from racism. If I‘m honest, I think some had it far 
worse than me [What do you mean?] I wasn‘t physically 
attacked.‘   
 
It is quite apparent that the peer group attracted the same types of individuals. These 
individuals emerged from similar social, cultural and economic backgrounds. More broadly, 
living away from home at university enabled Abdul to develop greater autonomy, which 
enabled him to see situations from another person‘s point of view. Therefore, as Abdul‘s 
account shows, class and ethnicity were important features in patterning his friendships, but 
perhaps the most crucial structural feature was religion.  
 
4.2.9 The Role of Religion 
 
There is a long history in Abdul‘s account of things not being quite what they first seemed. 
His biographical insight of the radicalisation process is jam-packed with ‗turning points‘. In 
its simplest form, this term can be understood as a pivotal moment that shapes one‘s life. In 
trying to uncover the various turning points Abdul experiences in his life, I realised that 
- 129 - 
 
more attention needed to be paid to the role of religion. As his early biography indicated, 
although he emerged from a very non-religious household, he had the potential for 
religiosity. As he commented, ‗I grew up knowing nothing about Islam, which is sad. But I 
do remember, as a child, having a strong craving to learn more about my religion‘. However, 
Abdul experiences an abrupt intensification of religiosity after just four weeks of attending 
university. The intensity and tempo of the religious awakening, from a non-religious state, in 
Abdul‘s personal life becomes quickly visible; increased attention to religious practices, 
greater emphasis on Islamic dress and custom. So what triggered this seemingly spontaneous 
intensification of religiosity?  
 
4.2.10 Religious Change 
 
One thing that emerges strongly from Abdul‘s account is a sense of acceptance which he 
received from his peers. However, does this properly explain his heightened state of 
religiosity? Abdul firmly believes that his religious enlightenment took shape within an 
intellectual framework.
136
 As he described: 
     
‗In Islam, a Muslim cannot arrive at faith through imitation or 
blind faith. In contrast, to other religions, the Islamic Aqeedah 
(doctrine) is attasdiq al-jazim (decisive belief). A basic 
condition for attasdiq al-jazim is rational proof, which must 
agree with reality. So, in regards to myself, I became 
convinced through rational proofs. I was pushed to think about 
existence for the first time, so I started to think about what 
came before this life and what will come after it. [Is this not 
just from Nidham al-Islam?]
137
 Of course, the party pieced 
together the way I think, I am trying to rationalise my 
experiences so you can understand why I became 
practising…As soon as I realised Islam was the truth, I knew 
that I had to live my life according to it, so this realisation was 
reached through rational thinking.‘  
 
                                                 
136
 Abdul‘s insistance that his religious transformation was firmly embedded within the intellectual greatly 
undervalues the eschatological influences of HT rhetoric and ideology. From an eschatological perspective, HT 
seeks to connect individual behaviour and actions to the afterlife, or more significantly the ‗Qiyamah‟ (Day of 
Judgment). This connection to the afterlife is critical, because it allows HT to apply fear of punishment in the 
afterlife as a way to influence actions in the present. Therefore, if a recruit wishes to gain salvation in the next 
life, then he or she must work for HT. The fear of punishment in the afterlife has mixed responses, as one 
member suggested: ‗if the shab (novice) has a religious basis then you can link their actions to jannah (Heaven) 
and Jahannam (Hell)…but if there not religious then you need to convince them through social ills‘. This would 
indicate that some novices are coerced by the fear of punishment. Therefore, Abdul, who had a religious 
awaking through the HT peer group, was influenced by the fear of the afterlife and joining HT was connected 
to the eschatological.      
137
 Nidham al-Islam (The System of Islam) is the first book studied in the Halaqah. 
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As you can see, there is a richness and complexity to Abdul‘s account, forcing me to 
concentrate on some key themes. Firstly, many religious experiences invoke the feelings of 
being ‗called‘ or ‗chosen‘ by a higher power. In spite of this, Abdul never refers to himself 
as someone who has been appointed (Stendahl, 1976, p. 9). His experiences are more closely 
related to the phenomenon of conversion, because he seemingly undergoes a sudden 
transformation.  
 
Secondly, Abdul reduces this process to the cognitive aspect, leaving the impression that his 
religious experience was distinctly private and individualistic. In reality, his religious 
experience takes root through the interaction of the public and private spheres. In particular, 
the transformation is experienced in the context of the peer group. Abdul stresses how he 
was part of a group, in which the brothers would ‗hang out‘ and talk to each other about 
Islam. Therefore, even though Abdul spent a considerable amount of his time mulling over 
his existence, this was not without its social dimension. In other words, a social encounter 
occurs in which Abdul, the religious seeker, meets and interacts with HT members who 
seemingly have already found the answers to the questions being asked. Thirdly, as the 
religious transformation progressed, Abdul was encouraged to engage in further study of the 
party culture and to cut off his contact with non-Muslims who might deplete his new-found 
beliefs.
138
 As Abdul makes clear: ‗my behaviour completely changed when I became 
practising…for instance, my classmates found it strange when I stopped mixing with them‘. 
The ‗turning away‘ from one‘s past life and behaviour could indicate that Abdul finally 
became ‗converted‘ or ‗practising‘. More importantly, the question remains, at what point in 
the process did Abdul become radicalised?  
 
4.2.11 Radicalisation 
 
In this section, I want to look at radicalisation from a group perspective. This will help me to 
understand why HT affected Abdul so strongly. It is very difficult to establish when Abdul 
developed into a radical, because radicalisation might be conceived as a continuing process. 
As he explained: 
 
                                                 
138
 This attempt to control the social environment of a recruit is very similar to the indoctrination tactics used 
by cults. Singer (1995) points out that ‗cults have used tactics of coercive mind control to negatively impact 
victims‘. It has been argued that cults often use behaviour modification techniques on recruits. For instance, 
Hassan (2001) suggests that ‗thought-stopping tactics‘ and installing an ‗us-versus-them‘ mindset help to 
coerce the person into joining the group. 
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‗I think after seven or eight weeks I joined the party. I was 
invited after some discussion to Halaqah.
139
 At this point, 
everything was new. In many ways, I was a blank canvas…and 
that‘s why it took me a few months to carry Dawah, because I 
wanted to be fully convinced. [Convinced of Islam or HT?] 
Both.‘   
 
A brief glimpse into Abdul‘s early university life revealed that he was not fully radicalised 
until he joined HT. For the moment, I want to consider what happened to Abdul‘s identity 
when he started to attend Halaqah. Abdul described the Halaqah as a ‗deep and profound 
culturing experience‘, giving him a totally new cognitive perspective with which to view the 
social world. This would indicate that, first of all, the Halaqah was the basis for the creation 
of Abdul‘s new cognitive perspective, as his personal identity gives way to the group 
identity. Abdul explained that the Halaqah would be used, as the fundamental process to 
ensure that both the ‗Aqlya‘ (mentality) and the ‗Nafsyya‘ (disposition) of the novices were 
radically transformed.   
 
The Halaqah was used to indoctrinate Abdul with a new belief system, awakening in him a 
host of feelings and ideas entirely different from those to which he was accustomed. As he 
explained: 
 
‗When I started to study the culture [HT] it immediately had an 
impact. My parents quickly noticed a difference in my 
behaviour and personality. [What was their reaction to you 
joining HT?] It was very negative. I had a big clash with my 
father, our viewpoints were totally at odds, and so it caused 
problems.‘  
 
The short-term effects of the indoctrination programme could be seen once Abdul returned 
home. The conflicts at home pushed Abdul to isolate himself from his family, alienating him 
from his previous group memberships. As Abdul‘s case has shown, given the intensive 
challenges he received to his newfound beliefs, it was not surprising that he emerged 
stronger and unchanged. This shows the strong interplay between individuals and groups, 
which enabled HT to permanently change Abdul‘s identity.   
 
4.3 Case Study Two – Tariq 
                                                 
139
 Within HT literature the term ‗Halaqah‘ has been translated in many ways, such as: private circle; culturing 
circle; intensive culturing; concentrated circle; and secret culturing. However, the two key components of this 
circle are privacy and culturing, so I have defined Halaqah as ‗private culturing circle‘. 
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Tariq, 26, is a successful computer analyst living in Berkshire, and is an active member of 
HT. The purpose of this case study is to provide a personalised explanation of how he joined 
HT. A biographical study of HT members is fascinating not only because it has the potential 
to tell us so much about the processes of radicalisation, but because it can also tell us so 
much about the early social life of members. Like all life histories, Tariq‘s account is 
actively woven together to tell a story from his life experiences. This type of approach has 
been necessary in order to draw out more clearly some of the differences and commonalities 
that exist between HT members. Having identified the focus for the case study, the next step 
will be to develop a precise understanding of how Tariq came to construct his identity and 
how this, in turn, made him susceptible to radicalisation.  
 
4.3.1 Home Environment: Family Life, Class and Upbringing 
 
Tariq, a British-born Muslim of mixed-race, found it very difficult to come to terms with his 
own ethnicity. He talked, for example, about the way his identity had to be formed from 
fragmented sources. As he described: 
 
‗My dad is Pakistani and my mum is [a non-Muslim] English 
[white]. So I felt out of place in family situations as a kid. I‘d 
be conscious of my fair skin when I was with my dad‘s family. 
My parents never understood… I couldn‘t explain it to them. I 
was different from them. I wasn‘t fully Pakistani or English.‘ 
(Tariq; Interview 2, 07/11/2004). 
 
This brief glimpse into Tariq‘s early experiences reveals how difficult it was for him to 
integrate contradictory parts of his identity into a coherent whole. We see, in this extract, 
neither his mother nor father were capable of empathic understanding, because they are not 
mixed-race. His parents failed to provide Tariq with all the cultural knowledge necessary to 
construct his identity as mixed-race. As several social theorists have noted, unless a unified 
perception of the child is maintained, ethnicity can become a constant worry (Wetherell, 
1987; Jenkins, 2004). Research on parents in an Asian-white marriage has focused on the 
need to foster a multi-cultural behavioural range in order to guarantee their multi-racial 
children‘s survival (Piscacek and Golub, 1973). The awareness of being different in physical 
complexion from the rest of the family reinforced Tariq‘s feelings of ‗not belonging‘. In 
adult life, ethnicity is still a salient feature of his identity. He told me, even though he has 
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both Pakistani and English heritage, he never found complete acceptance in either 
community. As Wilson (1987) points out, mixed-race children find it difficult to balance 
between majority values and minority culture.  
 
4.3.2 Family conflict – Religious Identity 
 
The years from about the ages of six to twelve were very important in the development of 
Tariq‘s identity. During these years, he became aware of the religious and cultural 
differences between his parents. As Tariq explained:  
 
‗My parents always fought about how to raise us [Tariq and 
two younger siblings]. I‘d be forced to take sides… Eventually, 
I became closer to my dad, so I started to go to the Mosque 
with him, which upset my mum. Ironically, back then my 
father was not that religious – he was influenced by Paki pride. 
[What do you mean?] His sons couldn‘t be Christians, that‘d 
bring shame on the family.‘  
 
By not being able to involve Tariq in both sides of their religious heritage – such as 
celebrating religious events – his parents made him feel marginalised. This feeling of 
exclusion experienced within the family setting greatly impeded his relationship with his 
mother. As Tariq explained, ‗…my mother was distant. All day she‟d go on about how much 
she had to suffer from my dad and his family, so she‟d take it out on us [Tariq and his 
siblings]‘. According to Knowles and Cole (1990, p. 161), if a mother‘s efforts are rejected 
it can lead to a vicious cycle in which the mother feels emotionally wounded. Some social 
theorists argue that conflict and frustration is natural in the mother-son dynamic because 
mothers misunderstand what their sons need (Smith, 1997). In other words, when adolescent 
boys conceal their vulnerability, mothers can mistake this emotional posturing for 
masculinity.   
 
In family gatherings, the religious beliefs of Tariq‘s mother were often degraded and 
stigmatised. This unsettled environment made forming a coherent religious identity for 
Tariq more challenging than for those adolescents in non-mixed religious households. As a 
result, he experienced a period of confusion and exploration before accepting a religion. As 
he explained, 
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‗I really started to ask myself what religion I should belong to, 
but I had no help from my parents…they just wanted me to 
follow them blindly. So, I really felt lost and confused.‘  
 
It is very important to help children of mixed religious heritage to understand that they are 
part of both groups, allowing them to ask questions about their identity (Rom and Lamb, 
1986). In Tariq‘s case, when family conflict arose, his parents expected him to categorise 
himself into one specific religion, not accepting that he could belong to two. This prejudice 
was reinforced in family gatherings, for example, spending time with his father‘s relatives 
helped skew his view of Christianity. Tariq was greatly inspired by hearing his uncles‘ and 
grandparent‘s accounts about Islam, but this overlooked his mother‘s religious and cultural 
heritage.  
 
Living between two religious traditions had shaped some of Tariq‘s values and beliefs. 
However, family conflict over religion pushed him away from religion as he grew up. As he 
mentioned:  
 
‗My dad just wanted me to be Muslim, so I accepted that. But I 
was not religious. I never prayed, fasted or cared about Islam. I 
saw religion as something bad; it caused so many problems at 
home…So, I considered myself Muslim in name only.‘  
 
To some extent, this period marked a time of exploration of different ways of looking at his 
religious and racial identity. Raised Muslim, Tariq appeared very fair, and felt that he was an 
outsider. According to Marcia (1993, p.146), the balance between identity and confusion lies 
in making a ‗commitment to an identity‘. Although, Tariq was actively involved in exploring 
different identities, he did not make a real commitment to a religious identity. Some social 
theorists believe that those young people who make a strong commitment to an identity tend 
to be happier than those who do not (Marcia, 1993).     
 
4.3.3 Family structure140 
 
Recent research has shown that the quality of family interactions has important associations 
with the formation of a child‘s identity (Kellaghan, 1993). This makes it essential to examine 
the ways in which Tariq‘s family members interacted. So far we have observed that Tariq‘s 
                                                 
140
 Family structure refers to the hidden ‗set of functional demands‘ that sort out the manner in which family 
members communicate and interact (Minuchin, 1974, p. 51).  
- 135 - 
 
parents were unable to offer a balanced religious perspective. Within the family setting, 
Tariq‘s parents failed to provide a unified set of experiences for their children. Unlike most 
families, his household was fragmented by religious and cultural differences. It was on this 
muddled foundation that Tariq set out to find and shape his own identity. As he explained, ‗I 
grew up very confused about my religion... So it [religion] was not a defining feature of my 
childhood‘. Alongside the parental conflicts there were major shifts in his family‘s structure 
and the relationships within the family were clearly disrupted. As he commented: ‗Religion 
became the focal point of conflict and I remember that my father left for a while. When he 
returned, my mother was less confrontational. She pretty much gave in to his demands.‘ In 
fact, his parents tried to re-negotiate the balance of power within their relationship. His 
mother surrendered to her husband‘s religious demands, after a short separation. According 
to Kayser (1996), estrangement can become an opportunity for growth or decline; it can 
serve as an incentive to modify the boundaries of relationships. Accompanying this 
hierarchal change was a revision of his mother‘s role and boundaries within the family, 
which prevented her from influencing the children‘s religious upbringing.   
 
In the family, all decisions inevitably became dominated by Tariq‘s father. As he explained, 
‗[after the separation] my dad really started interfering in my personal life... he‘d wanna 
know about everything, especially the conversations I‘d had between my mum and brothers‘. 
A somewhat common problem in fragmented families is a weak boundary between sub-
systems
141
. As Minuchin (1974) points out, for a family to function correctly it must have 
cohesion among the parental sub-system. Unsurprisingly, the shifting role of Tariq‘s father 
can be attributed to the conflict over child rearing. In particular, his father tried to become 
more involved with Tariq‘s religious upbringing. As Tariq explained, ‗When my dad came 
back home, he really pushed us to pray, but I knew it was a fake gesture…because after a 
while he couldn‘t be bothered.‘ Both parents were competing for the parental sub-system 
role in order to exact their authority over the children. However, after the short separation, 
the rules that regulated the interactions between parent and child became distorted. His 
mother, for example, assumed the responsibility for nurturing and his father took greater 
control of family decision-making.  
 
4.3.4 Class 
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Over the past three decades, class has played a greater role in Tariq‘s life and upbringing. 
The movement of his family up and down the economic ladder has made him very sensitive 
to class cleavages. When his father immigrated to the United Kingdom from Pakistan in the 
early 1970s, he struggled to support himself despite having a master‘s degree in electronic 
engineering. As he commented:  
 
‗My dad worked in a factory for years when he came over from 
Pakistan. He was highly educated, he was an engineer. So, I 
remember life being very hard for my family in the early days. 
We lived in a small flat, and both my parents worked. [Is your 
mother educated?] Yes, she has a degree in English…she is a 
primary school teacher… So, we were a working class family, 
in a financial sense, during the 70s. But my parents came from 
middle class backgrounds.‘  
 
Whilst migration forced downward economic mobility for his family, his migrant father still 
held onto his middle-class values and aspirations. However, the changing political and 
economic landscape of the 1980s radically altered his family‘s economic fortunes. In fact, 
after the privatisation of British Aerospace, Tariq‘s father was employed as an engineer. The 
family saw their standard of living dramatically improve. Soon, his father took a position as 
a senior engineer. His parents bought a large house outside London, where they raised their 
family. Tariq‘s family have gained considerable economic independence since the early 
1980s. However, economic self-sufficiency is not the sole determinant of an individual‘s 
position in the class hierarchy. In general, social theorists believe that a variety of social 
factors need to be considered in order to identify class – such as education, employment 
status and grade, home ownership and lifestyle (Goldthorpe e al., 1987).  
 
At this point, I wanted to understand how Tariq conceptualised class, and thus I asked him to 
which class grouping he felt he belonged:  
 
‗I think I‘m middle class, because my parents are both 
educated professionals, they own several freehold properties 
and the home I grew up in… and I went to university. So, I 
think that makes me middle class.‘  
 
What strikes me about this extract is Tariq‘s need to be recognised as middle class. This can 
be problematic, as Hutber (1976) points out, since individuals tend to distort or exaggerate 
their social aspirations. According to objective standards, Tariq and his family should be 
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considered middle class (Goldthorpe e al., 1987). However, in the United Kingdom, social 
lifestyle and status are also considered important indicators for determining class – such as 
accent, manners, place of education, heritage and acquaintances (Cooper, 1979). Some of 
these issues are important because when I first met Tariq, he did not strike me as being 
middle class. He seemed to retain the mannerisms of his original social group. He talked 
about this briefly:  
 
‗I never went to private school, for some reason my parents 
wanted me to go to a good state school. I really regret not 
having the benefit of private schooling…my friends come from 
mixed backgrounds but most of them were working class, 
which was hard because I had to hide things from them. [Can 
you give any examples?] My parents enrolled me into a private 
tennis club.‘      
 
My interview with Tariq showed that he is very aware of class issues. He talked, for 
example, about articulating a middle-class identity, within a set context, in order to fit in 
with his middle- class friends. However, with his working-class friends, he would hide 
aspects of his social lifestyle and status.  
 
4.3.5 Finding Identity – Friendship, Schooling and Racism 
 
In the preceding discussion, I looked at the central most important interactions and 
relationships in Tariq‘s family life. As Laursen (1993) notes, the diverse function of 
friendship is fundamentally different to a parent-child relationship. Like most people, Tariq 
has formed strong ties and relationships that have evolved, developed and changed over 
time. As a result, I need to look at what these relationships mean to Tariq and what he has 
gained from them.   
 
When it comes to understanding Tariq‘s friendships, one must appreciate the situational 
factors that seem to influence his friendship selections. By this, I mean that his friendships 
cannot be viewed simply as a ‗private and voluntary act‘ (Bell and Coleman, 1999). Rather, 
as Allan (1989) notes, friendship is constituted within the constraints of class, age, ethnicity, 
gender and proximity. This is very important because in one setting, the tennis club, Tariq 
would describe his friends as close, but not in other settings. This places substantial doubt 
upon the notion that friendship is based on voluntary selection. As Tariq points out: 
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‗My school friends and I weren‘t close, they were just school 
friends. And that‘s the same for my mates at the [tennis] 
club…At school my friends came from poorer backgrounds, 
and my recreational interests never quite matched-up.‘     
 
If, as Tariq suggested, he did not share in his friends‘ interests then, apart from geography, 
why did he associate with his working-class friends? The relationships he formed with his 
working-class friends at school were simply based upon utility. This explains why these 
friendships eroded when he went to college, utility changes according to need and 
circumstances. As Tariq explained he was pursuing his own advantage: 
 
‗School was divided by race [and] in order to survive I made 
friends with ethnic kids. It was benefit. That‘s why I never 
hanged out after school… I never even liked‘em.‘ 
 
Recent research has found that young people who lack friends can suffer from psychological 
problems later in life (Howe, 2010). It seems clear that the type of relationships Tariq is able 
to form in different social settings is based on practical necessity, rather than choice. Thus, 
by and large, Tariq‘s friends remain bounded by the initial setting for interaction, such as 
school or the tennis club.  
 
4.3.6 School and College 
 
Recent research into student transition has revealed that children need to feel socially 
connected to their school (Newcomb and Feldman, 1994). In other words, they want to be 
socially accepted by their peers and teachers. As Osterman (2000) points out, this is 
important because those students who feel disconnected display greater behavioural 
problems. In Tariq‘s case, he experienced significant difficulties adjusting to his secondary 
school, which had a negative effect on his attitudes about British society. In particular, his 
school experiences are littered with frustrations based on the inability to fit into a racially-
divided community. As Tariq explained:  
 
‗On my first day of school a white kid came up to me and 
asked if I was a Paki…I reacted [to racism] with hate; I hated 
white people [and] being called a Paki every day made me feel 
different…Race became a big issue for me because the school 
was divided by skin colour. The whites kept to themselves, 
which was fine, because I despised them. So, school was us 
against them, whites versus. ethnics, which would always erupt 
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in a fight, and it was clear which side I was on…So all this talk 
about integration is complete rubbish; white people will never 
accept a Paki. I realised that at school, you can‘t integrate with 
white people, or be their friends. I was only comfortable 
hanging around my own kind...I felt safe with Asians and 
Blacks [Afro-Caribbean and Somali]…Also, the teachers 
would always favour the white kids; they were all racist 
[teachers]‘. (Tariq; Interview 2, 07/11/2004) 
  
This highly revealing extract shows us that racism is a very destructive phenomenon 
(Bryant-Davis, 2005). It distorts Tariq‘s image of white people, leaving him emotionally and 
mentally discounted.  The racial interplay between the multi-ethnic communities manifested 
itself in an excessive divide that had a significant impact on Tariq‘s social development. He 
was exposed to severe racial discrimination during his childhood, finding it extremely 
difficult to adjust. He experienced all forms of racial prejudice as a child; ridicule, abuse, 
physical assault and harassment. Tariq found it easier to cope with these direct forms of 
racism, becoming acclimatised to them because they were overt acts. In contrast, the 
perception of covert racism seemed to agitate Tariq more intensely than the overt type, 
because gradually he developed a means of protection against direct racism by associating 
with Asian and Black gangs. Vigil (2002) argues that problems of identity among minority 
groups are most often concentrated in larger, inner-city schools that are breeding grounds for 
gangs. However, a gang cannot provide an individual with protection from covert racism, 
perceived in an institutional from, i.e., teachers and police officers. As Sanchez-Hucles 
(1998, p. 74) notes: ‗The trauma and emotional abusiveness of racism is as likely to be due 
to chronic systemic, and individual assaults on the personhoods of ethnic minorities as a 
single catastrophic event‘. Thus, a social distrust was aroused, especially concerning 
institutions, which became more pronounced as Tariq grew older.  
 
The racial discrimination that Tariq experienced had a number of parallels with Abdul‘s 
case; it adversely affected his personality in the same way. However, unlike Abdul, Tariq 
did not adopt a solitary lifestyle; rather, he sought shelter in groups. This had a major 
influence on his entire outlook; he felt a sense of confidence within the gang environment. 
As he explained: ‗there was power in numbers, and I knew my friends had my back‘ (Tariq; 
Interview 2, 07/11/2004). Tariq‘s socialisation should be viewed within the context of the 
sub-culture from which he emerges. The gang environment offered him, and other members, 
a form of protection and belonging, which originated in response to a common problem felt 
by all gang members. A subculture is a specific sub-division within the dominant culture 
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that has its own norms, values and ideals (Ferracuti and Wolfgang, 1982, pp. 129–41). The 
gang brought together young Asian and Black children from similar circumstances and 
backgrounds for mutual support, as they found themselves isolated and neglected within 
mainstream society.
142
 Within the gang, Tariq adopted the sub-culture of violence in a 
passive manner, which accepts violence in certain social situations. As he described:  
 
‗When you‘re in a gang, as I was, there‘s always instances of 
violence; for instance a white kid insulted me at school once; 
soon after we [the gang] reacted by giving him a beating.‘ 
(Tariq; Interview 2, 07/11/2004)   
 
The approval of violence, as a norm, affected Tariq‘s daily behaviour, because it was in 
conflict with conventional society.  However, the experience of a sub-culture environment 
did not establish a permanent connection between Tariq and the behavioural patterns of the 
gang. Rather, once he was at college, Tariq was able to adjust to a more stable environment. 
As he described:  
 
‗I suppose I was alienated in the social sense. I had minimal 
contact with whites, though things changed as I matured. I 
started reading the works of Trotsky and that really helped...I 
found myself drifting to the labour movement. At college, I 
found the Socialist Workers; they offered an outlet. I thought I 
had found a group of individuals that I could integrate with, 
although I had my own views on issues.‘ (Tariq; Interview 2, 
07/11/2004) 
 
The experiences at college reinforced the implicit need Tariq displayed to be part of a group; 
also, on finding the Socialist Workers, he instantly formed a bond with them. They 
restructured his sub-culture ideals according to the ideology of socialism, reshaping his 
mindset and providing him with a renewed feeling of belonging. However, this did not erode 
his frustrations, as he had been raised a Muslim and felt that this was under-represented in 
his disposition. As he explained: 
 
‗I remember getting vexed with some SW [Socialist Workers] 
member‘s in the canteen, they insulted Muslims and Islam 
badly. And I ignored it, which burned me deep. From that day I 
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realised that the socialists were fools, but this incident really 
sparked my interest to learn about the deen [Islam].‘ 
 
From a social perspective, Tariq was not able to establish close ties, because he was still 
overwhelmed by identity issues.    
 
4.3.7 University – Finding Islam 
 
Like many students, Tariq found moving to university a huge transition. Going to university 
meant moving away from home for the first time, which he found daunting and unsettling. 
As he explained: 
 
‗University was a big step. I always relied on my mum for 
everything…so I had to take responsibility for myself, which 
was really hard at first. I never liked my halls [of residence], it 
was constant jahiliyah
143
. This made me miss home, I felt 
detached from these people [non-Muslims]. So I went clubbing 
with my neighbours a few times. But I realised this was 
wrong.‘ 
 
Most university students enjoy the transition from home life to complete freedom. It gives 
them the opportunity to find new friends and enjoy an adult social life. However, for Tariq, 
living among non-Muslims greatly unsettled him. He felt alienated by his initial experiences, 
and there was no help and support when he needed it. However, he soon found the support 
and love he needed. In the morning, after a night of clubbing, he awoke feeling very guilty. 
He decided to go to Friday prayer, for the first time at university. As he mentioned: 
 
‗You need to understand that for the first few months I was 
trying to integrate, I went clubbing two or three times a week 
and I never bothered about Islam during that time. But I 
couldn‘t remove the guilt…I knew what I was doing was 
wrong. So, alhumdullah [praise be to God], I went to Jummah 
[Friday prayer] and that changed my life. I met the brothers 
[members of HT] there for the first time. In fact, one of the 
brothers was giving the Khutbah [service/speech] on the topic 
of raving – he destroyed the issue of split personality – living 
like a kaffir [non-Muslim] and Muslim. It was so true; I‘d been 
living that life. So, after the Khutbah, I went and met the 
brothers [and] they invited me to have some food with them.‘  
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After an unpleasant few months at university, Tariq was thrilled to discover that the 
university setting provided him an opportunity to know peers whose backgrounds and 
lifestyles were similar to his own. This interpersonal experience, taking place in an 
environment that encouraged intellectual inquiry, seemed to foster profound personal 
growth.  
  
4.3.8 Finding Brotherhood – The Peer Group 
  
Tariq‘s interview, and that of other HT members in my sample, has revealed an important 
link to peer group relations. As Asher (1990, p.3) makes clear, peer relationships are 
important sources of companionship, providing ‗stability in times of stress and transition‘. If 
as suggested, Tariq experienced great difficulty in adjusting to university life, feeling alone 
and disconnected, then it makes sense given his penchant for collectivity. Tariq‘s peer 
relationships developed strongly because he felt the group could facilitate his goal of 
becoming Islamic, which he believed would influence him in a positive way. As he 
explained: 
 
‗I realised after meeting the brothers that they‘d teach me about 
the Deen [Islam]. So I spent time with them, attending events, 
which introduced me to the party [HT] culture…I‘d never 
heard of Hizb ut-Tahrir before university. [What motivated you 
to join?] First of I was convinced, and still am today, that it is a 
duty to work for the Khilafah…and thus if you do not perform 
this duty you‘ll be sinful. Also, I never knew about political 
Islam: that Islam offered an alternative ideology. So, in a 
nutshell, I joined the party in my first year and, yes, I did feel 
like I belonged to something real, because everyone had the 
same collective goal; we were working [carrying the party 
mission], learning and living like brothers.‘ (Tariq; Interview 2, 
07/11/2004)         
 
This extract gives us some insight into Tariq‘s emotional need to belong. He seeks out 
support from his peers, which in this instance is facilitated by HT. In effect, this provides 
him with a collective identity and purpose.  
 
Tariq‘s description of his relationship with the peer group raises some intriguing questions 
about what attracted him to this group of young Muslims. As Newcomb and Feldman (1994) 
points out, commonality among peers based on attributes such as attitudes, interests, and 
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beliefs facilitates social attraction.
144
 Recent research has shown that individuals are less 
likely to accept, or will avoid communicating with, those who are different (Howe, 2010). 
Unsurprisingly, Tariq is attracted to the cultural homogeneity of the peer group. As he 
explained: ‗The brothers were just like me, we‘d grown up in this cesspit [Britain] and faced 
the same problems [and] troubles…we were Asians from good backgrounds, but that did not 
unite us, it was Islam that brought us together‘. Islam might have been the overt symbol of 
the peer group, but it was similarity in attitudes, age, ethnicity and class that attracted Tariq 
to the group. According to Carley (1991), individuals make a greater effort to seek out 
homogeneity in their social relations. Recent research has indicated that students are more 
likely to form friendship ties based on commonality of race and ethnicity (Mollica, Gray, and 
Trevino, 2003).  
 
4.3.9 Beginning the Indoctrination Process: Contact 
 
The goal of this section is to show how indoctrination is used in HT. In order to do this, I 
have used Tariq‘s account because it provides an overview of indoctrination at three key 
stages; contact, novice and member. As Singer and Lalich (1995) note, indoctrination is the 
systematic application of psychological and social influence techniques. The primary aim is 
to fabricate behavioural changes within a closed and structured setting (Lifton, 1989). As 
briefly described earlier, Tariq felt excessively isolated and lonely. These negative feelings 
soon went away once he became friends with HT recruiters at university. This stage is 
critical because Tariq became emotionally and intellectually connected to the peer group. 
Speaking retrospectively, Tariq candidly talked about his experiences as a ‗contact‘145:  
 
‗I never knew that I was a contact or that the brothers had an 
agenda other than friendship. I was completely innocent at the 
time, but now I know what they were up to [recruitment], 
because I use the same methods. They first sought to develop a 
relationship with me. This allowed them to get to know me: 
My thoughts, concepts and personality. For example, I 
mentioned that I went clubbing the night before, which gave 
the brothers insight into what thoughts I was clearly 
lacking…Developing a relationship also means living with the 
contact, as the brothers did with me, in a natural way. This 
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allowed them to guide my aqlya [mentality] and nafsyya 
[disposition].‘     
 
This extract has given me considerable insight into the beginning of Tariq‘s indoctrination. 
Firstly, the peer group sought to form a ‗physical relationship‘ with him in order to 
understand, and then exploit, his personality.
146
 According to Lifton (1989, p. 5), 
indoctrination consists of two key elements: ‗confession‘ and ‗re-education‘. In Tariq‘s case, 
the members encouraged him to confess and renounce his sins in order to begin the process 
of individual change. Secondly, unprepared for their indoctrination techniques, Tariq 
concluded that only the members could re-educate him, providing absolute certainty and 
conviction in Islam. He was unaware that the members sought to ‗remake‘ him in HT image 
(Lifton 1989, p.5).   
 
4.3.10 Intermediate Stage: Becoming a Novice 
 
Tariq spent considerable time with his new peers, interacting in the same social space. More 
significantly, he started to view the world in a similar fashion, transforming his behaviour to 
gain ‗peer acceptance‘ (Howe, 2010). Tariq talked, for example, about modelling his 
behaviour around the members. He changed his style of dress and use of language in an 
effort to consolidate his group membership. More significantly, the peer group conditioned 
Tariq to internalise HT ideology, reshaping his thoughts and behaviour (Hassan, 2002). As 
he commented: ‗I started maturing in the [HT] culture, and I really pushed the guys for 
more…so eventually they asked me to join the Halaqah.‘  
 
As an observer, I am struck by the way in which Tariq so willingly surrendered his 
individuality for the group experience. As Triplett (1898) points out, moving from a state of 
isolation to a group context can reduce one‘s sense of individuality. In Halaqah, Tariq 
adjusted his thoughts and personality to match the collectively defined ideology of HT. The 
perspective of Tariq, a member of HT, is surprisingly open and frank on the issue of the 
Halaqah. As he commented: 
 
‗The Halaqah is designed to culture the daris [novice], 
building them with the correct thoughts and ideas about Islam. 
So, we begin each Halaqah with Nidham al-Islam [System of 
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Islam, book]. This is the best party book, in my opinion, 
because it builds the Islamic foundation. For example, the first 
chapter talks about change: in order to create change 
[individual and society] one must change the thoughts because 
thoughts lead to action. This is a fundamental concept; it 
allowed me to appreciate how to create change in myself and 
society. So, take a simple example, a Muslim drinks alcohol, 
this is a corrupt action. So, if you want to change that action 
then you need to address the corrupt thoughts that motivate that 
action, like freedom…I want to make it clear that the Halaqah 
does not brainwash, I became convinced by the intellectual 
arguments of Hizb ut-Tahrir, and if you do not accept that then 
you are distorting the reality of the culturing process of the 
party.‘ 
   
This observation underscores some of the limitations of the interview method. Tariq, for 
example, is not aware of all the contextual factors that are influencing his behaviour and 
personality. Consequently, he cannot identify or understand the types of indoctrination 
techniques being employed against him.  
 
Lifton (1989), a prominent psychiatrist, observed three psychological techniques used by the 
Chinese government to indoctrinate young students. As Lifton (1989, p. 7) points out, these 
techniques ‗represent the successive psychological climates to which the student is exposed 
as he is guided along the path of his symbolic death and rebirth; the great togetherness, the 
closing of the milieu, and submission and rebirth‘. During the intermediate stage of 
indoctrination Tariq became a novice and joined a six-person Halaqah in which he received 
culturing on HT ideology and aim. Then, after three months, a noticeable change took place 
– there was a large shift in emphasis from the intellectual and ideological to the behavioural. 
Tariq casually acknowledged this shift, as he commented: ‗The first three chapters of 
Nidham [System of Islam] focus on aqlya [mentality] – the correct way of thinking – and 
chapter four really targets naffsyya [behaviour] because the concepts need life‘. Tariq began 
to realise that his views came under intense scrutiny and his Mushrif (Halaqah teacher) 
started to exert considerable pressure on him to adopt HT ideology in totality. ‗Milieu 
control‘ was a powerful technique used to control Tariq‘s environment (Lifton, 1989). 
According to Tariq: ‗the party [HT] is the only group today that understands the Islamic 
ideology [and] the Halaqah maintains this purity and knowledge‘. The concepts he studied in 
Halaqah were strictly controlled, and thus no alternative sources could be used, as this would 
distort the new world view being crafted.  
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4.3.11 Final Stage: Membership and Ideology 
 
When Tariq began conveying the thoughts of HT effectively, as if they were his own, then 
he was considered for membership. This was not a free choice; significant coercion was used 
in order to manipulate him into joining the organisation. Although, there was no physical 
pressure, the coercion was clear. During the weekly Halaqah, intellectual pressure was 
applied, which forced Tariq to bend towards group expectation. The novice is seen as 
intellectually inferior, especially if he or she displays independent thinking. According to 
Fahim (senior member), ‗most shab join the Hizb knowing very little…they are like empty 
pieces of clay, making it the Mushrif‟s job to mould them into members‘. However, Tariq 
showed desire for membership by imposing himself on the organisation, which served as the 
first indicator of his readiness. He talked openly about his membership:  
 
‗I recall being summoned, without any explanation, on an early 
Sunday morning by a senior member. I arrived at the location 
to find several members already present, among them was the 
Naqib [committee head] and Masool [area leader]. To my 
surprise, they offered me membership into the party, which I 
accepted. The Naqib at the time explained that the party 
stipulated that in order to become a member, I must take al-
Qasm [the Oath].‘  
 
The swearing of the oath is a requirement for all prospective members, to be assured of their 
loyalty. The following is the oath in full: 
 
[I declare that I will be] (1) a faithful guardian of Islam, [and I 
swear] (2) to adopt the opinions of this Hizb ut-Tahrir, its 
thoughts and its constitution [administrative laws] by word and 
deed. (3) to trust its leadership, (4) to execute its resolutions 
even if they are different from my opinion, (5) to exhaust all 
my efforts to achieve its objective, (6) [all this for] as long as I 
am a member. (Anon., leaflet Al-Qasm, 20/08/1998).  
 
The first condition of the oath demands that a member must be ‗a faithful guardian of Islam‘. 
To be a guardian of Islam entailed that Tariq propagate the Islamic message, as interpreted 
by HT, in a political fashion to the wider society. Secondly, anyone who becomes a member 
of the organisation has to adopt the party ideology. In this respect, the member must be a 
walking manifestation of the ideology, acting in full accordance with it, even if he disagrees 
with some aspect of it. According to Lifton (1989, p. 430), another characteristic of 
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indoctrination is ‗the subordination of human experience to the claims of doctrine‘. In other 
words, Tariq‘s personal experiences were subordinated to the ideology because HT doctrine 
is more important than the individual. The third condition relates to confidence and trust in 
the leadership, which is imperative. The fourth requirement stipulates that once the oath has 
been taken a member must execute every decision made by the party, regardless of his own 
view, ‗as decisions are made for implementation‘. The fifth condition demands that as a 
member you commit to carry the party ideology with all your effort and energy. Finally, the 
oath ends with a self-declaration to uphold all the aforementioned conditions, confirming 
this oath with God as the witness. This is very important, as violation of this oath would be 
considered a contravention against God‘s law.  
 
4.4 Becoming a Radical – Common Trends 
 
Although I looked at nearly thirty case studies, this chapter has documented the 
radicalisation of just two young Muslims. The extracts have provided a powerful source of 
information, and now I need to make sense of them. There are many characteristics that I can 
identify, and diverse kinds of category that I could use to conceptualise these accounts; but 
any type of analysis will be selective in the features it focuses on and the categories used to 
classify them. So what features should I use? Although each respondent is unique, common 
patterns of experience can be singled out. However, as I will show, these are not conclusive. 
They constitute issues to be discussed, rather than clear-cut features of radicalisation. My 
analysis has drawn out three key commonalities; socialisation, peer group formation and 
collective identity.      
 
4.4.1 Socialisation
147
 
 
The collection of case material clearly indicates that the respondents did not operate 
independently from society. Instead, I discovered that the respondents were embedded in a 
complex set of relationships with other social forces and settings outside of the family, such 
as school and peer group contexts. Abdul, for example, tailored his identity at home in 
relation to his ethnic culture, but beyond the home he struggled to develop relationships with 
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the white majority. In spite of this recognition, a great deal remains to be examined about the 
ways in which these social influences affected the respondents.  
 
To be a radical, or, more precisely, to be susceptible to becoming one, involves subjective 
experiences. Each case history provided important insights into the cognitive ways in which 
the respondents processed and made sense of their adverse experiences. Each of the 
respondents experienced the world through their own particular frame of recognition, 
actively trying to understand, predict and explain their own perspective. Much of Abdul‘s 
awareness, for example, is made up of racial discrimination, which deeply affected his 
perception of the ‗other‘. The very way Tariq presented himself emphasised the 
fragmentation of his ethnic identity. Leading psychologists suggest that the ways in which 
children cope with adverse experiences is dependent on the individual‘s early emotional 
history and the unconscious motivations that this history produces (Freud, 1932; Storr, 
2005). This can provide a way of coping with the world, and of maintaining some sense of 
control.  
 
It is noticeable that in both cases the respondents‘ childhood experiences became a trigger 
for radicalisation. Storr (2005) believes the anger provoked by a sense of powerlessness in 
childhood is likely to be twisted into hate in adulthood. Many of the respondents became 
disaffected and marginalised through their experiences; for instance, Abdul and Tariq never 
fully recovered from racial victimisation. Those young people that suffer an abusive 
socialisation are more likely to develop a dysfunctional identity (Chansky, 2001). According 
to Adler (2002), feelings of helplessness that originate in childhood precipitate an inferiority 
complex, and can encourage a child to compensate for these feelings in adulthood.  
 
Socialisation assumes the individual is constituted by their inherited culture, but, in the case 
of the respondents, the substance of this was disjointed, which left then feeling deprived. In 
this respect, the respondents struggled through their life cycle, trying to adjust their identity; 
but the changing social environments they encountered triggered a host of frustrations that 
they were unable to resolve. Tariq, for example, could not alter his identity to fit into a 
distinct social grouping. If socialisation is not developed properly then it can foster negative 
feelings in adulthood. However, a prerequisite of radicalisation is not necessarily a violent 
childhood, because many children are exposed to violent acts, but this does not always turn 
them to a violent path in life. For this reason, I am not saying all instances of adverse 
- 149 - 
 
socialisation will result in radicalisation; rather, I contend that a turbulent socialisation may 
increase the potential for radicalisation in later life.  
 
4.4.2 Effects of Racism 
 
According to Abdul, ‗racism was not a black and white thing…kids were picked on because 
of their religious beliefs; refugee kids were always singled out because they looked different 
and couldn‘t speak English‘ (Abdul; Interview 1, 05/11/2004). It is clear racism, in the form 
of violent physical attack and harassment, had a deep emotional effect on the respondents. 
As Miles and Brown (2003) point out, at the heart of racism is a process of making sense of 
the ‗other‘, which distorts the social perspective into various forms of ‗us‘ and ‗them‘. The 
distorted representation of others can validate discrimination, but how did the respondents 
perceive and interpret their social world? In general terms, the challenge for me lies in 
explaining how racism affected the respondents, and whether it provided some motivation 
for embracing a radical identity. During my initial interviews with Omar Bakri (the former 
leader of HT, Britain), he explained how the experiences of young Muslims of being racially 
attacked, in the cases he observed, caused them to be ‗distrustful of [the] Kuffar [non-
Muslims]‘ (Omar Bakri Muhammad, interview 26/03/2004). Consequently, these and other 
adverse social experiences were exploited by HT to cultivate a group of young Muslims who 
had been marginalised through racism. According to Fanon (1968), racism has a significant 
effect on an individual‘s psychology and raises issues of self-alienation.   
 
The case histories that I have presented indicate that radicals were greatly affected by their 
interpersonal interactions with others, providing me with extensive insight into the causes of 
their eventual radicalisation. Clearly, radicalisation requires some form of emotional trauma 
in the recruit‘s life cycle, principally during early socialisation, which would make them 
more prone to radicalisation in adulthood. This is perpetuated by the inability to balance 
racial prejudice with one‘s own cultural distinctiveness. To some extent, this appears to be 
generally true of many of my respondents, as their external perception of others changed 
based on their negative interactions. Synder and Tilly (1974) asserted that individuals recall 
information about ‗others‘ based on their stereotypes, which allows them to selectively 
interpret and draw upon subjective experiences. Consequently, the respondents perceived 
situations and processed information that was dependent on their prior stereotypic 
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experiences. These events have radically altered their cognitive outlook; many have 
internalised their feelings and developed a ‗negative identity‘.  
 
4.4.3 Social Alienation 
 
At the heart of the respondents‘ radicalisation lay a catalogue of grievances that had 
traceable markers to alienation. This would suggest alienation had a destructive effect on all 
the respondents. The concept of alienation, its meaning and ways in which it can be applied 
to this context, need to be understood. In its simplest form, alienation refers to 
estrangement, the separation of the self from society, leading to a gradual disengagement 
(Bealey, 1999). The concept of alienation has been a major source of debate and research, 
requiring one to extract, from the beginning, a coherent definition.
148
 Keniston‘s (1967) 
framing of the term, which he used to study the psychology of alienated students, is of 
crucial importance to my study. As Keniston (1967, pp. 189-190) notes, alienation means 
‗an explicit rejection of what are seen as the dominant values of the surrounding society‘.     
 
It follows from the above definition of alienation that not all young Muslims are equally 
alienated from their society. Why did my respondents feel alienated, while other young 
Muslims do not? Clearly, the socio-psychological features of alienation are different for 
each alienated Muslim, and no composite account can deduce a single profile of an 
alienated young Muslim. According to Sageman (2005), Muslims who live abroad tend to 
become more isolated from their cultural origin, which makes them, feel ‗more royal than 
the king‘. He found that second generation immigrant‘s experienced similar feelings of 
disaffection from their cultural origins. My respondents experienced similar emotions, 
especially since they felt culturally separated from the dominant values and cultures around 
them. Abdul, for example, could not associate with his migrant culture, nor did he feel 
British. This clash of cultures had a destructive effect on Abdul, as he was not able to find a 
sense of identification with people of his own ethnicity, nor with the white majority, making 
him feel socially excluded (Lewin, 1948). By viewing alienation in accordance with other 
social factors, I can account for the causes of alienation among the respondents.  
 
4.4.4 Radicalisation in Context: Why Abdul and Tariq chose HT? 
                                                 
148
 ‗Alienation‘ has been used to describe such varied conditions as the separation of spirit from nature (Hegel, 
1931); man‘s loss of relationship to his labour (Marx, 1844); the individual‘s estrangement from some deep 
part of himself (Fromm, 1955); the loss of his own sanity (Kaplan, 1964); political apathy (Levin, 1960). 
- 151 - 
 
 
The radicalisation of both Abdul and Tariq into HT was explored from an environmental 
perspective, namely the social milieu in which they emerged from. This to some degree may 
undervalue other potential variables. For example, the innate connection an activist may 
have to HT ideology. Therefore, it is important to contextualise both men‘s radicalisation in 
a way that explores their social context and intellectual motivation for joining HT. Firstly, 
Abdul joined HT in 1999, while Tariq joined in 1998. This is somewhat symbolic from the 
perspective that their radicalisation pre-dates the terror attacks of 9/11. This would suggest 
the international context had little impact on their respective decision to join HT, as Abdul 
asserts: ‗global events didn‘t influence me (joining the Hizb)…it was solely based on 
conviction‘. This telling statement raises one significant question, does context matter?  
 
The trajectory of Abdul and Tariq prior to joining HT revealed a deep social need for 
belonging, which made them seek out like-mined people at university. In fact, the vast 
majority of HT activists are recruited within the same social setting, namely amongst 
university peer groups. This would suggest that HT radicalisation is context-specific. In 
other words, HT activists emerge from similar social realities and backgrounds, making 
ideological motivation less salient. Hoffer (2002), utilising a social psychology approach to 
study why and how mass movements form, concluded that mass movements, irrespective of 
there religious or political disposition, attract similar personality types. However, if this is 
true, then why do similar types of Muslims select HT? Well, according to Hoffer (2002), 
groups like HT proliferate amongst certain social demographics because they promise 
fulfilment of particular deficit-needs, which the activist has been lacking in society. 
Therefore, whatever the motivation, whether political or religious, HT appeals to a specific 
group of frustrated young Muslims who struggle to identify with society and community. In 
other words, HT offer young middle class Muslims, who are seeking to escape a feeling of 
social exclusion, a way to gain a real sense of belonging. Therefore, the process of joining 
HT has very little to do with ideology. In actuality, acquiring social acceptance within a 
homogenous social peer group is a key feature of joining HT. This is why events like Bosnia 
or 9/11 played little role in the narratives of HT activists, instead the peer group offered the 
novices a sense of social belonging.
149
 Therefore, leaving HT is considered extremely 
                                                 
149
 The data I have accumulated clearly shows that the vast majority of recruits were not influenced by global 
events, such as 9/11 or 7/7. In particular, out of the 28 male members interviewed, 17 were recruited pre-2001 
while 10 were recruited after the 2001 terror attacks. The narratives of the 10 members recruited after 9/11 
talked little about such global events, and instead focused on the national context of their upbringing. In 
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difficult, as members become institutionalised within the social group and leaving would 
essentially mean returning to a state of social isolation.   
 
However, the above does not totally explain why Abdul and Tariq opted for HT over other 
Islamic groups, like Young Muslims or JIMAS? There are a number of issues that provide 
an answer to this issue. Firstly, in respect to recruitment strategy, HT operates in an 
evangelical style at university, looking to actively recruit from a closed pool of Muslims 
predisposed to HT radicalism. In contrast, rival groups do not actively recruit members, as 
they are not structured as a religious-political organisation. As Abu Yusuf, a member from 
London, commented:  
 
‗We [HT] were rampant at uni, literally unstoppable, the other 
groups couldn‘t compete…they had no organisation and were 
not politically active. We [HT] literally took over campuses and 
groups like YMO watched on from the side lines to afraid to 
challenge us‘.       
 
The free reign HT seemingly possesses at university enables them to be the first point of 
contact for young Muslims arriving at university for the first time. This was supported by the 
evidence I collected from my fieldwork, which indicated that the first Muslims most 
members encountered at university were HT recruiters, who they befriended and within the 
peer group became radicalised. Secondly, rival Islamic groups struggle to relate to those 
young Muslims predisposed to HT, namely middle class Asians, because they are mainly 
populated with working class activists. Respondent I, who prior to joining HT was 
associated with YMO, suggested that he struggled to connect with YMO members, because 
they emerged from totally different social worlds.
150
 As he mentions:  
 
‗they [YMO] were full of uneducated idiots…I just couldn‘t 
relate to a bunch of labourers and gang members…I grew up a 
million miles away from those people and what they felt were 
social problems were a million miles away from my reality and 
problems‘.    
 
This would further support my contention that personal contact and relationships underpin 
the joining process. In other words, social need may have predisposed Abdul and Tariq to 
                                                                                                                                                      
actuality, none of the respondents cited 9/11 as a precipitating trigger to joining HT. For further information 
refer to Appendix III: synopsis of male members, p. 275  
150
 Refer to Appendix III: Synopsis of male members, p. 278-79. 
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HT, but social connection to likeminded individuals pulled them to the movement. After the 
initial pull factor, Abdul and Tariq were able to fulfil secondary interests within HT. Abdul, 
for example, displayed more affinity to religiosity and thus devoted significant attention to 
religious learning. While Tariq remained solely interested in HT political activism, spending 
the majority of his time and energy immersed in reading the news and discussing HT 
politics.   
 
On the surface, it may appear that Abdul and Tariq were drawn to HT by different 
motivations. For instance, Tariq seemed more inclined to the political aspect of HT activism, 
while Abdul was more orientated towards religious activism. In fact, the religious and 
political motivation of the men evolved after encountering HT recruiters. As Abdul and 
Tariq explain: 
 
‗...before the Hizb [HT] I knew nothing about the Deen [Islam], I 
never cared about the political situation and I had a passing 
interest in religious matters...only after joining the Hizb did I 
realise the importance of the Deen [Islam], which as you know 
brother combines politics and religion...and that is the power of 
the Hizb, it brings politics and religion together making the Deen 
[Islam] come alive...so in answering your question, the Deen is 
both political and spiritual…so praying, fasting or pursuing the 
news are all acts of worship‘ (Abdul). 
 
‗I was never religious growing up, I actually learnt to pray 
properly after I joined the Hizb at university...Islam had no 
practical meaning before that. When I joined the Hizb I was 
amazed by its culture, after reading political concepts [HT book], 
my political world view changed, I never knew how the world 
ticked until I joined the party...I learnt about all aspects of the 
Deen [Islam], its spiritual parts and its political parts... (In 
particular) I started to develop a deep interest in the political 
culture and intellectual ideas of the Hizb‘ (Tariq).     
 
From the above two statements, it may be argued that ideology is somewhat marginal at the 
joining phase, but it begins to take shape after radicalisation. Once the old worldview of the 
novice is dismantled, and as radicalisation deepens, it gives an opening for a new worldview. 
In other words, exposure to HT ideology takes place within the Halaqah (culturing stage), 
which means the primary prerequisite for joining HT is social need and peer group 
socialisation. In addition, HT recruitment is context specific. This means specific 
personality-types, such as those matching the homogenous disposition of the HT fraternity, 
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are sort out at university. Therefore, the social need to join HT predisposed Abdul and Tariq 
towards HT, irrespective of their political and religious orientations. 
 
4.4.5 Relationships and Interactions: Peer Group Formation 
 
The process of becoming a radical is strongly dependent on the social settings in which the 
person lives. In this respect, understanding how the respondents reacted to ‗others‘, often on 
the basis of stereotyped views, is of great significance. The accounts of my respondents 
showed me how they were adversely affected by other people‘s perceptions and responses to 
them. As a result, many of the respondents experienced substantial difficulties in forging 
durable relationships during their early experiences, leading them to manifest a host of 
confusions concerning their race, ethnicity, culture, religion and class. All the respondents 
emerged from a distinct minority culture; because of this, they struggled to contend with 
rejection. This directly affected their identity development, creating an ‗attachment 
disorder‘, and provoking a greater propensity towards disaffection and alienation (Prior and 
Glaser, 2006). As a consequence, they felt that they did not belong to a specific social 
classification or group, leading to their withdrawal from mainstream society. Tariq, for 
instance, emerged through multiple sub-cultures; first, the teenage gang, then, the Socialist 
Workers, until these are permanently replaced by HT. The respondents lacked a deep sense 
of attachment, which meant they could not establish a proper place in society. All 
individuals, especially adolescent children, must feel loved and feel that they can belong to a 
social group in order to feel comfortable within their surroundings (Argyle, 1992). When the 
respondents were denied security and belonging, they withdrew from those situations to seek 
safety and love elsewhere.  
 
A common feature in all twenty-eight case studies was the university peer group, which had 
a considerable influence. In particular, the respondent‘s self-identity was refashioned in 
accordance with their exposure to the value system of the peer group. Upon entering the peer 
group the respondents became conscious of alternatives to their own cultural and social 
voices, they began to question old ideals (e.g., family/minority traditions). Both Tariq and 
Abdul found the new world view extremely persuasive. These new-found concepts became 
entwined with feelings of belonging, as group participation brought positive rewards. As 
mentioned earlier, one of the difficulties encountered by the respondents during their 
childhood involved establishing relationships with others. A stable relationship requires the 
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interrelation of two distinct social worlds (Laing, 1972). According to Laursen (1993), 
individuals display greater happiness when engaged in active relationships. Individuals are 
most happy when they are with friends, followed by being with family, and they are least 
happy when alone (Argyle, 1992). Besides the peer group offering protection from 
alienation, it introduced the respondents to a group of individuals that had the same interests 
and goals.   
 
4.4.5 Empowerment – Collective Identity 
 
I am greatly interested in what happened to the respondents‘ identity and motivation when 
they became members of HT. Let us first explore this issue through the words of my 
respondents, which will allow me to gain a sense of collective identity from their 
perspective. According to Abdul: ‗the [party] culture is a liberating force…it gives you 
supreme confidence and total conviction, because it‘s the truth‘. Similarly, Tariq, on entering 
HT, described his experience as an ‗overpowering feeling of absolute confidence, as you 
know you‘ve found the truth‘. These views are only a small glimpse from much longer 
discussions, but they can be used to make some important points about the nature of radical 
identities. Most importantly, the respondents‘ cognitive processes were radically transformed 
in HT. In other words, the basis for the respondents‘ self-definition changed in the group 
setting. The respondents‘ personal identity gave way to the ‗Hizbi‘ (collective) identity. 
Moreover, because they adopted the characteristics of the group, their perceptions of 
themselves changed.  
  
I need to look at why HT affected the respondents so strongly and how the radical identity 
was formed. In order to examine these issues, one must consider the minimal group studies 
of Tajfel and Turner (1979), because they identified three key components that transform 
identity in a group setting; ‗categorisation, identification and comparison‘ (Tajfel, 1981). 
Within the radical group, the novice will adjust their sense of identity, their ideas and their 
dispositions to harmonise with the collectively defined attributes of their group. In effect, 
the novice will take on the group characteristics, making them their own, which conditions 
the novice towards group conformity (Asch, 1952). Also, the novice‘s self-esteem becomes 
firmly attached to the fortunes of the group, seeking to achieve positive and negative value 
connotations, so as to differentiate their in-group from a comparison out-group (Tajfel, 
1981). This search for ‗positive distinctiveness‘ shapes the individual‘s sense of identity. In 
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the case of HT, this positive distinction also applies to other Muslims, who become less 
relevant sources, as they represent the out-group members – those who do not belong to HT. 
Turner (1982) links this to self-stereotyping, which involves radicals stereotyping 
themselves when they identify with their group. I witnessed a good example of this in 
practice, while visiting a respondent at his home. As I arrived, his neighbour had just 
returned an item that he had borrowed and they appeared to have a pleasant conversation; 
but, as soon as he had left, to my shock, The respondent furiously berated him: ‗dirty Kuffar 
[disbeliever], I should burn this [foot pump]‘. He continued for much of the conversation 
with this theme; he later suggested that his other neighbour, a Muslim, would always return 
a borrowed item immediately. This situation demonstrates the process of ‗self-stereotyping‘, 
in which a person may have very different responses to people at different times. For 
instance, the respondent responded to his neighbour in terms of his personal identity, but in 
my presence he switched to his collective identity. 
 
The group appears to be a recurring feature in the radicalisation process, as it provides a 
sense of belonging, a feeling of self-importance, and a new cognitive system that fashions a 
fresh identity. The social setting within HT, for example, is strongly governed by the ‗Hizbi‟ 
(collective) identity, which allows the member to adopt the characteristics of HT. The 
transition from personal identity to a ‗Hizbi‟ (collective) identity is achieved, firstly, by 
building the ‗aqliyah‘ (mentality)151 on a specific idea that serves as the bond linking the 
individuals in the group together. Secondly, the ‗nafsiyah‘ (disposition) must be changed in 
accordance with the work of the group: ‗This requires that the shab [novice] engage himself 
in studying the Hizbi [group/collective] culture, adopting it as his viewpoint in life, and 
interacting with it in such a manner that it shapes his course of actions as a Muslim‘ (Anon., 
1994, p. 1). The ‗Hizbi‟ identity must acquire full domination over the individualistic aspect 
(ibid.). Once the members have attained this shared sense of collective identity, it becomes 
the basis for their wider identification (Sherif and Sherif, 1969). According to HT (Anon., 
1994), for the novice to be considered part of the group, he or she must adopt all processes 
related to the group:  
 
This means that he must forsake some of the individualistic 
aspects in order for him to be part of the Hizb…Even if the 
shab [novice] is a Mujtahid Mutlaq [highest grade of scholar], 
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 Within HT literature ‗aqliyah‘ has been translated in several ways, examples include: mentality, thought, 
concept and mindset. In the book Shaksiyah Al-Islamiyah (Islamic personality), for example, the most common 
translation is mentality. 
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he is to abandon his opinion for the opinion of the Hizb. (Anon 
1994, p.1).  
 
The radical identity that emerges from the group dynamic often gives rise to a deep feeling 
of empowerment, increasing a radical‘s sense of confidence and self-worth. On entering 
HT, for example, individuals are assimilated into the cultural norms of the group. Most 
importantly, the group exploits the need to belong within the novice, providing him or her 
with a feeling of self-importance by conveying a new belief structure that defines the 
individual identity. As the radicalisation process deepens, the novice is gradually 
conditioned to accept the moral supremacy of the group identity. Shaw (1986) makes a 
similar assessment of membership in a terrorist organisation, as the group often offers an 
answer to the pressing personal needs that is not achieved in the wider society. This 
provides the individual with a new identity and a role in society, albeit a negative one, 
which, in a passive sense, imposes conformity. Post (1990, p.159) goes further, as he 
suggests that radicals ‗whose only sense of significance comes from being terrorists cannot 
be forced to give up terrorism, for to do so would be to lose their very reason for being‘. 
This is equally true for members of HT, as they cannot envisage life outside of the group. 
The group provides a way to enhance social status, a quality greatly under-represented in a 
recruit‘s social life. For instance, a loner at school or work becomes a high-ranking figure, 
gratifying their ego. 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 
When I started my investigation, I found the prospect of constructing a radical‘s pathway 
based on their biographical experiences somewhat daunting. However, the task in practice 
was not as difficult as I first assumed, since HT members‘ identity processes have coherence 
even when dysfunction appears to be the norm. If I accept that a HT member‘s identity is 
structured in some manner, then my task is to ascertain the key features of that structure. One 
thing that emerged strongly in the accounts from Abdul and Tariq, for example, is a sense of 
continually evolving identity. In other words, the process of being made and remade, as we 
saw, heavily depended on their past experiences. In Abdul‘s case, his radicalisation can be 
tracked back to several stirring events. Firstly, racism and class left him alienated from his 
classmates, making it difficult to develop close relationships. Although these features were 
beyond his control, it still indicates that society has a lasting effect which cannot be easily 
washed away. Yet, on the other hand, it would be simplistic to suggest that society 
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determined his pathway towards radicalism. Therefore, it depends upon how social 
experiences, either negative or positive, become translated into everyday life. For example, 
Abdul argued that one thing which had a strong impact on him joining HT was university, as 
he affirmed: ‗If I never went to university, I probably would‘ve never met the Hizb, and my 
life would‘ve been totally different if I hadn‘t‘. Abdul acknowledges that university was a 
pivotal event. For example, he becomes religious, develops close relationships for the first 
time and joins HT, directly affecting the kind of person he becomes.   
 
The features identified in my case studies could not encompass all of the intricate details of a 
HT member‘s identity in totality. However, I was able to document the key features of 
Tariq‘s and Abdul‘s identity structure – in relation to their ethnicity, religion and social 
status. My research catalogued a host of recurring characteristics, patterns of common 
experiences and settings, which directly influenced the respondent‘s identity formation. In 
this respect, I would suggest that a member profile can be crafted that defines the pathways 
into radicalism. However, in order to produce such a profile, I must expand my research to 
include a broad sociological study of the common trends among the social strata of HT 
fraternity.
152
 Of particular interest is whether members of HT in Britain share sociological 
characteristics. This might be useful in profiling radicals, if profiling is at all feasible, and in 
understanding somewhat better the motivations of individuals who become radicalised. 
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 Refer to chapter six, p. 191. 
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Chapter Five: 
Radical Pathways II - Profiles of Female HT Members 
 
The British media often depict Muslim women as victims of cultural and religious 
fundamentalism, in desperate need of western emancipation. I must confess, before starting 
this study, I had a very narrow and distorted image of Muslim women as relatively 
powerless. This image has been somewhat changed by my research into HT female activists. 
These women appeared very active and eager to enter the political landscape, albeit in a 
radical fashion. On the surface, however, HT seems to be a predominantly male-dominated 
space. What is less clear is how far HT makes room for female activists. If Muslim women 
are drawn to HT, then it is equally unclear what roles they take on within it. These issues 
caught my attention because there are considerable misunderstandings and ambiguities about 
the role of women in HT. As I tried to examine these broad topics, I discovered that most of 
the female activists I encountered had strong commonalities – in terms of age, education, 
ethnicity, socioeconomic status and background. This chapter therefore seeks to understand 
the paths taken by a group of Muslim women into HT radicalism. Painting a picture of this 
largely unknown subject requires insight into the influences within home, school and wider 
society.
153
    
 
5.1 Family Environment 
 
Past research on the migrant communities in England has revealed that they are 
overwhelmingly kinship-orientated (Joly, 1995; Ali, 1992; Lewis, 2002). I therefore 
expected to encounter examples of extended family networks and traditional family life. 
While I found that the idea of kinship remained relatively strong, the results from the focus 
group indicate, however, that it is a less significant feature. Moreover, many of the women 
challenged such assumptions, one member commented: 
 
‗Our parents came over here [UK] from the subcontinent, 
bringing with them a host of corrupt traditions that were not 
compatible with the west and for that matter with Islam. They 
had a link to their ancestry, but we don‘t…I personally 
struggled to accept their ways and traditions‘.    
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 As I explained in the introduction chapter the data was collected using focus group discussions, for further 
details on this refer to introduction chapter (pp. 33-34) and Appendix III. 
- 160 - 
 
The movement from one social world to another can be extremely problematic (Ghunman, 
1991; Kim, 1988). As the above comment reveals, migration can expose a gap between the 
generations, as two distinct social and cultural worlds collide. Pearce and King (1987) 
describe this process as ‗poly-cultural‘, since the features from both the native and host 
country become fused into a new identity. More significantly, it seems that the women chose 
to reject their parents‘ cultural indices in order to accommodate integration into the dominant 
culture. Given the women‘s membership of two diverse worlds, it seems necessary first to 
explore their family life and upbringing before investigating the above issues.  
 
5.2 Family Life and Upbringing 
 
A number of studies on family life have highlighted the importance this social setting has on 
child development (Lareau, 2003). This makes it vital to paint a clear picture of the women‘s 
upbringing because a variety of influences within the home can affect identity formation. As 
Amina suggested: ‗my parents tried to bring us up in a traditional way but my mum was very 
western and liberal…this meant I could pretty much do as I pleased‘. Amina‘s family 
dynamic allowed her to develop a fairly independent and open world view. This is somewhat 
unusual since most Muslim families impose rigid controls on their children‘s behaviour. 
Nina‘s upbringing, for example, was stricter. As she explained; ‗My parents are very 
traditional. I couldn‘t go out with my school friends and my movement was restricted…I 
lived a dual life though; at home I was a traditional Pakistani girl but at school I was 
western‘. One of the most surprising aspects of the women‘s family life seems to be their 
constant endeavour to acquire freedom from parental authority. Although they could not 
fully achieve this in the home, their parents had no control over them beyond the family 
environment. As a result, the women clearly developed a dual identity, facing conflict at 
home and freedom in school (Anwar, 1981). 
 
A cursory survey of the literature on family processes indicates subtle differences are to be 
expected in culture and ethnic background (Chibucos, 2005). Although family processes can 
be expected to vary, I observed several common features among the women‘s family 
structure. First, during their youth, the rules that governed the interaction between the girls 
and the outside world appeared imbalanced. In particular, it seems stricter boundaries were 
enforced because of their gender. As Nina commented: ‗My brothers were given total 
freedom, they‘d be able to visit their friends and go out till late, but I had really strict and 
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unfair curfews‘. The majority of the women cited similar experiences, which resulted in acts 
of deception and rebellion. Deception, in the case of the girls, was needed in order to live 
within two conflicting social settings (Wade et al., 1992). This can have a considerable 
psychological effect on children, because they are constantly forced to act out different 
social roles. Second, as I see it, the girls underwent socialisation in their own South Asian 
culture as well as within the majority culture. As Nina explained: 
 
‗My mum wanted me to be traditional. She wanted me to learn 
to cook, look after my brothers and get married…I was never 
forced by my parents. This gave me freedom to go against 
Pakistani tradition, for example, I wore western clothes and I 
was able to pursue academia…I attribute this to my parent‘s 
openness because they were not from some village in Pakistan, 
they were educated, and they wanted the absolute best for me. 
So sometimes they‘d try to pass off their cultural stuff on me, 
but if I refused, that was the end of it‘.    
 
Despite this freedom, the girls‘ identities were continually challenged both from within and 
without. As Nadia observed: ‗…When my grandma visited us from Pakistan, she had a go at 
my mum for allowing us to become western. While she was here I had to wear Pakistani 
clothes, which I hated, but it kept my family happy‘. If one scrutinises the narratives of 
family life, as told by the women, then it is clear a number of confusions and contradictions 
exist. On the surface, for instance, the women all seem at odds with the ethno-religious 
traditions of their parents, yet there are instances when the girls conformed to the traditional 
value systems. As Nadia suggested: ‗of course we had limits…I never had a boyfriend in 
school because it was deemed something strictly taboo in our culture‘. Although it is not a 
salient issue here, the idea of Izzet [family honour] may have had an underlying role in the 
above extract. The majority of the women suggested, however, that such a concept had 
greatly diminished, owing to social changes and modernity. As Amina said: ‗On the surface, 
my parents were traditional, but they knew the reality of living in Britain. We [the family] 
had to adapt to England and become integrated. That was their view twenty-odd years 
ago…and that‘s my parents‘ mentality today, unfortunately‘.    
 
5.3 Social Class and Lifestyle 
 
The women‘s families migrated to England during the 1960s and 1970s, in search of greater 
socioeconomic prosperity and stability (Lewis, 1982). The pull factors are the economic 
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forces – such as greater job opportunities and higher living standards – that motivate 
migration (Jackson and Hudman, 1986). As I observed from the discussion, the phenomenon 
of migration had a significant impact on the development of the girl‘s socioeconomic 
situation. In particular, after the families had established themselves permanently, they 
struggled to gain upward social mobility (Tajfel, 1978). It is not surprising to find that social 
status and class were seen as important social categories for the girls when they were 
growing up. As Nadia commented: ‗My parents started at the bottom [after migration], and it 
took them a while to settle down, but after that our situation changed. My dad was a 
qualified doctor and he quickly started a practice‘. The socioeconomic changes to the 
women‘s families were very similar: for example, their fathers are all well educated 
professionals.
154
  
 
In most South Asian households, it is common for women to assume the role of homemaker 
and child carer, while husbands perform the function of economic provider (Joly, 1995). In 
contrast with this norm, the women‘s mothers entered the labour force and developed careers 
for themselves, while maintaining their household duties. As Sara explained: ‗My mum was 
a biochemistry researcher for over thirty years…and even though she did most of the chores, 
like cleaning and cooking, my dad did a lot to ease the burden of housework‘. This 
attitudinal shift reflects a somewhat modern approach to family structure and life, especially 
among South Asian families (Robinson, 1988). I mentioned earlier that the parents of the 
respondents seemed eager to raise their children in a traditional fashion, which seems at odds 
with their mothers‘ active career pursuits. Nadia provided greater insight on this issue, as she 
explained: 
 
‗Our [focus group] parents, I think, wanted us to be traditional, 
because they didn‘t want to abandon all their Pakistani 
traditions. So they tried to pass on these concepts to us, not by 
force, but by guidance or stories. But my mother, for example, 
is a consultant…she dresses in a western way because it is 
expected…it would be contradictory for her to tell me how to 
dress, even though she does. My parents started to lose their 
cultural identity when they started to work so how could they 
pass it on to us…this is a by-product of integration [loss of 
identity]‘. 
 
                                                 
154
 The women identified their parents‘ professions as accountants, doctors, teachers and engineers.  
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The cultural influences on the families appear to be underpinned by socioeconomic status.
155
 
In particular, the families seem prepared to discard parts of their cultural identity for upward 
social mobility.   
 
5.4 Ethnicity and Religion 
 
Ethnicity is a highly complex component of identity, because individuals are assigned and 
identified by labels, which they may not agree with.
156
 Nadia, for example, did not like any 
type of racial or ethnic identifiers: ‗I thought of myself as British, everything else was just 
not relevant...I hated being referred to as Pakistani because I was born and raised here [UK]‘. 
As Modood (1997) points out, ethnic labelling is an imposed identity created by the 
colonialist. An ethnic marker can be wrongly applied and stick, causing immense frustration 
for individuals who are trying to meld into the dominant culture (Sanchez-Hucles, 1998). As 
Sara explained: ‗Growing up here [England] can be difficult, because you have to live two 
lives... At school I was British but in family gatherings I was Pakistani‘. The women would 
have preferred to use the label British, it seems, but social forces pushed them to emphasise 
their ethnic and racial identity. This artificial sense of identity is not healthy. Many social 
theorists have argued that a stable concept of self needs to be constructed both in terms of 
personal and group identity (Wetherell, 1987). The inability to replicate a sense of ethnic 
identity contributes to the feeling of ‗becoming like them [white people]‘. In some respects, 
it could be argued that the parents of the girls were slightly responsible for not establishing 
an ethnic identity, which might have reflected cultural and religious distinctiveness 
(Modood, 1997). Although the respondents largely rejected ethnicity, they were unable to 
select a free and independent identity from the dominant culture, which continued to 
perceive them as Asian.  
  
It became clear through the discussions about the girls‘ upbringing that their attachment to 
ethnicity became attenuated. Trying to explore the factors undermining the importance of 
affiliation to ethnicity was not an easy task, as there were several possible causes. First, the 
distinctive attributes of ethnicity – such as cultural values, customs and traditions – were not 
properly transmitted to the girls. As Nadia said: ‗…I was given mixed messages about Islam, 
                                                 
155
 Socioeconomic status refers to two key aspects: (1) the economic aspect which is represented by wealth and 
income, home ownership, and other financial assets; (2) the social aspect includes education, lifestyle and 
upbringing (Davis and Moore, 1945).   
156
 The families of the women mainly originated from Pakistan, except Amina, who was of Malawi-Indian 
descent. 
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for example, not having a boyfriend. But my parents never cared about practising Islam, they 
were totally secular. It was pointless to use Islam because none of us practised‘. A 
superficial glance at the girl‘s family life may lead one to believe religion was relatively 
insignificant. Nevertheless, I think the lack of religious identification helps explain why the 
women felt disconnected from their ethnic identity. Islam is often seen as a key identity 
marker for the Muslim South Asian community in Britain (Gardner and Shuker, 1994). Islam 
is also often connected to and reinforced by ethnicity (McLoughlin, 2002). Nonetheless, the 
discussion with the girls supported the view that they seldom felt like they belonged to a 
religious community: for example, they never attended the local Mosque or participated in 
communal gatherings.
157
 Their families showed a lack of commitment to religion, which in 
effect perpetuated a sense of not belonging (Stark et al. 1980). Second, ethnic affiliations 
became weakened by migration and economic burdens, which directly undermined cultural 
values. More importantly, status became associated with socioeconomic achievement, giving 
the girls access to alternative cultures at school. As Sara explained: ‗I never thought about 
religion or ethnicity growing up, because I felt totally integrated‘. As Verma and Ashworth 
(1986, p.20) acknowledge, individuals can perceive themselves as more ‗ethnic‘ in certain 
social settings, drawing upon their own cultural identity at varying levels.   
 
5.5 Gender 
 
When I first talked to the women, I was somewhat taken aback by their active interest in 
ideological and religious perspectives regarding gender. It was therefore not surprising to 
find them participating in the political struggle to make their theological beliefs work for 
them and the wider society. At this stage, however, I wanted to understand the role of gender 
in relation to the girls‘ upbringing. As discussed earlier, the women felt freer in the school 
environment and enjoyed less freedom than their male siblings. Although the girls had 
limited independence, it seems that their boundaries were broadened after they reached the 
age of fifteen or so. As Nina said: ‗My parents were less protective of me when I started my 
GCSEs, I visited my friends unaccompanied…and when I started driving I had pretty much 
the same freedom as my brother‘. Similarly, the other girls talked about a more relaxed 
curfew at around this age.  
 
                                                 
157
 This is quite a salient feature of HT middle-class radicalism, as most members rarely experienced traditional 
religious practices (e.g. Friday prayer). In contrast, working-class south Asians often are socialised into 
traditional religious practice at an early age (for more refer to Lewis 2007, pp. 33-60).   
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More importantly, the identities the girls created are clearly marked by gender influences at 
many varying levels. Within the family setting, broad power relations between father and 
mother have an impact (Wetherell, 1987). Nina described her mother as very ‗authoritative 
and controlling‘ within the home environment. The other women perceived their mothers to 
be equally powerful within the domestic sphere, providing a positive gender archetype. This 
gave the girls the opportunity to craft an identity more in keeping with secular western 
tradition. As Sara acknowledged:  
 
‗When I was little my mum wanted me to wear shalvar-kameez 
[traditional Pakistani clothing], even though she‘d wear 
western clothing for work…I hated it and told my mum I 
wasn‘t going to wear shalvar-kameez because it made me stand 
out. [What about your father?] He never cared. I think my mum 
felt she was betraying her culture [and] so she‘d try and 
overcompensate with me‘.    
 
This is a rather interesting extract as it reveals to a certain extent that identities depend 
heavily on ideological beliefs, cultural and religious values, and social position (Haddad and 
Esposito, 1997). Owing to the lack of cultural influences, the girls‘ adolescent identity is 
formed through a more open perspective, which has a significant effect on their ascribed 
gender roles. Notwithstanding their views on some gender inequality, the girls were prepared 
for productive work in adult life, in the same fashion as their brothers, and not as 
homemakers. As I will explore later, however, after radicalisation, this view was totally 
overturned. The women, for example, adopted a domesticated role, seeing this as the natural 
responsibility of women as constituted by their newfound HT ideology.    
 
5.5.1 Internal Agency: Breaking Out of Tradition  
 
In the previous chapter I suggested that socialisation played a critical role in the 
radicalisation process. In the case of female activists, they were brought up within a 
predefined set of values and traditions, which became instilled into them during their early 
upbringing within the home environment. At school age, for example, the effects of this 
socialisation meant the women were aware of the ethno-cultural distinctions between 
themselves and their white classmates. Therefore, the more parents treat their children in 
ethnically differentiated ways, for instance over emphasising ethno-cultural norms, the more 
it is believed that a child will reflect such stereotypes. Through this process the women 
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became ‗socialised‘ into culturally structured gender roles. This begs the question did the 
women join HT to break away from the traditional path mapped out for them?  
 
The answer to this question is rather complicated, as it hinges on whether or not the women 
joined HT freely. In chapter one, I mentioned that participation within HT is a direct 
expression of human agency, albeit with structural influences. In the context of joining HT, 
agency was exercised by free choice, which counteracted the stereotypical characteristics of 
South Asian cultural expectations. As Sara explained:  
 
‗Islam is a liberating ideology, it sweeps away the falsehood and 
guides people to the right path…growing up in an Asian family 
meant we [Sara and her family] adopted many corrupt practices 
and I never want[ed] to live a traditional lifestyle – were 
community defines the way you live – Islam is the reference 
point and with Allah‘s guidance I found a way out‘.  
 
From this statement, there are several conclusions that can be forged. Firstly, despite the 
internalisation of Asian culture during childhood, the women sought to actively break away 
from the cultural mores of their parents. In this respect, HT was an important mechanism for 
making sense of the world, especially as they facilitated the creation of a new ideological 
viewpoint. For the women, as Sen (????) notes, internal agency represents the ability to act 
on behalf of goals that matter to them. In this respect, the women were actively involved in 
determining their own fate, and thus escaped becoming submissive heirs to their parent‘s 
traditions. Secondly, for the women, agency was expressed as a form of ‗resistance to social 
and cultural norms‘ perceived as backward and overbearing (Mahmood, 2005). Research has 
shown that immigrant families seek to transmit from one generation to the next a series of 
ethno-religious cultural markers (Lareau, 2003). The passing of traditional values and norms 
to offspring is seen as a way to reproduce and continue a connection with the land of origin. 
However, as the life-stories drawn from both male and female HT members have shown, 
activists struggled to reconcile the diverse nature of the two opposing cultural worlds they 
inhabited. As a result, consciously or unconsciously, the women‘s choice to join HT was 
influenced by their deep desire to resist the traditional patriarchy of their home upbringing. 
Thirdly, from an outsider perspective, it would seem that the women replaced one form of 
subordination for another, as HT ideology is equally rooted in patriarchy. In actuality, as the 
women intimated endlessly, the choice to join HT was an expression of self-agency, while 
the cultural values and norms of their parents were enforced upon them. According to 
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Mahmood (2005, p. 172), women often gain a sense of ‗self-empowerment through the 
cultivation of self-esteem‘. In other words, joining HT enabled the women to pursue ‗self-
directed choices and actions‘, giving them an opportunity to break away from traditional 
Asian constraints (Mahmood 2005, p. 172). In fact, the women felt voiceless and powerless 
within the constraints of Asian culture, and thus joining HT gave them a feeling of 
empowerment. So, even though the women‘s agency is subsumed and side-lined in HT, it is 
still voluntarily discharged, and thus can be reclaimed at any juncture during their 
membership. In this respect, the women are free agents because they appear to construct 
their own desires, values and goals.  
 
5.5.2 Intersections between Ethnicity, Class and Gender 
 
According to Crenshaw (1992, p. 1467), women from minority backgrounds are trapped 
between ‗the rocks and the hard places of racism and sexism‘. In other words, minority 
women are subject to dual forms of social vulnerability, which intersect in their lives to form 
experiences that are often unique to them (Crenshaw 1992, p. 1467). Through the concept of 
intersectionality, I will hopefully be able to put the distinctive experiences of HT female 
activists into focus by looking at the intersection of class, ethnicity and gender. In particular, 
the women experienced discrimination in a totally different manner than white women. 
Firstly, they all experienced discrimination based on their membership of a particular ethnic 
group. As Nina mentions, ‗by virtue of skin-colour I was stereotyped as Asian…which 
meant I was seen as culturally backward and uneducated by English people‘. This reflects 
how the women often experienced unique forms of stereotyping, placing social barriers upon 
them in relation to ethnicity and gender. As Kane (1992, p. 311) points out, ‗the intersection 
of racial and gender inequalities creates unique structural positions for black women, black 
men, white women, and white men‘. Secondly, the women grew up within a middle class 
household, which left them disconnected from working class Muslim women. At university 
the women struggled to relate to Asian Muslims from working class backgrounds. As Sara 
explained, ‗they (working class Muslim women) had to fight to go to university while 
education was encouraged for us‘. As the women reflected, being a member of the South 
Asian ethnic group and being female created unique experiences for them, which may 
ultimately have influenced their pathway into radical Islam? Therefore, it is clear from an 
intersectional perspective that HT women experienced multiple and overlapping forms of 
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discrimination, and thus they collectively felt socially excluded on the basis of race, ethnicity 
and gender. 
 
5.6 Social Environment 
 
The process of immigration places natural demands on the host country, as it involves 
working with diverse cultures and preparing the local labour market to welcome a new 
source of supply. Unsurprisingly, this can be a highly complex and challenging process 
because it places considerable demands upon the migrants. In most cases, immigrants are 
expected to modify their behaviour to conform to the dominant culture, which devalues their 
sense of cultural identity (Hutnik, 1985). As I discovered in the previous section, the girls 
and their families had to make their own choices about which aspects of their native identity 
they wanted to preserve and which to discard. Through this process, the girls developed their 
own social and cultural milieu, which in turn enabled them to feel integrated into society. 
Consequently, the girls‘ identities were not constructed in a vacuum but within a variety of 
social settings, making it essential to examine these social domains.  
 
5.6.1 Schooling and Friendship 
 
Some social theorists have argued that the family setting provides a powerful seed-bed for 
young people‘s educational success and professional ambition (Kellaghan, 1993). As Amina 
commented: ‗My parents had university degrees and so I was expected to go to 
university…my parents wanted the best for me so I had extra tuition after school‘. Although 
the girls acknowledge that their families assigned considerable importance to education, it is 
difficult to ascertain which family influences were the most significant. According to Lareau 
(2003), social status and family background provide children with greater access to 
educational resources, giving middle- and upper-class families a distinct advantage. Through 
social mobility, the girl‘s parents expressed high aspirations, providing motivation to pursue 
higher education. As Sara explained; ‗…they [parents] were involved in my education right 
up to university‘. Thus, the motivation of the girls was strongly influenced by the social class 
to which they belonged and their family environment.  
 
This helps explain some of the family influences on academic ambitions, but I want to 
explore the different social contexts that triggered the girls to think, feel and act on the basis 
of their social identities (Turner et al., 1987). As discussed earlier, the girls felt that the 
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Asian and Pakistani identity labels were imposed upon them by family networks and the 
dominant culture. Despite their dislike of labelling, most of the women insisted that they 
liked almost everything else pertaining to British culture and society. Hogg and Vaughan 
(2002) believe social identity is the individual‘s self-concept, which is extracted from 
perceived membership of social groups. I found it very interesting to hear about the social 
groups the girls belonged to when they attended secondary school. Amina, for example, 
attended a private girls‘ school and she talked about some of her experiences: 
 
‗I hated my first year of school because I was having silly 
squabbles with some girls who were gossiping about me – I 
think because I was the only Asian girl in the class – but things 
changed. I became really good friends with those girls and we 
stayed friends until university‘.  
 
The friendships between young girls can be very unstable (Bell and Coleman, 1999). Most of 
the girls described similar experiences of disruption of friendships, but after changing their 
allegiances they developed very strong bonds. Nina observed: ‗It‘s nice to fit in, I hung out 
with my friends, who were all English [white]‘.  
 
In general, school friends tend to share the same interests and children tend to reject other 
children with dissimilar interests. This is very important, as Nadia explained: 
 
‗My friends were English as well…We had the same tastes in 
clothes, music and other stuff. My thoughts and concepts were 
very corrupt and westernised, so I was accepted by my friends. 
But there was an Indian girl in my class who was always 
bullied. She‘d recently come over [from India] – so her dress 
and language really made her stand out – everyone would pick 
on her…when I was younger I thought she deserved it 
[bullying] because she never tried to integrate‘.  
 
Being part of a social group helped the girls to feel close to others. They might have moved 
in and out of different groups, but that is natural as children drift apart and make different 
friends (Allan, 1989). More importantly, the girls felt accepted in their social groups at 
school. The above extract, however, shows the darker side of exclusion, as social groups 
establish group norms and rules for self-categorisation in ways that favour the group 
members at the expense of the out-group (Turner and Tajfel, 1986). As soon as the girls 
started identifying themselves as belonging to a group, they took up an identity in their own 
eyes and in the eyes of others. However, this social pressure was embedded within an 
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undercurrent of racial inferiority. As Amina explained: ‗in retrospect I was forced to hide my 
culture amongst my friends because it was seen as odd, and maybe even backward, because I 
was seen as different even though I fitted in‘. This is a salient point, as it appears the girls 
social acceptance came with a subtle precondition. In order to integrate within the white 
peer-group the girls were forced to hide aspects of their home identity, which facilitated the 
creation of a dual identity. Moreover, it underscores their deep feelings of being seen as 
socially ‗different‘ from the white majority.   
 
5.6.2 After-school Activity 
 
A common feature of the girls‘ narrative is their after-school activity, which indicated a very 
free and unrestricted social life. They talked, for example, about being allowed to visit 
friends without a chaperon.
158
 Moreover, their accounts often depict their social lives as 
being active and spent in public areas: ‗We‘d [friends] go to the cinema, spend hours in 
shopping centres and just hang around‘ (Nina). This is surprisingly different from the 
perceived and often well-documented notion that Muslim girls are restricted to the home 
(Modood, 1992). Close friends often see each other during the school day and in after-school 
activity, spending considerable amounts of time together. This interaction can have a 
powerful effect, exerting considerable influence on a child. As Sara explained: ‗I‘d hide 
parts of my life so I‘d fit in…I never really let my friends come over to my place because I 
didn‘t want them to see my Pakistani side – like food and stuff‘. Despite having minimal 
presence, the girls chose actively to shun their ethnicity and cultural heritage. This perceived 
rejection of ethnicity was essential, as Nadia suggested: ‗Even though I am Asian, I was 
accepted
159
 by my white friends because I integrated. Integration literally means adopting 
their [Western] viewpoint. If you don‘t, then you‘ll get singled out, and that happened to a 
lot of Asian children at my school‘. It would appear that the girls failed properly to 
experience dual socialisation, which allows two cultures to overlap (De Anda, 1984). The 
failure to retain an ethnic identity is in many ways, however, a natural response to the 
realities of being Asian in a white society.          
                                                 
158
 This was after the ages of fourteen and fifteen. 
159
 The perception of feeling ‗accepted‘ seems somewhat contradictory, as it entailed hiding a key element of 
the girl‘s social identity, namely their ethno-religious identity. This in many ways appears connected to the 
image that their ethno-religious traditions are seen as wholly inferior to the majority culture. As Sara suggested: 
‗in a class discussion I remember feeling really sick…we were talking about ethnic minorities and racism, 
funnily enough, and everyone agreed that immigrants should give up their culture at the boarder and embrace 
British culture…they belittled Asian customs like arranged marriage and dress‘. This would suggest acceptance 
was bestowed only to those who willingly accepted the white majority culture, which was seen as superior.  
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5.6.3 Racism 
 
In the previous chapter, the male members described how racism was used to marginalise 
and exclude them on the basis of their skin colour and ethnicity. The physical manifestation 
of racism was more visible among the male members, and so was more readily 
understandable, whereas covert means were preferred by girls, making the behaviour of girls 
more difficult to predict and understand (Miles and Brown, 2003). Although the girls were 
not victims of any racially-motivated violence or intimidation, there was an undercurrent of 
racism which some of the girls experienced. Amina observed: 
 
‗My friends were all white…we‘d occasionally pick on other 
girls. On one occasion, two Asian girls were singled out and 
racially insulted for the way they acted and looked. I bumped 
into them on the bus later. They couldn‘t understand why I 
hung around with racists…they referred to me as a coconut – 
brown on the outside and white on the inside…I hated Asian 
culture. But I never felt British either‘.  
 
This highly complex extract reveals several unsettling components of racism. First, a 
negative judgement was made of those seen as different, containing a positive valuation for 
those imposing it. Living in a social environment in which prejudice is reinforced towards a 
minority group has been shown to have deep psychological impact on the development of 
young people (Sanchez-Hucles, 1998). Second, as it was described to me by the women, 
racism emerged from within a social context, rather than the belief or ideology of having 
innate superiority. As Nadia said: ‗I suppose they [friends] were a little racist, but they were 
my friends…I tolerated it because I wanted to be a part of the clique‘. This reveals some 
important issues; feeling socially accepted required hiding their ethno-religious culture in 
order to fit in. However, racism evoked deep confusions about identity, as it reinforced their 
sense of difference from the wider society. Third, the women questioned the validity of 
applying generalisations about social groups. They strongly believed that ethnicity could not 
provide knowledge about them as distinct individuals, especially since despite some 
contradictions they saw themselves as British. In other words, the girls did not want to be 
placed into, or represented by, a particular social group. As Nina commented: ‗Growing-up, 
I thought of myself as British, so I hated it when people would ask me where I was really 
from, implying that I‘m not really British…that‘s why I grew up confused about my identity, 
I felt British but I was not seen as British…it left me feeling like an alien‘.        
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5.7 Radicalisation 
 
The radicalisation of Muslim women receives considerable attention in the literature but it is 
still difficult to understand why growing numbers of women appear to be attracted to a wide 
range of activities within a radical, and sometimes violent, setting. The radicalisation of 
women, unlike men, is often thought to be stimulated by different social realities. These 
gender-based assumptions assert that female activists are less influenced by political 
involvement or ideology (MacDonald, 1992). Galvin (1983) tries to argue that family 
networks, namely husband and brother relationships, play a significant role in the 
recruitment of female activists. Similarly, MacDonald (1992) noted a large percentage of 
boyfriends recruited their girlfriends into Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA)
160
. I am not 
disputing these claims, but it is unwise to apply male-derived assumptions regarding female 
behaviour. The notion women are less likely to become radicalised because they are 
inherently more passive has been widely discredited (Skocpol and Campbell, 1995).
161
 My 
goal is therefore to examine why the women in my focus group became radicalised.  
  
5.7.1 University 
 
Ruth Kelly, the then Secretary of State for Education and Skills, in the aftermath of the 
London bombings on 7 July 2005, addressed a conference of university heads, in which she 
declared: ‗I believe that higher education institutions need to identify and confront 
unacceptable behaviour on their premises and within their communities‘ (Times Higher 
Education, 16-09-2005). It is apparent from these remarks that the authorities recognise 
radicalisation as a real and dangerous threat to university students. University can be a very 
unsettling experience, as young people grapple with a sense of purpose, beliefs and future 
direction (Erikson, 1968). There is extensive literature on the general nature of the university 
experience and its impact on student behaviour, but this research tells us very little of the 
actual processes by which Muslim women adapt in different ways to their university 
environments (Newcomb and Feldman, 1994). I needed to identify how the four women 
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 ETA is a militant-nationalist group seeking a free Basque homeland. 
161
 Helene Deutsch, a psychologist, argues that female passivity in work or politics is greatly misunderstood, 
because ‗the ego can be active in both men and women‘. She believes political passivity does not translate into 
‗inactivity, emptiness or immobility‘ (cited in Times Magazine, 20/03/1972, ‗Behaviour: Male and Female: 
Differences Between Them‘)  
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became radicalised at university. The how was crucial because without knowing the 
processes of radicalisation, one cannot counter it. 
 
5.7.2 Transition to a New Social Environment 
 
The girls had very similar social backgrounds, emerging from, and belonging to, a 
homogeneous social group during their early upbringing. Most of the women were optimistic 
about moving away to university, as it would allow them to gain autonomy from their 
parents. As Nina said: ‗I wanted to live on campus because I felt sheltered at home. Moving 
to university gave me the opportunity to become independent and meet new people…so I 
was excited‘. The reality of the first few months, however, brought many unforeseen 
complications, proving to be very disruptive to the girls‘ adjustment. Research into student 
transition indicates that many find the early alteration to a new social milieu very difficult 
and challenging (Newcomb and Feldman, 1994). As Sara described it: ‗University was 
different. I‘d never seen so many Asians in my life [and] I found it hard to develop friends, 
because my interests were western‘. Amina experienced the reverse: ‗I hated it [university]. 
Everyone was white, but really stuck-up, and I felt excluded because I was Asian‘. 162 
Overall, each of the women struggled to integrate into the social environment of university 
life. As Levitz and Noel (1989, p. 66) acknowledge, the ‗first two to six weeks‘ are a critical 
period for adjustment and integration. Although many students find the social aspect of 
university life enjoyable, the respondents found it difficult to establish meaningful relations 
with their university peers (Paul and Kelleher, 1995).  
 
The women appeared quite deflated by their initial experiences, as summed up by Nina: ‗It 
[Student life] was like being surrounded by children: you‘d have loud music playing all 
night, food was constantly stolen, [and] I even started to miss my parents‘ nagging after a 
while‘. This disconcerting introduction to student life made some of the women question the 
very purpose of university. As Amina explained: 
 
‗It was hard leaving home. I‘d never lived away from my 
parents for such a long period. My first term was really 
difficult. I felt out of place; it [university] was a daunting 
experience...I was going to transfer after the first year to a 
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 Amina talked about her experiences among upper-class white people – she felt her accent, clothing and 
interests made her unable to integrate with her university peers.  
- 174 - 
 
university near to my home, because I really felt alone and I 
missed my family‘.  
 
Most of the women cited similar problems in adjusting to the university setting which 
involved a degree of social isolation and loneliness. Whenever an individual experiences a 
shift in behaviour - moving away from home to university - they can become unsettled 
(Feenstra et al., 2001). More significantly, a few of the women cited peer rejection as a 
salient cause for their loneliness, which is supported in the literature on student transition 
(Asher and Coie, 1990). They seemed deeply affected by their inability to find acceptance 
within a peer group, resulting in heightened anxiety when membership was denied to them.  
 
Overall, I identified two distinct problem areas which the women encountered in making the 
transition to university life: forming peer relations and disconnection from family. First, the 
introduction to university life was blighted by feelings of loneliness brought about by peer 
rejection. These emotions varied in intensity. For Nadia, university ‗lacked warmth‘, while 
Nina felt it was an ‗intimidating environment‘. The feeling of isolation in the midst of dense 
collective activity – student union events – had a negative effect on their identity and self-
esteem (Hymel and Williams, 1999). When the women had trouble forming peer relations 
they felt lonely because they had no emotional support or companionship. An underlying 
factor in the women‘s peer rejection can be attributed to a failure to integrate because of 
class and ethnicity. For Sara, ethnic divisions became difficult to bridge: ‗I never wanted to 
be bound by my race and culture…so I felt like an outcast because I rejected my people‘ 
[South Asian]. Second, the women struggled to adjust to being away from home, missing 
their family‘s support and love. Although home-based students find it difficult to forge new 
peer relations, they benefit from continued family and friendship ties (Komarovsky, 2004).  
 
5.7.3 Peer Group  
 
I intend in this section to focus predominantly on the role of the peer group, and on the 
nature and impact of relationships between my respondents and female HT members, within 
a university context. In selecting themes that have direct relevance to the radicalisation 
process, I have chosen the development of religiosity and peer socialisation, since out of the 
many available themes these appeared to me to be two key issues. In a general sense, a peer 
group often attracts a collection of people, roughly of the same social background and age, to 
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a shared sense of values (Hartup, 1983). Even in my brief glimpses into the personal 
experience afforded by the women, I saw the part played by peer groups.    
    
5.7.4 Encountering the Peer Group 
 
As I was writing this chapter, there were several stories which consistently featured in the 
media – Muslim women wearing the Niqab (face cover) and female suicide bombers in Iraq. 
These issues are reminders that the boundaries of the individual and the social context cannot 
easily be separated from each other. If social processes influence the formation of identities, 
then I needed to make sense of how the women‘s social life changed after encountering the 
peer group. According to Howe (2010), peer groups have a psychology that overwhelms the 
individual. If this assumption is true of my respondents, then it is important to hear these 
experiences from the women‘s perspective first. Nadia described her earliest encounter with 
HT peer group: 
 
‗I was given a flyer outside the canteen, inviting Muslim 
students to the freshers‘ dinner…so I decided to go along. I 
found the talks really interesting, because I thought Islam was 
just a religion. The talks presented Islam as a complete way of 
life and they exposed the fallacy of the western 
civilisation…the dinner gave me a chance to meet some of the 
sisters [HT recruiters] and we had a long discussion. After the 
dinner, the sisters would visit me at my halls regularly and we 
became friends. Initially, we‘d chat about the fundamental 
question and I really started to think about my life and my 
purpose…I became interested in the Deen [Islam] and I spent a 
lot of time with the sisters. We became very close 
friends…they helped me to practise Islam. Without them I 
would not have discovered Islam, so I‘m grateful to Allah. 
[How long did this process take?] Well, I started university in 
September and by the end of that semester I would say I was 
practising, so about four months‘.    
 
The extent to which Nadia felt negatively about herself influenced the social realities of her 
university experience and interactions. In previous extracts Nadia mentioned she struggled to 
form stable relationships within the social space of university. In many ways, her need for 
peer recognition might have been a defensive construction to provide a sense of continuity 
and belonging (Howe, 2010). First, throughout her life she had developed the belief that 
Islam was just another religion, as a result of her family interactions. The HT gathering 
challenged this self-definition of Islam, at a time when she was experiencing low self-esteem 
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and isolation. More significantly, after several personal visits her identity was gradually 
replaced. Religion became the focal point for change, as it provided answers to the meaning 
of life. As Shupe and Hadden (1988, p.133) assert, religion is the pursuit of ultimate truth 
and values. The religious aspect acted as a catalyst for the substantial change in Nadia‘s 
intellectual and behavioural outlook, resulting in a reassessment of her role in this life. This 
spiritual dimension was extremely powerful and important in the radicalisation process, so I 
intend to expand upon increased religiosity in the next section. 
 
What strikes me about her experience is the rapid speed with which significant behavioural 
changes take place, especially those within a peer group context. From Nadia‘s perspective, 
encountering the peer group had a positive impact. For instance, Nadia talked about how her 
relationship with the ‗sisters‘ changed from just friendship to ‗close friends‘ when she 
became a member of the peer group. The need for acceptance and the desire to avoid peer 
rejection were important to Nadia. This is not surprising, because within a group setting 
individual identity often gives way to the collective identity (Tajfel, 1981).   
 
What follows is the account given by Sara of how she encountered and developed 
relationships with HT female activists.  
 
‗I came across the sisters during Ramadan. I tried to fast and 
pray for the first time. I just wanted to know about Islam, so I 
went to the prayer room. There I met two sisters; they were 
living in my halls but I‘d never really seen them…we started to 
hang out. I really liked them and we became close. They 
helped me a lot, they introduced me to the culture and it had a 
big impact on me…like the other sisters [focus group], I started 
to think about this life and the next. For me, accepting the Deen 
was an intellectual process, because you have to change 
concepts to change behaviour‘. 
 
Although her personal experiences are different from Nadia‘s, this short extract contains 
some common themes – such as peer group relations and religious transformation. In theory, 
peer relations may not be as vital to human survival as attachment relations, but they clearly 
provide social and developmental advantages (Hartup, 1983). After her encounter with the 
peer group, Sara grew dependent upon the supportive social relationships. She had to secure 
peer acceptance first, however, which she described as intellectual and behavioural change. 
In other words, she was expected to conform to the religious culture of the peer group; for 
example, she had to start practising Islam. According to Marcia (1993), this type of 
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behavioural transformation is marked by two distinct processes: exploration and 
commitment. Sara, for example, attended gatherings and encountered the peer group with an 
open mind, which allowed her to explore various identity alternatives. After a brief period of 
association with the peer group, she pledged commitment to their values and beliefs by 
adopting the identity offered by her HT female peers, to which she remained stubbornly 
faithful (Marcia, 1993).  
      
Amina‘s account exemplifies a more interpersonal relationship, which served as the 
foundation for her identity change. She talked about how her friendship triggered a turning-
point: 
 
‗In the second semester I opted to take a sociology module. 
There was a sister in my class who would wear the hijaab and 
Khmer. I thought badly of her, at first; perhaps she was 
oppressed or unintelligent. I had never seen anyone wear 
hijaab in my area, so I couldn‘t quite understand why someone 
living here [the west] would wear it. But she impressed me – 
she‘d make these brilliant comments that challenged the 
lecturer on intellectual issues…so I became friends with her. 
We were the only Asians around. I never thought that I‘d 
become practising or that I‘d wear the hijaab…but that is the 
power of the truth. We became inseparable; we‘d hang out, 
cook together and discuss the Deen [Islam]. A major turning-
point for me was the conversion of a classmate to Islam. She 
was English, and when the sister gave her dawah, I‘d be there 
and it affected me, especially when she converted. After that 
the sister would teach us both about the Deen [Islam] from the 
beginning. Eventually, she started giving us formal Halaqahs 
when we joined the party‘.   
 
Amina‘s account exemplifies a more interpersonal relationship that served as the foundation 
for her identity change. She describes the shift from an old identity structure, seemingly built 
upon western ideology, to her new Islamic identity. Mead (1934), the architect of social 
psychology, might view Amina‘s identity transformation as a reflection of her social 
experiences. More significantly, her identity is formed and contained within the relationships 
and the cultural context of the peer group. Clearly, the development of close ties with the 
female activist was central to Amina‘s radicalisation. From the earliest interactions between 
them, joint or shared activity was evident. A large part of Amina‘s time at university was 
spent doing things with the peer group – such as studying, engaging in recreation and 
learning about Islam. All these involved the development of joint activities wherein the peer 
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group had established shared patterns of action, shared understandings and feelings. In other 
words, by embracing these patterns of joint activity Amina acquired a sense of shared 
identity, which emerged from continued interactions and conversations with the peer group.       
  
The final account is given by Nina. Her encounter with HT is more contingent upon social 
circumstances. As she explained: 
 
‗I signed up to the Islamic society at the freshers‘ fair. After 
about a few weeks two sisters visited me and I got to know 
them. I was struggling to fit in at university. I was living next 
to some loud and annoying students…I moved in with the 
sisters, they had a house near to campus. It was excellent living 
with the sisters and we became close friends. The house was 
dawah central; we‘d bring contacts over and have talks. I 
became convinced so quickly, literally a week after moving in I 
was practising, it was a great atmosphere…it was a turning-
point for me‘.  
 
In documenting the various paths the women took in joining the HT peer group, it is clear 
that they were harbouring deep feelings of isolation and loneliness. To overcome this, Nina 
turned to the peer group who were very sympathetic to her needs, and in due course Nina 
revealed her unpleasant experiences of university life to them. According to Bean (1985, p. 
35), university students actively chose favoured ‗agents of socialisation‘. He argued peer 
group influence can be an overriding factor in changing student behaviour (Bean, 1985). 
After Nina became acquainted with the peer group, she found they had similar backgrounds 
and interests. Not long after their friendship began Nina discovered that the women, whom 
she came to depend upon to lighten her despondency, were in fact members of HT. More 
significantly, she seemed unaware that the peer group had an agenda other than friendship, 
and were in the process of recruiting her into HT. Van Gennep (1960, p. 11) summed up this 
type of student transformation in three stages: ‗separation, transition, and incorporation‘. 
This albeit simplistic representation rather accurately depicts the stages Nina, and the other 
women, went through in their encounter with the HT peer group.   
 
5.7.5 Religious Transformation within the Peer Group 
 
It seemed fairly apparent HT targeted emotional weaknesses in their recruitment of the 
women. From the impression given by the respondents the peer groups were seen as 
spiritually complete, the female members appearing unaffected by the disappointments that 
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plagued the daily lives of the respondents. In particular, religion was used to help make 
sense of their social circumstances, giving them the vital inspiration and energy to overcome 
their perceived problems. As Hood et al., (2009, p. 24) point out, religion focuses on two 
basic human needs: unlocking mysteries and circumstances. This understanding offers an 
overview of the women‘s sudden religious change. First, all the women cited the need to 
answer the fundamental mysteries of existence. This was achieved, they all insisted, through 
Islam, which provided them with the correct answers to the fundamental questions regarding 
their existence. Islam, it was argued, addressed the issue of their purpose in life and 
integrated it into the grand scheme of existence, i.e. ‗what came before this life and what will 
come after it?‘ (Nadia). Second, the women found themselves socially and culturally isolated 
at university. This situation gave rise to feelings of frustration, since their previous beliefs 
left them feeling unfulfilled. Consequently, these feelings made them susceptible to the peer 
group, which prompted them to become religious seekers.  
 
In many ways, it is important to contain the religious transformation experienced by the 
women within the context of the peer group. Their religious experience never took place in a 
vacuum: rather it was directed, if not initiated, by the peer group. Some of the women 
suggested this was a rapid transformation, but breaking from one‘s previous beliefs is not a 
sudden process as it takes time to integrate a system of beliefs. As Sara suggested: 
‗Practising the Deen [Islam] is an ongoing struggle…I had to overcome many contributions 
from my corrupt secular viewpoint, like wearing the hijaab, which was a huge step‘. This 
statement puts the religious experience into some sort of perspective, as comprehensive 
identity reformation takes effect gradually. I have refrained from using the term ‗conversion‘ 
to describe the women‘s experiences, because it is somewhat ambiguous and it does not 
quite match the realities of the women‘s circumstances. Peel (1977), for example, defines 
conversion as a shift in primary religious affiliation. The women were born into the Islamic 
faith, however, and thus never transferred their religious allegiance. Their experiences can 
consequently be described as a process of turning away from old lives towards not a new but 
rather a revitalised or idealised version of Islam.
163
  
 
My discussions have revealed that the women‘s religious involvement was based in the first 
instance on friendship, and then on belief. I am not, however, trying to play down the role of 
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 In some respects, this experience is analogous to feelings of being ‗born-again‘, which in a Christian context 
refers to a spiritual rebirth and salvation. However, the term is firmly embedded within the Christian 
theological tradition and its usage would be confusing as a result. 
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belief, which is critical. The religious revitalisation was only completed when the women 
transcended beyond social relationships and fully accepted the beliefs of HT. This was quite 
apparent during my discussions with the women, as I found them very passionate, even 
arrogant, about their beliefs. The women encountered many challenges after their 
revitalisation: for example, they all cited family disputes. As Nina recalled: 
 
‗When I returned home from university for the winter break my 
parents were in absolute shock. I was dressed in hijaab and 
jilbaab. They were really upset and concerned that I‘d been 
brainwashed or something…I‘ve slowly turned my mum 
around, but my dad still has a problem with it [Islamic dress]‘.  
 
This raises the issue of what behaviour or rituals had to be enacted by the women to be 
deemed as practising by the peer group. According to Nadia:  
 
‗After I accepted Islam as my viewpoint in life, the sisters 
taught me the things that were Fard [duty] and the things that 
were Haram [forbidden] in Islam…so I learnt how to pray and 
I started wearing the Jilbaab and so on, really‘.   
 
When the women became religiously revitalised, the way in which they interpreted life was 
transformed. They adopted a ‗holistic‘ viewpoint, which gave them guidelines and systems 
that applied to every aspect of their daily life. As Durkheim (1984) points out, the function 
of religion is to make us act and to aid us to live. In other words, revitalisation changed the 
women‘s self-awareness, as their new religious beliefs took centre stage in their lives. 
Religious revitalisation is an on-going process, however, a struggle to refrain from sin and 
regression to past beliefs (Eliade, 1987). In sum, the women found themselves disconnected 
in a new social world, which made the peer fellowship very appealing. The peer group 
provided religious meaning and purpose to the women, and thus a strong bond was forged 
between them. 
 
5.7.6 Indoctrination 
 
The issue of indoctrination proved a difficult topic, as the women refused to acknowledge 
the term. They felt it had a negative connotation and it implied that they had been forced to 
join HT. From the women‘s accounts, it is difficult to assert Singer‘s (1995) view that all 
religious change involves mind control. Their transformations did not include any form of 
physical confinement, coercive persuasion or bodily threat. Can I therefore still use the term 
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indoctrination to describe the women‘s experiences with HT? After consulting the literature, 
I discovered a more suitable definition. Some theorists have described indoctrination as 
‗milieu control‘ (Lifton, 1989). This entails the enforcement of ‗unethical practices‘ to 
control intellectual thoughts within the group setting, manufacturing a deep sense of 
separation from society (Snook 1972, p. 12). This definition needs more clarification. 
Unethical practices may refer to the inculcation of concepts and beliefs into an individual in 
a closed environment, like the Halaqah. There is a noticeable problem with this definition: it 
is too general. According to this definition, teaching children in a classroom environment 
could be classified as a form of indoctrination.
164
 Using the term in this way ignores the 
content of teaching, which determines whether or not teaching is indoctrination. As Flew 
(1972, p. 11) stated: ‗No doctrine, no indoctrination‘. By using the above definition (Snook, 
1972), I will be in a position to see how the women became indoctrinated. It is important to 
divide indoctrination into two distinct stages: primary (the Halaqah) and secondary (peer 
group). 
 
5.7.7 Primary Indoctrination: the Halaqah 
 
The content of the Halaqah was deliberately engineered and delivered in such a way as to 
generate collective indoctrination. As Sara explained:  
 
‗Before I joined [Halaqah], the sisters would discuss concepts, 
but it wasn‘t structured and I never felt connected to the party. 
But when I started H [Halaqah] things became clearer; I could 
understand the concepts and culture better…it really helped. I 
became connected; before I felt like an individual or an 
outsider‘.        
 
Unlike peer discussions, the Halaqah leader would convey the ideas in an authoritarian 
manner and the content was continually drilled into the women‘s psyche. As Nadia said: 
‗Halaqah is a building process…corrupt concepts are destroyed and the correct concepts 
built‘. Clearly, the outcome of the Halaqah is an ‗indoctrinated person‘ (Wilson 1972, p. 18). 
It is important, however, to emphasise that the women objected to my use of the term 
indoctrination, as they collectively felt it implied a lack of rationality. Some social theorists 
have assumed that indoctrination is arrived at through ‗non-rational methods‘ (Wilson 1972, 
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 Barbara Geerdes, a teacher in the United States, was accused of indoctrinating her students with progressive 
Marxism in the classroom (Lake Minnetonka Liberty Archives, 09/04/2010). The classroom can be seen as a 
control setting, but indoctrination often depends on the content being taught. 
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p. 19). In the context of the Halaqah, the discussions are controlled and restricted, which 
determines the outcome of the discourse. This means that rationality is contrived, making the 
Halaqah an ideal setting for indoctrination. As I concluded in the previous chapter, the aim 
of the Halaqah was to create a quite different world view. Unfortunately, the women were 
reluctant to enter into any detailed discussion regarding their experiences and development 
within the Halaqah system. As Nina explained: ‗The Halaqah is an administrative issue, and 
as members of Hizb ut-Tahrir we‘re not at liberty to discuss these matters‘. In spite of this, I 
know about the Halaqah from a variety of sources – such as my own personal experiences as 
a Mushrif [Halaqah teacher] and other biographical accounts.  
 
5.7.8 Secondary Indoctrination: the Peer Group 
 
From the women‘s accounts, it was quite evident that indoctrination occurred within the peer 
group setting. Although I believe that the women‘s lives were greatly affected by their 
encounters with the peer group, it is not easy to describe these processes. First, it is clear that 
the peer group exerted significant influence over the women. As Nina said: ‗…practising 
was hard early on because you‘d be told what to do and how to do it‘. This interaction 
appears to be very one-sided, allowing the peer group to stimulate deliberate behavioural and 
mental changes. Second, the peer group developed close relationships with the women, 
making indoctrination easier. As Sara explained: ‗I really trusted the sisters; we became 
close and I revealed a lot to them about myself‘. Close ties within peer groups enable weaker 
or newer members to be socialised into the group (Howe, 2010). Peer socialisation was an 
important developmental stage in the radicalisation process, as it gave the women definitions 
of acceptable ways to handle the social world. The women became submerged within the 
peer group, which developed an unquestioned attachment to the ‗sisters‘, including 
automatic obedience and willingness to sacrifice for the group. As Amina observed: ‗I‘d 
miss a lot of lectures because I‘d be busy with the sisters carrying the dawah [Islamic 
message]‘. As with all group dynamics, the peer group indoctrinated a deep sense of group 
identification among the women. In sum, the women sought identification with the peer 
group for the following reasons: (1) membership provided benefit; (2) it offered 
distinctiveness from other social groups (e.g. dress); (3) there was a sense of common 
experience (Triandis 1989, p. 96). These influences were undoubtedly present within the 
women‘s accounts, and thus indoctrination played an important role in preparing the women 
to join HT. 
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5.7.9 Effects of Indoctrination on Identity 
 
When the women joined HT, they acquired a new outlook, which from their perspective 
empowered them. I want to look at this issue by exploring the women‘s aspirations prior to 
joining the peer group, as this may reveal insight into the effects of indoctrination. Rather 
surprisingly, most of the women entered university not anticipating professional careers. As 
Sara explained, ‗After graduation I expected to get married and have children‘. Upon 
radicalisation, however, some of the respondents began to shift from a traditional women‘s 
role to a more career-orientated outlook (Komarovsky, 2004). As Amina suggested, ‗The 
culture [HT] gave me confidence…my interests began to grow in [the] social sciences and I 
ended up following that path after graduating‘. This newfound career expectation was not 
just restricted to the social sciences. For example, after her degree in mathematics, Nina 
pursued a teaching career. Nadia, however, after graduating got married and settled into a 
traditional homemaker role. At this point, the discussion became slightly confrontational, as 
Nadia insisted that Islam does not advocate symmetrical role allocation in marriage. 
According to her, ‗Women are responsible for child rearing and looking after the husband‘. 
The female respondents all acknowledged that God sanctifies their role as different from that 
of men, owing to the biological differences between the sexes. According to the Quran 
(verse 4:34): ‗Men are responsible for women because God has given the one more than the 
other, and because they support them from their means‘.165 This states woman alone can give 
birth and nurture, so men are required to provide material support. The women agreed 
unanimously, however, that this verse does not restrict women from providing material 
support. After some lengthy discussion, they concluded that a career combined with family 
life is the truest portrait of a Muslim woman.    
 
This revealing discussion shows that indoctrination changed the women‘s social roles and 
perspectives. As Marcia (1993) acknowledges, social roles are highly important in 
understanding adult behaviour and development. In university, for instance, the women 
adopted new social roles that expanded their perceived opportunities for self-expression, 
giving structure to their identity. According to Talcott (1960), social roles connect 
individuals to social environments. If this is true, then the indoctrination process took place 
within a set environment, namely university. I want to find out, however, what happened to 
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 Ali, A. (translation). ‗The Holy Quran‟. (Published 1994: Dawah Academy, verse 4:34). 
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the women‘s identity once they returned to their family homes. As expected, the women 
maintained their newfound identities, even though their beliefs were not supported by family 
members. This would indicate that the women‘s old values and beliefs had been effectively 
altered by indoctrination. More significantly, after encountering HT, the women physically 
changed their outward appearances in accordance with their newfound ideals. As Amina 
confirmed:  
 
‗Alhamdulillah [Thank God] I found the sisters, who brought 
me to Islam…I started praying, and then I adopted Islamic 
dress. Wearing the hijaab and jilbaab was the biggest 
step...Naturally, my classmates and lecturers were shocked, but 
I was totally content, because I was pleasing my Rubb [God]‘.   
 
Apart from physical changes, the women‘s behaviour was reshaped in harmony with their 
new identity. For example, the peer group enforced segregation from the male student 
population within a social context. This behaviour came as a shock to some of the women‘s 
classmates, as Nadia explained: ‗When I stopped mixing freely, I experienced some negative 
reactions - one Kuffar student called me a nun‘. The women‘s new identity was tested by a 
variety of social interactions, but they remained committed to their remodelled identity. 
From a social psychology perspective, they successfully resolved previous identity conflicts 
and developed an identity capable of moving on to other adult challenges like work and 
marriage (Erikson, 1950).
166
  
 
5.8 Inside HT – a Female Perspective 
 
On the surface, HT appears to be largely male-dominated, making the role of female activists 
unclear. Some feminist commentators have suggested that if the social landscape becomes 
widely dominated by men, then women become suppressed and passive (Komarovsky, 
2004). Before embarking on the study, I suspected that this gender imbalance would be 
visible in HT, but nothing could be further from the truth. The women I met – through their 
educational, political and social activism – appear to be setting their own agendas. To 
demonstrate this more effectively, I will look at the women‘s ideological beliefs and party 
activities.   
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 Identity conflict refers to issues that affected the women‘s student life and interpersonal relationships, which 
seemed to bring on a crisis that forced them to redefine themselves (Jenkins, 2004).  
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5.8.1 Motivation and Ideology 
 
On the question of ideology, I was not surprised by the women‘s responses. The party 
mabda (ideology) came to the forefront of the discussion, because it is viewed as a 
‗comprehensive way of life that organises every aspect of society‘ (Amina). Similarly, Nina 
stated: ‗the ideology is the foundation of the party…it is the soul of its existence and without 
it the party would die‘. Their idealistic rhetoric made it difficult to delve into deeper issues 
and motivations concerning ideology. Instead, my questions only seemed to gain a 
combative response and they did not elicit any credible information. I decided to gather more 
insight into the ideological mindset of the women. By asking questions about living in the 
west, I was able to understand their ideological commitment rather better. In particular, we 
discussed the proposed ban of the niqab (face veil). They questioned why a liberal state was 
interfering in the freedoms of its citizens, and the subsequent erosion of personal liberty. The 
women were agreed that the establishment of the Khilafah (Islamic society) would resolve 
this imbalance and other problems, because the Islamic State alone can reflect ideology 
through social relationships. These women believe in their adopted ideology and embrace its 
ideals in practice throughout their lives.  
 
I have extrapolated a few key inferences concerning the women‘s perception of their adopted 
ideology. First, they believe their attachment to the ideology was inspired by intellectual 
enlightenment. As Nina observed, ‗the Islamic ideology is built on the correct basis 
[divinity], which is established through rational thought‘. Second, the women believe they 
have freed themselves from all social, political and moral forms of western ideology, 
completing their presumed emancipation from secular convention. Third, the women appear 
to be more vigorous than men in their adherence to ideology. Amina suggested: ‗I think 
some of the brothers are more affected by secularism…we [women] have to wear the hijaab, 
which makes us much stronger‘.  
 
MacDonald (1992) also considered female activists to be stronger and more dedicated to 
extremist ideology. Although there is no clear way to determine the levels of ideological 
commitment between men and women, I have tried to look at ideological motivation. Galvin 
(1983) asserted that women appeared more idealistic than men. He also suggested that 
women join radical groups with different motivations (Galvin, 1983). My research has 
struggled to produce clear answers to these issues, but I did find that male members seemed 
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more drawn to the power of group membership. In contrast, the focus group discussion 
indicated that the women were attracted by promises of a better life. My research, however, 
has continually shown that an individual‘s personality, background and experiences are 
equally, if not more, important.   
 
5.8.2 Structure and Activism 
 
Patriarchy is commonly defined as a male-dominated system in which women are 
subordinate to men. According to the women, patriarchy does not exist in HT, because men 
and women operate in separate spheres. The administrative rules of HT are not gender-
biased in their configuration, and thus women are invited to perform party activity. As Nadia 
explained, ‗the women‘s structure has its own Mutamad [national leader], its own 
committees…we carry the dawah in the same way as the brothers‘. Historically, women 
were not governed according to the party structure, but as their participation grew, so did 
demands for equal representation. By the mid-1990s considerable effort had been made to 
encourage women to become autonomous. According to Nina: 
 
‗Before I joined the party, the sisters‘ structure was organised 
by the brothers, which was disastrous. There was little 
communication and the sisters became 
disconnected…afterwards the party addressed this issue. We 
[sisters] were given control of women‘s dawah‟.   
 
Female members had become a separate entity within HT, which allowed them to set up 
their own structural hierarchy. The equal participation of women must be understood in 
terms of the positions which they hold; they are the same as those of the men, but operate in 
two separate HT systems. So, for example, both Sara and Amina are Mushrifs (Halaqah 
teachers); they perform these roles in exactly the same fashion as their male counterparts.  
 
5.9 Gender Equality:  
 
In terms of activism, female HT members secured their own political space. However, to 
what extent, if any, has HT empowered its female populace? I wanted to know, from the 
perspective of the women, whether HT ideology is a response to the patriarchal 
interpretation of divine text that is dominant among Muslim societies. According to one 
female activist: ―Islam is the truth, it has been revealed to humankind by Allah and therefore 
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it is the most just system…it ensures true equality between the sexes unlike capitalism which 
exploits women‖.  According to this, Islam and for that matter HT ideology derives its 
understanding and mandate from the Quran and Sunnah. In theory, this guarantees rights and 
justice for women, and for men, in the entirety of their life. 
 
HT would claim that it has enabled its female members, through enlightenment, to acquire 
the ability to interpret the divine rights bestowed to her. This process has resulted in a 
complete rejection of ethnic cultural-tradition, which has subjected women to gender 
discrimination within many ethnic communities. Yet, I struggled to be convinced by these 
rather formulaic responses to my questions, so I sought to challenge the women‘s idealistic 
notion of equality.  
 
Firstly, I asked about the concept and practice of ‗Qiwama‟. 167  There was a lengthy 
discussion about the precise meaning of the term, Amina, for instance, suggested that it 
meant ‗men having responsibility over women‘. While, Nina explained that it just relates to 
men providing for women in a financial capacity. The women gave me the impression that 
they were all in agreement concerning gender equality in Islam, despite the fact that ―men 
and women have differing roles and responsibilities‖ (Nina). The concept of superiority was 
hotly contested in relation to Qiwama, and it was clear the women were resolutely adamant 
about men having no everlasting superiority over them. This unified stance quickly dissolved 
when the discussion moved to the issue of ‗beating‘. In the same Quranic verse as Qiwama, 
God grants men the right to ―banish them to their couches, and beat them‖ (Quran, 4:34). 
Surprisingly, the women seemed to be firmly split over this controversial piece of text. One 
group believed literally men have been granted legal mandate to control and police women, 
even to the extent of beating them. While the other group argued that this text has been 
misunderstood and misinterpreted. In other words, men do not have the right to beat women. 
This skewed division between the women goes somewhat deeper. In particular, the women 
who disagree with the text also argue that Islamic scholarship is excessively masculine, 
which enables men to define the role of women as subservient. Dwyer‘s (2000) study of 
Muslim women discovered a strong connection with men monopolising religious space and 
discourse in order to validate their influence.   
 
                                                 
167
 Qiwama, as mentioned in the Quran, is a highly controversial notion. Taken literally it implies that God has 
given men guardianship over women because ‗Allah has given one more than the other because they support 
them from their means‘ (4:34).   
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The women collectively attributed the cause of gender inequality to ethno-cultural practices 
and traditions. In essence, they all drew a clear division between religion and culture. In this 
regard, as Sara surmised: ‗our place is not the home… men and women are equal in Islam‘. 
However, this rather programmed response underscores confusion between religious belief 
and practice. In theory, the women believe Islam grants them gender equality, but they 
manifest male prescribed practices (e.g. asking permission before leaving the home, wearing 
Islamic dress and child nurturing). Somewhat surprisingly the respondents fervently argued 
that they were more liberated then western women, because they had accepted to live within 
the moral boundaries established by God. Therefore, their Islamic identity provided them a 
means to repel the dominant non-Islamic culture (e.g. both Western and Eastern). Dwyer 
(2000) found similar responses amongst Muslim women, as they used Islam to assert rights 
and freedoms that are often denied to them by ethno-cultural practices. However, as Malik 
(The Guardian, 25-10-2006) suggests, religious and cultural practices are in a constant state 
of flux, because ‗they have a mixed and changing social meaning‘. Therefore, HT female 
activists are equally equipped with male members, in terms of education and career 
opportunities, but they seem less forceful to interpret religious principles.             
 
5.10 Conclusion 
 
Two key thoughts inspired my focus in this chapter. First, I sought to understand the 
experiences of four HT female members. Second, I wanted to find out what impact these 
experiences had on the women and whether they made a difference to their radicalisation. As 
my discussions have shown, the women emerged from very similar social backgrounds. 
During their early upbringing, namely at secondary school, the women did a lot of things to 
gain acceptance amongst their white peers. Importantly, in order to belong to the peer group, 
the women consciously concealed their ethno-religious identity, which allowed them to fit 
in. This caused deep identity confusion. The women evolved through their youth with an 
incomplete and fragmented sense of identity, as they constantly had to negotiate between 
conflicting social worlds and value systems. As Nadia explained: ‗I could never hide my 
Asian side totally, for example, my friends had boyfriends but I never did…this always made 
me feel like an outsider‘. In many ways, these confusions in identity and sense-making 
reflect the intolerance of the majority culture.
168
 Therefore, the women were fearful of 
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 This raises important questions about diversity and acceptance. As Malik (2005, p. 182) explains, within the 
framework of ‗reasonable pluralism‘ religious groups ‗must co-exist with conceptions of the good that are not 
based on faith‘. She goes on to say, in some cases faith perspectives will have to co-exist with doctrines that are 
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showing fragments of their ethno-religious identity because they were essentially seen as 
backward and inferior. So, clearly at this stage of the women‘s trajectory they were 
struggling to find themselves in a society that on some levels rejected their presence, making 
them feel socially vulnerable.  
 
In relation to social vulnerability, when the women went to university they encountered more 
complex problems and realities, which made them susceptible to radicalisation. To start 
with, living away from home increased feelings of loneliness, which made the peer group an 
attractive prospect. An obvious issue to consider at this point is how and why the 
respondents were drawn to HT activists at university? Based on the research accumulated 
during my fieldwork, it appears clear that both male and female HT respondents became 
radicalised within the closed boundaries of a peer group. It appears the young women 
gravitated towards relations with people that were alike to them, based on similar social 
experiences. In essence, the women sought refuge in the ‗familiar‘, seeking out women with 
the same ethno-religious and social class backgrounds.
169
 According to Burleson (1994), 
adult friendships are rooted in similarity, as this facilitates the sharing of beliefs, allowing for 
spiritual self-exploration. More interestingly, Murstein (1977) grounded friendship within a 
proximity paradigm, which he termed ‗closed-field friendships‘. In other words, the 
pathways to friendship are governed by closed social settings. The respondents at university, 
for example, were thrown into an unsettling social environment in which they found safety 
in the closed relations with HT activists.  
 
The exposure to HT rhetoric which takes place in this setting has a powerful influence on the 
formation of a new cognitive perspective. Within this tightly-knit context, respondents 
fashion a radical identity by demarcating themselves in accordance to HT collective identity 
and membership. This creates a symbiotic connection with HT, as one female activist eerily 
put it: ‗the Hizb (HT) does not need us, we need the Hizb‘. The effects of this collective 
identity were more visibly seen when the respondents talked about non-Muslims. In 
                                                                                                                                                      
generally sceptical about faith and religion‘ (cited in Ford et al., (2005) Fields of Faith: Theology and Religious 
Studies for the Twenty-first Century, Cambridge University Press)  
169
 From a psycho-social perspective, there are two important components of friendship: proximity and 
similarity. The respondents would not have formed relationships with HT activists unless exposed to a 
geographically closed space (e.g. university), which gave them an opportunity to interact. More significantly, 
individuals are drawn to familiarity. This underlying disposition motivated the respondents to seek out women 
who were similar to them in terms of age, ethnicity, religion, social class and background. According to Duck 
(1992), young people naturally drift towards those who share their beliefs and values about the world, as this 
allows them to share experiences in an open and safe environment. Therefore, apart from seeking refuge in the 
familiar, the respondents gained a sense of empowerment and self-identity.     
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particular, the respondents saw their own collective HT identity in opposition to ‗others‘, 
which in turn, enabled them to dehumanise non-Muslims as the enemy. This in essence 
merges the group with the individual, producing a powerful sense of belonging. It is clear 
HT radicalisation takes place within a peer group setting, and this is supported by other 
scholarly work. Della Porta (2006, p. 167) makes a similar conclusion, when she asserts that 
the choice to join a radical movement involves ‗cliques of friends‘. This was further 
reinforced by Bakker‘s (2006) research on radical Islamist movements in Europe. He 
discovered that peer group associations were a key variable in the radicalisation process: ‗a 
picture emerges of networks including friends or relatives… that radicalise with little outside 
interference‘ (Bakker 2006, p. 56).  
 
In the context of HT, the discovery of like minded women who shared the same economic 
and ethno-religious backgrounds made it easier to offset the negative effects of social 
isolation felt during early university life. Given the identity confusions surrounding their 
early socialisation, it is no surprise the women emerged from multiple social worlds, which 
reinforced feelings of social difference. At university within the HT peer group, the women 
formed and maintained a new identity construct that challenged Western and Eastern value 
systems. Although my findings are very insightful, they are limited in terms of their 
application to the wider HT population. The problem of having a small group of participants 
means I cannot make generalised statements. In the next chapter, however, I will conduct a 
larger survey of HT members in order to determine some wider social trends.       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 191 - 
 
Chapter Six: A Sociological study of HT Membership in Britain 
 
The study of radicalisation has become an important research topic. Many articles and 
reports have been published, largely as a response to acts of terror. One such report, 
commissioned by the New York Police Department (NYPD) intelligence division, stated that 
the majority of Islamic radicals lived ‗unremarkable lives‘ and had ‗unremarkable jobs‘ 
(Silber and Bhatt, 2007). I regularly come across imprecise observations that tend to 
generalise radicalisation, ignoring the fact it is a highly complex and diverse phenomenon. In 
the previous chapters, I attempted to study the process of radicalisation by observing 
individual experiences, which allowed me to arrive at several important conclusions based 
on this examination. Now I need to determine whether these findings hold outside of my 
investigative sample. A great deal of what I know about HT, such as its social composition, 
the social status of its membership, the education and ethnicity of its members, has been 
obtained through surveys. Correlating this data would, in theory, allow me to determine 
whether a specific demographic is more susceptible to HT radicalisation. Of particular 
interest is whether HT members in Britain share sociological characteristics. This might be 
useful in profiling Islamic radicals, if profiling is at all feasible, and in understanding 
somewhat better the motivations of Muslims who become radicalised. 
 
6.1 Background 
 
I have been interested in the phenomenon of radicalisation for several years, trying to 
understand it, and determine its possible causes. The research conducted in the previous two 
chapters has helped me develop a number of possible explanations, which I now seek to 
rigorously test. The group interviews explored radicalisation in some depth, providing a 
relaxed environment in which the respondents openly expressed their views and experiences. 
Nonetheless, the views that the women conveyed, for example, may not be representative of 
the wider HT population. Despite the meaningful data I collected from my interviews with 
male and female members, I realised the need to conduct surveys. These surveys allow me to 
extend my knowledge of the radical condition within HT, beyond the individual members. In 
particular, my research has indicated that the current identities of members strongly depend 
on their past and present social experiences and backgrounds.  
 
Before determining the key sociological characteristics of HT radicalisation, it is useful to 
briefly summarise some of the key findings of Russell and Miller (1977). They conducted a 
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sociological study that involved investigating the likely settings of radicalisation amongst 
militant German groups. The distinctiveness of their work has been lasting primarily because 
it identifies a number of features of radical groups, and, subsequently, this has gone on to 
inform my own standpoint. They concluded that radical groups exhibit common sociological 
characteristics, such as age, social background, race and gender (Russell and Miller, 1977). 
More significantly, Russell and Miller (1977, p. 17-25) identify universities as the major 
recruiting ground for radical-terrorist organisations. This was certainly the case for HT 
members I interviewed, but while this sample was very revealing it is not sufficient in itself. 
This is because, unlike Russell and Miller, I am not trying to develop a generic profile of 
radical behaviour; instead my goal is to sketch out a common profile of HT membership. 
With this goal in mind, I needed to concentrate on class, age, gender, ethnicity and race, but 
other sociological features of organised social life, such as religion and peer groups, might 
also need to be examined.  
 
6.2 Youth Radicalism: Age  
 
After each survey, I would briefly reflect on the information given by members in order to 
pick out possible themes for further investigation. One very noticeable theme that emerged 
from my survey was the disproportionate number of young people involved within the 
group. For instance, 85 per cent of the members were below the age of thirty and 96.3 per 
cent were recruited before the age of twenty-five (see Figure 4.1). Therefore, age should not 
be taken for granted, because it has a powerful effect on the way members see themselves 
and others. Just as religion and ethnicity shaped member‘s identities, so does age.  
 
Figure 4.1 Age of HT members 
 
Age (Current) 
Male 
Members 
Female 
Members 
 
Members 
Average 
(%) 
Under 20 9 6 15 8 
20 – 25  35 37 72 39 
25 – 30  32 39 71 38 
30 – 35 14 8 22 11.8 
35 – 40  5 1 6 3.2 
Over 40 0 0 0 0 
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Total 95 91 186 100 
 
Figure 4.2 Age of recruitment 
Age of 
recruitment 
Male 
Members 
Female 
Members 
 
Members 
Average 
(%) 
Under 20 53 51 104 56 
20 – 25  35 40 75 40.3 
25 – 30  7 0 7 3.7 
30 – 35 0 0 0 0 
35 – 40  0 0 0 0 
Over 40 0 0 0 0 
     
Total 95 91 186 100 
 
The radicalisation of the youth is not a new phenomenon; rather it has been the youth that 
have formed the foundation of countless popular movements. Iran, for example, experienced 
a significant ‗youth bulge‘ that fostered the conditions for its revolution in 1979 (Slavin, 
2007). So, why do young people appear more inclined towards HT in Britain? Some social 
theorists believe that identity is an unstable collection of perceptions in which age grapples 
with other social imperatives like ethnicity and class (James and James, 2004). In some 
respects, a member‘s age is tied to their identity, which shifts over time. Trying to 
understand this process is extremely difficult. Cote (1996) formulated a theory, which ties 
identity shifts to historical cultural markers. Another more influential model was proposed 
by Van Gennep (1960). He identified three key stages of social development: ‗separation, 
transition and incorporation‘ (Van Gennep 1960, p. 3). This process provides a way of 
looking at how the social transition to new age identities takes place. In the following 
sections, I seek to describe and explain how these stages help answer the question of youth 
involvement in HT.  
 
6.2.1 Separation 
 
Van Gennep (1960), a noted French ethnographer, developed his theory of rites of passage, 
which he suggested define a period when an individual reaches a new and significant change 
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in his or her life. More importantly, these rites of passage are designed to help people to 
understand their new roles in society. In the separation stage, members experience a feeling 
of detachment from the family environment, entering into a new role and social setting. This 
rite was mainly felt when members left the safety of the family home for university. In 
particular, the members I interviewed looked forward to their university experience, as they 
felt it would give them independence from their parents. The survey indicated that most 
members felt disconnected from their family‘s cultural mores (see Figure 4.4 and 4.5). 
Hutnik (1985) found that identities are often crafted to maintain distance from others. In the 
case of HT members, this is not surprising, as the older generation have found it difficult to 
impart the traditions of the subcontinent to the newer generation. From my discussions it was 
clear that members sought not to be represented by their parent‘s identities. This somewhat 
negative identity formation pointed to a more confused identity ambivalence, which was 
usually directed to their parents‘ culture and ethnicity. Although, the cause of radicalisation 
cannot be exclusively defined within the context of a generation gap, this has undoubtedly 
contributed to conflict with and separation from families.  
 
The most notable difference between the two generations relates to mindset. The first 
generation arrived in the early 1950s to fill the labour shortage in Britain. As a result, they 
never envisaged permanent settlement, instead they believed in returning home (Anwar, 
1979). This belief allowed the first generation to transfer the values of the homeland, which 
legitimised a separation from British culture. Therefore, this generation has been strongly 
influenced by a transitory or migrant mindset. As the prospect of returning home diminished, 
the first generation sought to establish a religious base that would transport their morals and 
values in opposition to those of the receiving culture. However, this mindset could not be 
passed on to the newer generation, as they have found it difficult to adopt the beliefs and 
lifestyles of their parents (see Figure 4.4). The second generation are born and educated here, 
giving them direct access to the majority culture. This has enabled them to experience two 
distinct social worlds, which have inspired some to challenge the conservative values of their 
parents; attitudes and behaviours that have been transplanted from the subcontinent. In 
particular, the rejection of these religious and cultural mores is evidence of a different 
mindset. The younger generation have adopted a different way of living in Britain, reflecting 
a symbolic separation from their parents, who were economic migrants.  
 
6.2.2 Transition 
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When young people are in the transitional stage, they are in a state of interruption, separated 
from their previous roles and not yet incorporated into the new one (Paul and Kelleher, 
1995). The transition to new social settings can be extremely unsettling, especially for 
minorities who are more vulnerable to rejection. The transitional stage can be usefully 
applied to the experiences of HT members at varying points in their life cycle. Young people 
often struggle during adolescence, because this stage of development is perhaps the most 
disruptive. During this stage, young people are greatly concerned with the perception of 
others (Erikson, 1950). In the previous chapter, many of the respondents failed to understand 
how they ‗fitted-in‘, which resulted in them developing a ‗dysfunctional‘ identity. As a result 
many of the respondents suffered from role confusion, meaning they were uncertain about 
their position in the social world. The transition stage is a period when members ought to 
learn the appropriate behaviour for the new stage they are entering (Turner, 1990). However, 
identity problems are very common during adolescence, as young people naturally struggle 
to contend with the changes that take place. Therefore, the most important transition for 
members appears to be to university. Some social scientists believe that young people are 
more inclined towards getting involved with movements concerned with protest and 
rejection at university (Russell and Miller, 1977). This is because university is seen as a 
natural social space for young people to actively learn and grow, and prepare them to 
become independent actors.
170
 Newcomb and Feldman (1994) conducted research into 
identity shifts during life transitions, focusing on students going to university. They 
concluded that young people become unsettled by leaving home and struggle to form new 
identities, which can often lead them to discover alternative identities.  
 
6.2.3 Incorporation 
 
The ways in which members move between social locations are often age-related, for 
example, leaving home to go to university. This is a key rite of passage for young people, as 
it allows them to discover themselves. In the previous chapters, I discovered that members 
often emerge from childhood as incomplete social actors, which contributes to their 
perceived separation. This makes young people the most sensitive age group in society, 
especially when their aspirations and needs are not satisfied. Therefore, the final stage of 
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 The data collected has clearly shown that the bulk of HT recruitment takes place at university, and thus I 
have discussed this issue in more detail in a separate section. 
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incorporation takes place when the members are formally admitted into the new role. Joining 
HT is the most visible example, as the member adopts a new and different identity, which 
has been stimulated by earlier transition and separation rites. Although, the rites of passages 
are important, there are more practical issues that relate to age. The British Muslim 
community, for example, has the youngest age profile of any other religious group (The 
Muslim Weekly, 15/10/2004). Therefore, radicalisation tends to be a condition associated 
with youth and 96.3 per cent of those surveyed were recruited during this highly formative 
period. Therefore, HT‘s fraternity is almost exclusively comprised of young people, making 
age a very important component.   
 
6.3 Social Background: Social Class 
 
Age has been suggested as a very important variable, but the rapid radicalisation of HT 
youth must be seen from a wider social perspective that includes social background. 
According to Warner (1949), social class should be isolated within a socio-economic 
framework that relates to fixed properties, such as income, education and wealth. In line with 
this analytical approach, the 2001 census, and a separate Labour Force Survey conducted in 
2004, has indicated that British Muslims are one of the most deprived social groups in the 
UK (The Muslim Weekly, 15-10-2004). Huntington (1996) believes that large-scale 
unemployment among young people provides a likely source for radicalisation. However, in 
the context of HT, it was found that the majority of the population occupied a higher than 
average social status. For instance, 97.3 per cent of the sample classified themselves as 
middle class (see Figure 4.3).  
 
Figure 4.3 Social Class of HT members 
 
Class
171
 
Male 
Members 
Female 
Members 
 
Members 
Average  
(%) 
Upper class 2 0 2 1 
Upper middle 29 19 48 25.8 
Lower middle 64 67 131 70.5 
Working class 2 3 5 2.7 
Lower class 0 0 0 0 
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 Taken from the five-class model developed by Thompson and Hickey (2005) 
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Total 95 91 186 100 
 
6.3.1 Are HT Members Middle Class? 
 
Most HT members claimed middle-class status, even though they seemed somewhat 
unaware of its precise meaning and application. This has made it very difficult to pin down 
how much members overestimate their socio-economic status, making it unsuitable to let 
members assess themselves as middle class. Furthermore, individuals do not always evaluate 
themselves in exactly the same manner. I needed to find a way of classifying the socio-
economic position of HT members, before trying to understand the role of class. After 
consulting the extensive literature on social class, I defined middle class using four key 
criteria: occupation, income, property and education (Davis and Moore, 1970; Parkin, 1979). 
Most social theorists tend to study class stratification through these distinct variables, which 
allowed me to fairly assess the class demographic of HT. 
 
Firstly, questions related to occupation revealed a large grouping of highly qualified 
professionals who occupy relatively privileged positions (see Figure 4.4). There is a 
particularly strong focus on non-manual occupations among the members, giving them a 
natural advantage in the labour market. Nonetheless, some social theorists would argue that 
this mobility is artificial and short-ranged, due to a social and cultural ‗buffer zone‘ between 
the middle and working classes (Parkin 1979, p. 56). This view assumes that movement from 
manual to non-manual occupations occurs superficially, and thus workers are employed at 
the lower levels of the work hierarchy (Goldthorpe et al., 1987). However, HT members do 
not occupy such positions, rather they have moved into professional posts, providing them 
with long-range mobility. Indeed, as Davis and Moore (1970) have suggested, Britain 
appears to have become a meritocracy, which means that emphasis is placed on achievement 
and this determines the position in the occupational hierarchy.     
 
Figure 4.4 Occupational Activity of HT Members
172
 
Occupation 
Male 
Members 
Female 
Members Members 
Average 
(%) 
Professional 47 15 62 33.3 
Intermediate 38 33 71 38.2 
                                                 
172
 Adapted from Reid (1977, p. 32). 
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Skilled (non-
Manual) 2 0 2 1 
Manual Partly 
Skilled 0 0 0 0 
Unskilled 0 0 0 0 
Unemployed 0 0 0 0 
Homemaker 0 31 31 16.7 
Student 8 12 20 10.8 
     
Total 95 91 186 100 
 
The occupation of female members falls into three key groupings. The most common is that 
of intermediate, but the proportion of female professionals is considerably lower than that of 
male members. The second largest categorisation is that of homemaker, which was indicated 
by 34 per cent of female respondents. In relation to some of these gender inequalities, it is 
worth noting that many female members suggested that they wanted to have children, and 
thus maintaining a professional career alongside this goal seemed far too challenging.  
 
Secondly, a member‘s household income tends to be higher than the national average.173 
Private firms employ most members, which has widened their economic capital. This income 
differential between occupations is somewhat apparent between those employed in the 
public sector, compared with the members in the private field. The income distribution 
among the members shows that over 60 per cent are located in the highest income categories. 
Thirdly, I was somewhat surprised by the relatively large number of members who privately 
own property (see Figure 4.5). This is because many of the members are quite young, and 
thus I would have assumed were just entering the property ladder. This indicates that 
members have shown a strong tendency to acquire property assets as a means of social 
mobility. As Parkin (1968) acknowledges, property ownership provides access to economic 
power, and thus is a key feature of the division of labour. Moreover, from my discussions 
with members, I realised that their parents had placed significant importance on creating a 
successful property portfolio. This gave them a significant financial advantage when house 
prices surged in the late 1980s. According to Cannadine (1999), middle-class families have 
greater financial resources, placing them in a better position to assist their children in 
                                                 
173
 It was estimated that in 2007 the top fifth of households in the UK was £72,900 (after tax £52,400). Refer to 
www.statistics.gov.uk. 
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purchasing a home or passing on their property. Thus, inherited property accounted for 27.4 
per cent of the sample. Furthermore, with the recent introduction of Islamic mortgages, many 
members have used this as a means to acquire larger properties and gain greater economic 
independence.  
 
Figure 4.5 Property ownership 
Property 
Ownership 
Male 
Members 
Female 
Members 
 
Members 
Average  
(%) 
Free Hold 41 43 84 45.2 
Inherited  29 22 51 27.4 
Islamic 
Mortgage 
19 23 42 22.6 
Renting 6 3 9 4.8 
Council  0 0 0 0 
     
Total 95 91 186 100 
 
Fourthly, higher education is clearly important for HT members, as it relates to their desire 
to gain employment advancement. As Cooper (1979) has discovered, most professionals are 
graduates, thereby allowing them to move into higher income categories. For example, 
evidence from the sample revealed that 87.6 per cent of members graduated from a higher 
education institution (see Figure 4.6). This is not surprising since members‘ parents have 
similar academic backgrounds, which helps to duplicate class status across generations (see 
Figure 4.7).  
  
Figure 4.6 Education Level of HT Members 
Education Level Male 
Members 
Female 
Members 
Total 
Members 
Average 
(%) 
Postgraduate 13 8 21 11.3 
Graduate 73 69 142 76.3 
College 1 2 3 1.6 
School (GCSE) 0 0 0 0 
No qualifications 0 0 0 0 
Current Student 8 12 20 10.8 
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Total 95 91 186 100 
 
Figure 4.7 Parents‘ Education Level 
Education Level Father’s 
Education 
Mother’s 
Education 
Total 
 
Average 
(%) 
Postgraduate 8 11 19 10.3 
Graduate 85 79 164 88.2 
College 2 0 2 1 
School (GCSE) 0 0 0 0 
No qualifications 0 1 1 0.5 
Current Student 0 0 0 0 
     
Total 95 91 186 100 
 
Relatively few members had limited education, indicating the propensity to acquire 
university admission and gain professional qualifications. More significantly, HT members 
have very little obstacles in going to university, as they have substantial financial support 
from their parents. Therefore, education is certainly a defining feature of HT‘s middle class 
disposition, which allows it to maintain itself as a class. It is worth noting, however, that 
social theorists have struggled to agree upon a precise and coherent understanding of the 
middle class. For example, some theorists believe that culture is a defining feature of the 
middle class (Cooper, 1979). Then again, as Roberts et al. (1977, p. 107) has insisted, it is no 
longer possible to define a core middle class culture because within the white-collar strata no 
coherent set of values exists. If one assumes, like Goldthorpe et al. (1987), that social classes 
are groups characterised by shared income, lifestyles and cultures, then HT members 
certainly comprise a homogenous grouping. Clearly, the data gathered from the sample 
indicate that social mobility has been achieved or maintained through occupation, education 
and wealth (property and income).  
 
Throughout my research, I have used the generic term ‗middle class‘ to define the social 
composition of HT. However, it is not entirely precise, as Parkin (1968, p. 175) points out, 
‗it lacks the analytical precision necessary for considering issues which cannot be posed in 
terms of class polarisation‘. Parkin (1968, p. 176) is referring here to comparisons made 
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between ‗white-collar groups‘. In relation to my study, I noticed very early on that HT 
activists seemed to be drawn from specific occupational fields (see Figure 4.8).  
 
Figure 4.8 The Occupational location(s) of HT Members 
Education Level Male 
Members 
Female 
Members 
Total 
Members 
Average 
(%) 
Medical/Sciences 13 11 24 12.9 
Engineering 8 1 9 4.8 
Computing 38 10 48 25.8 
Finance 14 8 22 11.8 
Law 0 0 0 0 
Arts 0 1 1 0.5 
Social Sciences 1 2 3 1.5 
Academia/teaching 12 15 27 14.6 
Student 8 12 20 10.8 
Other 1 31
174
 32 17.3 
     
Total 95 91 186 100 
 
Although the above data does not conclusively support my initial observations, it does 
illustrate that HT membership is drawn from the ranks of the educated middle class. This 
identification is important as research has shown that the educated, namely university 
graduates, are more inclined to ‗left-wing politics than those of similar social status but less 
educated‘ (Parkin 1968, p. 178). More interestingly, I found that disproportionately large 
numbers of HT members were drawn from non-social science fields. In terms of radical 
behaviour, this is significant, as it is largely believed that radicalism is usually equated to 
specific occupational categories (Glazer, 1961). Firstly, it is not surprising to see a high 
percentage of teachers and doctors in radical organisations, as these professions are 
constantly confronted with bleak social problems
175
 (Talcott, 1960). Indeed, very few HT 
members have experience of social disadvantage, and thus when confronted with these social 
realities may trigger inclination towards radical or right-wing politics. Secondly, their 
                                                 
174
 This figure represents female members that are homemakers.  
175
 In the above context, social problems are issues which affect people in society and are often deemed to be 
related to moral and socio-economic problems, such as: teenage pregnancy, alcoholism and drug use, racism 
and bullying, anti-social behaviour, prostitution and so on.      
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occupations are grounded within more technical or professionalised subjects, namely 
computing and science. This trend is harder to understand. When I started to give this greater 
thought, I remembered from my discussions that most HT members appear greatly 
fascinated by political concepts, like ideology. In fact, non-social science related students 
seemed unaware that HT appropriated these concepts from the Western political tradition, 
which is easily noticeable to those with a social science background.  
 
6.3.2 The Role of Class 
 
There appears to be a disproportionate number of middle-class recruits in HT, but this is not 
reflective of wider socio-economic trends among the Muslim community in Britain. In fact, 
the Labour Force Survey (2004) found that British Muslims were most likely to be 
economically inactive and 31 per cent of Muslims in work had no formal qualifications 
(Labour Force Survey, 2004). These rather bleak figures are all the more surprising when 
compared to the socio-economic success of HT members. In order to understand this 
disparity, one must look more closely at the social position of HT members. In particular, 
why is the middle-class drawn towards HT? To start with, HT young people are the progeny 
of largely middle class immigrants, originating predominantly from South Asia. According 
to Parkin (1968), family plays a key role in positioning individuals at certain stages in the 
class structure. Moreover, HT members‘ families sought to ensure that their children gained 
considerable advantage through education. Their parents relied on their academic 
qualifications to gain upward mobility, which motivated them to impart to their offspring a 
similar ambition (see Figure 4.6). In contrast, most working class families assign greater 
value to employment (Lareau, 2003). Thus, the members inherited a strong middle class 
ethic that required the completion of higher education. This academic tradition provided 
members with greater options and access to better employment opportunities.  
 
More significantly, two very different sets of value orientations exist among the middle and 
working classes (Cannadine, 1999). HT members have secured a stable economic lifestyle 
through their class position, enabling them to become more concerned with non-welfare 
related politics. In contrast, the working class place greater emphasis on material security. 
Thompson‘s (1988) study of working class Asians in Coventry indicated that children begin 
to contribute to family income at a very early age due to economic need. Therefore, the 
young Muslims who join HT tend to differ from other young Muslims. In fact, they seem to 
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have emerged from very different social conditions. The vast majority of young Muslims in 
Britain live under very poor social conditions, which is often a reflection of their social class 
and limited education. Conversely, most members of HT can be characterised as middle 
class. Despite these socio-economic differences, the experience of being socially 
marginalised is very real for both groups. So, why has HT been largely unsuccessful in 
recruiting working class Muslims? There are several possible explanations for this failure.  
 
Firstly, it could be argued that a difference in ‗post-materialist values‘ has skewed 
recruitment (Inglehart, 1977). This theory places individuals within a continuum of needs, 
with economic survival being a primary need while the pursuits of religious and political 
ideals are considered secondary in nature. Thus, as Lewis (1994) noted, South Asian 
Muslims constituted the underclass of the male working class.
176
 The Labour Force Survey 
(2004), for instance, has estimated that South Asians have the highest rates of unemployment 
among any minority group. Therefore, it is fair to assume that the values placed on economic 
security are proportional to one‘s class position. Working class Muslims, for example, are 
more likely to suffer from economic deprivation. This has a tendency to influence their 
political activism, which is more geared towards material and economic gain (Parkin, 1968). 
On the contrary, HT members are not driven by economic need, nor do they seek exclusive 
rewards for their specific subgroup, unlike the working class. These two sets of value 
orientations provide both groups with divergent economic and cultural strategies, making it 
difficult for HT to recruit working class Muslims.  
 
Secondly, one of the key traits of working class men is their dependence on local territory 
and their local community for a sense of identity (Thompson, 1978). It might seem to be too 
simple to say that the social position of working class Muslims limits their recruitment 
within HT, but the sociological data indicates a class divide. Let me explain this in a bit 
more detail. HT has failed to capture the support of the large Pakistani communities in the 
north of England. These dispersed communities are configured into introverted working 
class colonies. The Pakistani community is an amalgamation of different ethnic groupings, 
yet in the North of England Mirpuris form the majority. Mirpuris arrived as working class 
migrants, settling down in the industrialised North, and their children assumed the same 
patterns of stratification as their parents. This sub-ethnic group appears to be less responsive 
to HT, due to their inability to transcend their ethnic and class positions.  
                                                 
176
 The underclass, as defined by Mann (1992, p. 2), describes a ‗section of society that is seen to exist within 
and yet at the base of the working class‘.  
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It is somewhat obvious that HT has failed to recruit across class boundaries, but I wanted to 
know what members thought about this issue. After surveying members‘ views, it was clear 
that no consensus existed. Most members denied a failure to recruit working class Muslims, 
but once the data was presented to them they were often unable to provide an explanation. 
Some members argued that Muslims are solely motivated by the pursuit of money, because 
they come from the most deprived regions of the world, at the expense of Islam. Another 
popular suggestion focused on the Asian working class tendency to follow the economic and 
cultural norms of their community, making it impossible for HT to break into these closed 
and isolated colonies. There is some truth to this argument, as Asian working class 
communities encourage their children to follow similar employment patterns, assigning 
greater emphasis to work. Consequently, those young Muslims inherit a working class 
tradition from their migrant parents, making them less likely to enter into higher education. 
Access to university gave middle class members the opportunity to interact with people of a 
similar social background; it was within this setting that radicalisation took place. As I have 
shown in previous chapters, new identities emerged during university. Such changes, 
therefore, clearly impacted the members‘ lives, leading to a new outlook, which was a 
significant transitional moment in their development. Although, I will address these points in 
more detail in the sections related to university and peer groups, it is important to note here 
that the members found belonging amongst their middle class peers. Characteristically, as 
the data shows, it is the middle classes who show greater inclination towards recruitment 
within HT.  
 
In order to understand why the South Asian working classes show little propensity to join 
HT, I decided to talk to some working class activists in the East End of London.
177
 The 
respondents, including some who consider themselves on the radical right of the Islamist 
spectrum, generally felt HT lack any appreciation, even downplaying, working class lives 
and backgrounds. As Trigg stated, ‗HT don‘t exist here (East London) because this is a 
working class area – the struggles of our community involve poverty, housing, drugs and so 
on – HT members live sheltered lives away from real problems…so they (HT) can‘t relate‘. 
Clearly, HT activists have emerged from different social worlds, making it difficult for them 
                                                 
177
 Interviews held at East London Mosque, refer to Appendix V: Control group II, p. 259. 
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to identify with the struggles and histories of working class Muslims in Britain.
178
 The 
inability to empathise with the economic realities of working class Muslims has meant low 
support for HT ideology, which was viewed as idealistic and abstract. As Imran explained, 
‗their (HT) politics is about Khilafah…how is that going to solve the problems we 
(Muslims) are facing in Britain‘. These issues reveal that class has shaped two distinct 
mindsets. The working class, for example, tend to have large families, which makes work an 
immediate priority. In contrast, the stability and resources of a middle class household 
provides greater support for education, intellectual reflection and other leisure pursuits.  
 
6.4 Ethnicity 
 
Ethnicity provides a powerful source of attachment and solidarity, as it stems from a deep 
sense of ‗people-hood‘ (Stack, 1986). More importantly, ethnicity offers an individual 
perspective, which differentiates members of the social group from non-members (Monroe 
and Kreidie, 1997). An ethnic group is a distinct group of people, racially or historically 
related, having a common culture that unites them (Oxford English Dictionary, 2002). In this 
respect, ethnicity is a key sociological attribute, especially within HT, because it provides a 
common source of identity. Not surprisingly, South Asians constitute the largest ethnic 
cluster, forming 98 per cent of the party body in the UK. Although this recruitment trend 
might appear disproportionate, it does correspond to the wider demographics of the Muslim 
community, since South Asians are the single largest ethnic group (Ansari, 2004). 
 
Figure 4.7 Ethnicity of HT members 
 
Ethnicity 
Male 
Members 
Female 
Members 
 
Members 
Average  
(%) 
Pakistani 67 59 126 67.7 
Bangladeshi 18 19 37 19.8 
Indian 9 10 19 10.5 
Arab 1 0 1 0.5 
African 0 1 1 0.5 
Other 0 2 2 1 
     
                                                 
178
 The Muslim working classes in Britain have endured a long history of fighting against exploitation and 
racism. This struggle goes back to Muslim seamen working in the docks during the Empire, proliferating with 
mass migration post World War Two (Ansari, 2004) 
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Total 95 91 186 100% 
 
While I was conducting the sample, several members insisted that, for them, ethnicity retains 
no significance, especially in terms of their identity. Yet, as shown in the above table, HT is 
ethnically homogenous. This does raise an important question: how does ethnicity affect a 
member‘s self-image and, perhaps more importantly, what role does it play in their lives? 
Before I can properly address this question, it is worth briefly reappraising our definition of 
ethnic identity. Tajfel (1981) frames ethnic identity within the confines of group 
membership. This assumes an individual draws their self-image – which encompasses 
thinking, feelings and behaviour – from their membership of a particular ethnic group 
(Phinney, 1996). Thus, individuals naturally seek to form a unified conception of themselves 
(Wetherell, 1987). For ethnic minorities the task of identity construction is far more 
complex, as they struggle to integrate diverse and conflicting social positions. Some 
members suggested that they had little control over their identity choices, particularly 
ethnicity, within the home environment. On the other hand, some members drew greater 
significance to skin colour and race, which they believed singled them out as different. The 
life histories of Abdul and Tariq, for example, showed how their ethnicity often emerged 
when they tried to reassert themselves in different social situations. When they felt 
victimised, for instance, they tried to renew their ethnic bounds. This would indicate that 
ethnicity is partly adopted by choice, as Banks (1996) asserts.  
 
Beyond the restrictive measures of my survey, through ethnography, I was able to observe 
how ethnicity came to dominate members‘ self-perceptions in certain social environments. I 
witnessed members switching on these identities in family and religious gatherings, for 
example, in response to majority group expectation. In other words, members tend to modify 
their behaviour when faced with different ethnic identity options. For example, I observed 
some members who seemed to adopt and identify with the national culture, while others 
seemed to revert to their ethnic culture. In most cases, I witnessed a hybrid identity, which 
integrated facets of both cultures. Thus, it seemed apparent that members selected multiple 
identities, which allowed them to navigate through society. For example, members in their 
work environment clearly identified themselves as British – in terms of their language, dress 
and behaviour – while in community settings their ethnicity became more vocalised.    
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In spite of this, it was quite obvious that when I talked to members they seemed reluctant to 
accept that their ethnicity was a part of their overall identity make-up. Some social theorists 
think this is natural, since ethnic identity is endogenous, especially among second and third 
generation immigrants (Hutnik, 1985; Samad, 2004). This approach assumes that ethnicity 
develops from within, but after several discussions with members, I realised that a more 
complex picture of ethnicity was emerging. Firstly, it seemed their image of ethnicity had 
been distorted by the wider society. In particular, adverse experiences twisted the members‘ 
views of their surroundings, reinforcing a feeling of difference. I discovered that most 
members actively sought integration during their childhood, to the extent that the only 
visible difference would be skin colour. However, when this goal became disrupted, many 
members reverted to their cultural roots – in an effort to develop identification and meaning. 
Yet, most found it extremely difficult to derive meaning from their heritage, since they were 
also estranged from their culture. As one member aptly pointed out, ‗I lived in the 
community [Pakistani], but I never felt part of it‘. Secondly, within a family context, 
members did not develop an understanding of their ethnic identity. As one member 
commented, ‗I never knew much about my culture growing up‘. In general, a child‘s 
perception of ethnicity is usually stimulated within a family setting, which is dependent upon 
the connection a child has to their parents (Rumbaut, 1994). Rosenthal and Feldman (1992) 
discovered that parents‘ participation in the community openly influenced their children‘s 
ethnic self-identification. Thus, most members never visited there local mosque or had any 
involvement in an ethnic community, which left them feeling detached (see Fig 4.9).   
 
In sum, though the vast majority of members preferred to identify themselves as Muslim, I 
would treat this self-imaging with a degree of caution. For a start, I have often seen members 
reasserting their ethnic identity in accordance with family custom. For instance, members 
tend to marry from within their own ethnic groupings. More importantly, it seems that 
ethnicity often emerges, and is identified with, during times of social difficulty and 
estrangement. For example, most members join HT at university, forming close ties with 
people of the same ethnicity and background (ref to section 4.7).    
  
6.4.1 Ethnicity across the Fraternity  
 
Before conducting the survey, I was fully aware that South Asians formed the vast majority 
of the fraternity, but offering an explanation for this phenomenon is very difficult. HT has 
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had little success in recruiting Somali, Arab, Turkish, Algerian and Moroccan Muslims. 
There are several possible reasons why HT has struggled to gain a foothold in these 
communities. Firstly, many of these are newly established communities, comprising working 
class immigrants. Somali Muslims, for example, have recently arrived in the UK as refugees 
and asylum seekers. They have sought low-paid manual work, as they have little education, 
which makes them less susceptible to encountering HT. Secondly, these communities are 
very introverted, having little contact with the values of the indigenous culture that occurs 
through the medium of education. These ethnic communities wish to retain a sense of their 
cultural heritage, maintaining a firm link to their language, religious beliefs and traditions.  
 
On the other hand, the Yemeni community is one of the oldest migrant communities in 
Britain, so why are they not attracted to HT? I asked this question to some HT members, and 
I found their explanations quite insightful. One member suggested Yemeni‘s rarely formed 
ties with non-Arabs, especially at university, making it hard to develop a relationship with 
them. Similarly, another member argued Arabs in general have a tendency to look down 
upon non-Arabs, especially related to Islam because ‗they believe Islam was revealed to 
them [Arabs]‘. In spite of this, most of the members I spoke to were adamant that they rarely 
saw Arabs on university campuses, let alone Yemenis. There is some truth to this sentiment 
since the Yemeni community is very small, never exceeding fifteen thousand (1991; 2001, 
National Census). This is why Halliday (1994) describes them as the invisible Arabs. It is 
perhaps understandable that, given their extremely small population size, the Yemeni 
community is not widely represented within HT. Nonetheless, I do not think attraction to, or 
support for, HT can be reduced to just population size. For empirically, it has been shown 
that ethnicity seems to be an integral part of the overall scheme of radicalisation. In 
particular, as the above comments reveal, there are ethnic boundaries at work that inhibit 
relationships between Muslims of differing ethnicities. As Barth (1982) asserted, these 
boundaries dichotomise individuals into culturally separate groups. According to one 
member, segregation among ethnic groups is the norm at university. He suggested that 
students are drawn to their own ethnic heritage – of language, culture, food, music and so on.  
 
Given the fiercely demarcated divisions between social worlds, it is not surprising to see a 
lack of representation among Yemeni Muslims within HT. As already mentioned, 
recruitment into HT tends to hinge upon ethnicity. In fact, the social base of membership for 
HT is drawn from South Asians who have very similar social backgrounds. In short, it is not 
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ethnicity itself that is of major concern so much as the issues it helps to shed light on. For 
example, working class South Asians are not widely represented, making class and family 
status equally important. Thus, a better profile of those involved with HT would suggest that 
they are middle class South Asians.  
 
6.5 Language and Culture 
 
In the previous chapters, my respondents seemed very disconnected from their cultural roots, 
making it crucial to explore this issue in the survey. The process of migration makes it very 
difficult to maintain a sense of cultural identity. In particular, many cultural traits and 
customs are often lost in order to gain acceptance in the new social setting. According to 
Waters (1995), language usually fades away, as it becomes harder to transfer over the 
generations. In Britain, most working class Asian families teach their language of origin to 
their offspring, because it is considered a primary means of transmitting culture from one 
generation to another (Geaves 1996, p. 68). Mosques often reinforce vernacular languages, 
creating a link between religion and ethnic origins. Thus, it is very common to find young 
people being taught Urdu or Bengali in local mosques. However, the sample data indicates 
that the vast majority of HT members failed to receive knowledge of their ethnic language 
(see Figure 4.8).    
 
Figure 4.8 Language Fluency 
 
Language 
Male 
Members 
Female 
Members 
 
Members 
Average  
(%) 
Urdu 3 3 6 3.2 
Hindi 1 2 3 1.6 
Bengali 5 7 12 6.6 
Arabic 1 0 1 0.5 
Other 0 1 1 0.5 
Mixed
179
 23 20 43 23.1 
None 62 58 120 64.5 
     
Total 95 91 186 100 
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 Mixed refers to English and broken vernacular language  
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In general, the inability to speak one‘s native tongue is often perceived by the first 
generation as a symbolic rejection of their social group and culture (Kramsch and 
Widdowson, 1998). The sample indicated that 64.5 per cent of the members claimed no 
understanding or ability to speak a vernacular language. This was not surprising since I 
discovered, through my fieldwork observations and interviews, that members seemed 
completely disconnected from their ethnic culture. The loss of culture was somewhat 
inevitable, as the members were not taught about their culture during childhood. After I 
spoke to some of the parents of HT members, I gained a clearer picture. Some parents felt 
when they arrived in the United Kingdom they had no duty to maintain a foreign language 
and culture, because they came here with the goal to become British, which meant adopting 
the values of the dominant culture. In contrast, working class immigrants believed in the 
myth of return, and thus viewed their culture as a symbol of their social identity. The parents 
of members left their inner city dwellings in search for middle class status. Although, this 
departure was economically motivated, it did indicate a rejection of the ethnic community. 
Thus, most HT members grew up with little or no ties with, or experience of, ethnic 
communities.  
 
It should be somewhat clearer from all this, then, that culture is viewed slightly differently 
by the middle classes. One possible reason for this steady erosion of cultural values among 
the members relates to family socialisation. In general, culture and language are formed at a 
relatively early age, through childhood exposure to parental influences (Kramsch and 
Widdowson, 1998). It is assumed that these processes shape an individual‘s cultural outlook 
throughout his or her life cycle. Among working class immigrants, for example, there was 
greater desire to re-establish their cultural identities in the receiving country. As Anwar 
(1976) notes, working class Pakistanis have used the institution of Biradari (kinship ties) to 
maintain traditional and cultural structures. Consequently, working class Muslims seem 
more successful in transmitting cultural values to their children. In comparison, my findings 
have shown that none of the HT members sampled were sent to Islamic schools or mosques 
to learn about religious or cultural matters during their upbringing. From this, it is noticeable 
that members‘ parents were less inclined towards transferring cultural mores to their 
offspring, which may have contributed to a steady erosion of cultural values among HT 
members. 
 
6.6 Religiosity 
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Trying to better understand HT members is a very challenging endeavour. One aspect of 
their lives that remains difficult to document is their religious and spiritual lives. The survey 
indicated that members‘ religious beliefs and practices are important components in their 
daily lives, providing them with guidance and tranquillity. For the purposes of my study, I 
needed to find out when members became involved, or committed, to their religion. Before I 
present my findings, it is imperative to first explain the meaning of ‗religious commitment‘ 
(Roof 1979, p. 17). As Stark and Glock (1968) have pointed out, this can be very difficult 
because religiosity has a plurality of meanings. In other words, individuals perceive religion 
in different and conflicting ways. Despite this plurality, Stark and Glock (1968, p. 62) 
developed a five dimensional approach to understand religious commitment.
180
 There 
classification principally relates to religious seekers, and not to wider sociological aspects of 
religion (Furseth and Repstad, 2006).  
 
In the context of HT members, the belief dimension would entail ‗Iman [belief] in Allah, his 
angels, his books, his messengers, the last day and al-Qada wal Qadar [divine fate]‘, which 
must be built on ‗attasdiq al-jazim [decisive assent]‘.181 Second, the ritualistic dimension 
involves performing and adhering to a set of structured religious practices (e.g. five daily 
prayers). Thirdly, the experience dimension refers to subjective religious experiences and 
emotions. A member told me, for instance, after he prayed for the first time that he became 
overwhelmed by feelings of joy and tranquillity. Fourthly, the intellectual dimension 
involves acquiring knowledge about the fundamental tenets of the Islamic faith. For 
example, the basis of a member‘s actions is restricted to the Hukm Shariah (divine ruling) 
and therefore no action is performed until its ruling is known. Finally, the consequential 
dimension relates to the interaction with other people, and the effect religious beliefs and 
attitudes have on everyday life. Clearly, no comprehensive list can be crafted that correctly 
documents religiosity, as religious experiences are unique and complex. However, I have 
used these generic markers to identify a general pattern, which will help me analyze the 
commitment and development of members‘ religious beliefs and practices.     
 
6.6.1 Tracking Religiosity among HT Members 
 
                                                 
180
 The five dimensions of religiosity include: the belief dimension, religious practice dimension, experience 
dimension, the intellectual dimension, and the consequential dimension. 
181
 For a complete overview of HT beliefs, see Anon, Hizb ut-Tahrir (manifesto), pp. 30-37. 
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Trying to locate a period in time when members became religious is central to my 
investigation. I wanted to gather data on the importance of religion during childhood: 
whether the members were religious, and, if so, what role it played in their family and social 
lives.  
 
Figure 4.9 Location of Religiosity 
Influence(s) for 
religiosity? 
Male 
Members 
Female 
Members 
 
Members 
Average  
(%) 
Parents 0 1 1 0.5 
Siblings 17 11 28 15.1 
School/College 6 3 9 4.8 
University  72 76 148 79.6 
Work 0 0 0 0 
Private experience 0 0 0 0 
     
Total 95 91 186 100 
 
Figure 4.10 Prayer 
How old were you when 
you learnt to pray? 
Male 
Members 
Female 
Members 
 
Members 
Average  
(%) 
Under 10 3 4 7 3.8 
10 – 15 2 1 3 1.6 
15 - 18  19 24 43 23.1 
18 – 21 64 59 123 66.1 
Above 21 7 3 10 5.4 
     
Total 95 91 186 100 
 
The overwhelming majority of members became involved with, and committed to, religious 
beliefs at university. What is greatly striking about the religious experiences of members is 
the lack of parental influence, which appears non-existent. If this is true, then how did a lack 
of religious background affect their conception of themselves? Firstly, it is relatively clear 
that parents played a marginal role in religious transference. For example, most parents 
failed to teach their children how to pray. However, trying to understand this phenomenon is 
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not easy, especially since research on working class Muslims has shown that family 
members are primary influencing agents for religious matters (Modood and Werbner, 1997; 
Kucukcan, 1999). Most theorists acknowledge young people‘s beliefs and practices are 
principally determined by parental religiosity (Hood et al., 2009). Moreover, beliefs and 
practices are usually transmitted through modelling of parents‘ behaviours (Cornwall, 1988). 
Therefore, if parents are not religious, then it is fair to assume that their children‘s religious 
values, or lack of, will resemble their parents‘ non-religious dispositions (Dudley and 
Dudley, 1986).  
 
Focusing on the effects of non-religious parents is of course highly complex and not easy for 
a survey of this kind to elicit information on. So, I tried to ask several members questions 
about these matters. Most members suggested that during their upbringing they never gave 
much thought to religion, as their parents were very secular and Western orientated. As a 
result, religion was not considered important to their identity. Thus, it is important for my 
study to focus on the context or situation in which the members became religious. It is clear 
that the role of parents in the transmission of religious beliefs and practices was extremely 
limited. This means religious socialisation took place outside the family setting, in most 
cases at university through peer influence. In contrast, working class Muslims tend to 
acquire their religious values from family socialisation, usually in the early formative years 
(Erickson, 1992).
182
 This allows them to categorise and identify themselves with the wider 
Muslim community. As McGown (1999, p.98) points out about working class Somali 
Muslims in London:  
 
It [Islam] provided an oasis of tranquillity amid the 
dislocation of refugee straits and the turmoil of adjusting 
to a new culture, trying to learn a new language, and 
attempting to find jobs What was valuable about it was 
the very ritual of stepping outside the daily struggle, five 
times over the course of the day, to concentrate on the 
prayers that never alter, in rhythmic language that linked 
them to a community of believers that was theirs no 
matter where in the world they were. 
                                                 
182
 The religious socialisation of young working class Muslims gained media notoriety after a secret undercover 
report by Dispatches (Lessons in hate and violence in Muslim schools, 14/02/2011), which showed broad and 
systematic abuse of young Muslims. The exposure to abusive religious practices often creates feelings of 
religious disaffection amongst working class practitioners. Also, the religious socialisation received in British 
Mosques is embedded within the Barelwi and Deobandi traditions. Therefore, HT middle class recruits 
experience a different type of religious socialisation within HT. Importantly, HT provide middle-class recruits 
with a means to engage in intellectual reflection and exploration, which is closer to what they received during 
their middle-class socialisation.  
- 214 - 
 
 
The results of the survey strongly suggest that members‘ religious growth and change 
occurred mainly at university.  
 
6.7 Social Triggers 
 
This section will look at the main ways in which experiences have, over the years, affected 
members‘ expectations and understandings of other people. As Abdul pointed out, ‗I might 
have a British passport, but that means nothing when people judge you by your skin colour‘. 
The problem this poses, which was noted in passing in previous chapters, is that if social 
triggers have an effect on identity formation, then can these be identified and do other HT 
members experience them? There are many social conditions and triggers that could account 
for changes in a member‘s behaviour. For instance, family breakdown can have a deep 
psychological impact (Minuchin, 1974). Tracking all the possible triggers across a large 
population is extremely difficult, and thus I needed to isolate the most common triggers 
among the members. After several discussions, I noticed that members cited racism as a 
major childhood experience. Therefore, I quickly realised that despite minor differences in 
content and emphasis, racism could be singled out as a key social trigger. Although, racism 
was widely experienced, it mainly occurred during childhood (see Fig 4.11). In accord with 
the current social situation, it was not surprising to discover that religious discrimination, or 
Islamophobia, became a central issue for most members in adulthood. This would indicate 
that when members construct their identities, they are trying to connect their present 
experiences to what has gone before, rendering past experiences with meaning. Therefore, in 
this section, I want to focus on the effects of racial and religious prejudice.   
 
Figure 4.11 Social Triggers during Childhood 
Types of Triggers 
(Childhood) 
Male 
Members 
Female 
Members 
 
Members 
Average  
(%) 
Racism     
Victim 93 68 161 86.6 
Non-victim 2 23 25 13.4 
     
Islamophobia      
Victim 0 3 3 1.6 
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Non-victim 95 88 183 98.4 
     
Total 95 91 186 100 
 
Figure 4.11 Social Triggers during Adulthood 
Types of Triggers 
(Adulthood) 
Male 
Members 
Female 
Members 
 
Members 
Average  
(%) 
Racism     
Victim 28 19 47 25.3 
Non-victim 67 72 139 74.7 
     
Islamophobia      
Victim 53 71 124 66.7 
Non-victim 42 20 62 33.3 
     
Total 95 91 186 100 
 
6.7.1 The effects of Racism 
 
It is extremely difficult to document the many ways in which racism impacted the lives of 
members, because it is a highly personal experience. In the course of my interviews, most 
members cited experiencing direct forms of racism – like verbal and physical abuse – 
principally during their upbringing. Other more subtle forms of racism were cited in 
adulthood, often in relation to employment opportunities and accessing social resources 
(housing, health care etc.). These experiences took place during the most formative periods 
of the members‘ lives, which had a decisive effect on their development. As Sanchez-Hucles 
(1998) points out, young people who are exposed to adverse experiences, like racism, tend to 
carry the effects into adulthood. In chapter two, I realised victims of racism had a tendency 
to internalise the distorted images that racism promotes. Consequently, the impulse to join 
radical movements often grows from losing one‘s ‗sense of social belonging‘ (Parkin 1968, 
p. 4). The weakening of social ties is usually triggered by events that cannot be controlled, 
like racism. This inability to influence events can stimulate the growth of isolation from the 
wider society, making some more susceptible to HT. I am not alone in this view. One of the 
key issues to be drawn from the literature on mass movements was the recurrence of 
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alienation and the lack of integration as significant features for recruitment into such 
organisations (Hoffer, 1982; Parkin, 1968).  
 
The empirical data collected from my own research has shown that most members felt 
victimised by racism. Consequently, this experience damaged their ties with wider society, 
leaving most of them feeling socially isolated. Parkin (1968, p. 11) describes such 
individuals as ‗socially unanchored and adrift in the world‘. Therefore, it is assumed this 
isolation and lack of integration made these young Muslims more receptive to HT. Racial 
victimisation, for example, has a negative effect as it triggers a host of frustrations. HT 
deliberately uses this agitation to direct young Muslim anger towards the dominant culture 
while promoting its own subculture, which participants begin to identify with and gain 
acceptance from. This subculture is built on similar identities, drawing individuals to a single 
collective organisation that brings together like-minded people. This specific subculture 
formed when the larger culture failed to meet the social needs of a particular group of 
people, i.e. young middle class Asians. Thus, HT provides socially detached individuals 
access to new social ties and a meaningful way to gain self-identity. As Kornhauser (1959, p. 
33) argues, the alienated are more inclined towards fringe movements, ‗because they provide 
occasions for expressing resentment against what is, as well as promises of a totally different 
world‘.  
 
6.7.2 The Effects of Islamophobia 
 
It is somewhat unusual to see a discrepancy between racial and religious discrimination. 
Although both variables have high representation, racial discrimination is seen as a more 
vivid form of discrimination, especially during childhood. On the other hand, Islamophobia 
is much harder to describe. Some social theorists, namely Poynting and Mason (2007, p. 61), 
argue Islamophobia is a form of ‗anti-Muslim racism‘. In France, for example, a Muslim 
cemetery was desecrated. This act was described as Islamophobic. The Runnymede Trust 
(1997, p. 1) defined Islamophobia as acts of exclusion and discrimination based on an 
irrational ‗dislike of Muslims‘.183 For many HT members, this is undoubtedly a persuasive 
argument. For example, many members argue banning the hijab is an example of 
Islamophobia. So, it is not surprising to see such a high percentage of alleged Islamophobic 
incidents. Consequently, I would treat these claims with a degree of caution since HT 
                                                 
183
 Islamophobia tends to be expressed through a physical dislike of Islamic practice and symbolise (e.g. 
headscarf, building of new Mosques and so on).   
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exploits a skewed definition of Islamophobia. I was somewhat surprised by the relatively 
low number of instances of Islamophobia cited during childhood. This might suggest that 
Islamophobia emerged more vividly in the wake of the 2001 terror attacks (Benn and Jawad, 
2004). More significantly, Islamophobia cannot be singled out or attributed to HT 
radicalisation, because the vast majority of members only cited incidents post-radicalisation.     
 
6.8 Sources of Recruitment  
 
Recruitment into HT occurs through a multitude of sources: family and friendship networks, 
peer groups, universities and mosques are some of the most common examples. Although 
recruitment sources can be highly diverse, it still entails a process of locating, screening and 
selecting people to join HT. Despite widespread interest in HT, there is limited empirical 
data that explains why certain social spaces are more productive in recruitment. Since my 
research has two interconnected goals, namely to figure out the causes of radicalisation 
within HT from both an individual and a group perspective, I need to look at recruitment 
from this dual perspective as well.  
 
Figure 4.12 Sources of Recruitment 
Location(s) of Recruitment Male 
Members 
Female 
Members 
 
Members 
Average  
(%) 
University  81 65 146 78.5 
College 5 4 9 4.9 
School 0 0 0 0 
Mosque 0 0 0 0 
Work 1 0 1 0.5 
Community (clubs/centres) 2 0 2 1 
Home (family relations) 6 22 28 15.1 
Other 0 0 0 0 
     
Total  95 91 186 100 
 
It is clear that one unchangeable characteristic of HT success has been its ability to mobilise 
and recruit students behind its radical mission, a fact often singled out by many social 
commentators (Taji-Farouki, 1996). During the early 1990s, the party gained notoriety for 
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attracting young Muslims to its cause, which was something of a new phenomenon on 
university campuses. Given this picture of youth activism, I need to try and identify why a 
sub-section of the Muslim student population became inclined to HT. One of the most 
obvious explanations for the emergence of HT radicalism among a homogenous group of 
Muslim students is social isolation. Recent studies have shown that once in higher education, 
ethnic minorities tend to find themselves more alienated and excluded (University of Leeds, 
1992). Several case studies, for instance, in the previous chapter, showed that alienation and 
exposure to unsettling social environments at university made the respondents more 
susceptible to form peer friendships with HT activists. Thus, it is important to ask, who 
participates in these peer groups and why?  
 
6.8.1 University Peer Group and Deviant Subculture Formation 
 
To begin, it is worth first trying to tackle one key question: Why are middle class Asian 
students more inclined to join HT at university? Some social theorists attribute deviant group 
formation to an absence of social alternatives. As Lemert (1967, p.336) suggested, these 
groups usually form ‗because there is nothing else to do‘. Although this may be the case for 
many working class gangs, it is harder to apply this reasoning to HT. This is because, as the 
data has shown, recruitment mainly takes place within a university setting. Most universities 
provide open access to countless social activities and clubs, giving students an opportunity to 
find a place for themselves. Yet, as I learned from my interviews and case studies, in the 
previous chapters, most members failed to adjust to the social realities of university life. It 
was quite apparent members were unable to come to terms with feeling socially isolated. 
Thus, soon after arriving at university, most members began to seek out peers that matched 
their social backgrounds – young middle class Asians. They started spending much of their 
spare time with the peer group, constituting a major outlet for social activity.  
 
There is, then, a fairly strong argument to suggest joining HT occurs in part as a 
psychological response to loneliness and social alienation. As a result, the participant‘s 
desire for companionship allowed HT peers to socialise them into their deviant subculture 
(Ferracuti and Wolfgang, 1982). Members cannot be thought of as being unwilling 
participants within HT subculture, because psychological need appears to be a key social 
trigger. I was, therefore, greatly interested to discover the emerging features of HT‘s 
subculture. In its simplest form, subculture is the creation of a separate social space in which 
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a group of individuals establish their own system of values (Ferracuti and Wolfgang, 1982). 
HT subculture formed when the larger culture fell short in meeting the needs of some young 
middle class Asians. In addition, this homogenous group failed to develop a proper 
connection with their own communities. They were unable to expressively relate themselves 
to their families, leading to their withdrawal from society. As a result of this lack of social 
integration, they became highly susceptible to the radical values of HT, which differed 
strongly from the prevailing set of social and political norms. As Brake (1985, p. 10) 
explains, subcultures are ‗meaning systems, modes of expression or life styles developed by 
groups‘ in order to distinguish themselves from the population at large.  
 
In the case of HT, these meaning systems are believed to emerge through resistance, 
providing structured solutions to the perceived contradictions rising from the wider societal 
context. In this respect, a subculture inevitably involves membership of a class culture, and 
the subculture may be an extension of, or in opposition to, the class culture. Juvenile gangs, 
for instance, provide working class youths with an alternative source of self-esteem (Cohen, 
1980). Miller (1958) discovered the values of youth subculture merely reiterated, in a 
distorted fashion, the focal concerns of the adult working class population.   
 
Trying to understand why middle class Asians are the most receptive demographic to HT‘s 
radical message is very tricky. To start, I need to locate the features of HT middle class 
radicalism that serve to distinguish it from the radicalism of the working class. Many social 
theorists argue that working class radicalism is firmly based upon their perception of, and 
place within, the social structure (Parkin, 1968). In other words, it is assumed the hub of 
working class activism is orientated around economic and material change, while middle 
class radicalism is believed to be influenced by more moralistic features. After speaking to 
several working class Muslims, non-HT affiliated, I was able to gain a better picture of the 
class divide. One activist asserted that HT is too idealistic, as he explained: ‗the Muslim 
community is the most deprived, we have huge unemployment and there is a big drug 
problem with the youth…HT doesn‘t address these issues‘. Most working class Muslim 
activists engage in interest-group politics – such as lobbying for equal rights, better working 
conditions and equal employment opportunities – that is fundamentally designed to provide 
benefits to the working classes. By contrast to this, HT, with its middle class roots, is not 
orientated to achieve material gain for its members. They are more typically concerned with 
issues of an ideological or spiritual nature, which offers no particular benefit to those 
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involved. As one member insisted, ‗we [HT] are doing Allah‘s [God‘s] work‘. Abdul (HT, 
member) described the feelings of performing actions for HT as a ‗spiritual buzz‘.  
 
During my interview with Omar Bakri, former leader of the UK branch, I made it a point to 
ask him why so many young middle class Asians were attracted to HT. He attributes this 
phenomenon to a ‗clash between cultures and values‘ (Omar Bakri, Interview 26/03/2004). 
In some respect, this is true since a subculture tends to develop in response to the prevailing 
culture, acting in opposition, as it seeks to differentiate itself from the mainstream. In this 
context, the term culture is perceived as a separate entity within the larger society, and one 
with which the larger society must contend (Cote, 1996). Theorists who purport subcultures 
form through resistance often state that members are always striving against dominant 
classes and the older generations. They seek to find ways to disrupt the social position of the 
dominant actors, so as to create spaces for themselves. In this respect, HT members are 
counterpoised against the first generation, opposing their culture, language and ideals. This 
loathing was directed towards the first generation for importing sectarian and ethnic 
characteristics from their previous domiciles. In contrast, working class young people tend to 
have closer interaction with their parents, demonstrating less intent on being different 
(Cohen, 1980). In comparison, middle-class young people display greater tendencies to 
associate with a subculture group so as to reinforce their independence. These young people 
are also given more disposable income with which they form their subcultures around 
themselves, engaging in a greater diversity of pursuits.  
 
The sociological data collected from HT has found that the membership is disproportionately 
represented. This unbalanced stratification allowed HT members to group together in 
accordance with their social status, facilitating a subculture that was determined by class, 
ethnicity and age. At university, for example, most members experienced social isolation. 
This, Bakri believes, facilitated the rise of an ‗identity crisis‘, pushing them to interact with 
people similar to them (Omar Bakri, Interview 26/03/2004).  
 
Brake (1985) points out youth subculture are formed from more than one particular identity, 
moving from different types and even mixing identities. Exposure to HT subculture, initially 
through peer groups, opened up a new social world, comprised of Muslims who emerged 
from similar family, class and ethnic backgrounds. HT offered disaffected middle class 
Asians a homogenous social space to gain acceptance and belonging. The rise of an 
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oppositional subculture among the Muslim middle class, inspired by common experiences, 
became personified by the life-cycle identity change. In this respect, age played a central 
factor, because the types of individuals who became radicalised within HT were those who 
were young, well-educated and had been raised in a middle class household. Many 
disaffected middle class Asian youths found comfort and belonging within HT‘s subculture 
because it gave them a sense of purpose. This middle class radicalism offered its participants 
access to identity options outside of the constrained family and community structures.   
 
6.9 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have searched for common characteristics and trends in HT member 
behaviour, in order to better understand why some young Muslims join the group. However, 
many concepts that are relevant to this question cannot be measured readily by single 
variables. In fact, I have discovered that the relationships between members and their 
environments are ‗mutually shaping‘ (Bronfenbrenner 1979, p. 22). In other words, I had to 
look at social interactions across connected systems - namely family, university and peer 
friendships. Increased religiosity, for example, did not take place in a family setting, rather in 
most cases it originated from peer interactions at university. Peer group relations are a very 
important, and recurring, feature of the data collected. This social space allowed members to 
find solidarity with other Asian students who emerged from similar experiences and social 
backgrounds. Every HT member is marked by the stages of social life, each providing a set 
of experiences that get internalised into psychological expectations. Firstly, during early 
socialisation, it was observed that most members endured some form of racial 
discrimination. These negative encounters reflect not only the development of frustrations 
but also the influence of shared disaffection and anger towards the larger culture. This 
enabled HT to bombard the novice with ideas about how to deal with these perceived 
problems, providing a sense of belonging.  
  
Let me return to the main themes of the chapter to summarise what my analysis has revealed 
about the common characteristics of a typical HT member in Britain. Firstly, the most 
instantly recognisable trait of HT radicalism is its success in mobilising young people. Thus, 
it was not surprising to find that most members were recruited at a similar age. Secondly, 
recruitment generally takes place within the same social space, namely university campuses. 
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, I discovered that HT membership is firmly rooted 
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within the ranks of the educated middle classes. There are deep cultural and socio-political 
divisions amongst the working and middle classes within the Muslim community, to such an 
extent that lifestyle and orientation has created two very different sub-groups. Consequently, 
HT has struggled to gain support among the fairly large and heterogeneous working class 
population, forcing it to narrow its recruitment pool to middle class students. Fourthly, early 
childhood experiences left members feeling isolated and disconnected, which in most cases 
created a predilection to become involved with HT, and that these experiences were rooted 
in racial discrimination. Some theorists argue that exposure to social instability during one‘s 
childhood can dramatically increase the chances of exhibiting deviant behaviour in 
adulthood (Chansky, 2001; Howe, 2010). Therefore, HT members exist within a small 
homogenous group, which may be narrowed down and defined as young middle class 
Asians.  
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Chapter Seven: 
Is HT Radicalism a Conveyor Belt for Terrorism? 
 
The call to proscribe HT has received significant attention in the aftermath of the 7 July 
London bombings. The British media has portrayed the group as dangerous and 
uncompromising, making it worthy of proscription. David Cameron, the leader of the 
Conservative Party, added his voice to the growing body demanding to ban HT, prompting 
greater scrutiny of its subversive activities and extremist ideology (BBC, 4/7/2007). Despite 
this wave of condemnation, HT remains a legal organisation. More significantly, it has been 
described in a leaked home office report as a ‗radical, but to date non-violent Islamist group‘ 
(The Guardian, 22/07/2005). If this assessment is accurate, then the study of violence in HT 
requires an approach that focuses on the relationship between radical speech and physical 
violence. Trying to equate HT with radical violence is extremely problematic. This is 
because radicalisation is often thought consequential for violence, or at least a natural 
precursor of violence. The outcome, however, is not necessarily towards more violence. In 
fact, religious initiatives may either support or help undermine violence, and there is no 
clear-cut cause and effect to be seen. During my interview with Omar Bakri, he emphatically 
declared that he was a force for good in British society, as he advocated non-violent 
activism, which helped young Muslims channel their frustrations away from violence. 
Although one might question such an assertion, it is crucial to reiterate how HT evolved into 
one of the most dominant radical youth movements, and whether it has stimulated violence 
in Britain.   
 
7.1 Defining Violence and Radical Speech 
 
In the course of my research, I had countless discussions with HT members regarding the 
nature of its alleged non-violent ideology. The prevailing opinion within the fraternity 
indicates acts of physical violence are non-existent. HT violence, if in fact such a thing truly 
exists, cannot be understood independently from the concept of radical speech. In other 
words, a more fruitful debate would be to understand the synthesis between radical speech 
and violence. In order to understand the relationship between these two concepts, I must first 
try to define each term. Although, several attempts have been made to define violence, it still 
remains a highly ambiguous and divisive term. Steger (2003, p. 12), for example, believes 
that violence has countless meanings: including ‗to force, to injure and to violate‘. 
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Honderich (2003, p. 91) narrows his definition of violence to the ‗use of physical force‘ that 
violates and destroys people or things. Interestingly, both accounts make reference to 
violence as an act that violates. However, I would caution against restricting a definition of 
violence to physical force, because a violation can occur without physical force.     
 
Relating violence to ‗extreme speech‘184 is an exceedingly difficult exercise, since it raises 
the question of what type of speech should be made unlawful. From a legal standpoint, 
speech is rarely considered a crime, unless an overt act is committed (Weinstein and Hare, 
2010). In Britain, ‗public order‘ proclamations are used to counteract hate speech in public, 
but these laws have created a great deal of uncertainty because they are ‗unworkable in 
practice‘ (Hare and Weinstein 2010, p. 60). As Hare and Weinstein (2010, p. 60) point out, 
British courts struggle to differentiate between words that ‗insult‘ from those that ‗offend, 
shock or disturb‘. Traditionally, the United States requires clear and present danger of an 
overt act following a speech, before a prosecution can be sought (McWhirter, 1994). In other 
words, a clear line of distinction is usually made between speech and actions. However, an 
individual who, by speech, provokes an action is then equally culpable with the individual 
who perpetrates it (McWhirter, 1994). More recently, in Sweden a religious minister was 
prosecuted for a speech he gave to his congregation in which he referred to homosexuality as 
a perversion. He had violated Sweden‘s Anti-Hate statute, an act that gives broad protection 
to individuals and groups from ‗verbal violence‘ (The Local (29/11/2005).  
 
In the UK such a law does not exist, the introduction of anti-terror laws has ignited debate 
about acceptable speech. In particular, in the aftermath of 7/7, there was a concerted effort to 
criminalise speech under the Terrorism Act 2006 (Malik 2010, p. 96). This Act gave 
extensive powers to detain and charge individuals who glorify acts of terror and incite others 
to carry out such attacks. Tony Blair, the former Prime Minister, insisted the law was passed 
to take stronger measures against those who ‗don‘t just directly engage in terrorism but 
indirectly incite it‘ (The Guardian, 10/11/2005). The glorification laws were brought into 
immediate effect in the aftermath of the London terror attacks to clamp down on radical 
speech. However, the newly introduced measures were widely condemned for their 
ambiguity. Dominic Grieve, the Conservative legal affairs spokesman, pointed out that the 
laws would not be properly understood by juries when prosecutions were eventually brought 
(House of Commons research paper, 16/06/2005). His concerns were realised in the trial of 
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 As Malik (2010, pp. 96-98) suggests, defining speech as extremist can be a difficult task, but if one adopts 
liberal democracy as the yardstick, then a criteria can be formulated.  
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the first person to be prosecuted under the act, Samina Malik, the self-dubbed lyrical terrorist 
(The Guardian, 06/12/2007). The jury struggled to understand what crime they were 
prosecuting, i.e. her poetry or downloading terrorist material.   
 
Despite the many shortcomings of the terrorism legislation, it does offer legal insight into the 
relationship between radical speech and violence. The courts have upheld convictions even 
for remote tendencies to violence as proper grounds for punishing mere speech. Omar 
Brooks, a member of Al-Ghurabaa, and several others were prosecuted for speeches they 
gave at Regents Park Mosque in which they allegedly incited young followers to commit 
acts of violence (BBC, 17/04/2008). The reformatted statutes identify acts not deemed 
punishable a decade ago as worthy of prosecution today, mere utterances of beliefs and even 
membership in groups holding radical opinions are potential for incarceration. It may be 
argued that any such discussion of where to draw the line for criminalisation of radical 
speech is not relevant to my research, since no cases directly involving violence have been 
brought against any UK HT member. Despite this truth, the proscription of HT is still under 
review by the Home Office, making it essential to track its activism in the light of their 
willingness to advocate violence against others.  
 
7.2 Campus Wars 
 
By the start of the 1990s, HT had shifted its emphasis to public activism, with the intent to 
bring about social and political change. Although freedom of speech allows individuals to 
oppose the state, it could be argued that HT‘s aim to overthrow the government cannot be 
accomplished without force. However, as one member pointed out:  
 
Our goal is not to establish an Islamic State in Britain…it was 
never our intention to do so. The party is being deliberately 
targeted and victimised for policies that were not sanctioned by 
the central leadership, the misunderstandings of former 
members (Omar Bakri) should not be used to judge the 
party…to do so would be a deliberate attempt to distort our 
true aims. 
 
This may be the case of HT today, but I am trying to track the development of HT. 
According to Omar Bakri, the type of activism enacted by the group during the 1990s was 
designed to subvert the system. More interestingly, the above member does not deny this 
fact. Instead he tries to equate their radical past to Omar Bakri, singling him out as the 
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person responsible for their extremist and combative tendencies. These tendencies towards 
confrontation earned HT a reputation for being overaggressive and confrontational, 
particularly when dealing with Muslim and non-Muslim students, which set it on a collision 
course with university authorities. HT entered university campuses during the placid period 
of the 1980s, allowing Farid and Bakri to lay the interior platform for activism. Farid 
Kassim, when asked about the rapid success of HT at universities, candidly proclaimed:  
 
‗I think the reason why Islam is so attractive and stimulated so 
much debate and discussion is precisely that it is an ideology. 
And it‘s an ideology that is coming to a society that is devoid 
of intellectual debate and discussion, a society not interested in 
intellectual issues‘ (Public Eye BBC 2, 25/07/1995).  
 
This zealous declaration by Kassim stands as confident testimony to the ascendance of HT 
activism. They surfaced rapidly as a new phenomenon pioneering Islam in the form of 
intellectual ideas that became the main focal point of discussion across university campuses.  
 
HT gained media notoriety during the 1990s for their overt activity in more than fifty 
universities across the country. The rise to national prominence, in part, was achieved due to 
their sheer determination to take full control over university campuses, ‗taking over from the 
beleaguered and defeated socialists‘ (Kassim, 26/05/2004). The growing rise of HT was 
closely monitored by the National Union of Students (NUS) for some years, especially as 
party members infiltrated university clubs and societies, disseminating political and 
intellectual ideals that were deemed to be anti-Semitic and homophobic. As a result, the 
NUS sanctioned a generic ban that prevented HT from assembling any kind of organised 
activity on university campuses. Kassim, in the wake of the NUS proclamation, emphasised 
his complete indignation at their unjust position, when he stated: ‗…there is an intellectual 
storm taking place…it‘s time for the NUS to acknowledge that and try to construct an 
appropriate intellectual response to that, instead of banning and censorship‘ (Public Eye 
BBC 2, 25/07/1995). However, the imposed sanctions forced HT to operate clandestinely 
under the semblance of duplicate societies. The process of operating under the guise of these 
surreptitious clubs allowed the party to manoeuvre around broad restrictions, despite 
campus-wide bans for alleged anti-Semitic rhetoric.   
 
7.2.1 Promoting Anti-Semitism on Campus 
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No sooner had HT emerged than speculation began about its subversive campus activism. 
From a British Muslim perspective, student radicalism was somewhat unprecedented. 
Although HT advocated a non-violent approach, it propagated an extremely radical ideology. 
In particular, outrage rapidly grew against HT for creating an upsurge of hostility towards 
Jewish students. The question I wish to pose here is whether HT‘s radical message promoted 
violence against Jewish students. It is important to emphasize that radical speech and 
violence are not synonymous. Clearly, not all radical speech promotes violence. For 
instance, I have surveyed most of HT campus activism and, despite the hysteria; very few 
violent incidents could be associated to HT directly. In fact, HT activism mainly involved 
organising public events and debates, most of which passed without incident. However, there 
were several talks convened by HT under the guise of discreet clubs that are worthy of 
discussion. To start, a meeting arranged by the Culture Society, at King‘s College, had to be 
dispersed by the police, in order to escort Jewish students away from a meeting of the Jewish 
Society that was taking place in a nearby room.  
 
This incident was eclipsed by the unfolding problems at the School of Oriental and African 
Studies (SOAS), where the 1924 Committee was operating as a front for HT members. The 
1924 committee held a talk, entitled: ‗Israel, the Apartheid State‘. Faisal Muhammad, a 
British born Malaysian, was an active member of HT and was the chairman for the meeting. 
Police were again called in to escort the opposing factions away from the college after the 
talk. Unsurprisingly, the 1924 committee was found guilty of its association to HT. On 31 
October, SOAS issued a statement saying, ‗the 1924 Committee had by its action shown 
itself to be closely aligned to an Islamic fundamentalist group, the Hizb-ut-Tahrir‘ (The 
Times Higher Education Supplement, 04/11/1994). As a result, SOAS banned speakers 
representing the views of HT from speaking at future meetings of the 1924 Committee. HT 
members, aggrieved at the decision, felt victimised by the college authorities, and thus 
quickly adopted a proactive response that sought to expose the fallacy of this incident. The 
members launched a poster campaign that read:  
 
SOAS bans Islam. SOAS has finally exposed its long-standing, 
hidden agenda of deep hatred for Islam by banning speakers 
invited who present Islam as an ideological alternative. The 
West and universities such as SOAS espouse ideas such as 
freedom of speech, but these become redundant when Muslims 
want to express their views. (The Times Higher Education 
Supplement, 04/11/1994)  
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The proceeding clampdown on HT continued throughout London campuses, and it was not 
restricted to meetings. Numerous party leaflets and flyers were generating condemnation for 
promoting anti-Semitic extremism. In particular, a leaflet advertising a meeting at which 
Farid spoke was entitled: ‗Peace with Israel – a crime against Islam‘. Outrage was directed at 
an inflammatory quote in the leaflet, which read: ‗The last hour would not come unless the 
Muslims will fight against the Jews and the Muslims would kill them, until the Jews would 
hide themselves behind a stone or a tree, and a stone or a tree would say: Muslim, or the 
servant of Allah, there is a Jew behind me; come and kill him‘. Even though this provocative 
extract was a direct reference to a Hadith, it did not safeguard the group from criticism.
185
 
Kassim definitely rejected these claims, when he stated: ‗The vast majority of our leaflets are 
political and intellectual, that‘s the main focus of our activity…if we put a gun on a poster 
then we‘re immediately called extremists, but Sinn Féin for example, at the University of 
North London have been doing it for some time‘ (Public Eye, BBC 2).  
 
However, this did not prevent the suspension of the Islamic Society of Brunel University for 
three months after holding a meeting judged to be illegal by the university authorities. A 
debate entitled, ‗Hands off Muslim Land or Jihad‘, had resulted in the cancellation of the 
event, as the university authorities believed it did not promote respect and tolerance for 
opposing views. Firdaus Miah, a British born Bangladeshi, was the president of the society 
and a member of HT. As a result of the incident, Firdaus Miah was subjected to disciplinary 
action for alleged activities that were deemed to be in breach of the university‘s disciplinary 
code. Universities became the central battleground between Jewish students and HT. It was 
necessary for HT to contest the continuing claims of their alleged anti-Semitism. The party 
felt a deliberate campaign of misinformation was being spearheaded by vociferous elements, 
designed to prevent debate about the legality of Israel. HT elaborated their statement of 
innocence in a six-point declaration that defined the position of HT. It stated:  
 
1. Jews are to be accorded the protected status of dhimmi 
provided that the trust placed in them is not betrayed. 
 
2. The Muslims of Palestine are entitled to fight in self-defence of 
their lands which are under occupation. This disposition does 
not extend outside of Muslim lands and thus does not include 
any ‗battlefield‘ in Britain. 
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 Hadith are sayings of the Prophet Mohammed. 
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3. Muslims living in non-Muslim countries are to live according 
to the commands of God and to refrain from harming, 
betraying or cheating non-Muslims. They are to seek to invite 
non-Muslims to embrace Islam. 
 
4. The killing of innocent people, including hijacking aeroplanes, 
is forbidden in Islam. 
 
5. The Qur‗anic verses referring to adultery, fornication, stealing 
and homosexuality are clear but the punishments prescribed 
apply only to an Islamic State. 
 
6. There is a concerted effort by the media to limit the 
effectiveness of Islamic proclamation on university campuses. 
(Extracted from Daily Awaz, 07/03/1994) 
 
The situation did not change, even though HT published their opinions, which sought to 
clarify the misunderstandings. However, articles in the national press continued to vilify HT 
activity at universities in an attempt to prevent the party expansion. The Daily Mirror 
described HT as a ‗fanatical group of Muslim extremists... stirring up hatred in Britain 
against Jews‘ (The Daily Mirror, 04/03/1994). A similar article to those noted appeared in 
The Observer, under the provocative headline: ‗Hitler‘s Heirs Incite Islamic Students‘ (The 
Observer, 13/03/1994).  
 
As a result of the frenzied assault on HT by the national press, the NUS, at their annual 
conference in Blackpool, singled HT out for its alleged anti-Semitic and racist 
pronouncements. Kassim dismissed these allegations, as he expressed his outrage at the 
NUS, claiming:  
 
The great crime is that the National Union of 
Students has been taken over by people that are 
involved in a conspiracy, if you will, an anti-
Islam conspiracy to mute the voices of Muslim 
students at university campuses…We are well 
aware that the NUS is controlled by forces that 
have their own hidden political agenda, and 
Islam is a convenient way in which they can 
enact their agenda. (Public Eye, BBC 2)  
 
This emotional statement illustrated the frustration Kassim and party officials felt at the 
imbalance of the NUS rules and regulations that were intended to limit HT activity. 
Therefore, HT utilised this attack to condemn the concept of free speech as a ‗Western 
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myth‘. It became evident that anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism were being quantified as the 
same thing, and as a result Muslim students who protested against Zionism and the activities 
of the State of Israel were branded as anti-Semitic and thus condemned by the policies of the 
NUS (Kassim, 26/05/2004). The decision to publicly condemn HT was seen as a calculated 
act of provocation. Kassim responded by saying, ‗It doesn‘t deter us because we believe all 
the prophets were vilified by their own people...We believe intellectual thought changes 
human beings and we must discuss things in order to change society‘ (Public Eye, BBC 2). 
This rather polemical rant was overshadowed by an address made by Kassim in which he 
said, ‗it will be better for the Jews to become Muslims if they want to live in peace in the 
land of Muslims‘ (The Guardian, 07/02/1994). Inevitably, this provoked many sections of 
the Jewish population into action, and was widely condemned for its anti-Semitic rhetoric.  
 
I have presented a small selection of examples of HT anti-Semitic rhetoric and activity. On 
the basis of available evidence it is difficult to equate HT activism with increased violence 
towards Jewish students. Although the rhetoric of HT is unpalatable to most, it does not 
warrant proscribing. Many contemporary theorists and law makers have struggled to 
correctly identify radical speech in terms of violence, and this makes it problematic when 
studying HT. There are at least two distinct ways of conceptualizing HT‘s radical speech 
related to Jews. Firstly, on a personal level, no case has to date been presented against any 
HT member concerning speeches deemed unlawful. Despite objections to the anti-Semitic 
speeches and leaflets attributed to HT, no legal action has been taken. However, with the 
widening of terror laws, its inflammatory material if replicated today would surely warrant 
greater sanction. Secondly, the organisation, as I will show in latter sections, has undergone 
significant change. In particular, its speech towards Jews has been toned down, especially 
after the departure of Omar Bakri. According to Home Office documents, released to the 
party under the Freedom of Information Act, ‗HT‘s activities centre on intellectual 
reasoning, logical arguments and political lobbying‘ (HT Britain website, 01/06/2005). With 
respect to anti-Semitic speech, HT denied stirring up hostility towards British Jews. In fact, 
they believe a deliberate campaign of misinformation was waged against them in an attempt 
to subvert the group from propagating the Islamic ruling about the state of Israel (The Daily 
Awaz, 07/03/1994). Even though this may be partially correct, HT‘s attempts to undermine 
the legitimacy of the Jewish state created a combative environment in which many Jewish 
students felt intimidated.  
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From a historical perspective, university authorities were totally unprepared to deal with the 
rise of HT on university campuses. As a result, the NUS set up a twenty-four-hour hotline 
for students to ring in with fears of intimidation on university campuses because of 
continued HT activity. HT was particularly identified as a source of concern by the NUS 
president, as he attested: ‗It is the single biggest extremist threat in the UK at the moment‘ 
(The Times, 31/10/1995). The results of calls in 1995 were published in an NUS report 
entitled ‗Campuswatch‘. This revealed that threats and harassment were twice more likely to 
be blamed on extreme Islamic groups than on ultra-right-wing organisations (The Times, 
31/10/1995). Furthermore, ‗there were more than 100 reports of distribution of offensive 
material by Islamic extremists, primarily Hizb ut-Tahrir, and 50 reports of offensive 
meetings, 47 threats of violence and 31 acts of physical intimidation or harassment‘ (The 
Guardian, 31/11/1995). In all, there were 271 complaints about Islamic extremists as 
opposed to ninety-one against the British National Party (BNP). The report boldly 
proclaimed that freedom of speech, though fundamental to campus life, did ‗not include the 
right to make propaganda which incites violence‘ (The Times Higher Education, 
16/08/1996). The question that needs to be posed here is did HT speeches intimidate, or 
incite violence against, Jewish students? From a legal perspective, intimidation and violence 
can be classified differently, as intimidation does not necessarily entail the use of physical 
force (Lumpkin, 1999). Verbal intimidation, for example, is often used without inflicting 
physical injury. More significantly, intimidation is a subjective act (Shields, 1999). Radical 
HT speeches that reject the legitimacy of Israel, for example, need to be seen from two sides. 
HT activists believe equating violence to their speeches ignores the intellectual nature of 
their talks and message. In contrast, Jewish students perceive such speeches as intimidating, 
as they contribute to a feeling of fear. Thus, there is no evidence to suggest that radical 
speeches attributed to HT resulted in acts of violence. After a relatively lengthy search, I was 
able to catalogue most of the campus speeches given by HT related to Jewish themes. 
Although, some of the speeches had anti-Semitic undertones, no violence could be attributed 
in the aftermath of such events to HT members. Even the charge of anti-Semitism is not 
definitively provable. Apart from a few leaflets, no radical speech was directly equated to 
anti-Semitism.  
 
7.2.2 Promoting Militancy 
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During the 1990s, it became common to describe HT campus activism as militant. BBC 2, 
for example, broadcasted a documentary about HT entitled: ‗Islam‘s Militant Tendency‘. 
Although militancy is often used to depict violent activism, it can refer to a person who 
engages in non-violent confrontation. In order to understand the relationship between HT 
radical speech and violence, I need to focus on more overt instances of violence attributed to 
HT. An article in The Guardian, for example, alleged HT had written an inflammatory 
leaflet sanctioning violent terrorism: ‗Do something to prove that on your shoulders there 
stands a head not a piece of cheese. Throw a stone, trigger a bomb, plant a mine, hijack a 
plane, and do not ask how‘ (The Guardian, 07/02/1994). Kassim mentioned his absolute 
disgust at such articles, as purporting false allegations from questionable sources; he strongly 
condemned the media for its partial coverage, which was unwilling to engage HT 
intellectually. The alleged HT leaflet was distributed outside Regents Park Mosque. More 
significantly, the printed allegations were not accredited to any published HT articles, 
diminishing the integrity of the accusations.  
 
HT militancy was placed under greater scrutiny after the fatal stabbing of Tundi Obanubi, an 
African student at Newham College. It was alleged that Bakri‘s speech, given days earlier, 
had stirred up militancy among the largely Muslim student population. Ed Hussain (2007) 
felt the incident was a direct result of HT infiltration into the college. Relating HT activism 
to this intentional act of violence is appealing to some, but there appears to be an underlying 
problem with any attempt to equate violence to an HT radical speech. Firstly, as Bakri 
suggested, the culprit responsible for this unlawful killing had no affiliation to HT. ‗I 
propagate Islam peacefully…so it is untrue. My members cannot do such a thing‘ (Bakri, 
interview). Indeed, Saeed Nur, the man charged with the murder, had a longstanding 
relationship with Jihadist organisations (Q News, 24/03/1995). His radicalisation into 
militancy had taken place over several years, and thus his act cannot be attributed to HT 
speech. Secondly, as mentioned Omar Bakri strongly denied these allegations, he even 
demanded that HT members cooperate with the authorities. As he said: ‗I have asked my 
people to help the police to find the killers because this was pure murder. In Islam this 
behaviour is really disgraceful‘ (Q News, 10/03/95).  
 
This incident once again underscores the need to work out the connection between violence 
and radical speech. The media has condemned HT for radicalizing Muslim youth, forcing the 
authorities to protect young people from radical influences. The key question that needs to 
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be considered here is how much influence does a speech have on an individual? The tragic 
death of Tundi Obanubi has been used to charge HT with culpability for actions committed 
by Saeed Nur (Hussain, 2007). Does this constitute a case for incited violence that HT is 
responsible for? In fact, it is usual for criminal courts to accept diminished responsibility for 
imitative violence caused by radical speech, because it is nearly impossible to establish in a 
court of law the existence of a provable link between speech and violence. Obviously, if the 
speech demands violence against a stated party, then a credible link can be drawn. Indeed, no 
HT member has been charged with inciting violence. Let us look at another example, at 
West Thames College.   
 
HT activity was not restricted to university campuses, as a race riot occurred at the West 
Thames Further Education College in Isleworth, which saw mass fighting between Sikh and 
Muslim students. The disturbances erupted after a Muslim student was attacked by a group 
of Sikh men. The following day saw around one hundred HT affiliates gather at the college 
to hold a demonstration. However, the police were warned of a pending disturbance, and 
fighting broke out between the respective sides, leading to twenty arrests. HT mobilised a 
further hundred affiliates to hold a protest outside Chiswick police station where some of the 
demonstrators were being held. Fifteen of the young HT affiliates who were arrested were 
brought before magistrates in Feltham on 10 January 1995 and charged with public order 
offences. They were remanded on bail until 24 January. However, the charges against the 
men were formally dropped due to a lack of evidence.  
 
This incident is actually very complex. HT had infiltrated the college, over a sustained 
period, taking over the Islamic society. This gave them a strong presence on campus. It was 
alleged HT had stimulated a renewed sense of religious association among Muslim students. 
This greatly undermined existing identity affiliations. For example, a sustained campaign 
was launched against ‗Asianism‘. Before HT gained access to college grounds, most Asian 
students coexisted together. Indeed, Asian students shared similar values, which united them 
culturally. However, religious violence was inevitable. HT instigated the revival of religious 
identities across the campus, which in effect led other religious groups to renew their 
identities. Thus, the rise of Sikh and Hindu fundamentalism were firmly rooted in 
reactionary trends against the emergence of radical Islam, as pioneered by HT. Clearly, HT 
activism increased the appeal of religion among Muslim students, but is this sufficient 
ground to claim they were responsible for a full-scale riot at West Thames College? In short, 
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it is difficult to equate this episode to HT, because they did not instigate the out break of 
violence. The root of the riot was attributed to a group of Sikh men who attacked a Muslim 
student.  
  
7.3 Departure of Omar Bakri (1996): Decline in HT radicalism? 
 
The mid-90s were a golden period in which HT grew beyond any predictable parameters. 
They were dubbed ‗Europe‘s fastest-growing Muslim group‘ by the national press (The 
Observer, 13/08/1995). This popularity allowed HT to enjoy a period of unrivalled success 
in the recruitment of young Muslims. According to Bakri (Ibid., 02/06/2004), the group was 
attracting a growing following among students across the country. This golden era came to a 
resounding end, however, after the departure of Omar Bakri. Very little is known about the 
rapid decline HT underwent during this rocky period. In particular, I was greatly surprised 
by the negative standpoint most HT members have towards Bakri. One member suggested he 
was responsible for infusing HT with militancy and extremist rhetoric. This raises a variety 
of very important questions: Did Bakri influence HT‘s militant disposition? If so, how did he 
contribute to it? What effect did his departure have on HT‘s radical disposition? In order to 
answer these key questions I will need to look at the followings issues: (1) the type of 
activism sanctioned by Bakri as the UK leader of HT; (2) the change in radical orientation 
HT underwent after he departed and formed Al-Muhajiroun; (3) the reforms HT mandated 
after Bakri left.  
   
7.3.1 Bakri’s HT 
 
Omar Bakri, even in exile, remains a highly controversial figure. He has caused countless 
media storms with his radical rhetoric and activism. In the aftermath of the London terror 
attacks, he boldly declared that the only people he blamed for the bombings were the British 
government and public. Naturally, he was seen as a preacher of hate by the media, and 
widely condemned by the Muslim community. Before his notoriety, he led the UK branch of 
HT for over a decade to unrivalled success. Trying to understand his legacy as UK leader is 
not an easy task, because HT has openly condemned his affiliation with the group. In reality, 
this negative backlash is politically orientated towards undermining his role as one of the 
groups most popular and influential leaders. So, to what degree did he influence HT? The 
best sources for assessing the role that Bakri played in turning ordinary students to activism 
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are the members themselves. In order to avoid the skewed views of current members who 
tend to condemn Bakri‘s involvement with HT, I interviewed several ex-HT members to 
discuss the roots of their activism and Bakri‘s influence. Firstly, the predominant opinion 
among the members suggested that he did not play a significant role in their joining HT. 
However, they all agreed Bakri was a key figure in reconstituting HT activism in the UK.
186
 
Bakri, as an experienced radical activist, changed the focus of party activism to local settings 
and realities. His goal was to engage in a radical, albeit non-violent, struggle with the state 
and to bring about an Islamic revolution. As Ferdous asserted, this agenda was at odds with 
traditional HT ideology. The aim of HT is to revive the Islamic way of life, and thus its 
primary focus is to re-establish the Islamic state somewhere in the Muslim world. More 
importantly, as Khalid explained, Bakri operated independently from HT‘s central 
leadership. This gave him free rein to carry out activism as he saw fit. 
 
Unlike the indigenous recruits, Bakri had a firm grounding in Islamic teachings, specialising 
in Islamic Jurisprudence. This enabled him to interpret the need for greater Islamic 
awareness, focusing on political Islam. Notably, he drew upon the experiences of the 
Muslims who migrated from Mecca to Abyssinia, which provided a source of guidance to 
Muslim activity in Britain. Bakri stated: ‗Muslims went to Abyssinia, and their focus of 
discussion was with society and the Abyssinian King‘ (Bakri, 02/06/2004). In contrast, 
British Muslims upon migration had become politically and culturally isolated, concerned 
only with economic survival. Yet, in Abyssinia Bakri proclaimed Muslims ‗started to talk 
about what is Islam‘ and they rejected those practices that contradicted Islam, as they ‗had 
their own personality and way of life‘ (Bakri, 02/06/2004). The comparison with Abyssinia 
was important for Omar Bakri because it provided a standard for organising activity in a 
non-Muslim country. As Bakri explained:  
 
…the Prophet consented to live in non-Muslim society, to 
speak out and to speak the truth wherever you are, and not to 
fear the consequences, commanding the good and forbidding 
the evil, wherever they are… so the message of Hizb ut-Tahrir 
is political, therefore when people accept Islam, intellectually 
and politically, then they start to know more and more about 
Islam and change their own personalities. (Bakri, 02/06/2004)   
 
                                                 
186
 I interviewed 34 ex-HT members about a range of issues related to their radicalisation and why they left HT. 
88.2 per cent of ex-members suggested that Omar Bakri had little influence in them joining the group, but 94.1 
per cent believed Bakri was a key figure in HT success and expansion during the 1990s. 
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As a result, Bakri immediately enacted a plan to culture British Muslims. One important 
issue emerges from this discussion. As Kahlid pointed out, ‗OBM (Omar Bakri) is a scholar, 
and as such he was our reference point‘. Bakri gave the indigenous members a way to 
integrate a wider array of Islamic principles into their daily lives. One ex-member looked 
back upon this introduction to Islamic ideas as a liberating experience, as he stated: ‗Bakri 
turned on the light‘. Thus, as the UK leader, Bakri certainly facilitated the militant 
disposition of HT in the UK.   
  
7.4 Omar Bakri post HT 
 
When the shocking announcement of Bakri‘s removal filtered down to the fraternity, it 
caused widespread dissention and discord. Most members struggled to digest the news of 
their leader‘s departure. Publicly Bakri declared that his resignation was influenced by HT‘s 
new policy, which was ‗very heavy in terms of administrative do‘s and don‘t do‘s‘, putting 
restrictions on dawah (Muslim News, 16/02/1996).
187
 Although, his resignation sent 
shockwaves across the UK fraternity, it only had small repercussions. Those loyal to Bakri 
left HT and joined him, as he established Al-Muhajiroun (ALM). The majority of members, 
however, remained faithful to HT ideology and denounced Bakri. The division caused deep 
resentment between the two ranks that became further inflamed when ALM became active. 
Highly agitated Jewish groups were concerned that HT‘s change of tactics, which coincided 
with the departure of Bakri, could herald a new wave of anti-Semitic activity on Britain‘s 
university campuses (The Observer, 02/02/1996). This hysteria was not found to be justified, 
as HT was simply attempting to recover from this shock and the reason for its departure from 
public activity was to implement wide-ranging reforms to its structure.  
 
7.4.1 New Wave of Public Activism 
 
Bakri, now leader of ALM, launched a new wave of bold public activity. Bakri intended to 
replicate university activity with his new group, using similar styles to those he had 
pioneered with HT. As he stated: ‗They will not be able to ban peace and human 
societies…If they do, it will only backfire...We will use other people‘ (The Guardian, 
23/08/1996). ALM was starting to gain significant ground on HT, who was still abstaining 
                                                 
187
 Bakri‘s departure was grounded in the introduction of new HT policy, which ended political struggle outside 
of the Muslim world. Bakri, however, refused to implement these demands, as they went against everything he 
believed and subsequently his membership was terminated.  
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from public activity, and thus Bakri felt it was time to hold a large public rally. Bakri was, 
however, totally unprepared for the media and government backlash that soon followed. The 
Algerian Foreign Ministry in particular urged the UK government to ban the rally, believing 
it would be ‗attended by the paymasters, the ideologists, the financiers and the zealots of 
international terrorism‘ (Weekly Telegraph, 04/09/1996). In a similar move, the Egyptian 
government threatened to break off diplomatic relations if the rally were to go ahead. Bakri 
was under growing pressure to cancel the rally because adverse publicity meant increased 
security costs at the London Arena, placing the venue outside the scope of his planned 
budget (Omar Bakri Mohammed., 02/06/2004). Although the rally was cancelled, Bakri 
claimed the event was a ‗success because of the publicity boosting the Islamic cause‘ (Ibid., 
02/06/2004). It is difficult to accept this view; for example, the capacity of the venue was 
14,000 but only 3,000 tickets had been sold, and the video messages from Islamic leaders 
worldwide had not turned up. The cancellation of the event actually averted a disaster in 
terms of finance and publicity.  
 
There was significant media focus on Bakri and ALM, which he used to condemn what he 
described as a deliberate attempt by the British government to ‗demonise Muslims‘ (Asian 
Age, 09/09/1996). In the aftermath of such controversy, it was somewhat surprising that 
ALM was given permission to hold a rally in Trafalgar Square a year later. Bakri decided to 
invite a host of Islamic scholars, jurists and activists to give evidence against Muslim 
governments that he deemed guilty of oppression against Islam (Ibid., 02/06/2004). The 
‗Rally against Oppression‘, as it was entitled by Bakri, was held without any major incident 
on 3 August 1997. ALM was, however, struggling to hold events as local councils continued 
to ban their activities. ALM, for example, acting under the guise ‗The Society of Converts to 
Islam‘, booked the Southall Community Centre to hold a rally against Israel. The event was 
subsequently cancelled as it breached rules regarding the incitement of religious and racial 
hatred. According to Suleiman Keeler, ALM member and organiser of the rally:  
 
If some people misinterpret our intentions as violent then that 
is not our fault. We want people to boycott Jewish businesses, 
not talk to Jews, but we do not instruct followers to physically 
attack Jews. Just because the subject matter is a little bit hot it 
does not mean this event is not going to be a fun day. It is for 
all the family and there will be book and clothes stalls and a 
series of lectures. If it is banned I will be annoyed but we will 
find somewhere else to stage it. (Southall Gazette, 17/10/1997)  
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Following the banning of the meeting, ALM staged a highly controversial protest outside 
Ealing Town Hall. The protesters displayed banners and slogans such as: ‗The hour will 
never come until the Muslims fight the Jews and kill them‘ (Ealing and Acton Gazette, 
24/10/1997). Unperturbed, ALM continued to hold a variety of events and activities across 
the country, such as: ‗Drink and Drugs, Public Enemy No. 1‘. As a result, the focus on 
public activity allowed ALM to increase their national profile.  
 
7.4.2 Tottenham Ayatollah 
 
Bakri was gaining noticeable media coverage, and, as a result, he agreed to participate in a 
Channel 4 documentary (1997). The ‗Tottenham Ayatollah‘ was a documentary about a year 
in the life of Omar Bakri. When Bakri discovered the nature of the programme, he 
immediately contacted the press to lodge a complaint about the content of the broadcast. He 
was particularly disgruntled about the way in which the research was conducted and, in a 
letter to the producers, he threatened to sue the filmmakers and Channel 4 (Ibid., 
02/06/2004). According to Abdul Haq (ALM member), ‗the programme was a vicious attack 
on Islam and the Sheikh…it distorted the truth, but what do you expect from the Kufr [non-
Muslims]?‘ Similarly, Makbool Javaid (ALM member) suggested ‗the general thrust of the 
programme was the demonisation of Omar Bakri, and not the representation of his Islamic 
principles and ideology, as he was led to believe‘ (Asian Age, 10/04/1997). The broadcast 
had raised a number of real concerns regarding Bakri‘s rhetoric and activities. In particular, 
his views concerning women, homosexuality and Western society were brought under 
scrutiny. Homosexuality, for instance, was publicly condemned by Bakri as a perversion and 
immoral act. Despite grounding these speeches within the framework of religious scripture, 
they still appear to be motivated by hate and dislike. Moreover, these public declarations 
created a ‗threatening‘ and ‗intimidating‘ atmosphere in which homophobia was encouraged 
and endorsed (Leigh 2010, p. 377).    
 
7.4.3 Support of Terrorism and Jihad 
 
After Bakri was able to distance himself from HT, he promptly sought to propagate more 
extremist views. Jihad, for example, was reinterpreted as ‗Fard al-Kafiayh [individual duty]‘ 
(Ibid., 02/06/2004). Using this somewhat literal interpretation he advocated that Muslims 
should seek military training and fight jihad in those areas under occupation. The fallout of 
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his views, as broadcasted on the television documentary, ‗Tottenham Ayatollah,‘ resulted in 
the Crawley Council cancelling the lease on a hut rented by ALM. It was alleged that it was 
being used as a ‗training camp to mould militants into Islamic warriors‘ (Crawley Observer, 
16/04/1997). Although Bakri denied any involvement in organising jihad training camps in 
Britain, it was clear that some volunteers from ALM were leaving to fight in Chechnya. As 
Bakri confirmed: 
 
The military wing of the IIF is run by Osama bin Laden. 
Volunteers from Britain are travelling abroad to join camps run 
by the IIF and other organisations. Once they are there they 
receive military training or take part in Jihad. Last week we 
sent 38 people to Chechnya. Our volunteers are not terrorists. 
They are not targeting civilians and they do not target people in 
Britain. (The Sunday Telegraph, 07/11/1999)  
 
Further concerns were raised regarding fundraising for terrorist activities. Bakri insisted that 
money raised by ALM to support militants in the Middle East was intended for humanitarian 
relief and not intended to purchase weapons. He was unwilling, however, to guarantee said 
money would not end up in the hands of terrorists (Enfield Advertiser, 03/12/1997). It was 
reported, however, that Bakri was a member of a committee that regularly held meetings to 
consider appeals for money. Bakri admitted that the committee channelled funds for jihad 
and often received requests from groups linked to Bin Laden (Ibid., 02/06/2004). 
 
In early 2000 Bakri became embroiled in a local incident that soon escalated to national 
prominence. A distraught Muslim family from Crawley contacted the local authorities as it 
emerged that their son, Omar Kyam, had absconded to Pakistan to become a ‗holy warrior‘ 
after being recruited by members of ALM. The family of Omar Kyam demanded ALM 
provide information on the disappearance of their son, placing mounting pressure on the 
organisation. Consequently, Bakri was forced to make a statement to the national press, in 
which he stated:     
 
I share the worry of these families, but if my child wanted to go 
and fight for a noble jihad then I would encourage them. I have 
received many complaints from families in Crawley and other 
places but I tell them it is a Muslim‘s duty to have military 
training when they reach puberty. These boys go not because 
of what I tell them to do, or what their mother and fathers say, 
but as an obligation to God. (The Times, 22/01/00).  
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Although ALM tried to deny their involvement with Omar Kyam‘s disappearance, it was 
apparent he spent time with the organisation. More importantly, it was revealed ALM had 
been concentrating on university campuses in an effort to encourage young students to 
engage in jihad in countries abroad like Kosovo, Kashmir and Chechnya. This was not a 
surprising revelation, as Bakri explained: ‗Islam demand[s] you struggle…I form Al-
Muhajiroun for this, so I make two networks. There was [the] Dawah network and [the] 
Jihad network‘ (Ibid., 02/06/2004). The Dawah network, as Bakri described it, would attract 
young students to ALM from Britain‘s university campuses, and from there students would 
be enticed into jihad.    
 
Bakri (Ibid., 02/06/2004) proudly proclaimed that his group had successfully sent ‗several 
hundred British Muslims‘ abroad to receive training and to fight jihad. In the aftermath of 
the 11 September terror attacks, however, ALM adjusted their combative style. In order to 
appease increasing governmental concerns about the link between terrorism and ALM, Bakri 
maintained Muslims were restricted by ‗a covenant of security‘ (Ibid., 02/06/2004). In spite 
of this, growing pressure forced Bakri to leave the UK in 2005 in an effort to avoid arrest 
under obscure treason laws. While in exile, Bakri retracted the covenant of security. He cited 
two key reasons: Firstly, Bakri declared that the banning of Islamic groups and the 
unwarranted detention of Muslims under newly-formed anti-terror legislation violated the 
covenant. Secondly, he believed that the MCB had been recruited to spy on the Muslim 
community, which would bring harm to Muslims (Jay, ALM member, 2007). After he was 
contacted by UK members, however, he claimed the ‗covenant was back on‘, as his 
judgments concerning the activities of the British government did not come to fruition.        
 
7.5 HT Post-9/11 
 
The 11 September 2001 terror attacks redefined the approach of HT in Britain. In the 
immediate aftermath of the attacks, the government increased political pressure on radical 
Islamist groups it accused of having links to terrorist organisations. More significantly, the 
government introduced stringent anti-terrorism legislation. As a result, HT suspended all 
public activity and the leadership held several meetings to discuss events post 9/11. 
According to Fahim (member), ‗the events of 9/11 caught us by surprise, that‘s why we 
suspended activity…it was a difficult period and we didn‘t know how the government would 
react‘. In contrast to the Muslim community, whose response to the attacks was mixed, the 
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great majority of HT members condemned the attacks. According to Ameer (member, 2001), 
‗killing innocent civilians is not jihad‘. Similarly, Aminur (member, 2001) stated: ‗As a 
Muslim, and as a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir, I totally condemn the attacks…9/11 was haram 
[forbidden]‘. Also, I personally recall several meetings in which senior members explained 
how such attacks were ‗un-Islamic‘ and ‗totally condemned‘. I was somewhat surprised that 
even beyond the shadow of the leadership, rank and file members still denounced the attacks. 
Not surprisingly, some members alleged that the event was staged: a ‗US conspiracy‘, but 
they were a very small minority.  
 
Despite the great majority of its members condemning the 11 September attacks, some 
political commentators have described the group as ‗soft Jihadists‘ (Crandall 2008, p. 256). 
The events of 9/11 precipitated a focus on Islamist groups who preached and engaged in 
violence. In response, Imran Waheed stated: ‗The party considers violence or armed struggle 
against the regime a violation of the Islamic Sharia‘ (World Press, 12/09/2005). This is 
supported by a restricted Home Office document that was released to HT under the Freedom 
of Information Act: ‗Hizb ut-Tahrir is an independent political party that is active in many 
countries across the world…It considers violence or armed struggle against the regime, as a 
method to re-establish the Islamic State, a violation of the Islamic Shariah‘ (HT website, 
extracted 03/10/2005). It is clear HT does not advocate violence; instead it seeks to create 
social and political change through peaceful activism.  
 
7.5.1 Proscribing HT: Global Crackdown 
 
Since the start of the War on Terror, HT has been forced to counter allegations of supporting 
terrorism. Imran Waheed, HT media spokesman in the UK, declared that the movement had 
been engaged in non-violent political activity and since its inception had ‗never accepted any 
form of armed struggle or killing of civilians‘ despite the killing of party members. In recent 
years, HT has faced growing calls for its prohibition, making it essential to provide an 
overview of this debate from various perspectives.
188
   
 
In February 2003, the Russian Supreme Court put HT on a list of banned terrorist 
organisations. A month before, HT was outlawed in Germany, under newly-formed 
legislation, for going ‗against the concept of international understanding‘ (Radio Free 
                                                 
188
 In order to provide greater contextual perspective, I have looked at various media reports, the views of 
politicians and governments, internal HT sources and the views of ordinary HT members.   
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Europe, 26/10/2004). HT gained notoriety in Germany, after organising a conference against 
the pending war in Iraq at Berlin‘s Technical University. The conference was also attended 
by several members of the extreme right-wing National German Party (NPD). The meeting 
provoked outrage in the press against ‗Islamists and neo-Nazis‘ uniting to deliver anti-
Semitic propaganda (Reuters, 15/01/2003). HT‘s representative in Germany, Shaker Aasim, 
rejected these accusations:  
 
We, the members of Hizb ut-Tahrir, are not anti-Semitic…We 
consequently reject that [accusation]. We do not call to kill 
Jews. Our call is addressed to the Muslim people to defend 
themselves against the Zionist aggression in Palestine. And 
they have the right to do so. (Taken from www.islamic-
state.org/leaflets/november0402.htm, 04/11/2002)  
 
Interestingly, upon being arrested, on 15 January 2003, Aasim asked the police chief ‗why 
we (HT) were banned in Germany, although in other European countries, like Great Britain, 
where we are much more active and stronger, no one gives us a second thought‘ (Radio Free 
Europe, 26/10/2004). The German official responded by saying, ‗we banned you in Germany 
so that what is happening in England doesn‘t happen here‘ (Radio Free Europe, 26/10/2004). 
Uwe Halbach suggested that ‗in Great Britain, Hizb ut-Tahrir is still not banned and has a 
surprisingly strong field of action – a lot stronger agenda than in Germany…in fact, in 
Germany, it all came as a surprise‘ (Radio Free Europe, 26/10/2004). Subsequently, in a 
similar move, the Danish and Dutch governments also authorised the prohibition of HT. This 
has not perturbed the group, as they remain active across Europe. In the United States, 
conservative politicians have been calling for increased pressure on members of HT. A 
report by the conservative Heritage Foundation think-tank called HT ‗an emerging threat to 
American interests in Central and South Asia and the Middle East‘ (Radio Free Europe, 
26/10/2004). President Karimov of Uzbekistan echoed a similar view, when he criticised 
what he described as the paradox that ‗Hizb-ut-Tahrir is banned in Germany but is free to 
run its international headquarters in London‘ (Radio Free Europe, 26/08/2004). Without any 
credible evidence of violent intent, however, it is questionable why HT has been subject to 
such harsh treatment, especially since their presence in these European countries is limited. 
The bans in Europe therefore appear to be a pre-emptive measure to prevent the progress of 
HT.   
 
7.5.2 The Proposal to Ban HT in Britain  
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The horrific terror attacks on London‘s public transport system placed immense pressure on 
HT. After 9/11, however, HT‘s leadership appeared to be undergoing a genuine transition 
towards a more moderate and mainstream approach. The UK leadership, led by Jalauddin 
Patel, made a concerted effort to modernise the party ideology, which they saw as outmoded. 
Imran Waheed, for example, tried to re-conceptualise the goal of HT within a Western 
ideological framework. As he commented: ‗Our aim is to re-establish the Islamic Caliphate 
in the Muslim world. Our vision of the Islamic Caliphate is one of an independent state with 
an elected and accountable leader, an independent judiciary, political parties, the rule of law 
and equal rights for minority groups‘ (Parajpan 2005, interview with Imran Waheed). The 
move towards a more moderate position has been met with stern resistance from some 
members, who believe the new party image is a clear sign of its cultural and ideological 
decline. According to one member, ‗The Hizb has lost its identity and message…it‘s been 
watered down by JP [Jalaudin Patel], Imran Waheed and Abdul Wahid to make it palatable 
to the Kufr, so they don‘t ban us‘.189 This was somewhat evident in HT‘s response to the 
Danish cartoon controversy in which they called for a peaceful demonstration and better 
education initiatives. More surprisingly, they publicly condemned the acts of Islamist 
groups, like ALM, for inciting hatred and violent behaviour. The leadership felt it was 
crucial to gain some distance from Omar Bakri, as his extreme rhetoric post 9/11 was being 
attributed to the party even though his affiliation ended in 1996.  
 
In the aftermath of the London terror attacks, HT issued a public denunciation of the 
bombings and reiterated its commitment to peaceful activism. The entire fraternity was 
noticeably outraged at the atrocity, and it was clear they condemned the killing of innocent 
civilians under any circumstances. Following the attacks, the party sought to calm the 
situation, believing ordinary Muslims might be targeted for retribution. Imran Waheed, for 
example, explained in the wake of the 7 July London bombings that it is irresponsible ‗to 
hold the Muslim community entirely responsible for the actions of a few…will do little for 
community relations‘ (BBC website, 19/07/2005). He explained that mosques were not 
succeeding in channelling the frustration of young Muslims and urged greater dialogue 
between opposing viewpoints. In the media, however, HT were being linked to Omar Bakri 
and his militant fringe group Al-Muhajiroun. HT was portrayed as a militant organisation 
because of its perceived links to ALM. The historical connection with Bakri was proving to 
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 The member did not want his name mentioned for fear of the HT leadership. 
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be very destructive, as his inflammatory rhetoric was being linked in the press to HT. Omar 
Brookes, a spokesman of the newly-formed Al-Ghurabaa, refused to condemn the July 7 
attacks. As he explained: ‗What I would say about those who do suicide operations or 
martyrdom operations is they‘re completely praiseworthy…I have no allegiance to the 
Queen whatsoever or to British society; in fact if I see mujahideen attack the UK I am 
always standing with the Muslims, never against the Muslims‘ (The Guardian, 06/08/2005). 
 
Within this context, it is difficult to understand the proposal to place HT on the Home 
Office‘s list of proscribed groups. According to one member, ‗the Muslim rulers have placed 
considerable pressure on Western governments to have the organisation banned‘, because of 
its demands for political change in their countries. This view is supported by reports that 
Pervez Musharraf, the former president of Pakistan, urged Tony Blair to ban HT on the 
grounds that it ‗brainwashes people, and that leads to violent acts‘ (The Guardian, 
06/08/2005). More recently, David Cameron, the Conservative Party leader, tried to gain 
political mileage from this issue by asking newly-appointed Prime Minister Gordon Brown, 
in his first question-time, why HT had not been banned. Cameron insisted HT were 
indoctrinating young Muslims with an ideology of hatred but John Reid, former home 
secretary, stated that his department had examined the case of HT on two separate occasions 
and there was not sufficient evidence to proscribe the party under British law. Clearly, HT is 
not involved in committing acts of violence, nor does it provide support for and make 
statements that glorify violence. Craig Murray, the former British ambassador to Uzbekistan, 
declared that HT ‗is a completely non-violent organisation‘ (Hizb ut-Tahrir Media 
Information Pack, p. 5). One might disagree with the views of HT, but unless they espouse 
violence it is unlikely a ban will occur. Thus, on the basis of available evidence and despite 
HT being banned in other countries, there appears no clear justification yet for a ban in the 
UK.     
   
7.6 Conclusion 
 
To date, as my research verifies, I do not know of a single prosecution or case brought 
against any member of HT for incitement to violence. Not a single act of violence has been 
proved against a member of HT in this country. However, this has nothing to do with radical 
propaganda. HT has been denounced for its radical speech, but again it is difficult to equate 
this speech to violence. HT strongly argues that it does not adopt or advocate violence. Its 
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history of activism in the UK in many ways attests to this claim. According to International 
Crisis Group, HT advocates: ‗the restoration of the Islamic caliphate. It differs from jihadi 
groups that share this objective in abstaining from violent activity (International Crisis 
Group, 02/03/2005). In fact, I have not encountered any convincing evidence that HT 
advocates violence. Apart from HT activism, I looked at key events in the organisation‘s 
history. In particular, at the height of their success, they imploded in catastrophic fashion. 
HT suffered two significant splits that saw Omar Bakri and Farid Kassim, the founding 
members of the UK branch, leave the group. Consequently, HT re-emerged after its self-
imposed isolation with a wave of activism and recruitment in an attempt to rebuild the 
organisation.  
 
It might be relatively clear that HT does not participate in overt violence, but they have been 
accused of being a ‗gateway‘ organisation to violence. This concern was highlighted in a 
recent speech by David Cameron, at the Munich Security Conference (2011). The Prime 
Minister talked at length about extremist ideology, he identified Islamic radicals who ‗may 
reject violence‘ (number10.gov.uk 5/02/2011). As he explained:   
 
As evidence emerges about the backgrounds of those convicted 
of terrorist offences, it is clear that many of them were initially 
influenced by what some have called ‗non-violent extremists‘, 
and they then took those radical beliefs to the next level by 
embracing violence…So first, instead of ignoring this 
extremist ideology, we – as governments and as societies – 
have got to confront it, in all its forms. And second, instead of 
encouraging people to live apart, we need a clear sense of 
shared national identity that is open to everyone 
(number10.gov.uk 5/02/2011).  
 
In other words, HT might not be openly implicated in the quest for Jihad, but they may 
facilitate and expedite the trajectory of young Muslims into Islamic militancy. This claim of 
‗conveyor belt‘ radicalisation appears to be somewhat merited. A by-product of HT activism 
has been increased radicalism. It is common for young Muslims to start with HT, becoming 
indoctrinated and radicalised, but often some young Muslims feel HT is not doing enough. 
As one ex-HT activist stated: ‗HT talks a good game but they don‘t do anything…Muslims 
are being killed and sisters are being raped and HT say wait for the Kilahah, this is 
rubbish…the answer is simple, its jihad‘. This feeling is quite common, but it does illustrate 
that most young Muslims who are inclined to more militant ideology see HT as a non-violent 
and passive organisation. However, the culturing process within HT offers young Muslims 
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access to radical ideology, which is very similar to the religious and political principles of 
Jihadist groups. The HT construction of radical identities and frameworks of political Islam 
produce carbon copies of radicalised personalities. Also, HT introduces young Muslims to 
diverse networks with more militant actors and groups, exposing them to the ideology of 
jihadists. However, further research is required to verify this claim, and my research has not 
been focused towards ex-members and militant groups.
190
 Therefore, it is not surprising to 
see the group still under the spotlight, despite the fact HT emerged from Bakri‘s departure as 
a more moderate entity. However, the UK branch openly and publicly denounces terrorism 
and condemns the actions of Osama Bin Laden. Yet, its role and impact in radicalising 
young Muslims is still not clear. In the final chapter, I try to explain this issue in greater 
detail, bringing all my findings together.   
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 For more information refer to Wali, F. (forthcoming) ‗Post-radicalisation Pathways: What happens when 
young Muslims leave Militant Islam?‘  
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Chapter Eight: 
Conclusion – Demystifying the Schemata of HT Radicalisation 
 
Recent debates concerning young people and radicalisation have generated some interesting 
insights, but there is considerable disagreement over the exact nature of radicalisation. 
Speaking broadly, a scholarly consensus on radicalisation is unlikely since it is a highly 
complex phenomenon that has a wide range of causal factors (Borum, 2004; Silber and 
Bhatt, 2007). Moreover, radicalisation is constantly moving forward into new areas of 
discussion and debate. The coalition invasion of Iraq, for example, instigated widespread 
debate about Britain‘s foreign policy. In particular, military occupation of Muslim countries 
and real or perceived collaboration with despotic Muslim regimes tend to be treated as causal 
factors for radicalisation by many British Muslims (Pape, 2006). The alleged relationship or 
overlap between foreign policy and radicalisation is often cited in testimonies of violent 
radicals. Mohammed Bouyeri, the murderer of Theo van Gogh, for example, expressed his 
deep anger with Western foreign policies in a note which he stabbed with a knife to the body 
of van Gogh (Jansen, 2005). Although the government explicitly rejects any connection, HT 
claims Muslim anger towards the West is born out of its illegal war in Muslim lands. As 
Imran Waheed, spokesman for HT, stated:  
 
‗When Westerners get killed, the world cries. But if Muslims 
get killed in Iraq or Afghanistan, it‘s the smallest of news. I 
will condemn what happened in London only after there is the 
promise from Western leaders to condemn what they have 
done in Fallujah and other parts of Iraq and in Afghanistan‘ 
(New York Times, 10/07/2005).  
 
In the course of my research, I have spoken to several young Muslims who voiced similar 
concerns regarding British and US foreign policy, which they claimed acted as a trigger for 
violent and extremist behaviour. The government has a tendency to divorce foreign policy 
from extremism, which is rather naïve, but the issues or contexts that lie behind HT 
radicalisation cannot be reduced solely to foreign policy. In fact, foreign policy did not 
feature in any of the HT narratives I encountered. So, if foreign policy was not identified as a 
contributing factor, then what attracts some young people to HT? In the foregoing chapters, I 
have taken a glimpse into the radicalisation process, but now these diverse strands need to be 
tied together to produce a relatively complete picture of HT radicalism. This means trying to 
highlight my findings and integrate them into the wider debates about radicalisation. 
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In order to go beyond abstract theory, I will need to use my empirical findings to provide an 
answer to why some British Muslims join HT. I have used many diverse strategies to gather 
the required data—such as interviews, surveys, focus groups, participant observations, and 
so on—to ensure that my theories are based on empirical findings. In my introduction, I 
noted the lack of attention paid to HT members and their backgrounds; a more recent review 
has seen markedly more focus on HT (Abbas et al., 2007; Husain, 2007; Lewis, 2008). Even 
though these noteworthy texts emphasise some interesting developmental issues, they do not 
claim to provide a clear picture of HT radicalisation. Indeed, as I discovered through the 
course of my study, any scrutiny of HT radicalisation based on single variables—such as 
ethnicity, class, or religion—fails to fully explain the causes of radicalisation. The members I 
observed experienced considerable disorder throughout their life-cycle experiences, making 
it vital to identify the specific social contextual factors they were exposed to and embedded 
within. Thus, radicalisation must be measured within a particular social reality, because the 
relationship between members‘ experiences and their environments are mutually shaping. 
Before I sketch out the distinctive features of HT radicalisation, it is first essential to explore 
the relationship between the social bases of HT membership and radicalisation. A key reason 
for looking at the social base first, I believe, is that it will allow me to identify and interpret 
commonalities between HT members, thereby providing a backdrop to radicalisation. HT 
radicalisation, therefore, has to be placed within a social and cultural context, because this 
will allow me to single out the types of Muslims who are most susceptible to joining the 
organisation.  
 
8.1 Profiling HT Membership: Young Middle-class Asians 
 
Through undertaking my study, I have gained considerable insight into the inner realities of 
HT, therefore it seems logical to first identify the social makeup of the fraternity. As I will 
show, the UK branch of HT is mainly composed of a homogenous group of young middle-
class Asians. A number of theories have surfaced about HT in recent years, most of which 
are restricted by a failure to address adequately the group‘s social base. This is particularly 
significant, since HT radicalisation discourses that neglect social structures are unable to 
provide a picture of the phenomenon. Some social theorists, for example, believe the 
movement‘s growth among young people is rooted in frustration at ―the inaction of 
traditional authority in their communities‖ (Abbas et al., 2007, p. 157). This claim cannot be 
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properly substantiated, as my findings indicate, because HT members do not emerge from 
traditional Muslim communities nor are they aligned economically to them. The debate 
about HT radicalisation has been primarily confined to ―causes,‖ revealing a significant gap 
in such an approach, since it ignores the analytical importance of the social base. The social 
structure of HT membership has emerged from similar social experiences and backgrounds, 
facilitating behaviour and identity changes. In other words, social structures shape members‘ 
everyday lives, making it a fundamental aspect of HT radicalisation. Structural forces like 
religion, class, and ethnicity have been treated as explanatory factors. However, simplifying 
the concept of identity-formation into these restrictive parameters does not necessarily 
explain the emergence of generic HT member profiles.  
 
In Chapter Six, I looked at the social structure of HT membership. A generally surprising 
characteristic and trait of HT membership, which I singled out in my research, was its 
success in mobilising young middle-class South Asian Muslims behind a political ideology 
and cause.
191
 In fact, a recurring feature of HT recruitment is the group‘s ability to attract 
homogenous clusters of young people from parallel social worlds. As far as the study was 
concerned, it seemed apparent at an early stage in my research that HT members were 
typically drawn from a specific section of the Muslim community: young middle-class 
Asians. This identity framework provides a ‗category of social significance,‘ for belonging 
to a specific social class and ethnic group enables the members to define their distinctiveness 
in terms of comparisons with other Muslim sub-groups (Hitch, 1983, p. 118). While these 
social structures overlap, in a general sense, it becomes necessary to emphasise the 
homogenous properties of HT membership.       
 
Contemporary theorists are excessively preoccupied with the social conditions of working-
class Muslims, creating a tendency to over-exaggerate a link with radicalisation. 
Traditionally, the political affiliation of the working classes in Britain was often equated 
with economic disadvantage (Cannadine, 1999). Undoubtedly, the social reality of the 
Muslim working classes is bound to be affected by unemployment and poverty, as the 
statistical data verifies (Abbas 2005, p. 9). Beyond the economic dimension, however, there 
                                                 
191
 HT‘s capacity to attract this demographic to its ranks was something novel, especially during the 1990s and 
in a British context. This is because most young people are seen to be politically inactive and apathetic (Parkin 
1968, p. 140). As Abrams and Little (1963, p. 77) discovered, most young people in Britain ‗leave school 
ignorant of the workings of the political system…90 per cent find politics a bore…Sixty per cent believe it will 
make little or no difference to their lives which party is in power‘. Although, these finding are somewhat dated, 
more recent reports suggest little has changed. In the 2010 General election more than half of 18- to 24-year-
olds were not registered to vote (UK Electoral Commission, 20/05/2010). 
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are wider issues directly impacting working-class Muslims. They are firmly embedded, for 
example, within ethnic and religious cleavages which have been exported from their 
countries of origin. Significant attention has been paid to these subgroups. In contrast, little 
focus has been directed to the relatively small minority of middle-class Muslims. In relation 
to HT, social class is often ignored as membership is characteristically portrayed within a 
working-class paradigm or equated with ‗low social class position‘ (Abbas et al., 2007, p. 
151). In spite of that, once I was able to sketch out a general profile of HT membership, it 
became clear its recruits were predominately drawn from the ranks of the middle class. 
Therefore, within an HT context, equating radicalisation to economic deprivation is 
misplaced.   
 
On the whole, as mentioned, the overwhelming majority of studies dedicated to a better 
understanding of Muslims in Britain have focused primarily on working-class Muslims. This 
void in the research meant I could not readily draw upon studies about the Muslim 
community in Britain, since these are orientated towards working-class communities. As a 
result, I had to rely heavily upon my own findings in order to identify the differences 
between the two disparate classes. Identifying these differences became important, as it 
would provide insight into why middle-class Muslims appear more inclined toward HT. To 
start with, a large number of HT members were born into middle-class status. This clearly 
indicates HT members grew up within a social world qualitatively different from that of 
working-class Muslims. The parents of HT members, for example, did not come to this 
country in response to the manual labour shortage. Instead, the vast majority of HT parents 
arrived in this country as professionals—such as doctors, engineers, accountants and so on—
giving their progeny an array of advantages. Social class, therefore, was an important factor 
in the way members narrated their life experiences and made sense of their identities. The 
importance of the social base means that I have to understand social class in the context of 
time and place; for instance, how a member‘s upbringing gave them a sense of who they 
were and where they came from. So, it was not surprising to hear members talk about where 
their parents were located in the social hierarchy, making class a very important feature of 
HT identity. 
 
Unfortunately, most academic research today tends to pigeonhole ―Muslim youth‖ into a 
single generic category, shaped strictly by their shared religious traditions. Drawing parallels 
between working-class and middle-class Muslims ignores the gap in perceptions of social 
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identities that have emerged from these two very diverse social worlds. In previous chapters, 
I suggested that membership in HT could be interpreted as a partial response to its subculture 
status. Young (1999, p. 89) believes subcultures tend to provide disconnected youths with 
joint solutions ‗to collectively experienced problems‘. Working-class Asians, for example, 
emerge from sharply contrasting experiences, which can prompt involvement with gangs 
(Van Gemert, 2008). Cutting through the bleak social and economic realities of working-
class Muslims reveals a unique culture. Firstly, within middle-class HT households, 
education was seen as an essential commodity. As one member explained, ‗the wages of 
graduates (university) have skyrocketed since the 70s and 80s…this means education 
guarantees economic success‘. Meanwhile, a high percentage of working-class Muslims 
have no formal qualifications, restricting their social status and mobility to the bottom of the 
economic hierarchy.
192
 A common problem among working-class Muslims is the 
prioritisation of employment at the expense of education, reflecting negative economic 
conditions and realities. As Lareau (2003) noted, working-class parents tend to navigate 
through parenting by adopting dysfunctional child-rearing procedures, as they are usually 
forced to contend with adverse social and economic hardships. In contrast, she argued that 
middle-class parents engage in ‗concerted cultivation‘ (Lareau 2003, p. 2). HT parents, for 
instance, intensely supervised their children‘s academic work and pushed them towards 
after-school leisure activities.
193
      
 
This brings us back to the primary issue: the culture gap between working- and middle-class 
Muslims. The early generations of working-class Muslims found it difficult to build class 
solidarity with their white counterparts, which led many to retreat into their ethnic cultures 
(Abbas, 2004). As a result, working-class Muslim communities emerged across the country, 
forming in economically deprived urban centres. In contrast, HT families consciously 
shunned these communities in favour of more suburbanised settings, which meant living 
among the majority white populace. These distinct settings, or social worlds, meant HT 
members grew up disconnected from their ethnicity and community. Indeed, most members 
cited encountering Muslims and Asians for the first time at university. Consequently, HT 
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 It has been estimated one-third of Muslims have no formal qualifications in the UK (Choudhury, 2004).  
193
 Despite these middle class family socialisation techniques, the respondents developed susceptibility to 
radicalisation. A recurring theme that constantly emerged in the narratives of HT activists concerned ‗relative 
deprivation‘. It was clear that significant social problems were encountered during adolescents, especially when 
navigating through different social settings. As Parkin (198, p. 141) states, ‗certain experiences during the most 
formative period of life tend to be of decisive effect on the development of the individual‘s political attitudes‘. 
Given this social reality, it seems that most of my respondent‘s became radicalised in response to the acute 
experiences of being deprived social acceptance. In fact, the respondent‘s I spoke to all echoed similar 
experiences of feeling rejected and excluded from community and society, creating a deep sense of discontent.    
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members never developed a proclivity towards their ethnic culture; instead they seemed 
more inclined towards the majority host culture. This symbolic disassociation with their 
ethnic origins was partly directed by their parents‘ own attitudes towards their culture. In 
fact, most HT parents themselves became wrapped up by the host culture. Given this secular 
orientation, it is not surprising that minimal space was carved out for their children‘s 
religious heritage and development. In some respects, the first generation of working-class 
Muslims embodied a traditionalist view towards their ethnicity and religion, which they tried 
to transmit to their offspring. Ironically, both working- and middle-class parents have 
struggled to transmit their ethnic values to their children. However, in the early stages of 
development, middle-class parents found it easier to pass on secular attitudes to their 
children. Thus, HT members emerged from non-ethnically orientated social worlds, while 
most working-class Muslims are brought up within ethnically centred communities.          
 
Despite emerging from two diverse social worlds, there are still some commonalities 
between these two groups. In particular, both sets of Muslim youths experienced racism. As 
Abdul quite rightly pointed out, ‗racism is not restricted by class‘. However, the racism 
directed towards HT members during their early childhood is slightly more pronounced. 
Second-generation working-class Muslims, for example, grew up in segregated 
communities. This to a degree restricted their interaction with white people, and thus 
reduced adverse experiences of racism. As several social theorists point out, racism towards 
minorities usually takes place within a certain space or setting wherein the white majority is 
more prominent (Miles and Brown, 2003). HT members, for instance, found themselves 
exposed to social settings in which they were often the only Asian students. By locating 
these marginalised spaces, it is easier to visualise the consequences of class differences 
between the two different classes. In other words, HT pathologies were constructed within 
fixed spaces. In their home lives, members were socialised within a middle-class tradition, 
which developed identities that correlated with social status. Also, members generally 
benefited from better and prolonged schooling, allowing them to either maintain their class 
status or gain more upward mobility. Therefore, I noticed through my interviews and 
ethnographic observations that HT members carved out a middle-class identity in contrast to 
the dominant working-class identity of most British Muslims. This created a natural class 
boundary, which to some extent explains why the HT struggles to recruit working-class 
Asians.  
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Many academics within contemporary British society have suggested that class boundaries 
play a limited role in society (Cannadine, 1999). This may be the case for society itself, but 
class identification amongst HT members is quite visible and very important. This was rather 
aptly pointed out by a working-class opponent of HT, whom I met in East London: ‗They 
[HT] can‘t appreciate the reality of being working class because they‘re on the other side of 
the economic spectrum‘ (Mohammed Khan, 28). Thus, HT membership, which is not 
exceptionally large, is largely based on individuals with a common middle-class background. 
This means they are largely unaware of the socio-economic realities of working-class 
Muslims. Even though HT has managed to recruit a small segment of working-class 
Muslims, they are still considered outsiders or looked down upon. As Yusuf, an ex-HT 
activist, explained: ‗A postman, like myself, would never be given the chance to do talks 
because that would distort the image of HT‘. This provides some insight into the middle-
class culture at play within HT. In bringing into play the issue of class, I found markedly 
different cultural patterns between HT members and their working-class counterparts. These 
different strains, at least partly, relate to personal experiences, and thus account for negative 
HT attitudes towards working-class Muslims. In other words, HT members are generally 
unable to recruit from the ranks of the working classes, because they are not conscious of the 
social contexts from which young working-class Muslims emerge and are embedded within. 
 
In the description of a typical HT member, age seems to be a powerful component. The 
trajectory of HT members, as depicted in Chapter Four, has shown that age underpins their 
identity choices. My data revealed most HT activists were recruited during their youth 
(between the ages of 16 and 21), which is not surprising since young people are more 
receptive and susceptible to radical ideas. Youth, consequently, is a period in the life-cycle 
that is greatly affected by recurring and unsettling changes, which impact physical makeup 
and social position. The female activists, for example, talked about challenging the 
boundaries of family culture and expectation as they approached adulthood. In order to better 
understand HT radical identities, the ages that fall broadly within the classification of youth 
offer the most crucial insight into radicalisation—not least because HT seems to exclusively 
target and recruit young people. Navigating between childhood and adulthood forms a 
unique period in a person‘s life history. Most youth identity is stimulated through 
participation within a shared social setting, such as a specific youth subculture, which 
distinguishes it from other age identity experiences. One way of looking at youth subcultures 
within a British Muslim context is in terms of class identification. Social lives develop at 
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specific times and manifest in certain locales. Working-class Muslims, for instance, spend a 
lot more time in mosques (Abbas, 2004). In contrast, HT middle-class activists spent little 
time in their youth in mosques, and thus experienced a secular upbringing and social 
world.
194
  
 
Ethnicity is another prominent feature of HT‘s social composition; from the early 1980s a 
large number of Asian students were attracted to the group. The ethno-religious experiences 
of working-class Muslims are somewhat removed from the social life of middle-class HT 
members. In general, the ethno-religious identity of most young Muslims is often shaped by 
personal and social interactions during childhood. In other words, the members‘ 
disassociation from ethno-religious markers relied heavily upon their secular middle-class 
upbringing and experiences. In this respect, unlike most working-class Muslims, HT 
members did not inherit a religious tradition from their parents. Therefore, the social realities 
of HT members differ strongly from working-class Muslims, creating a culturally distinct 
group that emerged out of the experiences of a middle-class status. Unfortunately, within the 
bulk of the literature I surveyed, little focus has been given to this homogenous sub-group, 
making a comparative study between working-class and middle-class Muslims vital. 
Jacobson (1998), in her study of British Muslim youth in the London borough of Waltham 
Forest, for example, fails to account for class differences between her subjects. However, if 
one assumes that the majority of her respondents emerged from working-class households, 
then her study provides some significant insights. For instance, she argues that young 
working-class Muslims in Waltham Forest displayed high levels of religious commitment 
(Jacobson, 1998, p. 126). Furthermore, working-class parents are able to transfer to and 
maintain religious traditions among their offspring more easily, because their children grow 
up in very ‗close-knit‘ religious communities (Jacobson 1998, p. 63). In contrast, as my 
findings have shown in Chapter four, HT members tend to grow up detached from their 
ethno-religious roots. This, naturally, affects how HT members relate to, and interact with, 
working-class Asians. Consequently, middle-class HT activists do not share an ethno-
religious bond with working-class Muslim youth, providing both groups with distinct and 
separate frames of reference. Therefore, HT middle-class identity is influenced by the social 
                                                 
194
 The transmission of religious belief and practice amongst traditional working-class South Asian Muslims is 
usually inherited from family socialisation, which often entails sending young children after school to the 
mosque. The manner and form of religious teaching in these institutions is very abusive (Dispatches, lessons in 
hate and violence in Muslim schools, 14/02/2011). Consequently, HT middle-class recruits became socialised 
into religious practice through HT (e.g. learning to pray and reading the Quran). This allowed HT activists to 
escape closed and backward working class orthodox approaches to religiosity, enabling them to develop an 
intellectual attachment to a politicalised brand of Islam.  
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context from which a member emerges, making it unreliable to look at Muslim youth as a 
single and unified group.  
 
8.2 Causes of HT Radicalisation (why do some young Muslims join HT?)  
 
Before I began my study several years ago, I was invited by scholars within the field to talk 
about my involvement with HT, in an effort to bring about greater insight into radicalisation 
processes. Although I was not surprised by the overwhelming lack of understanding 
concerning HT, I became more troubled by the great volume of disjointed theories put 
forward to provide an explanation for radicalisation. The literature on radicalisation is 
equally incoherent. However, among the theorists who reflect on radicalisation, there is 
agreement that more needs to be done to understand the phenomenon. Furthermore, the 
literature on radicalisation is littered with grand theories that try to unify Muslim behaviour 
and activism on a general level. This approach is extremely problematic, because, as I have 
discovered, Muslims emerge from diverse backgrounds and experiences. So, how do I go 
about understanding why some young Muslims join HT? One approach relied on asking HT 
members why they joined the group. I listened in earnest to what they said, but what I heard 
was a torrent of idealistic rhetoric about Islam, which gave me no real insight or answer into 
why they joined HT. In order to better understand HT membership, I quickly realised, I had 
to be able to see through the twisted rhetoric to find out what really motivated members.  
 
Another difficulty in dissecting HT radicalisation is merging my somewhat broad findings, 
in Chapter six, with an understanding of the life trajectory of HT members in chapters four 
and five. However, as I will show, there are general patterns and contexts at play from which 
members emerge, and are embedded within, making them more susceptible to HT 
radicalism.    
 
A common facet of a member‘s experience is his or her upbringing. As I commented earlier, 
a member‘s early identity is greatly shaped by structural factors like class, ethnicity, and age. 
However, these identifications usually manifest into boundaries of separation. Unlike 
working-class Muslims, who generally are more ‗physically segregated from the white 
population‘, HT members grew up in white middle-class areas (Ansari, 2004, p. 391). This 
brought them into direct contact with white people and their secular culture, which in most 
cases was perceived as unwilling to accommodate ethnic and racial differences. Therefore, 
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HT members emerged from their predominantly white surroundings as victims of racism. 
This rather hazardous exposure to perceived British culture and sensibilities left most 
members with a variety of challenges. Firstly, they could not revert to their ethnic or 
religious identity, since they did not inherit an attachment to their families‘ Asian-Muslim 
origins. In fact, most HT parents encouraged their children to pursue a distinctly secular 
path, seeing that a religious heritage was perceived in the Western society as an entirely 
backward and irrelevant phenomenon. Alongside this religious void, members could not 
enhance their own sense of ethnicity as they felt culturally British or white. These perceived 
contradictions helped sustain a feeling of uncertainty among the members, who had grown 
up in white middle-class suburbia as outsiders. In large part the attraction of HT, especially 
for its activists, lies in the fact that it gives young Muslims a way of disentangling 
themselves from the insecurity and quandary of living in contemporary Britain.  
 
The adverse experiences of living, and interacting, with white people drew the members 
away from British society. The members I spoke to talked about how they started to believe 
the negative distortions about their race and ethnicity, which left a lasting impression on the 
way they viewed their place in British society. As they matured, most members could not 
develop a unified understanding about all the diverse aspects of their life. Religion and 
ethnicity were disconnected from their social identity, preventing them from establishing a 
unified identity. Consequently, the members found themselves in a social limbo, rejected by 
the dominant white culture and unwilling to embrace an ethno-hybrid identity like their 
working-class Muslim counterparts. The lack of stable and coherent ties linking the members 
to their ethnic and non-ethnic communities resulted in their being psychologically and 
socially divorced from the wider society. According to Parkin (1968, p. 11), individuals that 
fail to integrate or find a place in society are ‗highly susceptible to the appeals‘ of radical 
and fringe movements. Although the social encounters the members experienced played a 
significant part in their upbringing, they cannot be attributed as causal features of HT 
radicalisation. This is because I encountered a small number of HT members who insisted 
they felt socially connected to their white middle-class communities; they had strong ties 
with friends and did not differentiate according to ethnicity or race. Despite coming across 
only a handful of members that claimed to be well adjusted, I had to accommodate their 
experiences and insights into my theory of HT radicalisation. Consequently, it is very 
difficult to maintain with absolute certainty a generic set of causes for radicalisation that fit 
into the life pathologies of every HT member. Therefore, it is better to conceptualise 
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radicalisation in terms of ‗social agents and settings‘. This allows me to consider the major 
features of radicalisation that commonly exist across HT‘s fraternity; in particular, locations 
of radicalisation, experiences, and group radicalisation have been treated as explanatory 
factors.      
 
Throughout the course of my study, it became apparent that despite minor differences in 
location and experiences the primary trigger in the radicalisation process is HT. The group is 
the central agent in radicalising young people. During the ethnographic stage, for example, I 
was able to study the ways in which members seemed to lose parts of their individuality 
when they encountered HT. In fact, I noticed several key themes were present during the 
―contact‖ stage of the recruitment process—new social settings, dysfunctional transitions, 
and peer group associations—appeared frequently in the case histories of HT members. It is 
therefore argued that recruitment is an integral part of the radicalisation process, because the 
contact is moving towards joining the group. To start with, recruitment into HT is likely to 
occur at university or college, as I identified in Chapter Four. When the members left their 
homes for the first time they struggled to deal with the transition to a new social and cultural 
environment. Talcott (1960, p. 293) quite aptly points out that radical movements ‗which 
exploit the generalities and ambiguities‘ of social situations are able to naturally recruit 
troubled or alienated individuals. This tendency was set off by perceived social barriers, 
namely ethnicity and religion, which inhibited the formation of close ties with others. 
Consequently, this turbulent transition into university life forced members to seek out people 
who shared the same socially constructed identities as themselves (i.e., middle-class Asian-
Muslims).  
 
Even though the peer group brought together Muslims who emerged from similar social 
realities, the one feature that overrides everything else is religiosity. The peer group, made 
up of HT recruiters, provided a sense of purpose and significance to members‘ lives by 
infusing them with religion. This involved rapid socialisation into very intensive religious 
practices. It seems clear that the advent of a ‗religious awakening‘ was triggered by the 
formation of powerful religious bonds between members and peer group participants.
195
 
Religion gave the peer group an opportunity to recruit non-religious students into HT. Most 
members revealed that they had never considered themselves spiritually connected to a 
global ummah (community) and thus never felt emotionally moved by the plight of Muslims. 
                                                 
195
 Refer to chapter four, p. 112. 
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However, this changed when members were exposed to HT rhetoric, and began to embrace 
party ideology and belief.  
 
It can be fairly assumed that peer group ties are critical, because new ideas are transmitted 
through these friendship bonds, allowing new recruits to enter the group setting in familiar 
surroundings. However, joining HT is not purely a free choice; significant coercion is 
applied in order to manipulate a potential member into joining. Although there is no physical 
pressure, the coercion is clear in that if you do not join HT, you will be deemed to be sinful 
and God will condemn you to the pits of hell for eternity. By virtue of ignorance, one is 
placed in a state of guilt for not working for the Party‘s aims, and thus feels compelled to 
join. Thus, I was not greatly surprised by one member‘s suggestion that the ‗Hizb (group) 
does not need you, rather you need the Hizb (group)‘. What strikes me about this statement 
is that it underscores the negative impact of group membership. The conditions and 
experiences of the members are of particular interest to me, since the success of HT is 
dependent on their ability to isolate identities that display a need for the group. One of the 
key subjects I will need to consider in this chapter, as I think about group influence and 
group processes, is what happens to members in the group. When members start to act 
collectively, for example, does this erode their sense of individual identity?  
 
Joining HT as a novice requires attending a weekly Halaqah (study group); this deepens and 
cements the radicalisation process. It is considered a key stage and an instrumental part of 
group radicalisation. During this period, intellectual pressure is applied, forcing the novice to 
bend towards the group‘s expectations. In particular, the Mushrif (teacher) is very keen to 
establish a joint construction of reality in order to create a new cognitive viewpoint. 
Developing a new cognitive framework entails changing the way a novice views his or her 
social surroundings, often by making sense of their past and present experiences. In other 
words, the reinterpretation of the world around them takes place in the Halaqah, eventually 
leading to the internalisation and manifestation of a radical HT identity. To remove extreme 
individual differences and independent thought the Mushrif forces novices to agree with and 
accept as their own the ideas presented in Halaqah. The novice is seen as intellectually 
inferior, especially if they display independent thinking. Although this alignment of ideas is 
consciously arrived at, it does denote the acceptance of influence.  
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Beyond the setting of the Halaqah, I was able to witness group practices that overpowered 
the member. The norms, roles, and patterns of communication engineered by HT constrain 
behaviour. As one member explained, ‗when the shab [novice] is new his nafsiyya 
[behaviour] is in conflict with his concepts so you need to draw him closer to the Hizb 
[group] in order to purify and cleanse his nafsiyya [behaviour]‘. Indeed, Milgram (1974) 
makes an important distinction between conformity and obedience that has relevance. He 
conceptualised conformity as following one‘s peers in a group setting, while obedience 
relates to a chain of command (Milgram, 1974). Conformity, if defined as following one‘s 
peers, best describes the Halaqah. This is because novices are placed amongst their peers 
within a controlled setting, forcing them to conform. However, obedience is the 
psychological apparatus that connects a member‘s action to the collective work of HT. The 
party rhetoric, as cited in countless publications, has stated that the Mabda (ideology) itself 
to the exclusion of anything else is the basis of organising and mobilising the fraternity. In 
reality, this is not true. The Party imposes the ideology onto the members, demanding they 
obey the commands of the party hierarchy.  
 
When the novice begins to convey the thoughts of HT effectively, as if they were his or her 
own, then he or she is considered for membership. Even though radicalisation has no 
definable end point, membership signals the alignment of beliefs between the novice and the 
group. At this point, members have fully adjusted their sense of identity, their thoughts and 
behaviours, to match the collectively defined attributes of HT. By developing a sense of ‗we-
ness‘, a member is made aware that beyond HT there is a ‗they‘ that constitutes the dominant 
culture (James, 1996). This distinction from the larger society allows HT to shape members‘ 
identities permanently. Consequently, when a novice becomes a member, they essentially 
belong to HT, deriving their sense of identity, at least in part, from it. This creates a 
collective mindset. Thus, when a novice has been sufficiently assimilated, membership is 
offered. According to one ex-member, ‗membership is the final stage of radicalisation, 
because you feel you can‘t live without them [HT]‘. Therefore, those that are attracted to the 
homogeneity of the group are those individuals that display a predisposition for belonging. 
Thus departure is unthinkable as re-socialisation into society cannot occur; this is analogous 
to criminals who spend a lifetime incarcerated.  
 
In the course of this study, I have sought to dissect HT membership, which I have argued 
embodies a brand of Islamist radicalism that is characteristically South Asian and middle 
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class in nature. In order to gain a deeper sense of HT membership, I decided to hold focus 
group discussions with ex-members, as I felt this would provide a useful picture of HT 
appeal through a less idealistic narrative.
196
 After speaking to these ex-members, I noticed a 
common perception of HT radicalism emerge. As Dawud explained, ‗they (HT) are a cult‘. 
If this was so, then I wanted to know how HT operated like a cult.
 197
 Hassan (1988) suggests 
that ‗thought-stopping tactics‘ and installing an ‗us-versus-them‘ mindset help to coerce 
people into joining cults. In a similar way, HT use coercive influences to psychologically 
control their members (e.g. like the Halaqah). However, Zimbardo (1997, p. 14) believes 
cult methods of recruiting, indoctrinating and influencing their members are not ‗exotic 
forms of mind control‘. Rather, they are more intensely applied tactics of social influence, 
which are practiced daily by all societal agents of influence. In other words, certain 
environmental conditions can make people more vulnerable to cult recruitment, such as 
social alienation, depression and frustration. Within this context, cults often provide a set of 
life-altering solutions, which are more importantly accompanied by structure, authority, and 
close social contacts.  
 
From a general perspective, HT clearly exhibits a host of similar characteristics to those 
found in cults. I have located five comparable features between cults and HT. Firstly, strict 
adherence to a set of shared beliefs is mandated and, in turn, provides a sense of meaning 
and purpose to their members. Secondly, group members are intensely motivated by the 
group-mind, succumbing to group pressure. According to Bion (1980), when individuals 
function in a group context, their individual judgement and behaviour are strongly 
influenced by the powerful forces of group dynamics. Thirdly, the group facilitates the 
psychological need to be part of a group, making the member feel significant, which 
provides a sense of belonging and security. According to Post (1998), ‗belonging‘ to the 
group may be the first time they truly belonged, the first time they felt truly ‗significant‘, the 
first time they felt that what they did ‗counted‘. Fourthly, recruitment techniques often rely 
on intense social influence, using coercion and guilt, to force the recruit to agree with the 
group. Finally, in most cases, it is often extremely difficult to leave the group. These 
obstacles can come in the form of group pressure, where loyal members will intervene in the 
                                                 
196
 Refer to appendix IV: Focus group II – Ex-HT members, p. 257. 
197
 Interestingly, the study of cults has a lot in common with approaches to radicalisation. According to Scheflin 
(2000), there is a great need to investigate cults and their impact, because the ‗psychological factors that lead to 
terrorism might lie in understanding cults‘. Similarly, Hassan (1988) argues that ‗destructive mind-control 
cults‘ must be understood in relation to the war on terror. 
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case of a member who has doubts about the group and longs for his or her old life, or the 
obstacles may be psychological. 
 
8.3 Recruitment Grounds: The University Link 
 
Another important variable in the radicalisation schemata of HT is location of recruitment. 
Clearly, as my research has outlined, university campuses are primary recruiting grounds for 
HT activists. Universities provide a magnet for HT activism and recruitment, as they attract a 
wide spectrum of young British Muslims from diverse geographical locations and 
backgrounds. In keeping with the middle-class dimension of HT‘s social base, universities 
offer the group access to a large pool of middle class Muslims, who have often moved away 
from their homes for the first time. This creates a deep feeling of social displacement, 
making them gravitate towards HT activists who exploit the social commonalities that often 
exist and the deficit for companionship. As a result, apart from the socio-economic 
similarities, potential recruits find themselves in vulnerable settings, rendering them more 
receptive to the allure of HT. Notwithstanding the importance of universities, the peer group 
associations that are created within this social space are primary factors in the radicalisation 
process. What is subsequently striking about the location of HT radicalisation is the minimal 
influence Mosques appear to play in recruitment activity. This is consistent, though, with my 
research of Muslim middle-class lifestyle and activity. The background and upbringing of 
the respondents shared the notable lack of religiosity during their youth, manifesting in 
complete disconnection from religious institutions.  
 
In the mind-set of HT activists, Mosques have become increasingly synonymous with 
working-class Muslims, and thus offer slim recruitment opportunities (Kepel 1997, p. 105). 
This also reflects the overly secularised nature of the respondent‘s upbringing. In particular, 
religious activity played no real role in their daily activity, which meant the mosque lacked 
any instrumental significance. Therefore, seeing that Mosques have little centrality in the 
makeup of young middle class Muslims, it is reasonable for HT to target universities at the 
expense of Mosques. As the early HT pioneers suggested, there is no overtly better location 
then university campuses in which to encounter young middle class Muslims, especially 
since they display a heightened receptivity to the radical message of HT. Historically, HT 
invested significant focus and attention to universities, creating hubs of activity across the 
country in which large scale recruitment took place. Therefore, the HT infiltration of British 
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university campuses marked a key stage in HT recruitment, and thus the success of the UK 
branch rests and falls in this critical social space.         
 
8.4 De-radicalisation  
 
In recent years, critical questions have been asked about how radicalisation can be tackled or 
countered. In the UK, in the wake of the London bombings, considerable effort and 
resources have been assigned to building greater community cohesion. The PREVENT 
strand of the government‘s CONTEST strategy is being used, not least, to challenge the 
ideology of violent extremism.
198
 More recently, the government is working to revise its 
counter-terrorism strategy to widen its definition of extremist behaviour. The draft proposal, 
dubbed CONTEST 2, intends to broaden the radical net to include activists who: advocate a 
caliphate (Islamic State), promote Sharia law, argue that Islam bans homosexuality, believe 
in jihad, and fail to condemn the killing of British soldiers in Iraq or Afghanistan (The 
Guardian, 17/02/2009). There are obvious problems with such an overreaching strategy that 
will inevitably trigger issues of free speech and opinion. Muslims must feel confident in their 
ability to enjoy and express views in an open environment. Thus, it seems clear this redraft 
aims to control Muslim thought, forcing them to embrace the Western political system and 
its core values. Moreover, those who advocate this strategy ‗say hardline Islamist 
interpretation of the Qur'an leads to views that are the root cause of the terrorism threat 
Britain faces‘ (The Guardian, 17/02/2009). I have already suggested that radicalisation has 
no single definable cause. Instead, radicalisation needs to be regarded as a multi-layered 
phenomenon that has multiple triggers. This would suggest that de-radicalisation strategies 
need to be case-specific, as generic plans fail to acknowledge the distinct realities of group 
members. Despite the importance of de-radicalisation, I only have time to analyse the 
effectiveness of current UK policy, and thus hope in the future to formulate a more precise 
strategy based upon my findings.   
 
                                                 
198
 On 26 January 2011, the newly elected collation government announced a review of the counter-terrorism 
strategy, in which six key powers were considered: ‗(1) The detention of terrorist suspects before charge, 
including how we can reduce the period of detention below 28 days; (2) Section 44 stop and search powers and 
the use of terrorism legislation in relation to photography; (3) The use of the Regulation of Investigatory 
Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) by local authorities and access to communications data more generally; (4) Measures 
to deal with organisations that promote hatred or violence; (5) Extending the use of deportation with assurances 
in a manner that is consistent with our legal and human rights obligations; (6) Control orders (including 
alternatives)‘ (Home Office Report, January 2011, p. 4)   
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The first, and perhaps most common, strategy concerns proscribing HT. Reworking the legal 
boundaries to tackle HT radicalisation is very complex and counter-productive. To start with, 
UK counter-terrorism legislation does not include groups like HT, because they employ a 
non-violent ideology.
199
 This is all very well but HT radicalisation, if deemed a threat, needs 
to be tackled by formulating a distinct plan that treats the underlying factors of HT 
radicalism. As Faz, an ex-member from East London, explained: ‗the government is 
incapable of tackling HT radicalisation because they don‘t understand the ethos of the 
party…HT is a middle class entity and so you need to tackle middle class radicalism 
amongst British Muslims‘. Also, a generic ban will only drive the group underground, and 
thus may strengthen its appeal amongst disaffected Muslim youths. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that banning radical organisations, like Al-Muhajiroun, tends to have a limited 
effect, as they still continue to recruit new activists and engage in public events. Therefore, a 
de-radicalisation strategy cannot rely wholly on legal intervention; rather it needs to tackle 
the causes of HT radicalisation through social, political and educational strategies.
200
  
 
There is little doubt that bringing young Muslims of different social backgrounds together is 
an important first step in tackling the problem of radicalisation on a national level, but it 
seems government strategy fails to understand the nature and complexity of Muslim 
identities. For instance, assessing young British Muslims as a single homogenous group 
ignores class and cultural differences. As Ansari (2004, p. 3) points out, ‗a Sylheti from 
Bangladesh, apart from some tenets of faith, is likely to have little in connection with a 
Mirpuri from Pakistan, let alone a Somali or a Bosnian Muslim‘. Such variation means a de-
radicalisation strategy, such as CONTEST, is not suitable because its functionality is 
structured around a set of fixed rules and guidelines. Instead, a more malleable approach is 
                                                 
199
 Immediately after the 7/7 London bombings, it became clear that HT actively sought to modify its public 
message in the UK in order to prevent legal sanction against it. This change of policy was imposed by the 
central leadership in Jordan, as they feared a ban in the UK would seriously jeopardise UK operations. 
However, internal opinion concerning the downgrading of its radical ideology was split. As Respondent B 
argued, ‗the Hizb does not engage in pragmatic activities because our ideology sets the agenda‘. In contrast, 
Respondent I insisted the policy was a necessity, as ‗the rules of the game changed after 7/7‘. In reality, the 
downgrading of ideology was embraced at the leadership level, while on the ground, rank and file members 
struggled to align their radical beliefs with a watered-down version of HT ideology.  
200
 In the wake of 7/7, the government sought to fund Islamic groups, such as the Radical Middle Way and the 
Quilliam Foundation, across university campuses in an effort to counter the extremist ideology of groups like 
HT. However, there is little evidence to suggest that the proliferation of these groups on university campuses 
has had an effect. In particular, the Quilliam Foundation has no physical access to grassroots activism, which in 
effect means they cannot counteract radicalisation because this phenomenon is taking place at the grass roots. 
During the final stages of my fieldwork investigations, I was swamped by views from ordinary Muslims, not 
affiliated to any radical organisation, about the disingenuousness nature of the Quilliam Foundation. Most 
Muslims felt they were actively trying to distort the message of Islam in order to make it acceptable to western 
audiences, and thus had no real desire or know how to counter-radicalisation. In this respect, as most HT 
activists explained, the Quilliam Foundation poses little threat as it is detached from the grassroots. 
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required that can be adapted to fit the various social realities of British Muslims. Rouleau 
(2001) further elaborates upon this when he writes, ‗Islamist parties are quite dissimilar: 
often they have nothing in common but their references to the Prophet and Islam, which they 
interpret in a number of conflicting or contradictory ways, and they span the political 
spectrum from left to far right‘. According to Dawud (ex-member), ‗a policy that 
pigeonholes Muslims into a single cluster is doomed to fail…Look at HT and ALM, on the 
surface they seem the same, but you and I know that‘s not the case‘. Therefore, a de-
radicalisation strategy cannot be homogenous; rather separate initiatives need to be tailored 
to each form of Islamic group radicalism. Historically, Al-Muhajiroun and HT had very 
similar aims and ideologies, but their influence and impact was very different.
201
 ALM tends 
to exclusively recruit working-class Muslims, while the vast majority of HT members 
emerge from middle-class backgrounds (Wiktorowicz, 2005). Even though ALM and HT 
operate from within very similar radical frameworks, the social contexts their influences are 
poles apart. With this in mind, a more group specific strategy is required.
202
  
 
It would seem HT is only able to recruit from the ranks of middle-class Asians, making it in 
theory possible to formulate a generic de-radicalisation strategy for HT. The evidence I have 
accumulated in my study shows that HT radicalisation requires a human interface. This is 
partly due to the context in which radicalisation takes place. First and foremost, HT members 
often emerge from a homogenous socio-demographic background, which signifies attraction 
to peers of similar identity and trajectory. This means HT radicalisation initially takes place 
within a specific social context, usually amongst a group of friends at university. Even 
though similarity amongst the members breeds connection, it also limits their social 
interactions with the wider society. As a result, they enter a distinct social world in which the 
culture they receive, the attitudes they form, and the interactions they experience take place 
within a closed group environment. The radicalisation process reinforces this state of 
homogeneity, as it cements social ties between group members, while simultaneously cutting 
off relations with non-members. Despite the acknowledgment that a range of factors 
contribute to radicalisation, government strategy continues to hinge on broad policy 
                                                 
201
 ALM in 1996 adopted the same ideological aim as HT (e.g. establish the Khilafah system), but with one 
principle methodological difference concerning the area of work (e.g. ALM advocate the work for establishing 
Khilafah can be done anywhere, including the UK, while HT restrict their domain of work to the Muslim 
world). However, in 2003 Omar Bakri adopted a Wahhabist ideology, which resulted in a radical realignment 
to Wahhabism, making the separation between HT and ALM much more pronounced on a doctrinal level.  
202
 The social space in which HT radicalisation takes place cannot be easily divorced from the group setting. 
This is because radicalisation often takes place amongst a closed peer group of friends and the social influence 
that develops here is a key element in the radicalisation process as a whole. For further information on group 
dynamics refer to Della Porta and Diani (2006, p. 157-9). 
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initiatives such as ‗PREVENT‘ and ‗CONTEST‘. These broad measures are fairly 
ineffective against HT as they are designed to counter violent extremism. Moreover, 
government strategy over-emphasises an approach of criminalisation to radicalisation, which 
generally allows HT to continue its activism, as they operate legally. Finally, I would 
suggest that if the government wants to tackle HT radicalisation then it needs to confront the 
following three issues: (1) Muslim middle-class identity formation (disaffection and cultural 
exclusion); (2) peer group radicalisation at university; and (3) HT radicalisation practices 
(tackling HT ideology and indoctrination strategies). These points illustrate HT‘s social 
influence over a distinct group of British Muslims, namely young middle-class Asians. By 
dealing with these issues a more robust and distinct challenge can be mounted against HT.    
 
Throughout the course of this study, I have been interested in understanding why some 
young Muslims join HT, and in doing so provide greater insight into the causal factors of 
radicalisation. In order to bring this study to a close, one key question remains: what impact 
has HT radicalisation had on British Muslim identity? If we first consider the British Muslim 
population as a whole, then HT has had a limited impact. There are several clear reasons for 
this lack of broad appeal. Firstly, first-generation Muslims tend to interpret and practice their 
religious beliefs within a rigid framework that sustains the values and traditions of their 
countries of origin. As a result, HT activists have been unable to dislodge the deep-rooted 
beliefs of the first generation, making it difficult to gain any support or base amongst this 
demographic. Secondly, as I have already explained, HT is generally unsuccessful amongst 
working-class Asians; however, middle-class Asians tend to live and think differently 
allowing HT to establish a strong foothold in the midst of this social group.
203
 Consequently, 
it would be important in any HT de-radicalisation strategy to categorise this demographic as 
potentially vulnerable to HT radicalisation.  
 
HT may not have been successful in recruiting across the wider Muslim community, but 
recruitment is only one facet of impact. From a historical perspective, HT has been operating 
in the UK for over three decades, and thus it would be unfair and somewhat simplistic, to 
argue the group has had no real impact on British Muslim identity. HT introduced its radical 
                                                 
203
 The middle class relate more easily to HT because their radicalism is centred on social and ideological 
change which is political in content. Therefore, because of the background of its recruits, HT is able to 
communicate its ideas and engage this demographic providing them a meaningful political and social outlet to 
their lack of acceptance and belonging. Given the identity politics surrounding being a British Muslim in 
modern Britain, HT recruits are bestowed with a way to counter the dominant culture (Refer to chapter Six: 
Sociological breakdown, pp. 185-188). 
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message into a fresh social environment, like university campuses, which in turn heightened 
religious identity amongst the placid Muslim populace. During this period, British-born and 
raised Muslims started to assert their own distinct forms of identity. As mentioned in earlier 
chapters, charismatic figures like Omar Bakri Mohammed set about formulating an Islamic 
response to the challenges of living in modern Britain. In this context, HT exploited a gap 
amongst some young British Muslims, who were stuck between the world their parents 
migrated from and the world they were living within. Before HT overwhelmed university 
campuses, the vast majority of Muslim students were drawn to Asianism. This identity 
united students of South Asian origin together under the banner of their common culture and 
ethnicity. HT quickly erected ethnic boundaries between British Asians, pointing to a single 
Muslim identity that excluded other diasporic religious faiths. This redefining of student 
identity created a platform for HT to promote its political radicalism. By introducing 
‗Khilafah‘ to a politically inactive Muslim student body, HT was able to engage with British 
society and state in a new and radical fashion. The appeal of HT grew rapidly across 
universities principally amongst the Asian middle class, who felt socially excluded from 
their ethnic community and the wider society. In this respect, HT gave some young British 
Muslims a way to break free from the shackles ‗of the Islam of their forefathers‘ (Ansari, 
2004, p. 393). The radical interpretations of HT offered them a way to rediscover their 
religious identity, which became the sole determinant of their public and cultural life. Thus, 
HT gave some young Muslims a way to come to terms with their identity. 
 
All this begs the question: does HT have a positive or negative effect on British Muslims? I 
spoke to several HT members regarding this issue, and to some extent I was surprised by 
some of their responses. One member argued that HT works within the Muslim community 
to build better understanding between the West and Islam, which he suggested, would ‗help 
counter terrorism‘. Similarly, another member insisted HT was a force for good, as it 
directed Muslim grievances towards peaceful political activism. Despite its radical rhetoric, 
HT repeatedly and unequivocally has said the killing of civilians is forbidden. This is not a 
recent or opportunistic shift in policy since party methodology rejected the use of violence as 
a means for achieving its ideological goals over fifty years ago. Since the 9/11 terror attacks, 
HT has tried to counter the growth of Islamic militancy in the Muslim community by 
articulating a non-violent channel for Muslim anger. According to HT its work is peaceful 
and positive, as they have stated: 
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In the UK our work with the Muslim community is focused on 
directing Muslims to make a positive contribution to society 
whilst preserving their Islamic identity… Many of our 
members have senior roles in IT, economics, medicine, 
teaching, engineering, and some of our members were involved 
in treating the victims of the 7th July bombings in London‘s 
hospitals (HT media Pack 2008, p. 4). 
 
HT believes they are working towards the betterment of the Muslim community by offering 
alternative solutions to the dilemmas of British life. Yet, this seemingly noble goal does not 
quite extend to integrating Muslims within the social fabric of British society, making it 
harder to see the group as a symbol for good. However, British Muslims in growing numbers 
are beginning to question their association with the state. In the newly proposed counter-
terrorism strategy, CONTEST 2, the government is seeking to establish ‗a British version of 
Islam‘ in which Muslims must adhere to British values (Ruth Kelly, New Statesman 
09/04/2007). This extremely disjointed proposal demands Muslims must adopt shared 
British values, even though, despite the inescapable undermining of freedom of opinion, 
these values remain highly ambiguous and undefined. It seems the government is trying to 
intervene in theological issues, which is surely a matter for the Muslim community to debate 
and resolve themselves. These somewhat drastic proposals if targeted towards HT will not 
pacify their radical activism, and thus seem counter-productive.      
 
8.5 Conclusion: 
 
The research presented in this thesis has concentrated on one of the most controversial 
Islamist groups in Britain. Although the British media seem fascinated by HT, the academic 
community has failed to quantify its emergence within a British context. This is partly why I 
chose to carry out the study. I have discovered HT radicalisation to be a narrow and distinct 
process with identifiable patterns related to those who are attracted to the organisation. One 
of the main sets of issues raised for discussion throughout this study has been the 
phenomenon of HT middle-class radicalism. In recent times, broad strategies have been 
formulated to counter radicalisation, which assumes radicals do not match a specified 
demographic or profile. In contrast, not only are the underlying features of HT radicalisation 
identifiable, but more significantly it is rooted within a homogenous context. Amongst 
political commentators there is a growing tendency to work out and apply generic causal 
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features of radicalisation to highly diverse Islamic groups and peoples.
204
 This ignores the 
features present in middle-class HT radicalism that serve to distinguish it from the radicalism 
of working-class Muslims.
205
 Clearly, there is a need for more sustained study on this social 
group, as this demographic has shown strong identification with HT.  
 
The HT members I studied were not ‗abnormal‘.206 They were young middle-class Asian 
professionals who turned their backs on western society and embraced a radical version of 
Islam. I set out, therefore, to discover why these young men and women had joined HT. In 
part, HT radicalisation was conceived as a response to the frustrations experienced during 
the early life cycle. These included issues of racism, social deprivation and alienation, 
cultural marginalisation, identity crisis and psychological unsettlement. HT radicalisation 
became a means to express their reaction against these frustrations, and the white majority‘s 
alleged failure to live up to certain professed ideals, such as social egalitarianism. Despite 
their high educational and professional success, HT members were characterised by their 
social vulnerability, which facilitated a propensity for the radical politics of HT. This is 
perhaps a measure to the extent adverse social experiences can have upon the identity 
construction of some young British Muslims. Those who joined the ranks of HT felt a deep 
sense of social and political displacement within society. Accordingly, HT provided a safe 
social space to reconstruct identity, which gave the recruits a sense of belonging and 
acceptance. Based on the foregoing discussion on HT, a clear picture has been sketched out 
that provides a comprehensive investigation of the roots – political, social, cultural and 
psychological – of HT radicalisation in Britain. By identifying the context in which HT 
radicalisation takes place, and through penetrating the clandestine veil of the organisation, an 
important step forward has been made in ‗demystifying‘ HT radical behaviour and ideology.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
204
 Refer to chapter one, pp. 10-12 and chapter two, pp. 59-69. 
205
 In the light of my research, it is clear that a rethink of how the government tackles HT radicalisation is 
needed. The British government has been greatly preoccupied in recent years with the problem of working-
class radicalisation. I have constantly stressed that little if any attention has been directed to the small minority 
of middle-class Muslims who endorse radical Islamic views and activism.  
206
 ‗Abnormal‘ in this context refers to mental disorder as defined in psychology (Gill, 2007). 
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Appendix I: 
List of Interview Questions with Founding Members of UK Branch of HT 
 
My research has involved conducting extensive interviews with a wide-spectrum of HT 
activists and members. The first phase of interviews sought to gather a definitive source of 
data on the formative period of HT in Britain. This required the acquisition of new historical 
sources, which could only be extrapolated from the founding members of the UK branch. 
After identifying Farid Kassim and Omar Bakri Mohammed as the main protagonists, I 
sought to organise interviews with them, as they were the only individuals that could yield 
insight into the historical growth of HT in Britain. Consequently, I constructed a list of 
standardised questions, namely through semi-structured interviews. The following is a 
breakdown of the questions I used to elicit information from the two respondents:     
Figure 1.1 Interview One: Farid Kassim 
No.  Type of Question(s) Description and Outcome  
1 Before we discuss your involvement in HT, can you tell 
me a little about your upbringing and background? 
Question(s) 1 to 4: These questions sought 
to find out about the social reality and 
context of the respondents background, 
which would help me better understand the 
social influences on the respondents life 
experiences as well as their beliefs, identity 
and social position.   
2 What is your ethnicity? 
3 What class do you think best represents your social status 
and why?  
4 Did you have a religious upbringing, where you a 
practicing Muslims before you joined HT? 
 5 How did HT form in the UK and where did this formation 
take place? 
Question(s) 5 to 9: These questions tried to 
find out about the circumstances of the 
respondents recruitment. It was also 
important to discover the location of the first 
encounters between transient HT members 
and native activists.  
 
6 Where/when did you encounter HT and what can you 
remember about this experience? 
7 Were you the first native member of HT?  
 8 Why did you join HT? What attracted you to the group? 
9 Do you think location played a role in your recruitment? 
10 When/how did you meet Omar Bakri Mohammed? 
11 What was the composition of the early recruits? Class 
background, ethnicity and nationality? 
Question(s) 11 to 14: Sought to discover the 
social composition of the earliest recruits.  
12 Do you think the commonality between the early recruits 
(e.g. class and ethnicity) played a part in their recruitment?  
13 What do you think the appeal of HT was during the early 
1990s? 
14 What was the composition of the early recruits? Class 
background, ethnicity and nationality? 
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15 How did public activity begin? Question(s) 15 to 20: elicited information 
about the growth of public activism in the 
UK, and the strategies employed by the 
leadership.  
16 How important was Omar Bakri? In the culturing process 
and public activity? 
17 Why do you think HT activity was successful on 
university campuses?  
18 If HT ideology is ethno-religiously broad, then why did 
HT struggle to recruit: (1) working class Asians; (2) First 
generation Muslims; and (3) non-South Asians?  
19 What impact did the Rushdie Affair and the Gulf War have 
on recruitment and activism?  
20 What about public events like the International Khilafah 
Conference and The Rally for Islam? How much impact 
did these events have and why were they organised? 
21 Why was Omar Bakri‘s membership terminated? Did you 
agree with this decision? What impact did his departure 
have? 
Question(s) 21 to 23: Asked a range of 
questions about post-HT. 
22 Why did you join HT2?
207
 
23 What do you think about HT1‘s recent shift towards more 
mainstream politics? What are your views of HT1 
 
A key issue that the researcher sought to extract from the respondents related to the personal 
and professional experiences they had of the legal system in Syria, and their specific views 
of the state of emergency. This allowed me to gain a wider understanding of the lawyers 
shared experiences of everyday legal practice and the influences of the government enforced 
state of emergency. The focus group provided a rich source of data, which allowed me to 
find out what issues were perceived as salient. I did encounter some problems with this 
research method, however, when talking about politically sensitive matters related to 
government policy. The responses of some participants were not independent and felt very 
guarded due to fear of governmental reprisals or sanctions.  
 
Figure 1.2 Interview Two: Omar Bakri Mohammed 
No.  Type of Question(s) Description and Outcome 
                                                 
207
 In 1997, a small band of members, led by Abu Rami, within the highest levels of the party hierarchy staged 
an organised mutiny, announcing the removal of the Amir Abdul Qadeem Zalluom. They cited that the 
leadership was guilty of gross incompetence; denouncing Zalluom for allowing the publication of an adopted 
book ‗Hamla-dawah‘ that allegedly contained violations against the adopted thoughts of the Party (Shahid, 
member, 1997). The articulated logic behind the mutineers‘ contention was vague and incoherent, especially as 
the book was only printed in Arabic. When news of the insurrection reached the shores of the UK, it caused a 
popular division. Many fringe members who had grown discontented with their own lack of internal power 
endorsed the removal of the Amir.  
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1 Can you please explain you background? Place of birth, 
religious affiliations and scholarship?  
Question(s) 1 and 4: Sought to provide a 
historical pretext to Omar Bakri‘s arrival 
in the UK. Also, I wanted to find out about 
his upbringing and radicalisation in Syria, 
Egypt and Saudi Arabia. 
2 When did you join HT (which country / context / reason)? 
3 You spent several years in Saudi Arabia; can you briefly 
explain your activity and reason for leaving?  
4 Why did you seek political asylum in Britain? 
5 When did you arrive in the UK? What were your early views 
of Britain (e.g. culture and society)? 
Question(s) 5 to 10: Sought to discover the 
context in which UK activism began and 
evolved.  6 What contact did you have with the British Muslim 
Community and what were your initial perceptions of the 
Muslim community? 
7 How did HT public activism begin? 
8 How/when did you meet Fraid Kassim? 
9 When did you become UK leader? 
10 What strategies did you employ to recruit British Muslims? 
Why do you think young middle class Asians were attracted 
to HT? 
11 Why did you target university campuses? Question(s) 11 to 16: Sought to discover 
the strategies used to radicalise young 
British Muslims.  
12 What issues did you identify for dawah purposes (e.g. 
international or local issues) and why? 
13 How did you culture young recruits? 
14 How did you organise HT activity?  
15 Why did you organise national events (e.g. like the Khilafah 
Conference)? 
16 How much autonomy did you have as UK leader? What was 
your connection with the Central HT leadership in Jordan? 
15 Why did you leave HT? Question(s) 15 to 20: These questions tried 
to find out about the historical narrative of 
Omar Bakri post-HT. In particular, 
focusing on his views and ALM. 
16 Why did you form ALM? What was its aims and 
methodology 
17 Why did you disband ALM?  
18 Why did ALM only recruit working class Muslims? 
19 What are your views of 9/11 and 7/7?  
20 Do you think ALM acts as a gateway organisation for 
terrorism?  
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Appendix II:  
Breakdown and Interview questions with Male HT members 
 
The following is a list of the standardised questions that were employed in the data 
collection stage, namely through semi-structured interviews. The open-ended questions 
sought to elicit responses from my respondents regarding why they joined HT. This entailed 
formulating a range of questions about: (1) their upbringing and background, (2) Social 
status and identity, (3) religiosity, (4) and the context in which they joined HT. From a 
technical standpoint, I did not ask any closed ended or forced choice questions (e.g. like 
multiple choice questions), as I wanted to hear the experiences and views of the respondents. 
Before administering the interviews, a detailed explanation was given regarding the 
researcher‘s motives and purpose of the study, and full assurances of confidentiality and 
anonymity were conferred.   
 
 Figure 1.3 Interview(s): Male HT members 
 
No. 
 
Type of Question(s) 
1 Can you tell me about your upbringing? Where you grew up / family life / schooling. 
2 Can you tell me about your parents? Their country of origin / occupation / religious commitment etc. 
3 What social class do you think best represents your parents / your upbringing / yourself? And why? 
4 What was school like? Racism / friends  
5 How connected are you to your parent‘s country of origin? Is your ethnicity an important aspect of your 
identity as a child / teenager / adult? 
6 What about religion? Was this an important part of your identity as a child / teenager / adult? Why? 
7 Did you think of yourself as British? If yes or no why? Childhood / teenage experiences? 
8 Where\how did you encounter HT? 
9 Why did you join HT? 
10 Did your early childhood experiences play a role in your joining HT? 
11 Tell me about your university experiences? Did it play a role in joining HT? If so how?  
12 What about your peer group associations? At university? 
13 Why do you think HT attracts a large group of young middle class Asians?  
14 What were your views of 9/11 and 7/7? Does it match HT‘s views? 
15 Do you think you have been radicalised by HT? Explain? 
 
The tables below are a breakdown of the respondents, which documents their age, ethnicity, 
religion and profession. This gives some contextual insight into the respondent‘s background 
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and identity. After each discussion, I would briefly reflect on the information given by the 
respondents in order to pick out possible themes for further investigation. 
 
Figure 1.4 Interviews: General breakdown 
No.  Age(s) Ethnicity Profession / 
Occupation 
Location of 
Respondent(s) 
Interview 
Duration  
Year of 
Recruitment 
1 32 Pakistani Software Engineer  West London 1hrs 15mins 1993 
2 27 Indian Doctor London 57mins 1998 
3 - Pakistani Teacher Bradford 1hr 5mins 1993 
4 22 Pakistani Student West London 2hrs 2002 
5 - Indian - West London 20mins - 
6 - Pakistani IT Consultant Birmingham 40mins 2003 
7 20 Pakistani Student Birmingham 1hr 35mins 2002 
8 29 Bangladeshi Consultant East London 35mins 1995 
9 22 Bangladeshi Student East London 2hrs 5mins 2002 
10 25 Indian Dentist London 38mins 1999 
11 19 Pakistani Student Manchester 1hr 28mins 2004 
12 25 Pakistani IT consultant Manchester 1hr 10mins 2000 
13 26 Pakistani Pharmacologist West London 42mins 1998 
14 32 Pakistani Self-employed West London 1hr 20mins 1994 
15 20 Indian Student West London 35mins 2003 
16 31 Pakistani Self-employed West London 40mins 1994 
17 30 English Consultant East London 1hr 1995 
18 25 Pakistani Doctor South London 1hr 12mins 1998 
19 - Indian Accountant South London 28mins 2004 
20 19 Pakistani Student South London - 2004 
21 24 Bangladeshi Student South London - 2000 
22 36 Pakistani Doctor West London 2hrs 1994 
23 22 Pakistani Student West London 50mins 2002 
24 28 Pakistani Teacher East London - 1996 
25 29 Pakistani Teacher West London 1hr 1996 
26 25 Indian Accountant Central London 1hr 2001 
27 26 Pakistani-
English 
Computer Analyst Berkshire 2hrs 35mins 1998 
28 27 Pakistani IT Consultant London 2hr 46mins 1999 
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Appendix III 
Synopsis of Male Respondents  
 
The following is a short synopsis of each personal interview, which I conducted with male 
HT members. The goal of collecting these personal narratives was to understand the 
changing experiences of HT activists. Although, large portions of the interviews centred on 
the life histories of the members, significant attention was also given to topical and thematic 
questions related the respondents opinions (e.g. their views on the 9/11 terror attacks). 
Overal, the narratives I collected provided a rich source of information, which provided me 
insight into the HT social world and the radicalisation process 
 
   
Interview 1: Respondent A 
Age Ethnicity Occupation Location 
32 Pakistani Software Engineer West London 
Respondent A is a 32 year old British born Pakistani. He joined HT at university in 1993 
after encountering HT recruiters in the canteen. He revealed gravitating towards Asians at 
college and university, because he felt excluded by white people throughout his youth, 
forcing him to construct an identity orientated around ‗British Asianism‘, which he cited was 
popular during his time at university. He described this association as a ‗social security 
blanket‘, in which he gained a sense of security by socialising with people belonging to the 
same racial group as him. However, this did not provide a stable identity outlet, as 
Respondent A mentioned: ‗they (Asians) were all lower class...coming from uneducated 
families that arrived off the banana boat from the pind (rural villages)...so I struggled to 
connect with them‘. His encounter with HT introduced him to individuals that shared a 
similar social background and experiences, which provided him a real and safe space to 
construct a new identity. Thus, radicalisation took place within a peer group setting.    
  
  Interview 2: Mohammed 
Age Ethnicity Occupation Location 
27 Indian Doctor London 
Mohammed is a 27 year old British born Indian; he joined HT in 1998 at university. Initially, 
he alleged his childhood did not impact his decision to join HT. However, during the course 
of the interview, he revealed that he became dislocated from British society. He cited racism 
and prejudice as key social triggers for his disassociation with British society, despite these 
experiences Mohammed insisted when he joined HT it was purely motivated by ‗ideology‘. 
As he explained: ‗I was convinced by the way the Hizb packaged the deen (Islam) as a 
rational doctrine...this was important because I always thought of myself as a rational 
person‘. Ideology may have played a part in the radicalisation process, but it is problematic 
to de-contextualise his upbringing and experiences. 
 
  Interview 3: Respondent B 
Age Ethnicity Occupation Location 
- Pakistani Teacher Bradford 
Respondent B Joined HT in 1993. He grew up near to Bradford, in a lower-middle class 
white suburb. His father was a doctor, and thus he had a comfortable upbringing. However, 
Respondent B felt disconnected from his ethnic and cultural roots, as he described: ‗I grew 
up cut off from everything Asian...I wanted Asian friends because the people around me 
always made me feel like an outsider‘. This sense of dislocation from society and 
community pushed him to seek out the familiar in adulthood. At university he saw a flyer 
advertising a talk entitled: ‗Bosnia Today Bradford Tomorrow‘. According to Respondent B, 
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‗Bosnia meant absolutely nothing to me, who were the Serbs? But Ghoreea [white English 
people] I knew, and they were fully capable of cleansing Britain of us [Asians/Muslims]‘. 
From his narrative, it was clear Respondent B felt deeply affected by racism and alienation, 
which greatly fuelled his trajectory towards radical Islam. The motivation to join HT was 
somewhat associated to providing Respondent B with a sense of belonging. As he stated: ‗I 
felt connected to them [HT members] because they made me feel welcome and we shared 
similar backgrounds‘. The radicalisation of Respondent B takes place within a closed setting, 
namely within the HT peer group at university. The peer group was composed of individuals 
that shared the same sense of social dislocation from British society, making it easier to 
relate to his social needs.        
 
  Interview 4: Respondent C 
Age Ethnicity Occupation Location 
22 Pakistani Student West London 
Respondent C joined HT in 2002 at university. The events of 9/11 reinforced a sense of 
social estrangement from British society. As he mentioned: ‗they [non-Muslims] hated us 
[Muslims] before 9/11, the only thing that changed after 9/11 was their open declaration of 
hatred towards us‘. Despite being influenced by the events of 9/11, the pretext of Respondent 
C‘s radicalisation goes back further. His childhood was littered with racially motivated 
violence and discrimination, which skewed his sense of belonging and acceptance. He felt 
like an ‗outsider‘ from an early age. In addition, according to his own testimony, he felt 
equally estranged from his ethnic and religious community, expediting his withdraw from 
British society. Initially, in the wake of 9/11, Respondent C felt inspired by militant Islam. 
As he described: ‗I was inspired by Jihad after the 9/11 attacks...America had waged a war 
against Islam and Muslims and for the first time in my lifetime I‘d seen America with a 
bloody nose‘. However, this sense of Jihadism evaporated at university, when he 
encountered Jihadists. According to Respondent C, ‗they were phonies‘. He struggled to 
connect to them within a social context. As he described: ‗they always wanted to take me to 
the Mosque...I‘d never stepped foot in a Mosque in my life‘. Furthermore, they had emerged 
from dissimilar social realities and backgrounds, the jihadists had grown up in working class 
Muslim communities, and thus religious practice was embedded within them since early 
childhood. After moving away from his jihadist friends, he encountered a HT recruiter in the 
university canteen. After this he started attending HT events and rapidly became an active 
participant in HT dawah activities. Interestingly, the HT peer group provided him a sense of 
belonging, which could not be replicated by jihadist recruiters.         
 
  Interview 5: Respondent D 
Age Ethnicity Occupation Location 
- Indian - London 
Very limited biographical data was supplied by Respondent D. He did talk in brief about 
joining HT at university, but very little can be inferred from his experiences as he was 
reluctant to provide more information about himself. 
 
  Interview 6: Respondent E 
Age Ethnicity Occupation Location 
- Pakistani IT Consultant Birmingham 
Respondent E joined HT after he attended the nationally arranged conference entitled: 
‗British or Muslim‘, which was held by HT on 24 August 2003. According to Respondent E, 
he struggled to negotiate his identity throughout his upbringing and constantly felt out of 
place in, what he referred to as, ‗white Britain‘. The event helped Respondent E revaluate his 
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position in British society, and thus pushed him to reject the notion of ‗Britishness‘. After 
the conference, he was contacted by local HT recruiters and subsequently joined the group a 
few weeks later. Beyond the Islamic duty rhetoric, he suggested HT provided him solutions 
to his confusions about life and gave him a deep sense of purpose.   
 
  Interview 7: Ali 
Age Ethnicity Occupation Location 
20 Pakistani Student Birmingham 
Ali joined HT in early 2002, what is striking about his narrative is the limited impact 9/11 
had upon his radicalisation. As he mentioned: ‗I hated Britain well before 9/11 exposed the 
hatred they (non-Muslims) have for us (Muslims)‘. His trajectory into the group is 
interesting, as he grew up in Birmingham, yet his experiences are very similar to those 
members in London. He felt socially isolated from both White and Asian communities. He 
cited multiple examples of racism that made him feel like an outsider, while at the same time 
he struggled to relate to his ethnic culture and people.   
 
  Interview 8: Abu Yusuf 
Age Ethnicity Occupation Location 
29 Bangladeshi Consultant East London 
Abu Yusuf joined HT in 1995 at college. He described his upbringing in the East End of 
London as extremely difficult and complicated. Despite his father being a doctor, he 
struggled to coup with his social and economic environment. In particular, they lived within 
a working class community (albeit owning a large town house), which meant he had to 
navigate between his middle class affluence and the poverty of his working class friends. He 
described a community sharply divided on racial grounds, and thus his friends seemed 
exclusively drawn from the same ethnic grouping. According to Abu Yusuf, he deliberately 
sought out friendships with ‗Asians‘, because he was distrustful of white people. More 
significantly, university gave him the chance to encounter middle class South Asian 
Muslims, which allowed him to be himself. As he stated: ‗being amongst the brothers (HT 
members) at university allowed me to open up my personality, I felt safe, and we (HT 
members) shared a lot in terms of our backgrounds and stuff‘.       
 
  Interview 9: Respondent F 
Age Ethnicity Occupation Location 
22 Bangladeshi Student East London 
Respondent F joined HT in 2002 at the age of 20. He candidly talked about his childhood 
and upbringing in a racially divided community. He found it particularly difficult to 
negotiate between different social settings, as he felt torn between his white and Asian 
school friends. Consequently, he felt like an outsider from both community and society, 
making more susceptible to joining HT in adulthood. Interestingly, the events of 9/11 do not 
feature in his narrative, as he explained: ‗9/11 never changed my day to day life‘. 
Respondent F joined HT in his second year of university, after indulging in what he 
described as ‗jahlyiah‘ [non-Islamic practice]. More significantly, he suggested that 
religiosity never appealed to him, as he was raised in a secular household. Therefore, his 
attraction to HT was influenced by political activism and ideology, as these facets of HT 
deeply interested him. This begs the question, why did his interest in political ideology not 
take a more mainstream path? Piecing together an answer to this question was somewhat 
difficult, as Respondent F only provided small glimpses into his narrative. However, he did 
acknowledge, HT offered him a sense of social belonging and acceptance.         
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  Interview 10: Respondent G 
Age Ethnicity Occupation Location 
25 Indian Dentist London 
Respondent G was not prepared to talk at length about his upbringing, nor would he 
elaborate about his experiences within HT. In sum, he suggested that he found it difficult to 
integrate as he was the only Asian in his school, which constantly reinforced the feeling of 
being socially different. At university he was able to gain a sense of belonging when he 
joined HT in 1999. He revealed that his motivation to join HT was purely intellectual and 
had nothing to do with the plight of Muslims. In fact, he insisted that he only felt Muslim 
once he joined the group, and thus developed a communal attachment to Muslim people 
across the world. 
 
  Interview 11: Respondent H 
Age Ethnicity Occupation Location 
19 Pakistani Student Manchester 
Respondent H is a young British born Muslim from Manchester. He joined HT in 2004 at the 
age of 18. His older brother joined the group and subsequently recruited Respondent H into 
the organisation. He was reluctant to expand upon this further and was unprepared to talk 
about the context of his radicalisation.  
 
  Interview 12: AQ 
Age Ethnicity Occupation Location 
25 Pakistani IT Consultant Manchester 
AQ joined HT in 2000 at university. His personal narrative began with a detailed description 
of his early experiences during his school years. In particular, a sense of social dislocation 
began to develop when he was placed in a predominately white private school. He struggled 
to gain belonging and acceptance. After three years of pleading to change schools, his 
parents removed him and placed him within a state school. However, the social composition 
of the school was predominately Asian. Despite being surrounded by people of the same 
ethnic makeup, AQ struggled to build relationships with his classmates. As he stated: ‗I was 
seen as white, I spoke with a private school boy accent and by some cruel twist of fate I was 
surrounded by working class Asians, a group of people whom I had nothing in common 
expect the same skin pigmentation‘. The inability to form stable relationships drew AQ to 
HT at university, as they offered him friendship amongst individuals who could identify with 
his struggles.   
 
Interview 13: Adam 
Age Ethnicity Occupation Location 
26 Pakistani Pharmacologist London 
Adam is a 26 year old British born Pakistani, who joined HT at the age of 18 (1998). He 
initially came across HT recruiters at secondary school. He quickly gained acceptance and 
within the peer setting started to take an interest in ‗Islamic politics‘ and for the first time 
became religious. However, despite his friendship with activists and agreement with the 
party cause he was extremely reluctant to join the group, as he feared parental chastisement. 
At university, however, Adam sought out HT activists. He insisted it was a duty to ‗carry 
dawah‘ and thus he befriended a small group of HT activists at the fresher‘s fair. His 
radicalisation from this point was greatly expedited. He became involved in organising 
activities and was placed in Halaqah.       
   
Interview 14: Respondent I 
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Age Ethnicity Occupation Location 
32 Pakistani Self-employed West London 
Respondent I joined HT in 1994, after attending the first international Khilafah conference, 
held at Wembley Arena. The conference sought to raise national awareness for the call to re-
establish the Khilafah (Islamic State). According to Respondent I, the idea and notion of a 
‗global khilafah‘, which could politically unite Muslims, interested him. After attending the 
conference he sought out HT activists in his local area, believing it an obligation to work to 
re-establish the global khilafah. Respondent I explained he was not religiously inclined in his 
youth and his attraction to HT took a political trajectory. As he stated: ‗Hizb ut-Tahrir is a 
political party, and its ideology is Islam‘. More significantly, before joining HT, he actively 
attended talks and events organised by a variety of different Islamic organisations (e.g. 
YMO, JIMAS, FOSIS). However, he felt none of these groups tackled the vital issues 
affecting Muslims. Respondent I also suggested that he struggled to connect to the members 
from these organisations. As he explained: ‗they were totally out of touch, especially from 
my world and experiences...so how could they solve the problems of the ummah‘. 
Eventually, he joined HT and found what he described as a ‗real sense of purpose and 
direction‘.  
   
  Interview 15: Respondent J 
Age Ethnicity Occupation Location 
20 Indian Student London 
Respondent J was unprepared to talk in details about his radicalisation, insisting it was 
inspired by religious reaffirmation. He joined the group in 2003 and insisted global events, 
namely 9/11 had little impact on his desire to join HT. As he stated: ‗I joined because it is 
Fard, once I was convinced it was a Fard then my response was simple...A believer hears and 
obeys simple‘. 
 
  Interview 16: Respondent K 
Age Ethnicity Occupation Location 
31 Pakistani Self-Employed London 
Respondent K joined HT in 1994 at university. He was not prepared to talk about any aspect 
of his childhood, as he felt this would skew perception away from the real motivation behind 
joining HT, which he described as an intellectual awakening. According to Respondent K, 
‗the Hizb connected my thoughts and emotions to Islam, not in a spiritual sense but in a 
political and intellectual sense‘. However, after much discussion, he accepted that his early 
experiences may have played a role in him seeking out greater identity solutions in 
adulthood. Nevertheless, despite feeling socially aggrieved by British society, Respondent K 
insisted his radicalisation centred on a narrow political and ideological paradigm.   
 
  Interview 17: Respondent L 
Age Ethnicity Occupation Location 
30 English Consultant East London 
Respondent L converted to Islam after attending the ‗Rally for Islam‘ at Trafalgar Square in 
1995. According to Respondent L, his conversion to Islam was greatly inspired by his early 
childhood experiences. In particular, he grew up in a predominately South Asian area and 
felt accepted amongst Asians. Consequently, in adulthood he felt drawn to Asian people, and 
thus his radicalisation was crafted in this context. As he stated: ‗I grew up with Muslims...so 
my inclinations were always for Islam, joining the Hizb and embracing Islam was something 
inevitable...the brothers are my family‘.    
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  Interview 18: Abdul-Haq 
Age Ethnicity Occupation Location 
25 Pakistani Doctor South London 
Abdul-Haq joined HT in 1998 at university. Despite growing up in a predominantly Asian 
area, he found it extremely difficult to relate to this community. As he stated: ‗my family are 
affluent while they [Asians] are working class villagers...they are backward and uneducated‘. 
Abdul-Haq conceptualised his experiences within an ethno-class paradigm, in essence, 
creating class boundaries between himself and other Asians. These boundaries translated into 
cultural divisions, in which the two opposing groups had little commonality. At university, 
however, Abdul-Haq encountered HT recruiters who belonged to the same Asian middle-
class tradition as himself.         
 
  Interview 19: Respondent M 
Age Ethnicity Occupation Location 
- Indian Accountant South London 
Respondent M joined HT in 2004. He was unprepared to talk about his upbringing and social 
background. He insisted joining HT was a rational and autonomous choice, and trying to 
pigeonhole his motives into a generic set of theories and cause greatly understated his ‗true 
motivation to carry Islam to the world‘. Without any deep insight into his personal narrative 
it was difficult to build a picture of his radicalisation.  
 
  Interview 20: Respondent N 
Age Ethnicity Occupation Location 
19 Pakistani Student South London 
Respondent N joined HT in 2004. It seemed clear from his personal narrative that his 
childhood experiences played a key role in his radicalisation in adulthood. Firstly, he was 
victimised by white youths throughout his teenage years. This unsettling period left him 
feeling detached from British society. Secondly, he developed deep resentment and anger 
towards white people. This skewed his perception of non-Muslims. Consequently, at 
university he sought out friendships with Asian people, as a result he came across HT 
recruiters. He developed close friendships with these activists and they taught him about 
Islam and HT ideology. Within this setting, he began to pray for the first time, and joined 
HT. By his own admission, despite his radicalisation taking place after 9/11, his trajectory 
into radical Islam was rather personalised and based on his contextual experiences.         
 
  Interview 21: Respondent O 
Age Ethnicity Occupation Location 
24 Bangladeshi Student South London 
Respondent O joined HT in 2000 at university. It became clear, in Respondent O‘s case, he 
struggled to merge his ethnic identity with the social setting in which he was embedded 
within. At school, for example, he cited instances of hiding his ethno-religious identity in 
order to fit into the dominant white culture. In order to gain acceptance he would change his 
name and pretend to be half English. Yet, despite these actions, he was still perceived as 
different. This difference centred on his racial identity and makeup, something he could not 
physically erase. Although, he had white friends, he never felt completely accepted. At 
university, however, he gained acceptance amongst the HT peer group, which gave him a 
sense of comfort within the familiar (e.g. South Asian Middle Class Muslims that shared 
similar social experiences and backgrounds).  
 
  Interview 22: Respondent P 
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Age Ethnicity Occupation Location 
36 Pakistani Doctor West London 
Respondent P has been a member for over ten years, joining the group in early 1994. Firstly, 
he experienced a relatively settled childhood, but at college he encountered considerable 
displacement. In particular, the college was divided along ethno-religious lines, pushing 
Respondent P to befriend Asian Muslims. However, he struggled to connect culturally to 
these individuals, as they emerged from an Asian working class tradition, something rather 
foreign to Respondent P. These differences made it difficult to gain a sense of acceptance 
and belonging. However, after moving away from Asian groups, he encountered HT 
activists. Despite gaining friendship amongst the peer group, he was reluctant to join the 
organisation, as he was not religiously or politically inclined. Eventually, after a year, he 
joined HT. As he explained: ‗at the start I just viewed the hizb as one big social club...it was 
nice hanging around the brothers, but after a month or two in Halaqah the ideas started to 
gain real meaning and I started to carry the dawah‘. This rather insightful passage illustrates 
two important elements in Respondent P‘s radicalisation. Firstly, he is indoctrinated within 
the closed setting of the halaqah, in which his world view is reformatted. Secondly, he is 
attracted to the social element of the HT peer group, as these activists share similar 
backgrounds and experiences.      
 
  Interview 23: Respondent Q 
Age Ethnicity Occupation Location 
22 Pakistani Student West London 
Respondent Q joined HT in 2002, after a close childhood friend had become recruited into 
the group. He found this rather shocking, as both were not politically or religiously 
orientated. His friend had joined the group at his university, and invited Respondent Q to 
attend HT talks and events. Within this friendship dynamic Respondent Q felt obligated to 
join HT.  
 
  Interview 24: D 
Age Ethnicity Occupation Location 
28 Pakistani Teacher East London 
D joined HT in 1996. He grew up with a strong ambition to become a professional football 
player; however, he failed to secure a contract. He had several football trails with various 
clubs, during one trail he recalled being singled out for being Asian, and was asked by 
coaching stuff about his diet. As he reflected: ‗they asked if I ate curry everyday...it was 
disgusting‘. After this incident he began to think of himself as an outsider, alienated from 
British society due to his ethno-racial identity. He equated his failure to become a 
professional footballer to racism and discrimination, as he mentioned: ‗I know if I was white 
I would‘ve got a contract easy‘. His negative experiences helped him develop a susceptibility 
to HT radicalisation. At university he joined HT, but clearly his early experiences triggered 
his eventual recruitment. As he stated: ‗in some ways if I had become a footballer I‘d 
probably never have joined the hizb‘.           
 
  Interview 25: Respondent R 
Age Ethnicity Occupation Location 
29 Pakistani Teacher West London 
Respondent R joined HT in 1996, after his older brother had become a member. As he 
explained: ‗I joined the hizb because of my older brother...he came back from university and 
was with the hizb. He took me along to circles and the rest was history‘. For respondent R, 
HT gave him access to a new social world. In particular, for the first time he encountered 
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Muslims that shared similar experiences and backgrounds as himself, which he found 
appealing.  
 
  Interview 26: Respondent S 
Age Ethnicity Occupation Location 
25 Indian Accountant Central London 
Respondent S joined HT in 2001. Although, he joined the group before 9/11, he was 
adamant that 9/11 had little effect on HT recruitment. He asked: ‗how could 9/11 motivate 
young Muslims to join HT, it‘s not possible‘. Respondent S explained that he never felt 
British growing up, and he could not connect to his Asian identity. Consequently, he felt 
excluded from all elements of society, and thus HT offered him a means to reconstruct his 
identity around the familiar.    
 
  Interview 27: Tariq 
Age Ethnicity Occupation Location 
26 Pakistani-English Computer Analyst Berkshire 
Refer to chapter four for a full description of his case.   
 
  Interview 28: Abdul 
Age Ethnicity Occupation Location 
27 Pakistani Software Engineer London 
Refer to chapter four for a full description of his case.   
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Appendix IV:  
Focus Group I - Female HT members 
 
I was not able to arrange any individual interviews with female activists, due to strict 
segregation rules between men and women. Therefore, I opted to organise focus group 
discussions, the following is a breakdown of the standardised questions asked:  
Figure 1.5 Focus Group (I): Questions 
 
No. 
 
Type of Question(s) 
1 Can you briefly tell me about your upbringing? Where you grew up / family life / schooling / country of 
origin etc. 
2 Growing up did you feel socially integrated or alienated? Describe your experiences?| 
3 Did you ever experience racism or Islamphobia?  
4 Was your upbringing religiously inclined? 
5 When\Where did you encounter HT? Describe your initial experience of the HT recruiters you met? 
6 Why did you join HT? 
7 Do you think HT ideology has emancipated? Do you think HT ideology is patriarchal and orientated 
against women?  
8 Are you equally treated in HT? Activism and leadership? 
9 Does Islam liberate women? If so why? 
10 What processes are involved in joining HT? Culturing process? 
11 Did your university experiences influence your decision to join HT? 
12 What about your peer group associations? At university? 
13 Why do you think HT attracts a large group of young middle class Asians?  
14 What were your views of 9/11 and 7/7? Does it match HT‘s views? 
15 Do you think you have been radicalised by HT? Explain? 
 
Figure 1.6 Focus Group I:  Breakdown of Respondents  
No.  Age(s) Name Ethnicity Profession / 
Occupation 
Location of 
respondent(s) 
Interview 
Duration  
1 28 Amina Indian Researcher London 2hrs  
2 - Sara Pakistani Teacher - 
3 - Nadia Pakistani History Graduate / 
Homemaker 
London 
4 27 Nina Pakistani Teacher London 
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Appendix V:  
Focus Group II - Ex-HT members 
 
The following is a list of the standardised questions that were employed in the data 
collection stage, namely through focus group discussions. The open-ended questions sought 
to elicit responses from my respondents regarding diverse and broad issues related to why 
they decided to leave HT.  
 
Figure 1.7 Focus Group (II): Questions 
 
 
 
No. 
 
 
Type of Question(s) 
1 Can you tell me about your upbringing? Where you grew up / family life / schooling. 
2 Can you tell me about your parents? Their country of origin / occupation / religious commitment etc. 
3 What social class do you think best represents your parents / your upbringing / yourself? And why? 
4 What was school like? Racism / friends  
5 How connected are you to your parent‘s country of origin? Is your ethnicity an important aspect of your 
identity as a child / teenager / adult? 
6 What about religion? Was this an important part of your identity as a child / teenager / adult? Why? 
7 Did you think of yourself as British? If yes or no why? Childhood / teenage experiences? 
8 Where\how did you encounter HT? 
9 Why did you join HT? 
10 Did your early childhood experiences play a role in your joining HT? 
11 Tell me about your university experiences? Did it play a role in joining HT? If so how?  
12 What about your peer group associations? At university? 
13 Why do you think HT attracts a large group of young middle class Asians?  
14 What were your views of 9/11 and 7/7? Does it match HT‘s views? 
15 Do you think you were radicalised by HT? Explain? 
16 Why did you leave HT? 
17 Have you become less or more radical after leaving HT?  
18 Do you still agree with aspects of HT ideology? 
 
Figure 1.8 Focus Group II:  Breakdown of Respondents  
No.  Age(s) Name Ethnicity Profession / 
Occupation 
Location of 
respondent(s) 
Interview 
Duration  
1 32 Dawud Indian Politics graduate West London 2hrs 38mins  
2 30 Ash Bangladeshi Student South London 
3 29 Aminur Bangladeshi Accountant South London 
4 27 AQ Pakistani IT Consultant East London 
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Appendix VI: Control Group 
Control Group Discussion with non-HT activists 
 
I organised two separate control group discussions with non-HT activists. This was a very 
important methodological process, as it allowed me to determine the possible distinction 
between HT members and non-members. Therefore, after I located 10 viable non-HT 
activists, I administered a focus group discussion to determine why these young Muslims 
were not inclined to joining HT.   
 
Figure 1.9 Control Group: Questions 
 
No. 
 
Type of Question(s) 
1 Can you tell me about your upbringing? Where you grew up / family life / schooling. 
2 Can you tell me about your parents? Their country of origin / occupation / religious commitment etc. 
3 What social class do you think best represents your parents / your upbringing / yourself? And why? 
4 What was school like? Racism / friends  
5 How connected are you to your parent‘s country of origin? Is your ethnicity an important aspect of your 
identity as a child / teenager / adult? 
6 What about religion? Was this an important part of your identity as a child / teenager / adult? Why? 
7 Did you think of yourself as British? If yes or no why? Childhood / teenage experiences? 
8 Why did you not join HT after they contacted you? 
9 Why do you think some young Muslims are attracted to HT? 
10 Did you think your childhood experiences played a role in you not joining HT? 
11 Tell me about your university experiences? Did you encounter HT at university? What were your views 
of HT?  
12 Do you think HT has changed after 9/11 or 7/7? Have they become more moderate? 
13 Do you think HT should be banned? 
14 What were your views of 9/11 and 7/7? Does it match HT‘s views? 
 
Figure 1.10 Control Group I: 
 Breakdown of Respondents and Control group 
No.  Age(s) Ethnicity Profession / 
Occupation 
Location of 
Interview 
Interview Duration  
1 34 Pakistani Computer Engineer West London 2hrs and 30mins 
2 33 Pakistani Accountant West London 
3 28 Pakistani Consultant West London 
4 28 Pakistani Consultant West London 
5 35 Pakistani - West London 
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Figure 1.11 Control Group II: 
 Breakdown of Respondents and Control group 
No.  Age(s) Ethnicity Profession / 
Occupation 
Location of Interview Interview Duration  
1 25 Bangladeshi  Unemployed East London Mosque  
 
3hrs and 20mins 
2 - Bangladeshi - East London Mosque 
3 24 Pakistani Catering East London Mosque 
4 26 Bangladeshi Construction East London Mosque 
5 20 Pakistani Unemployed East London Mosque 
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Appendix VII: Dual Ideological Framework 
 
According to several members, internal conflicts and deficiencies are the direct result of the 
―dual ideological framework‖ (cited by various members). This explanation provides 
insight, according to HT culture, into why the deficiencies within members are formed. In 
theory, a hybrid of ideological ideals is created that become assimilated into the identities of 
members, while living in a secular environment. The following diagram explains how the 
members can maintain two conflicting ideals: 
 
The above diagram illustrates that before embracing HT ideology the novices adhered to 
secularism. Although they were Muslim by belief, their goal and viewpoint reflected a 
secular identity. Ideologically they sought to satisfy their basic instinctual needs by adopting 
solutions based on their own self-benefit, and thus the mind derived the solutions to 
problems. This process was forged in the mind, when activated by an external problem, 
which was rectified by referring to freedom as a viewpoint. The members underwent a 
holistic change, by first rationally detaching themselves from the inherent imperfections of 
western ideology. The member operates from within this identity framework, until the 
transformation process is completed. The identity that is forged from this framework is 
opposed to any foreign ideal, either from western or Asian culture, and this leads to the Hizbi 
identity. However, in actuality this rarely occurs, because members cannot completely 
extract the secular identity from their personalities. 
ISLAM 
Pleasure of God Self-Pleasure 
Islamic Law 
Sexual Instinct 
Marriage 
Freedom 
Fornication 
Protection/ Family Protection/ Self  
SECULARISM 
MEMBER 
Example Example 
Goal 
Viewpoint 
Instincts 
Solution 
Interests 
System ISLAMIC STATE BRITAIN 
Sexual Instinct 
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